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Abstract
Policy  networks  is  a  body of  literature  dedicated  to  modelling  state-civil
society relationship formats.  In this  particular relationship,  an interest  group with
privileged  (insider)  access  to  the  party  in  power  gains  advantage  in  the  policy-
making process by utilizing party’s ability to make political appointments in the civil
service.  The  parentela  (or  type  1  parentela)  was  first  discovered  by  Joseph  La
Palombara (1964) in 1960s Italy and was documented later again by Greer (1994) in
1920s-1970s Northern Ireland. 
Still, there has been no parentela research since 1994, save for Yishai (1992),
who argued the parentela did not exist in Israel in 1980s. It seems the concept is
considered of little utility to the academic community today. At the same time, as a
category of policy networks, the parentela is also susceptible to the wider criticism of
Thatcher  (1997)  and Dowding  (1995;  2001)  that  the  policy network  literature  is
unable to introduce causal dynamics in its models and distinguish between network
features  and network independent  variables.  This  study, therefore,  addresses  both
criticisms by studying the party-group-civil service relationship in Bulgaria, for the
period 2013-2015, using 26 elite interviews and a number of cases. 
Results  show that this particular policy network is still  viable today. They
support Yishai (1992) that hegemonic parties have no effect on parentela formation.
The study demonstrates that the cooperation between ruling parties, in need of funds,
and  organised  businesses  (groups),  in  need  of  market  advantage,  produces  the
parentela.  In  a  case  study  on  construction  tenders,  the  study  demonstrates  La
Palombara’s parentela, by exposing the process of how ruling parties intervene in the
civil service through political appointees to ensure construction projects are granted
to their  party insider  groups.  The study also discovers  a  new parentela  dynamic,
labelled as type 2 parentela, where the party intervention extends further to the free
market by affecting party insider’s market competitors through prejudiced regulatory
inspections that disrupt targeted businesses’ operations temporarily or altogether.
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Chapter 1: The Parentela Policy Network Type
1.1.  Introduction
The present research is an enquiry into the existence of a particular policy-making
arrangement known in the literature as parentela type of policy network. This term is
part of the policy network body of literature and stands for a particular relationship
format  between ruling  political  parties,  interest  groups and the civil  service.  The
purpose  of  the  present  study, therefore,  is  to  determine  whether  the  relationship
between these policy-making actors in Bulgaria conforms to the parentela. 
The policy network literature descends from an earlier, macro debate of 1970s-1980s
on the relationship format types between the state and civil society (i.e. pluralism,
corporatism). By the early 1990s, researchers conceded that this relationship could be
better studied if the concepts of the state and that of civil society are operationalised
on a meso level of analysis (Heisler 1979: 285; Jordan 1981, 1984: 147-152; Cox
1988: 298-300; Marsh and Rhodes 1992: 3-4; Jordan and Schubert 1992: 10; Marsh
1998; Marsh and Smith 2000; Ross 1983). As a result, the state-society relationship
is  now  studied  in  terms  of  policy  networks.  Again,  they  stand  for  the  various
relationship  formats  between  the  bureaucracy,  the  political  party  in  power,  the
Parliament, interest groups and the media. 
In his  Interest Groups in Italian Politics  (1964), Joseph La Palombara defines the
parentela as a party-group relationship where an insider group within a party extends
its  policy-making  access  from party  structures  into  the  civil  service,  usually  by
means of political  appointments.  La Palombara's  seminal  work on Italian interest
groups remains the only large-scale research that has firmly established the presence
of  the  parentela  to-date  (1964:  306-  349).  The  only  two  other  studies  explicitly
devoted to  the parentela  are  from Yishai  (1992) with Israel  as  a  case and Greer
(1994) on Northern Ireland (1920s-1970s). 
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Evidence of the parentela network type has not convinced the academic community.
The model received some prominence nearly thirty years after publication, when it
was discussed in the context of the policy networks classification debate (Atkinson
and  Coleman  1989:  54;  Waarden  1992a:  45,  50;  1992b:  133).  Nevertheless,  its
omission  by  Jordan  and  Schubert  (1992:  25)  from  their  network  classification
scheme reflects a wider lack of enthusiasm for this network type. They, however, did
not exhibit the same misgiving towards La Palombara's other model, clientela (1964:
252), which he introduced in the same book where he proposed the parentela (Jordan
and Schubert 1992).  Yishai (1992) also questions the validity of the parentela, after
failing to find supporting evidence of its existence in Israel. So far only Greer's study
provides  some optimism,  as  he  demonstrated  the  presence  of  a  parentela  in  the
farmer-state relationship in Northern Ireland, although, for the much more distant
1920s-1970 period (Greer 1994).  More recently, Guy Peters in his 2001 edition of
"The Politics of Bureaucracy" mentions the parentela, but without providing any new
evidence. Ultimately, the impression is that the concept of the parentela bears little
analytical value. The purpose of the present study, therefore, is to determine whether
the parentela exists, and if so, determine the causal dynamics it is involved in by
applying the concept to the Bulgarian polity in 2013-2015 time period. There are two
reasons for selecting Bulgaria. 
First,  preliminary  research  suggested  that  the  Bulgarian  policy-making  process
featured parentela-like relationships.  Known publicly as  circles  or  rings these are
policy-making phenomena identified by Bulgarian media and accepted by the society
at large. They denote any type of business that is in close association or cooperation
with a given party in power. A pilot study suggested great similarities between those
and the parentela. 
Second, the parentela dynamics observed in the preliminary research above occurred
in the absence of a hegemonic party in power. This relates to the parentela literature,
which posits that hegemonic parties cause the parentela. This was first proposed by
La  Palombara  (1964)  and  later  confirmed  by  Greer  (1994).  Both  of  them,
respectively, observed that the parentela's existence correlated with the presence of a
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hegemonic political party: Christian Democrats in 1960s Italy and the Unionist Party
in  Northern  Ireland (1920s-1970s).  With  a  case  study on Israel,  however, Yishai
(1992) contradicted that purpotedly causal relationship, by showing that what was a
period  of  Israeli  politics,  known  as  party  democracy,  the  political  parties  with
hegemonic features as of 1908s did not correlate with a parentela policy network.
The present thesis would support her claim that hegemonic parties do not influence
the parentela formation (chapters 8,9). Results from the present study on Bulgaria
(2013-2015) show that the parentela can form in the absence of hegemonic political
parties.
In  addition,  the  research  project  is  also  geared  towards  identification  of  other
possible independent variables that may be of relevance in this relationship. This is a
direct response to a criticism made elsewhere in the literature (chapter 2) that policy
networks were more descriptive than causal,  if  at  all.  In sum, the study has two
parallel objectives:
● To assess the extent to which the relationship between the party in power,
interest groups and the bureaucracy in Bulgaria conforms to the parentela;
AND.
● To identify any causal dynamics relevant to the parentela, particularly what
causes the parentela into formation and what dissolves it?
Results demonstrate that the parentela exists in Bulgaria (chapters 3-8).It is formed in
order to facilitate the exchange of resources between two policy-making actors: the
ruling party and the insider interest group. Respondents indicate that political parties
are in a constant need for campaign funds. At the same time, endangered yet affluent
companies (or simply groups) may need an additional form of pressure against their
competitors. As a result, the intersection point of the two actors marks the beginning
of the parentela formation. While political parties can provide a market advantage to
the given group, the latter reciprocates with donations. 
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While disclosing the process of party’s civil  service intervention,  which has only
been stated but not shown in previous research (La Palombara 1964; Greer 1994),
another contribution of the research is the discovery of a new parentela dynamic,
labelled  type  2  parentela  (hence,  type  1  for  La  Palombara’s parentela).  A large
number of the elite respondents reported that a second form of a market advantage a
party insider group could gain is by instigating a prejudiced regulatory inspection on
an insider’s market competitor (Chapter 9). In other words, the ruling party can use
its control over the civil service agencies through political appointments to conduct
regulatory inspections against  firms that compete with the insider on the market.
These are legal inspections from any of the agencies that regulate through sanctions
the  operations  of  a  business  establishment,  also  including  all  other  agencies
monitoring  for  violations  in  working  conditions,  tax  and  social  security
contributions, the environment, etc. 
According to the type 2 dynamics, some inspections of the above authorities may be
prejudiced and intended to disrupt the business operation of a market competitor of
the party insider. The distinctive feature of those inspections is that they immediately
establish offences, quickly revoke licenses of operation and initiate court proceedings
or  simply artificially  prolong  a  routine  inspection  (which  requires  the  temporary
discontinuation  of  certain  business  activities).  The  end  point  is  for  the  targeted
business to stall operation temporarily or altogether. A variation of that is what many
respondents described as the offer. Instead of direct inspections, the targeted outsider
is offered a choice: to sign away 51% of their business ownership to the insider and
be compensated, or face endless inspections.
The discovery of type 2 dynamics also showed that political parties alone can resort
to prejudiced inspections. First, they might use such mechanisms to threaten internal
dissenters or opposing interest groups. Alternatively, type 2 could be used in order to
obtain more campaign funds.  Here political  parties make offers to select affluent
outsiders: either engage in a semi-legal form of public funds machinations that will
deliver  benefits  to  both  the  party  and  the  outsider  or  refuse  the  offer  and  face
crippling inspections.
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In comparison, type 1 is a description of the cooperative relationship between the
ruling party, its insider group, the civil service and how the party intervenes in the
civil  service.  Type  2  is  an  add-on  to  these  dynamics.  It  reveals  the  aggressive
relationship between the parentela core (party and insider) and an outsider group.
However, this also shows the different manifestation of power: while power is shared
under type 1 cooperation, it is successfully applied in type 2 on outsiders without the
latter being able to retaliate.
Results also suggest that a key intervening variable (enabling factor) is party’s ability
to make party political appointments (PPA). This adds credence to the correlation
observed in earlier the literature: PPAs are present where the parentela is found (La
Palombara 1964; Greer 1994), while they are absent where it is not (Yishai 1992).
Greer’s study of Northern Ireland, however, can be included as a case of the said
correlation only if we agree that the intra-party selection of nominees from interest
groups as ministers is also a form of PPAs (1994). Endorsing group’s nomination as
minister is somewhat different from La Palombara’s intended meaning of the mid-to-
low civil service echelon appointments (1964).  
The present project on the parentela in Bulgaria also made inadvertent contributions
to other bodies of literature.   It  corroborates  the results  of Kopecky and Spirova
(2011)  on  PPA’s  far  administrative  reach  arguing  that  this  is  the  result  of  the
prevalent distrust in the Bulgarian policy-making system. Similarly, the study argues
that  the  policy-making  network  of  Bulgaria’s  transition,  has  given  way  to  the
parentela, even if the latter has inherited some of its elements. Chalakov et al (2008)
observed  that  the  network  mechanism  employed  by  the  communist  politico-
administrative elite to convert its waning access into capital (molecule of conversion)
gave way to a new network structure with unclear contours post 2001. The present
study argues that this network is the parentela, which has retained only a fraction of
the  molecule’s  dynamics,  namely, party’s desire  to convert  its  access  to  the civil
service into campaign contributions, which acts  as the reason why a party would
cooperate with or confront affluent groups.
Furthermore, the present project demonstrates that both parentela types, coupled with
parliamentary  elections  create  dynamics  of  elite  formation,  competition  and
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dissolution. The close, reiterated cooperation between a ruling party and its insider
group (i.e. type 1) could be seen as an elite formation process. However, a party
change following parliamentary elections and type 2 dynamics could eliminate an
elite formed earlier. This instability among political parties and interest groups and
creates an environment of competition among elites (chapter 9).
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This finding corroborates similar research on Bulgaria, carried out by Barnes (2007)
who has made the same argument, where at each new elections Bulgarian politics are
captured by a new elite in competitive fashion. Though basically both views overlap,
the  present  study would  warn  against  the  use  of  capture.  Results  show that  any
advantage a group has is due to the permission and cooperation with the ruling party.
As type 2 demonstrates, the party in power through its appointees in the regulatory
agencies is the most powerful actor (chapter 9).
In a similar fashion, the results also overlapped with the Offe’s description of some
of the corruption forms in Eastern European policy-making (2004). Here, type 2 in
particular was unquestionably evident in Offe’s thinking. However, because Offe’s
level of analysis is primarily on the individual, micro level, while the parentela is on
a meso level,  both types are better compatible with the literature on oligarchy or
transition (Barnes 2007). On oligarchy, the study also disagrees with the proposition
that both parentela types are evidence of oligarchy. Their aggressive and conflictual
dynamics is at odds with the notion of a stable and monolithic elite community with
full access to all policy-making aspects.
Finally, the study also makes two methodological contributions. The first relates to
the operationalisation of the generic term policy networks by developing a system of
classification  the  different  types.  The  study  reviews  the  network  categorisations
prevalent in the literature (Jordan and Schubert 1992; Kenis and Schneider’s 1989;
Atkinson  and  Coleman  1989;  van  Waarden  1992)  and  promotes  a  new  one.  It
promotes five qualitative indicators the combinations of whose values constitute the
different policy network types. Doing so ensures comparability of the results vis-à-
vis other studies.
The  second  is  the  development  of  a  new method  of  interviewing  resistant  elite
respondents, where the person who facilitated the interview (the intermediary) is its
third participant. This method received academic recognition with the publication of
a  joint-paper  with  L  Kaoullas  (Petkov  and  Kaoullas  2016).  Essentially,
intermediary’s  interview  participation  legitimised  the  researcher  and  relaxed  the
respondent into giving more information. 
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This introductory chapter, therefore,  is  divided as follows: subsection 1.2 gives a
quick, working definition of the parentela, to be developed more fully in chapter 2
and introduces the preliminary causal observations derived from a pilot study on the
Bulgarian polity, which suggest the hypothesis that the parentela can exist without
the presence of a hegemonic party. The preliminary observations are discussed in
more  details  in  section  1.3.  The  overview  of  the  chapters  and  corresponding
contributions are reviewed in the conclusion at 1.4.
1.2.  Parentela: Definition and Formation Causes
The parentela is a relationship format between the civil service, political party and
select  interest  group  (or  policy  network  type).  In  the  first  of  the  two  stages  to
establish such a network, an interest group has to gain privileged access to the ruling
political party (La Palombara 1964: 309; 331).  Stage two is when the political party
endorses the interests of the privileged group by securing favourable appointments in
the civil service (1964: 308, 310, 311).  In doing so, a group with privileged access to
a political party could control an agency or parts of the civil service because it can
affect  the  personal  career  of  the  bureaucrats  (1964:  327)  and/or  because  it  can
procure own appointees as chiefs of civil service agencies (1964: 326).  In the words
of La Palombara (1964: 327): 
[...]  the  impact  of  Christian  Democracy  (ruling  party,  sic)  and  its
parentela groups on bureaucratic recruitment, placement, and promotion
evidently extends considerably beyond commanding heights and involves
levels that, in theory at least, are supposed to be staffed strictly on the
basis of merit and seniority. 
All of the above is, of course, assuming the party in power has the right to political
appointments (1964: 346).  These quotations serve to illustrate what the parentela is
and what it does. However, there is still the question of any formal statement of the
term.
A formal definition of the term is not readily available in the literature, unfortunately.
All authors, save for Peters below, seem to share the same notion of the concept,
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without  formally  codifying  it.  La  Palombara  (1964)  in  particular  provides an
elaborate description of the parentela, as opposed to a formal definition. The closest
he goes to defining that network is with reference to the Italian Christian Democratic
Party, as if the term is a phenomenon relatable only to that party, although it is quite
clear that this is spoken in general (La Palombara 1964: 306, emphasis added):
[...]  parentela  involves  a  relatively  close  and  integral  relationship
between certain associational interest groups, on the one hand, and the
politically dominant Christian Democratic Party (D.C), on the other. It is
this  relationship  between  group  and  party  –  and  not  strictly  between
group  and  bureaucracy  –  which  is  of  interest  ot  us.  The  generalized
proposition we shall  explore is that where parentela exists, and where
certain other related conditions are met,  interest  groups that enjoy the
relationship  can  exercises  considerable  influence  over  a  bureaucracy
quite apart from any consideration of  clientela. 
While  his  definition is  based on the observation of DC and its  relationship with
interest  groups,  La  Palombara  (1964)  states  it  in  general  terms  and,  to  make  it
clearer, does so in contrast to the other network type he developed in parallel – the
clientela. One difference between the two is in the venues, the parentela starts from
the party in power, while the clientela in the civil service. He seems to suggest that
groups in both relationships can overpower the bureaucracy, but it is the group from
the parentela relationship that can cause a more significant impact, than its clientela
counterpart. In any case, the idea is that the parentela stands for a situation where a
group can gain privileged access in the civil service, following a party's intervention,
but that idea has not been formally communicated in the form of a definition.
Yishai’s definition of the parentela  closely follows the writings of La Palombara (La
Palombara 1964: 306 in Yishai 1994: 270; 1987: 210 in Yishai 1992: 271) and as
such is equally descriptive. She too conveys the same idea of a group's privileged
positioning in the civil service, following an equally privileged standing within the
ruling party:
A parente  is  a  member  of  one's  family and is  entitled  thereby to  special
consideration and unique privileges. In modern politics, parentela involves a
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close relationship between certain associations and bureaucrats  on the one
hand, and the political dominant party on the other. The conditions for the
development  of  a  parentela  relationship  are  the  existence  of  a  hegemonic
party, one unchallenged by serious rivals, and its willingness to act on behalf
of its kin groups. Parentela also requires that associations succeed in finding a
place inside the party (La Palombara 1964, p. 306)
Similar to La Palombara above, however, her attempt at defining the parentela falls
short of providing the necessary formality. Yishai above also seems to conflate the
parentela definition and the causes for its formation. when she states that a parentela
“involves  a  close  relationship  between certain  associations  […] and the  political
dominant party” but later stating that part of  “The conditions for the development of
a parentela relationship are the existence of a hegemonic party”. In any case, this
literature-wide weakness has been dealt with elsewhere in section 2.3. The point is
that Yishai's parentela explanation emphasises that it  is a party-group relationship
which allows the latter to exercise influence, or control over the civil service, thanks
to its pre-existing insider-standing in the ruling party.
Greer on the other hand, presents a more formalised expression of the term, when
promoting Peters’ definition (in Greer 1994: 397): 
Single dominant party or faction,  and in which pressure groups must gain
access and legitimacy through their attachment to that particular party rather
than through their ability effectively to represent a sector of the society
Note,  however, that  La  Palombara  does  not  require  party factions  as  part  of  the
definition of the parentela. This is an important point, which is evidenced in chapter
7 and the case of Multigrup.  Party insider  status,  therefore,  means that a private
group becomes an ally to an intra-party faction. All renditions, in short, share the idea
that being an insider to the party in power, the respective interest group is in the
position to influence the behaviour of the civil service in a way that reflects that
group’s interests. 
Yet  one  clarification  needs  to  be  made.  La  Palombara  emphasises  above  that
influencing  the  bureaucracy in  the  interest  of  own party  insiders  could  only  be
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achieved through party political  appointments,  which,  in  the absence of a formal
definition, has misleadingly implied that political appointments are also part of the
parentela definition.  It needs to be clarified that the parentela is essentially about
political parties interfering  or intervening (in his words) with the work of the civil
service  in  the  interest  of  a  third  actor,  i.e.  the  party  insider  group.  The  lack  of
research into the parentela has given the impression that appointments are the only
form of  a party's interference with the civil service process to the interest of the
party insider  group.  Another possible  mechanism of  a  party's  intervention  in  the
interest of own insider is by legally codifying the criteria for groups' access to civil
service consultations. Chapter 4 demonstrates how at certain periods in the past the
ruling Bulgarian party was able to pass legislation that effectively rendered certain
interest  groups  as  ineligible  to  participate  in  civil  service  consultations.  While
evidence is insufficient to firmly state that chapter 4 is a case of a party interfering in
the interest of own insider, it provides sufficient grounds to suggest that Bulgarian
ruling parties are indeed in the position to do so.
Therefore,  the  way  this  study  defines  the  term  parentela  is  as  follows:  It  is  a
cooperative relationship between a group with an insider status to the ruling party
and/or its factions, and a ruling party, which is in the position to interfere in the
bureaucratic  consultative,  or  otherwise  policy-making,  process  to  its  own  party
insider  group's  advantage. (On  this  note  and  to  gain  better  perspective  on  the
parentela, sections 2.4.1.-5 review a number of policy networks that differ from the
parentela. Also, sections 8.5.-6. provide a typical case of the parentela, while 9.2.
reports on the discovery of a new parentela dynamic, following the same logic party
intervention in the interst of own, party insider.)
The only modification of the original parentela term would be to specify that this
study sees groups in a much broader light. While previous studies have focused on
the more tangible groups, i.e. formal representative organizations, the present study,
as it will be seen later, applies the parentela to also include informal collections of a
limited number of private actors acting as a single unit to collectively defend their
shared interests through direct engagement with the party in power. This means that
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the non-political side in a parentela relationship in the Bulgarian case (2013-2015),
may also  include  companies,  oligarchs,  businessmen  and  other  relevant  business
actors who act as a single unit  outside  the channels of formal representation,  i.e.
through their  respective trade association.  As the final  chapters of the thesis  will
reveal, this has the benefit of filling up the conceptual space of the grey borderline
between policy-making and corruption. Because, it is naiive to believe or conceive of
politics as necessarily fair game.
The  literature  on  the  parentela  has  so  far  put  forward  5  prospective  explanatory
variables, only the first of which, however, has been tested more consistently. These
are (in La Palombara 1964 accordingly):
Condition 1: hegemonic political party (p. 316);
Condition 2: party political control over the bureaucracy (p.322)
Condition 3: a group gaining privileged standing within the party (p. 331)  
Condition 4: dispersed authority inside the state administration (p. 339)
Condition  5:  willingness  of  the  party  to  intervene  in  the  work  of  the
bureaucracy (p. 322);
Those conditions/Independent Variables have been promoted to explain the parentela
in the literature, which are summarised in table 1:
Table 1 Conditions (Independent Variables) associated with the Parentela as per La
Palombara, Greer and Yishai
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The research of Greer (1994) and La Palombara (1964) seems to indicate that there is
correlation between the parentela and the presence of a hegemonic party. Yishai’s
case  study on  Israel  in  the  1980s,  featured  a  hegemonic  political  party  with  no
corresponding evidence of the parentela. This suggests that while hegemonic parties
can contribute to a parentela formation, their attributed level of explanatory power
may be exaggerated. The ascertainment of this relationship, therefore, is behind the
present study on Bulgaria.
However, the present study does not see utility in adopting the rest of the items in
table  1  as  independent  variables.  Following  Thatcher’s  call  to  segregate  the
descriptive from the causal policy network elements, the present study sees only item
1, hegemonic party as sufficiently detached from the parentela in order to constitute
an independent  variable.  The rest  of  La Palombara’s conditions  for  the parentela
formation (in darker shades) are seen to fit better in the description of the parentela,
rather than its causes. There are a number of reasons for that.
First,  it  is  not clear whether  conditions 2  and 3 are external pre-requisites to the
formation  or  features  pertinent  to  the  parentela.  With  condition  2  (political
appointments) La Palombara makes it clear that a key feature of the parentela is the
insider  group being in  the position to  make nominations  or utilise  existing party
appointments in the bureaucracy (1964: 306-316), yet the same practice of party-
political appointments is also featured as a pre-condition for the formation of the
parentela (La Palombara 1964: 322-331). Condition 3 (presence of a party insider
group) has been operationalised in the present study as part of the description of the
parentela, as it is still hard to conceptualise it as an external factor contributing to the
parentela  formation.  The position  here  is  that  if  a  party has  made steps  towards
granting insider status to a group or practicing political appointments then that is
taken to mean here that the process of parentela has already begun. This study sees
both  concepts  therefore  as  part  of  the  definition  of  the  parentela,  as  opposed to
independent variables. 
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Likewise,  Greer  (1994)  too  does  not  differentiate  between  external  independent
variables (i.e. conditions) and network features (Greer 1994: 410-411). The fact that
the Unionist Party was hegemonic is not explicitly distinguished as an independent
variable for parentela formation, although La Palombara (1964: 316-322) makes the
point that it is a necessary precondition. It is noticeable also that the adherence to the
conditions is a bit loose in his and Yishai’s studies and no causal links are explicitly
addressed involving the conditions above, particularly in the relationship between
ruling hegemonic party and the insider group Ulster Farmers’ Union (UFU).  In a
similar vein the operationalisation of the parentela by Yishai (1992) makes it hard to
distinguish  a  parentela  indicator  (feature)  from a  parentela-forming  condition.  It
seems this complaint has least relevance to her first indicator group strategies, which
seems to be conceptually discrete from La Palombara's conditions (Yishai 1992: 275-
277). 
La Palombara (1964) posits  condition 4: bureaucratic segmentation as a possible
independent  variable  but  that  concept  is  still  wrought  with  complications.  His
argument seems to be that the Italian bureaucratic departments lacked cohesion, if
left without immediate political control. The confusion also stems from the fact that
La Palombara is uncertain whether bureaucratic authority is in the hands of lower
level officials because those above are reluctant to review them, or simply that there
is  overall  uncertainty  as  to  who  the  relevant  administrative  authority  is  (La
Palombara  1964:  342-343).  It  seems  La  Palombara  implies  that  a  fractured,  or
dispersed administrative hierarchical structure facilitates the parentela formation (as
a catalyst intervening variable), it remains insufficiently clear (1964: 339). Even if
that were the case,  then another difficulty on operationalisation would be how to
determine whether  a  present  day Bulgarian civil  service has  the  same feature of
administrative  fracture  as  1960’s  Italy.  At  the  same  time  this  condition  is  not
immediately connected in a causal relationship with parentela. Therefore, in light of
this  ambiguity  and  lack  of  identification  of  causal  relationship  that  prospective
independent variable was rejected from the study as inoperable.
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Furthermore, condition 5, “willingness of the party to intervene” suggests that even if
the conditions are met, it is a subject to a personal choice of the politicians from the
ruling party whether to establish a parentela. This line of thinking appears difficult to
integrate in a classic cause-effect relationship because it is unknowable whether an
action is product of free will or external stimuli. An independent variable based on
free will reduces predictability. If we assume political parties act without constraint,
on free will, then it becomes impossible to predict when they will decide to establish
one.  And  again,  even  when  they  rationally  decide  to  establish  a  parentela,  that
rationalisation  would  rather  be  the  reflection  of  external  stimuli  rather  than  own
choice. Still, the present study sees utility in employing this concept as part of the
description or definition of the parentela. In fact, it is implicit in the practice of party
political appointments and party political control over the bureaucracy, i.e. Condition
2. (A more detailed discussion on those is provided in Chapter 3.)  This prospective
independent variable requires more re-definition as, at present, it seems synonymous
to the practice of political appointments in the civil service. 
Only hegemonic party therefore has qualified to be operationalised as an independent
variable. Overall, condition 1 above seems to have been most readily conceptualised
by  the  three  authors  as  an  independent  variable,  while  condition  2  has  been
conceptualised  more  as  a  parentela  feature.  While  it  is  hard  to  say  where  La
Palombara places the stress among conditions 1 to 5, the presence of a hegemonic
party  nevertheless  seems  conceived  most  as  an  independent  exogenous  variable.
Both Yishai (1992) and later Greer (1994) seem to follow suit in this interpretation.
Yishai motivates her case selection of Israel on what was known at the time as the
party state, hence, condition 1 (1992: 271). Accordingly, she refutes the proposition
that hegemonic party correlates with the parentela. She finds that the Party Political
Appointments  (PPA)  practice  in  Israel  in  1980s  was  impossible  given  the  Civil
Service Law of 1958, which stipulates that appointment and promotion is strictly on
merit and competition (Yishai 1992: 282-283). To the contrary, Greer (1994) seems
to support La Palombara (1964: 410) in arguing that a hegemonic party causes the
parentela. In both cases the parentela correlated with the presence of a hegemonic
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party: the Christian Democrats in Italy, and the Ulster Unionist Party in Northern
Ireland. 
Two  main  research  questions,  therefore,  become  obvious  as  a  result  of  this
discussion: 
● Does the presence of a hegemonic party correlate (cause) the formation of a
parentela, and if so, how?
● What other independent variables could explain or affect the parentela policy
network?
In order to answer the above questions, the present study proposes one hypothesis
based  on  preliminary  observations  and  existing  literature.  Preliminary  research
indicated that  the  search  for  the  parentela  in  the Bulgarian polity was warranted
because features of the parentela,  such as party insider groups and party political
appointments, were identified in secondary qualitative data (e.g. citation?) and one
pilot elite interview (Golemanov). In addition to that, the pilot study also warranted
the inclusion of two other prospective independent variables that may have an effect
on the parentela relationship, if it were to be confirmed: parliamentary elections and
EU membership. The few informal interviews and secondary information, part of the
pilot  study,  simply  indicated  that  elections  have  the  capacity  to  disrupt  the
relationship between the party and its insiders. The next section will review the basic
results  of the preliminary observations on the Bulgarian polity that motivated the
study. 
1.3.  Preliminary Observations
Preliminary data both motivated the study and suggested a number of hypotheses,
because the gathered information preceding the study suggested that the party-group
relationship resembled the parentela.  This hypothesis was derived on the basis of
traces of existence of a network relationship between ruling political  party and a
privileged group; and the practice of PPAs. In addition, the hypothesis was advanced
also because it is a commonly known fact that that Bulgarian party system by 2015 is
competitive  and  absent  of  a  hegemonic  party,  suggesting  a  need  to  revisit  La
Palombara’s causal claims. 
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At the time of considering Bulgaria as a case of the parentela, both media reports and
sociological research indicated the presence of groups around ruling political parties
that  taken  together  resembled  the  parentela  (Chalakov  et  al  2008;  Raychev  and
Stoychev 2008; Haralanov in Georgieva 2005; Bakalov 2011; Lilov 2009, 2010a,
2010b;  Iliev  2011;  Vladimirova  2011a,b,  “Budimir  Kuyovich  Testifies”  2008;
“GERB Includes the Circle Capital” 2009; Raydovski 2007; Gyurova in Kostadinov
2008, 2011a,b; “Slavcho Hristov is assembling” 2011; Chalakov 2003; Chakarov in
Siromahova 2009, 2010; “The Circle Capital” 2010). Political parties were reported
to  be  in  cooperative  relationships  with  business  owners  or  simply  groups.  The
general impression Bulgarian media reports conveyed was that these were interest
group types, which were comprised number of firms, acting as a single unit in an
informal  manner,  as  opposed  to  formally  identifiable  interest  groups,  e.g.  trade
association. They were portrayed to cooperate with ruling political parties (hence,
privileged access to political parties, to begin with) and were also associated with
certain civil service appointments. At the same time the high turnover of political
parties indicated that the party political system was competitive and no dominant or
hegemonic political party has been or was in existence at the start of the project.
Finally, media reports were also rich on cases of party political appointments. All of
the above suggested the hypothesis that the Bulgaria hosted a parentela despite the
absence of a hegemonic political party.
1.3.1.  Traces of Party-Insider Group Network Relationships
A number of Bulgarian sociologists writing on the party-civil society relationships
before and after the regime change on 10th November 1989 argued that a number of
political networks were in operation at that time (Chalakov et al 2008; Raychev and
Stoychev  2008;  Raychev  2003).  The  presence  of  such  relationships  in  the  past
suggests  that  some  form of  party-group  relationship  may  have  remained  to-date
under different forms. Of greatest importance was the research of Chalakov et  al
(2008) and their  sociological  network  molecule of  conversion.  Essentially, it  is  a
network mechanism for the conversion of political power and access into economic
capital,  used by the retiring political elite immediately after the regime change in
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1989. The authors argue that this network type dissolved with the completion of the
privatization  in  2001  and  with  that  the  formation  of  the  first  fully  independent
business actors. 
The authors trace the origin of the molecule of conversion in the civil service before
the  regime change in  1989.  Accordingly they saw two big  divisions  in  the  civil
service, i.e. the nomenclature:  political and economic. The purpose of the economic
branch was to  operate  with the  economic  assets  of  the state  (e.g.,  through state-
owned enterprises),  while the political branch was to facilitate party's control over
the bureaucracy and prevent the economic branch from political mobilisation given
the  resources  under  its  control  (Chalakov  2003:  110;  Chalakov  2008:  51;
Bundzhulov in Chalakov et al 2008: 234-6; Raychev and Stoychev 2008: 38-40).  As
a  result  each  side  of  the  nomenclature  attempted  to  either  exert  or  resist  party
political influence in the policy-making process through: appointments control (or
cadre  control)  or  through the  informal  policy-specific  resource  exchange,  e.g.  of
expert or classified information, organisational control, or propaganda abilities, etc.,
(Chalakov 2008: 44-47; Bundzhulov 2003: 109; Raychev and Stoychev 2008: 36,
38). These exchanges,  within the political nomenclature in particular, assumed the
form of  autonomous  informal  interpersonal  networks,  which  fractured  the  entire
socialist  civil  service  and  which  had  varying  access  to,  and  influence  over,  the
policy-making process (Bundzhulov in Chalakov 2003: 110; Raychev and Stoychev
2008: 39).  These networks were internally cohesive due to the exceptionally strong
influence  of  patriarchalism,  which translated  itself  in  very strong loyalties  to  the
family, the region, friends, select colleagues (Bundzhulov 2008: 44; 233; 236; 239).
Even  the  formal  operation  of  the  nomenclature  was  impeded  by  these  loyalties
(Bundzhulov 2008: 234). 
With the regime change of 1989 however, the nomenclature networks had to reform.
Chalakov (2008: 45) explains that thanks to their  experience in (quasi-)economic
dynamics, the economic nomenclature had the technical knowledge to compete in the
capitalist order than their political counterpart.  However, as the latter still had an
overwhelming  ability  to  appoint  and  remove  from  office,  they  subjugated  the
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economic nomenclature networks (Chalakov 2008: 45-48). As a result, the network
members  of  the  hitherto  political  nomenklatura,  who  temporarily  retained  their
general policy-making positioning after the regime change as members of any of the
nascent  political  parties,  began  to  exploit  that  positioning  by  converting their
decreasing  state  administration  and  policy-making  access  by  privileging  the
businesses they acquired through the privatization process over which they exercised
political control  (Bundzhulov 2008: 209-210; 240-241, 249-250, 253-265, 260, 738;
Chalakov 2008: 495; Hristov 2008: 63-116; Raychev and Stoychev 2008: 8, 10-13,
41-46). 
Therefore, the process of conversion of political access into economic ownership and
the privileging of such businesses in policy-making, is labelled by Chalakov et al as
the  process  of  conversion and  the  totality  of  actors  connected  in  such  network
dynamics –  molecule of conversion  (Chalakov et al 2008: 258, 260; 280-281, 288-
289).   The  generic  actors  in  such  networks  that  facilitated  the  conversion  were:
politicians, businessmen, actors with media/PR resources and, for some time, agents
from  the  former  intelligence  services  (Raychev  and  Stoychev  2008:  83-84;
Bundzhulov in Chalakov et al 2008: 258). 
For example, as early as December 1991, the party-protected networks began to take
control  of  the  larger  economic  sectors  of  the  economy  by  procuring  deliberate
legislative and administrative changes that relaxed the stringency of the procedures
governing the state assets privatisation process (Chalakov et al 2008: 270-287; ff.
147;  295-304,  306,  309,  318-329,  341;  Raychev  and  Stoychev  2008:  39).  This
process is also illustrated by the personal observation of Kostadin Chakarov – the last
adviser to the Chairman of Bulgarian Communist Party comrade Todor Zhivkov –
regarding Andrey Lukanov, Bulgaria's first prime minister, months after the regime
change (Chakarov 2010: 236-239, quotations of translations from Bulgarian will be
in italics): 
[...] From dawn till dusk he was visiting banks […] editorials, firms,
etc.   He was lobbying for some,  he was hindering others,  and he
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secured credits for some, but blocked credit lines for others. […] And
all that happened behind the back of the party (BSP, sic). 
The account of Chakarov exemplifies how hitherto highest ranking civil servants of
the  nomenclature,  like  Lukanov, sought  to  exploit  their  personal  access  to  state
administration  resources  and  selectively  promoted  certain  businesses.  The
implication  here  is  that  –  as  with  the  parentela  –  there  was  a  form  of  close
cooperation between the party political leader and the business actor. 
As  a  network  structure  that  shares  features  of  the  parentela,  the  molecule  of
conversion warrants the presence of the parentela because of its inherent party-group
dynamic and the fact that sociologists are not certain of its complete dissolution. This
type of politically dominated party-business relationship, as exhibited by Lukanov,
Bundzhulov  (2008:  210-211)  argues  was  adopted  by all  governments  to  varying
degree until the 2001 government of Simeon II Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, when a process
of  emancipation took place and party-controlled businesses wrested freedom from
political  patrons  (Chalakov  et  al  2008:  261-  262):   “[...]  through delegation  the
emancipated  breaks  free  from his  patrons,  emancipates  and opposes  them”.  Yet,
Chalakov  reports  as  of  2008  the  observation  that  there  are  network  formation
between political parties and the now emancipated businesses, which according to
him posits  the  question  whether  the  molecule  has  ceased  or  whether  there  is  a
completely new network type. Although he is not explicit, his inquiry clearly implied
that the new network in question was the so called in Bulgaria  krag (circle)  or its
synonym obrach (ring) (or policy circles collectively) (in Chalakov et al. 2008: 737,
738).
The  policy circles,  or  the circle  in particular denotes a network type which is very
similar to the parentela as reportedly, it represents the symbiotic relationship between
the ruling political party and a privileged interest group, which usually is a single
business of large proportions. The coinage of the term circle is attributed to former
Prime Minister Mr Zhan Videnov who attempted to describe the proximity of certain
party members to large-scale business actors as:  "[...] one friendly circle among a
number  of  people" (Iliev  2011).   According  to  Gyurova,  however,  his  was  a
20
reiteration of an earlier idea made by Andrey Lukanov arguing that certain forms of
party-business cooperation no longer take the form of a holding company but have
merely  devolved  to  direct,  interpersonal  business  partnership  (Gyurova  in
Kostadinov 2008).  Regardless, historically, every such circle has had a name given
to it by the media or the public. The name "Orion" was given to the circle Mr Iliev,
Mr Videnov and Ms Gyurova refer to above. Overall, similar to the parentela, the
policy circles are associated with business actors with privilege access to the party in
power,  who  are  also  in  the  position  to  make  nominations  for  civil  service
appointment.
To give a sense of scale of the circles  phenomenon, see table 2 below, where there
are approximately 12 known circles in circulation in Bulgarian media as of 2013: 
Table 2 Popular Circles in Bulgaria at the start of the project (2013)
Most  names  come  from  restaurants  or  hotels  where  influential  members  would
frequently met. The numbering in table 2 above is in the alphabetical order of the
English translation.  The table  is  not  exhaustive,  but  illustrates  the breadth of the
phenomenon. It was compiled using the google search engine and the search-phrase
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“кръг Х” without initiating  a  search query, where  X stands for  all  letters  in  the
Cyrillic alphabet. The point of not initiating a search query is that the search engine
automatically suggests a completion of the search term, based on already existing
searches from other users online. The above table 2 is based on an initial search in
2013.  In  2015,  the  engine  additionally suggests  the  circles  Lamb Heads and the
Apostles.
The  rings,  too  are  synonymous  to  the  parentela  and  the  circles  above.  In  2005
Akhmed  Dogan,  then  leader  of  the  party  DPS  (Dvizhenie  za  Prava  i  Svobodi,
Movement for Rights and Freedoms), introduced the term ring: 
[e]very  party  has  […]  a  ring  of  firms...  If  you  think  that  my
capabilities are lesser than those of a banker then you do not have a
real idea of the capabilities of a politician. In the last 15 years surely
half  of  the  businessmen who are doing above  average are [doing
so]... either with my support, or at least due to my smile. 
In his honest addressal, Mr Dogan also conveys the same image as the circles, where
any business actor’s only hope for success is  through close cooperation with the
party in power. The quotation implies a cooperative relationship between the ruling
party and a privileged business actor (or group), where the former will employ its
control over the executive branch in order to facilitate the success of the latter. Both
the  ring  and  circle  clearly overlap as they both represent a symbiotic relationship
between the political party and a select business actor. 
Bundzhulov  (in  Chalakov  et  al  2008:  731-736),  however,  argues  that  there  is  a
distinction between the two terms, although such a distinction seems forced at this
stage. He seems to draw the line between  circles  as symbiotic model at a central
governmental level between a group and the ruling party and the ring as a likewise
party-group  symbiosis  but  on  a  local  level,  designed  to  give  a  local  business  a
friendly push:
Between the ring of firms from the type of Orion and from the type of
Olimp there is  fundamental  difference,  because  the  circle  Olimp is  a
project for taking over the entire economy or at least large parts of it [...]
while the ring of firms, as Dogan says is rather a local-based formation
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[...]  they  (Dogan's  rings,  sic)  are  not  monopolists.   They  are  with
different weight, with different intensity but they fight among themselves.
The problem is that with all of these rings there is symbiosis, and there is
no way for us to distinguish business and politics [...]  but this  is  not
some oligarchic circle, which commands the entire state 
The distinction seems exaggerated without additional research. The notion of central
vs  local level  arrangements  seems  forced.  A difference  based  on  geographical
locality  is  meaningless,  because  larger  business  actors  have  offices  in  the
municipalities, as well. For the most part, any negotiations with the ruling party will
have local  effects.  As chapters 8 and 9 demonstrate,  the administrative measures
taken by party insiders to push their competitors aside are not limited geographically.
A  difference  based  on  administrative  locality,  or  that  rings  are  in  a  symbiotic
relationship with the local administration is also meaningless, because even then, any
negotiations, as Mr Dogan, speaking as the leader of the DPS above declares, are
ultimately of interest to the central party leadership. This is reinforced in a second
key voter addressal in the next subsection, where he publicly states that the financing
of  local  EU-related  projects  is  determined  politically  by  himself,  i.e.  the  DPS
(Dvizhenie za Prava i Svobodi) party leadership. 
Ultimately, however, both terms share a great resemblance of the parentela.  They
depict private actors with a privileged standing within the ruling party (regardless of
local or central  level)  and following the parentela,  there is  some form of mutual
exchange, or cooperation. Furthermore, another overlap of the policy circles with the
parentela is that political appointments are also part of these party-group dynamics.
While this is a plausible assumption in this subsection, this is discussed at length in
the following one, 1.3.2. 
1.3.2.  Party Political Appointments
In fact,  the social  scientists  above are not the only ones interested in the circles.
While they emphasise the party insider status of businesses the media narrative on
the subject indicates the importance of party political appointments to policy circles.
That is another key similarity with the parentela. The investigative journalists Lilov
(2009, 2010 a, b) and Bakalov (2011) indicate cases of organised businesses that seek
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to  procure  favourable  appointments  in  the  state  administration  with  the  help  of
political  parties in  power.  For example,  Lilov argues that the Bulgarian premier
Borisov owes his premiership to his subservience to the circle Monterey (2009: 287).
Though  warning  against  grossly  overstating  their  influence  (2010:  230;  237),
Bakalov also confirms the presence of policy circles: businesses in close symbiotic
relationship  with  political  parties  in  power,  however,  heavily  relying  on  party's
control over the state bureaucracy (2011: 120, 170-222). Similar to Monterey, the
circle Capital has been reported in the media as responsible for the deposition of a
close economic adviser to the premier Borisov (Paramov 2010) and also as backing a
number  of  other  possible  political  appointments  in  the  state  administration
(Vladimirova 2011; “The Circle Capital” 2010; vsekiden.com 2009; Raydovski in
Kostadinov 2007).
The  rings  too  share  a  similarity  with  the  parentela  in  that  they  clearly  involve
securing favourable appointments in the state administration.  At a rallying event for
the 2009 parliamentary elections, Mr Dogan also explains that the party control over
the state administration is of utmost importance to the party in power, because it is
through its control over the state administration that a political party can coerce or
help businesses (Dogan 2008): 
I am the instrument of power, which divides the portions of financing
in the state [...] this regards the financing and the execution of your
projects  [under  EU  programmes  ...]  And  when  we  want  a  more
powerful presence in parliament, this means that we want a broader
positioning […]  in the executive branch.  [For example,]  like her,
[who] is the chief of the State Fund for Agriculture, ministers, vice-
ministers [...]
In other words, the relationship Mr Dogan describes fits the parentela. If someone
wants financing for their project under an EU program, they first have to seek access
to  Mr Dogan,  i.e.  the party leadership of  DPS.  In turn,  Mr Dogan,  or  the  party
leadership, will ensure that the respective project will receive due attention because
DPS had already appointed the right person as a chief of the Fund for Agriculture.
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Implicitly, the political appointment here implies that those who seek the cooperation
of DPS will have their projects taken with priority over others.
At the pilot stage, when the task was to determine whether the parentela concept
might have analytical power in Bulgarian circumstances, one elite pilot interview
with a former high ranking party functionary and civil servant was conducted. Its
results  also indicated parentela-like relationships of groups with insider  access to
political parties and using that as spring board to gain access to the civil service using
party political appointments. The full significance of this interview is evident in the
last chapters where Golemanov outlines the dynamic where every new incumbent
party removes from office all appointees of the previous party and instils own. The
significance of that is that it allows the new party to establish political control over
all departments which could be activated in the pursuit of purely party interests that
on occasion may coincide with those of groups with insider party access.  It  was
inescapable,  therefore,  that  the overall  description of the party-group relationship
found in Bulgaria, prior the study resembled the parentela.
The  previous  section,  showed  strong  indications  that  the  parentela  existed  in
Bulgaria,  in  the absence of  a hegemonic party. Therefore,  the study hypothesises
that:
● In agreement with Yishai (1992)  the absence of a hegemonic party has no
effect  on the formation  of  a  parentela.  Stated  positively, preliminary data
suggests  that  the  presence  of  a  hegemonic  party  does  not  explain  the
formation of the parentela.
In addition, in order to establish other independent variables that might have an effect
on the parentela, the study focuses on parliamentary elections and Bulgaria joining
EU because the former was indicated by the pilot study (Golemanov in particular)
while  the  latter  was  a  major  event  in  Bulgarian  political  history.  Looking  at
parliamentary elections is warranted also particularly in the absence of a hegemonic
political party. This is discussed in section 1.3.3.
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1.3.3.  Absence of a Party Hegemon
On 10th November,  1989,  Bulgaria  changed  its  political  regime  from totalitarian
socialism to capitalist democracy. Since then, the Bulgarian party political system
has been competitive, i.e. absent of a hegemonic political party, evidenced by the
variety of governments that have been in power by 2015:
Table 3 Bulgarian Governments to-date
Again,  the  table  above  clearly  shows  that  the  Bulgarian  party  system is  highly
competitive and absent of a hegemon. Yet, in the event that the parentela existed, it
was also interesting to see as an independent variable whether and how the party
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change affected an insider group's parentela relationship with ruling political parties
– if any.  
1.4.  Conclusion and Thesis Outline
The purpose of the present study is to establish whether the relationship between the
civil  service,  interest  groups and the party in power in  Bulgaria conforms to the
parentela policy network type. This is in response to the relative academic disuse the
term seems to  have  fallen into.  This  policy network type has  not  been found in
existence  since  1960s,  other  than  in  Northern  Ireland  up  until  the  1970s  (Greer
1994).  At  the  same time,  it  may also  have  explanatory power  for  the  Bulgarian
public,  because  both  the  local  phenomena known as  circles  or  rings  share  great
resemblance  with  this  term.  At  the  same  time  the  study is  also  geared  towards
establishing  the  internal  and external  causal  relationships  the  parentela  might  be
involved in. More specifically, to ascertain whether the absence of hegemonic parties
hampers parentela's development or there are other external factors that account for
that network's emergence? 
To that end the Bulgarian polity was selected on the basis of preliminary research of
secondary sources and one pilot elite interview, which suggested that the parentela
dynamics existed in Bulgaria. The pilot study indicated key parentela characteristics
in the absence of a hegemonic party, such as insider groups and the practice of party
political appointments. On the Bulgarian polity was therefore selected to further test
the  hypothesis  that  the  parentela  forms  without  the  input  of  hegemonic  political
parties. 
The  results  indicate  that  the  parentela  can  exist  in  the  absence  of  a  hegemonic
political party. Firms from the currently flagging construction sector in Bulgaria seek
the cooperation of ruling parties in order to gain market advantage vis-a-vis their
competition. At the same time, ruling parties seeks to exchange access to policy-
making with groups who possess campaign resources. The crossing point of both
actors lays the foundations of the parentela. Once the exchange is set up, it is through
the political appointments that the ruling party ensures insider’s market advantage. In
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the case of the construction sector in Bulgaria (Chapter 8) in particular, this translates
in the preferential treatment of insider firms in the award of public tenders. 
However, gaining market advantage can also be achieved more aggressively. Chapter
9 discusses at length the discovery of a new policy network dynamic,  part of La
Palombara’s parentela. In light of that discovery, the present Bulgarian study sees La
Palombara’s original parentela dynamic as type 1, while this new dynamic as type 2.
So,  if  La  Palombara’s  type  1  concerned  the  cooperative  and  power-balanced
relationship  between  a  party  insider  and  the  party  in  power  (or  the  parente
collectively),  type  2  parentela  is  about  the  conflict  between  an  outsider  group
(business)  and the  parente.  This  is  manifested in  the parente mobilising  political
appointees  in  the  civil  service  to  conduct  excessive  and  prejudiced  inspections
against  businesses that  compete on the market  with the party insiders.  The same
practice is also reported with regards to political parties alone, who resort to type 2
dynamics in order to extract additional campaign funds. 
An important factor in both type 1 and 2, or the extended parentela  (collectively),  is
the practice of party political appointments. In both cases, they act as an enabling
factor,  or  an  intervening  variable  (9.3.5).  Neither  parentela  dynamic  would  be
functional  unless  facilitated  by  PPAs.  Nevertheless,  the  presence  of  political
appointments alone does not explain any of the parentela dynamics.  This intervening
variable, therefore, is seen here as the most important variable for the sustenance of
the  parentela  and  if  disabled,  that  is  political  appointments  are  prohibited,  both
parentela types will be greatly deterred.
In addition, two other external variables had an effect on the parentela. Parliamentary
elections  for  example  introduce  an  external  shock  to  the  existing  parentela
arrangements (chapter 7, 9.52, 9.5.3). With a new party in power insider groups have
to re-negotiate their continued privileged status. This may not always be possible. As
a result, some groups, like Multigrup (Chapter 7) opt for a pre-emptive strategy of
establishing  good  relations  with  all  relevant  political  parties,  including  the
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opposition. Though costly, this strategy minimises the risks of losing access with the
change of government. 
Membership  in  the  EU  is  another  external  variable  with  potential effect  on  the
parentela relationship (9.6). Many respondents spoke favourably of Bulgaria’s EU
membership.  Overall  the  indication  is  that  at  present  Bulgarian  politicians  are
dependent  on  EU’s  positive  review  of  their  tenure,  and  will  react  accordingly.
However, that is not enough to have a significant impact on the parentela. The results
suggest  that  EU  institutions  can  have  a  real  impact  only  if  there  are  coercive
institutional mechanisms in place that could penalise or disable certain party political
behaviour. Therefore, this is an external variable with potential  effect on the party-
group relationship.   
However, establishing those causal  relationships  is  not straightforward.  The main
methodological  challenge  is  to  devise  a  common classificatory scheme of  policy
networks and to establish a pool of elite respondents that is comparable, if not better,
than that of La Palombara’s. The former objective enables comparisons across cases,
and,  ideally, discrete policy network types  and ensures against  false novelty. The
development of such a classificatory scheme is elaborated in the next chapter 2. The
chapter proposes a system of classifying policy networks according to a number of
features. However, it should be noted that while the classification seeks to encompass
all known major policy networks to-date, a specific feature of the parentela are party
political appointments.
Chapter 3 addresses the second methodological objective: to devise a comparable
pool of respondents to that of La Palombara. This enables direct comparability of the
results between the two studies. However, the main challenge here was to overcome
posed  by  elite  respondents  who  were  both  reluctant  and  resistant  to  conduct
interviews. This challenge was met with the invitation of intermediaries. This is a
new type of research participant. Their primary role is to introduce the researcher to
the  respondent  and  vouch  for  former’s  credibility.  It  is  their  involvement  at
interviews  that  secured  respondents’  cooperation  and  full  participation.  This
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approach  to  elite  interviews  was  reported  in  an  article  published  recently  at
Qualitative Research, July 2015 (Petkov and Kaoullas 2015).
Later chapters are dedicated to the results. Chapters 4 through 7 are dedicated to the
features  that  constitute  the  parentela.  Chapter  2  will  define  the  parentela  as  a
collection of five characteristics, the existence of which is revealed in chapters 4 to 6
inclusive. These are: cooperation, power parity, presence of a privileged group with
the party in power, the party is an effective policy-venue, the party intervenes in the
civil service (venue scope, chapter 2). 
Chapter 4 demonstrates that the party in power provides an effective route to policy
making  and  with  that  has  the  potential  to  host  a  parentela.  It  argues  that  if  the
parentela is to exist, then there has to be an indication that groups find that route to
policy-making effective, which is what the chapter demonstrates. Evidence suggests
that the party is more effective in comparison to the civil service. 
Chapter 5 is dedicated to the practice of party political appointments. The purpose is
to illustrate the breadth of that practice and show that this functional feature of the
parentela  there.  This  chapter  argues  that  party  political  appointments  are  greatly
prevalent.  It  reviews  the  research  of  relevant  authors  and corroborates  it.  It  also
provides additional legal analysis  of the actual process of appointments. Its  main
contribution however is  the argument  that  political  appointments follow from the
high level of political  distrust  in the policy-making process. As a result,  political
parties interfere in the civil service through political appointments. 
Chapter 6 argues that the remainder of the parentela traits are also present in the
party-group relationship: that the party provides insider access to groups; that there is
cooperation between insider groups and ruling parties; and finally, that neither side
seeks to overpower the other. The argument is also that while cooperation is visibly
part  of the process of granting insider  access,  that in turn implies that  there is  a
power-balance  between  the  two  sides.  Furthermore,  the  chapter  reveals  that  the
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dominant  mechanism  under  which  insider  status  is  granted  is  the  exchange  of
campaign resources (group) against access to policy-making (ruling party).
Chapter  7  addresses  one  limitation  of  the research:  there is  absence  of  a  clearly
defined profile of the group that partners the ruling party in a parentela relationship.
Earlier parentela research, e.g. of La Palombara and Greer, was clearly focused on
the  partnership  of  political  parties  with  clearly  defined  monolithic  representative
bodies: Catholic Action (Italy) and Ulster Farmers’ Union (Northern Ireland). The
available data in the Bulgarian case does not indicate the presence of any such bodies
which at the time of research were in a clear parentela relationship. It seems that a
larger number of firms (groups) engage in a parentela, even if access tends to be
exclusive. Still, despite being able to clearly pin-point a specific actor, the chapter
reviews several private actor types that can engage in a parentela: oligarchs, circles
(e.g. Orion from above) and single large companies such as Multigrup. That chapter
also provides a brief case study of the relationship of Multigrup vis-a-vis DPS, and
its  conflict  with  the  circle  Orion  within  the  Bulgarian  Socialist  Party  (BSP),  in
particular. Both actors established respective parentelas within BSP at the time and
vied against each other for more influence on the contents of the Law on Protection
of  Agricultural  Workers  (LPAW).  That  legislative draft  proposed that  agricultural
subsidies be provided to farmers under the forms of specialised loans, which were to
be distributed by a private bank and the funds for those loans, to be provided by the
state-controlled  Agricultural  Fund.  Multigrup  and  Orion  each  sponsored  a  bank
which was close to their own economic structures and wanted to see it become the
partner of the Agricultural Fund. 
Chapter 8 looks at the case of the Law on Public Tenders and public tenders in the
construction  sector.  It  traces  the  process  of  parentela  operation  and  how insider
groups receive preferential treatment through ruling party’s intervention in the civil
service. The main argument is that the main causes for the parentela formation are
groups seeking improved market standing combined with political parties searching
for  campaign funds. In  short,  chapter  8  reveals  a  typical  case of  La Palombara's
parentela  overlapping with its  dynamics.  The only differences  (elaborated in  9.2,
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9.3.5  and  9.4)  are  that  La  Palombara's  parentela  manifests  itself  in  non-policy-
making setting and without the involvement of single, sector-wide interest groups.
Instead,  it  is  observed in the case of public  tenders (or procurement contracting)
encompassing the relationships between the ruling party with single, relatively big
companies or single “oligarchs” who work in concert to procure own interests.
As  already  mentioned  above,  chapter  9  is  dedicated  to  the  discovery  of  a  new
parentela  dynamic,  which transpired from the elite  interviews.  Defined as type 2
parentela dynamic (or simply type 2 parentela), the chapter argues that the parentela
features another relationship: between the parente and outsiders. Type 2 parentela
dynamics  essentially  stands  for  the  practice  of  prejudiced  regulatory  inspections
whose aim is to sabotage the normal operation of a target business, using primarily,
tax investigations, rescission of licenses of operation, police raids, account freezes,
litigation,  etc.  It  is part of the parentela because the dynamics originate from the
same nucleus,  namely, the  party and its  insider  group,  or  the  parente.  While  La
Palombara focused on the relations within the parente (type 1), the newly discovered
dynamics shed light on the relations outside of it. That is between the parentela core
and  their  collective  collective  (political  and business)  rivals.  In  this  conflict,  the
parente uses type 2 dynamics as an implement of opponent elimination (9.2-9.4.).
For instance, the businesses that comprise a dissenting party faction or owned by a
party functionary could be put up for inspection until proven guilty of misconduct.
Or likewise, firms that are members of a government-opposing interest group could
be subjected to the same prejudiced regulatory pressure.Finally, instead of favourable
political appointments, a party insider could request that the party interferes in the
administration and thus  instigate  prejudiced  inspections.  Type 2,  therefore,  is  the
result of the intersection of the interests of the party and its insider group. The party
may engage in type 2 forced by the need to convert political access into business
capital  (extortion,  9.3.1),  desire  to  quell  internal  party dissent  (9.3.3)  or  suppres
external  group  opposition  (9.3.4).  A party  insider  on  the  other  hand  could  be
motivated to engage in type 2 relations by the need to expand its market share, say in
a declining market (chapters 8 and 9).
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CHAPTER 2:  Parentela Operationalisation
2.1.  Introduction
Chapter 1 introduced the concept of the parentela, defining it as type of party-group
relationship,  where  the  ruling  party grants  privileged  (insider)  access  to  a  given
interest group. Once having assumed an insider status the group could then influence
the policy-making process in the civil service by utilising existing or nominating new
party political appointments. The present chapter will explain how this concept is
operationalised in the present study. 
The most important point about the parentela is that it is a type of a policy network.
This  means  that  the  definition  of  the  parentela  must  not  overlap  either  with  the
generic term policy network or any other policy network types. The way this is done
in the present study is by developing a system of policy network classification, based
on previous attempts in the literature to do so. The purpose of this categorisation is to
define all policy network types following the same rules. There are policy network
types have to be defined with reference to the same set of generic features that are
accepted  by  the  literature  as  most  important  when  discussing  the  relationship
between interest groups and policy-makers.  
This  is  why, the  classificatory system developed here consists  of  policy  network
descriptors. A network descriptor (or network feature) is a qualitative indicator that
denotes a particular characteristic of a group's relationship with the relevant policy
makers  for  a  given  policy-making  location  (venue,  e.g.  party,  civil  service,
parliament and media). The present study utilises the following qualitative indicators
or descriptors such as  degree of access, power ratio, type of interaction, primary
policy venue and policy venue scope. Each of these descriptors is a binary, ordinal or
of multi-select type, and represents each of the five most important aspects of the
relationship  between  an  interest  group  and  policy  makers.  The  combination  of
descriptor values therefore helps both to define and differentiate individual network
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types. In developing said network typology, the chapter develops a generic policy
network definition which accommodates all of the more prominent policy network
types and overlaps with none of them. 
The  proposed  policy  network  definition,  therefore  opposes  the  policy  network
definition currently employed in the literature, which specifies that a policy network
is a cooperative, exchange-based relationship, because this overlaps with some of the
already  known  network  types  (iron  triangles)  and  excludes  others  that  harbour
conflict (issue networks). This is a weakness in the literature, which is also addressed
in connection with the policy network classification.
The chapter is organised in the following way: Section 2.2 differentiates the generic
term  policy  network  from  its  categories,  i.e.  policy  network  types.  Section  2.3
defines the policy network descriptors implemented in the present study. Section 2.4
applies  the  policy  network  descriptors  to  the  policy  network  types  (2.4.1-5),
developing therefore a policy-network classification system, discussed as a whole in
section 2.4.6. 
2.2.  Defining the Parentela Policy Network
There are a number of policy networks in existence, but because they have not been
developed  in  an  immediate  comparison  with  each  other,  there  is  a  degree  of
confusion as to the distinctiveness of each from the rest, and from the generic term
policy network. The present section is dedicated to disentangling the generic concept
of policy network from its categories. The next sections, 2.3 and 2.4 are dedicated to
distinguishing each policy network type (category) from the others. 
The  literature  has  already  acknowledged  the  need  for  a  formal  policy  network
classification. Jordan and Schubert (1992: 11-12), and van Waarden (1992) argue that
policy  network  proliferation  requires  the  policy  network  classification  and  the
differentiation between the generic policy network and its categories (also Pappi and
Henning 1998, Rhodes and Marsh 1992, Peterson 2003). 
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A cursory review of some of the more prevalent policy network types and policy
network  definition  shows  that  there  still  is  a  degree  of  insufficient  definitional
discreteness between: the generic term network and its purported types; and between 
each of the network types. Generic definitions tend to describe policy networks as
cooperative,  exchange-based relationships  between groups and policy-makers.  On
the one hand this overlaps with a number of policy network types, such as policy
community,  iron  triangle  and  the  clientela  (Ripley and  Franklin  1987:  8;  Jordan
1990: 319-320, 322, 324; Richardson and Jordan 1979: 98; 101-105, also Hay 1998).
At the same time such a formulation makes it impossible for the policy network type
issue  network  to  classify  as  a  policy  network  type,  because  it  lacks  those  two
features. It is described as a conflictual relationship between a large number of state
and non-state actors over policy contents, and by implication, absent from exchange.
Such  networks  could  be  observed  at  mass  protests,  public  stunts,  angry  media
appearances, etc. (Heclo 1978; Richardson 2000; Gais et al 1984).  
Let  us  quickly  review  some  of  the  more  prominent  generic  policy  network
definitions and then observe later how they come to exclude the issue network as a
policy-network type. Observe Rhodes and Marsh’s adoption of Benson's definition
(quoted in Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 13): 
a cluster or complex of organizations connected to each other by resource
dependencies  and  distinguished  from  other  clusters  or  complexes  by
breaks in the structure of resource dependencies. 
The definition suggests that a pre-condition for, or a constitutive feature of a policy
network,  is  the  exchange-based  relationship  between  the  public/private  actors,
codified above as resource dependency. Similar phraseology is also evident in Kenis
and Schneider’s 1989 policy network definition (in Jordan and Schubert 1992: 12): 
A  policy  network  is  described  by  its  actors,  their  linkages  and  its
boundary.  It includes a relatively stable set of mainly public and private
corporate actors.  The linkages between the actors serve as channels for
communication and for the exchange of information, expertise, trust and
other policy resources.  The boundary of a given policy network is not in
the  first  place  determined  by  formal  institutions  but  results  from  a
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process  of  mutual  recognition  dependent  of  functional  relevance  and
structural embeddedness (1989: 14). 
Note again that  the stress  is  on the  exchange network feature.  Compared to  one
another, both network-generic  definitions above stress that the public  and private
actors,  engaged  in  policy  negotiation,  are  mutually  dependent  on  resources.  The
difference  between  the  two  appears  in  the  scope  of  resources  used  in  the
Kenis/Schneider definition above.
There is another of the more common definitions of policy network is promoted by
Borzel (1998: 254) and adopted more recently by Compston (2009: 7): 
a minimal or lowest common denominator definition of a policy network,
as a set of relatively stable relationships which are of non-hierarchical
and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who share common
interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to pursue
these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to
achieve common goals.  
Compared to the Benson's, and Kenis and Schneider's definitions above, hers too,
suggests that a necessary prerequisite for a policy network is the exchange-based
relationship. However, the difference here is that it introduces the second consitutive
network-feature, cooperation. According to Borzel, not only are policy networks by
definition cooperative but also exchange-based state-group relations.
Such a conflation of the policy network term with the idea of cooperation is very
much  due  to  the  predominant  incidence  of  cooperative  network  types  and  the
ambiguity inherent in the policy network literature. Such a conflation of the policy
network definition with cooperation and exchange has the effect of contradicting and
excluding  certain  policy  network  types.  In  other  words,  the  overarching  term
overlaps  with  some  of  its  types,  while  excluding  others  from the  typology. For
example,  as  stated  above,  the  policy  network  notion  overlaps  with  the  policy
community/iron  triangle  network  types.  Not  only  is  it  difficult  to  differentiate
between the two, cooperation and exchange are at the core of those networks, but it
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makes matters worse when those networks' respective definitions overlap with the
term they are supposed to descend from.
Furthermore,  specifying  that  policy  networks  are  by  definition  exchange-  and
cooperation-based  contradicts  with  other  nown network  types,  such  as  the  issue
network.  As  it  will  be  seen later, these  are  networks  with  conflictual  dynamcs,
lacking resource exchange. Given the general definition, therefore, issue networks
are not a policy network type (2.4.4.). At the heart of this term is the observation that
certain policies are the product of a massive social conflict played out by coalitions
of actors who oppose each other.  The conflict spans from the public realm to the
institutions  of  government,  including  politicians,  civil  servants,  NGO  leaders,
scietists, journalists, etc. The point is that this is different if not the opposite of the
policy network term definition revealed above.
That  is  why it  is  necessary to  distinguish a  truly neutral  generic  policy network
definition  that  simultaneously differentiates  itself  from its  categories.  Part  of  the
solution, therefore, is to adopt Hanf's definition above that:
the term 'network' merely denotes [...] that policy making includes a large
number of public and private actors from different levels and functional
areas of government and society. 
But one also has to include at  the very end:  and their relationship formats.  This
addition, advocated by the present author, denotes that a policy network is essentially
a relationship between groups and policy makers. Therefore, a specific relationship
format is equivalent to a specific policy network type. This is an echo in agreement
to Dowding's conceptualisation that 'Networks are distinguished one from another by
the relations between the actors' (Dowding 1995: 152). A relationship format in turn
is  a  specific  relationship  feature,  e.g.  conflict,  cooperation,  overpowerment,  etc.
Therefore, policy network  types  are about the combination of specific relationship
features between groups and policy-makers. The following section is dedicated to a
policy  network  classificatory  scheme,  based  on  the  more  common  network
descriptors (features) discussed in the literature and operationalized in this study.
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2.3.  Policy Network Descriptors
The purpose of the present  section (2.3) is  to operationalise the different  policy-
network types on the basis of the different features in the relationship between the
group and policy-makers discussed in section 2.2. The features of the policy-making
relationships  are  operationalised  here  as  policy  network  descriptors.  A  network
descriptor  is a quantitative or qualitative indicator, which expresses a state-group
relationship characteristic (feature). A policy network type is the discrete combination
of  descriptor  values.  This  means  that  policy  network  classification rests  on  the
discrete value combinations of a pre-defined set of descriptors. 
There are several challenges associated with network descriptors at this stage. First
is: which descriptors will serve as the basis for comparison? The literature has yet to
agree on such a set (Atkinson and Coleman 1989; van Waarden 1992; Rhodes and
Marsh 1992; Jordan and Schubert 1992; Adam and Kriesi 2007). Jordan is one of the
first to explicitly alert for the necessity to find a commonly shared descriptors so to
differentiate  between  types  of  policy  networks  (1990:  329;  Jordan  and  Schubert
1992: 14-15, 18, 24; Rhodes and Marsh 1992: 191). Van Waarden (1992: 49) also
complains about the insufficient  effort  authors  exert  to  distinguish their  allegedly
novel policy network types from the pool of already existing ones. 
One example of such a necessity are Wilks and Wright who introduced a new policy
network type and in doing so redefined the term policy community (in Jordan 1990:
334-335).   As  a  result,  for  reasons  of  disjointedness  with  pre-existing  network
literature and non-justified re-definition of the established terminology, Marsh and
Rhodes supported Jordan above in rejecting any such claims of novelty (Marsh and
Rhodes 1992: 186). Novelty claims, therefore, will be better justified and warranted
in the presence of a clear policy network classification system.
The  second  major  difficulty  is  whether  network  descriptors  could  be  expressed
quantitatively.  Jordan  and  Schubert  (1992)  stress  the  importance  of  establishing
network dimensions (or descriptors herein) that lend themselves to empirical scrutiny
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and  operationalisation,  implying  quantification.  More  specifically,  serving  the
Atkinson/Coleman table (p. 39) as an example, they argue if networks are defined on
the  grounds  of  highly  disputable,  immeasurable  features,  classification  becomes
impossible (Jordan and Schubert 1992: 18; also on quantification Borzel 1998).  As a
result,  Jordan and Schubert  (1992) seem to suggest that quantification is the way
forward. 
In  fact,  the absence of  policy network quantification is  seen by Dowding (1995,
2001: 93) and Thatcher (1998) as the very weakness of the policy-network literature
(also Peters 1998, Marsh and Smith 2000). Both authors advocate the transposition
of quantitative indicators from Sociological Network Analysis (SNA) into the policy
network literature. This is a quantitative approach to studying networks in policy-
making adopted by sociologists  (Thatcher  1998; Dowding 1995).  Borzel  sees the
policy  network  literature  as  divided  between  the  Continental  borderline
sociological/political  scientists,  who  adopt  quantitative  methods  to  study  policy
networks,  and the  Anglo-Saxon/British  branch,  based  on observations  on  policy-
making in  UK, US, Holland,  France,  Italy, which at  the time of her writing was
primarily qualitative  (1998).  Dowding (1995;  2001),  Thatcher  (1998) and Borzel
(1998) suggest that the British branch of the policy network literature should adopt
the indicators used by the Continental branch. (Unless stated otherwise, the present
study is nested in the British/Anglo-Saxon branch of the policy-network literature.)
Furthermore, in agreement with Jordan and Schubert (1992), Dowding (1995, 2001)
and Thatcher  (1998) argue  that  quantification  will  lead  to  a  precise  and discrete
policy network classification and ability to introduce causality in the policy-making
models. However, both authors are mute on the question of how far the borrowed
SNA quantitative indicators would match the descriptions developed in the Anglo-
Saxon policy network literature. The SNA indicators are conceptually removed from
the  observations  on  the  UK/US/ITA policy-making  which  the  different  policy
network types sought to summarise. In fact Thatcher acknowledges that the main
weakness  of  the  interorganizational  (sociological)  network  approach  (SNA,
essentially) is the inconsistency with which a policy network had been defined by
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respective researchers (1998: 400-402). This means that there is an already present
mismatch  within  the  SNA literature  of  term's  definition,  types  and indicators.  A
conversion stage is necessary where network descriptors are distilled from existing
network  description,  and  calibrated  for  accuracy.  Without  such  a  stage  a  direct
transplantation of SNA indicators will not match the policy network term and related
observations  described  earlier  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  network  literature.  Again,  the
mismatch  is  compounded  by  the  fact  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  literature  is  itself
uncertain as to what a policy network actually is (2.2). 
Dowding's discussion on quantitative policy network indicators from SNA literature
and his proposition to transpose those over to the British branch of policy network
literature is another example of the difficulty in making such transposition(Dowding
1995: 153-158). First, the study here agrees with his conception that policy networks
are about the type of relationships policy-makers enter. Following the SNA logic,
therefore, Dowding expresses those relations in terms, which are very similar to what
here is advocated as network descriptors, namely of members'  characteristics and
relations characteristics, summarised in the table (p.35)  (1995: 153): 
Table 4 Adaptation of Dowding’s SNA indicators
While  some  SNA  network  characteristics  such  as  inclusiveness and  rules  of
interaction appear synonymous to degree of access and type of interaction (discussed
below), others, such as embeddedness or centrality appear quite disjointed from the
Anglo-Saxon side of the literature. Moreover, it is not immediately clear above how
for  instance  characteristics  of  relations  would  fit  the  description  of,  say,  policy
community (1995: 153).
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The third difficulty associated with policy networks is causality, although still related
to quantification. Thatcher (1998), Dowding (1995, 2001) and van Waarden (1992:
32)  note  that  policy  network  analyses  conflate  network  characteristics  with  the
independent variables responsible for the respective policy network type. Dowding
(1995; 2001) and Thatcher (1998) in particular argue that quantification will help
researchers  establish  various  causal  relationships  between:  the  network  and  the
policy-making  process;  external  variables  and  network  formation;  and
endo-/exogenous  variables  and  changes  of  network  structure  (Dowding  1995;
Thatcher  1998:  396-398).  Ultimately,  according  to  Dowding  (2001:  92-93)  and
Thatcher  (1998)  network  descriptors  would  be  integrated  in  a  more  dynamic,
mathematical  model,  that  will  reflect  the  causality  related  to  the  ideally  discrete
policy network types. 
However, the position in this study is that the concern with quantification, though
justified, is premature. The most pressing issue is the uniform definition of policy
network and its descriptors. As the section demonstrates, there is no reliable policy
network definition at present and that the debate on descriptors is still ongoing. Once
descriptors defining the types of policy networks are settled it would be possible to
engage in quantification. Those indicators promoted by Dowding and Thatcher do
not immediately fit into the existing observations of the policy networks from the
Anglo-Saxon branch (as Borzel (1998) calls it), which the parentela would be part of.
The argument  here is  not  against  quantification,  rather  to  promote debate on the
development  of  descriptors  that  are  theoretically in tune with the policy network
types. The danger is that if indicators are immediately transferred from elsewhere,
those might not reflect the description of known policy networks. The present case
on the Bulgarian political system, however, does not lend itself to such an agenda.
For example, the development of quantitative indicators may rely on the reviewal of
a  known  Anglo-Saxon  policy  network  type  (say  a  policy  community)  for  any
possible metrics that could later be used to describe/define other policy networks.
Those metrics would then have to be triangulated in a mixed-method study in a case
study on a network relationship, which hypothetically resembles one of the better
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known policy network types (say, between a UK department and a sectoral trade
association). If in a such a study both methods yield similar results, namely, that the
described relationship qualitative and quantiatively at the end is of one and the same
type (say, policy community), only then those indicators could be seen as calibrated
and ready for implementation in other studies. In light of that, however, the present
study is neither geared towards such a quantiative agenda, nor is it in the possession
of  reliable  quantitative  network  indicators  (descriptors)  that  have  already  been
developed in the Anglo-Saxon branch of the literature. That is why, it is primarily
qualitative. Moreover, given that the parentela appears either elusive to document or
simply  non-existent,  the  qualitative  method  is  better  suited  for  this  inevitably
exploratory study, because it allows for more and varied data to be analysed. Again,
going the quantitative road in the present study would mean applying previously
untested  quantitative  policy  network  indicators  on  a  case  where  it  is  unknown
whether the policy network in question exists. Any measurements, therefore, would
be unreliable in the absence of pre-established indicator validity.
Let  us  quickly  review  one  example  of  the  difficulty  of  employing  quantitative
indicators and their validity. In a study on the possible existence of the parentela in
1980s Israel, Yishai (1992) employs a quantitative indicator labelled group strategy,
which measures the contact frequency between an interest group and policy-makers
from a given venue. However, it raises the question of how to interpret such metrics:
is that a measurement of degree of access to the given venue or an indication for the
existence of a venue-specific policy network, i.e. parentela in her case. Yishai (1992)
takes the decreasing count of groups opting to influence through the party venue as
an indication that the parentela is not in operation. In her case, Ysihai (1992) takes
the position that the fewer the groups seeking contacts with the party venue, the less
one can claim the parentela exists.
However, the measurments of her  group strategy indicator is also consistent with
another part of the literature that only a few groups are generally granted privileged
standing within a certain venue states that regardless whether the venue as a whole
experiences  increase  or  decline  of  contacts  (Maloney et  al  1992;  1997).  This  is
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particularly relevant to the party, as in the parentela studies of La Palombara (1964)
and Greer (1994) identify only one group as the main partner to the party in power in
Italy and Northern Ireland,  respectively. Therefore,  the declining access does  not
indicate that the parentela does not exist. As Greer's case demonstrates, a parentela
can exist even when no large scale practice of party political appointments exists
(1994). 
Moreover, the overall decline of contacts with the party venue, therefore, means that
group strategies in fact might not be even measuring access but the perception of that
venue’s effectiveness by the interest groups universe. The party was once a thriving
venue for groups seeking access to the policy-making process, suggests barriers of
entry remaind  low also  during  her  study (Yishai  1994:  277,  table  2).  As  Yishai
argues, things changed when the bulk of the policies of interest to the group universe
were  largely  placed  under  the  purview  of  the  civil  service,  which  shifted  the
perception that the civil service is the more effective venue (1994: 282). 
In sum, the purpose of this discussion was to illustrate the inappropriateness of the
quantitative approach at this stage. The qualitative approach  is better suited because
there  is  some  agreement  on  the  qualitative  indicators  (descriptors)  which  lend
themselves to immediate employment in an exploratory setting. Moreover, as it will
be discussed in the next chapter, the qualitative approach allows for the detection of
power relationships and party-group dynamics that have not yet been discovered. But
before all,  quantitative or qualitative,  authors have to first  and foremost  come to
some agreement on what discrete policy networks descriptors will be used to classify
policy networks. 
The next sub-section will discuss the descriptors employed in this study. On the basis
of the selected descriptors it classifies the better known policy networks and in doing
so facilitates  the  effective results  comparison between this  study and the already
existing network descriptions. Again, each descriptor is equivalent to an indicator,
which  represents  one  aspect  of  group's  relationship  with  policy-makers.  The
descriptors discussed here are distilled from the literature. The benefit of a form of
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policy  network  classification  is  that  it  helps  to  accurately  identify  network
relationships observed in new polities. That in turn helps with carrying out causal and
comparative projects. This, however, is a point discussed in chapter 3. The present
section is dedicated to how and why the network descriptors in this study are adopted
from the literature. 
The network descriptor  selection for  the purpose of  a  network classification was
governed by a number of principles: 
 Fewest practically possible descriptors;
 Descriptors  also  have to be applicable to largest number of known policy
network descriptions;
 Maintain a meso-level focus, as per Marsh and Rhodes (1992: 1-4).
The following sub-sections (2.3.1-4) discuss the five descriptors from the literature
which  were  adopted  in  the  present  study:  power  asymmetry  (ratio),  network
dynamics,  degree  of  access,  primary  venue  and  venue  scope.  It  ends  with  the
conversion  of  the  more  commonly  known  policy  network  types  in  discrete
combinations of descriptor values.
2.3.1.  Power Ratio (Asymmetry)
The first network descriptor relates to the power relations between the private actors
(interest groups) and state policy-makers (civil servants and/or politicians) from the
primary  policy  venue.  Jordan  and  Schubert  (1992:  18)  argue  that  the  network
features  that  would  serve  as  a  basis  for  networks  comparison  have  to  be  non-
debatable or easy to operationalise, which is a difficult task, as exemplified in the
first literature attempt at network classification produced by Atkinson and Coleman
(1989). They classify networks according to two descriptors: degree of mobilization
of  business and  state's  propensity  to  yield  to  outside  influence  (state  structure)
(Atkinson and Coleman 1989: 54, table 5 below):
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Table 5 Network Descriptors, adapted from Atkinson and Coleman (1989: 54)
Jordan and Schubert (1992) and van Waarden (1992: 32) disagree with the Atkinson-
Coleman classification because it does not allow for all network types to be plotted,
e.g.  issue  networks.  Van  Waarden's  second  criticism,  echoed  later  by  Thatcher
(1998), is that it  is hard to distinguish between network features from exogenous
variables that explain network formation and its characteristics (van Waarden 1992).
In addition, the present study also sees that the Atkinson-Coleman classification is
based on a  macro  level  of  analysis  between the  State  and Groups (pluralism,  vs
corporatism),  while policy networks operate on a meso level (Marsh and Rhodes
1992: 1-4).  
Nevertheless, the Atkinson/Coleman network typology highlights a literature thread
that seems to have preoccupied many attempts at policy network classification. This
is namely the distribution of power among the policy network actors, or power ratio.
Looking at  the Atkinson/Coleman table, it  plots policy networks according to the
power ratio between business and the state.  The same is evident in van Waarden’s
classification in table 6 (p47), although he includes other dimensions: 
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Table 6 Network Descriptors, adapted from van Waarden (1992:50)
Van  Waarden’s  concern  with   power,  or  power  ratio,  is  evident  above  in  the
descriptors:  state agency dominant  and  interests dominant,  and also in  one major
societal group and  mainly state agencies. (1992: 49-50). In addition,  mainly state
agencies  and  parties or parliamentary committees are network descriptors that are
also concerned with  where  the policy network manifests.  That is  to say they are
concerned  with  the  locus  of  the  policy  venue  hosting  the  network  dynamics
(discussed below in 2.3.4).  The descriptors  one major societal  group,  two major
conflicting societal groups and  unlimited number of societal representatives above
refer to the number of actors involved in the network, and with that to the degree of
interest  group inclusion  in  the  policy-making  process  that  the  network  provides.
Finally, the descriptors number of actors and network function stand for whether the
network is engaged in implementation, delegation or other policy-making stage. 
However, the van Waarden classification is still susceptible to the same criticisms at
the  Atkinson/Coleman  classification.  Jordan  and  Schubert  still  highlight  the
inoperability of van Waarden's classification, particularly  power ratio (Jordan and
Schubert 1992: 12). Again, to this we should still add the level of analysis is still
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unclear,  particularly  with  the  conceptualisation  of  corporatism  and  pluralism  as
policy network types. 
Following their emphasis on measurability, Jordan and Schubert (1992: 25) offer a
classification based on descriptors kept as close to quantification as possible, and
with  that,  entirely  omitting  the  question  of  power  relations.  Their  network
classification is primarily based on  number of group participants and  issue scope.
Observe table 7 below: 
Table 7 Network Descriptors, adapted from Jordan and Schubert (1992: 25)
While the  number of group participants is a clear reflection of their emphasis on
quantification,  issue  scope is  about  whether  the  issue  at  hand  cuts  across
social/economic sectors. 
Jordan and Schubert object to an enquiry into the power ratio as futile in the absence
of power metrics (1992: 25).  However, the position here is that this descriptor is too
important  to  be  overlooked.  In  fact,  the  entire  literature  on  policy networks,  on
corporatism  and  pluralism  is  concerned  with  the  question  of  power  asymmetry
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between  public  and  private  actors.  The  concern  with  power  is  obvious  in  the
classifications of van Waarden (1992: 50) and Atkinson/Coleman's low autonomy v.
high autonomy of state structure (1989: 54). Moreover, the Rhodes/Marsh model is
also based on a power ratio gradient between state and group actors (Rhodes and
Marsh  1992:  184).  More  recently,  Adam and  Kriesi  (2007:  133-135),  too,  have
promoted the use of that  descriptor, although it  is  true that  they, and Marsh and
Rhodes (1992: 184, 199) are mute on the question of power metrics.  
Again,  the  question  of  power  is  too  important  to  ignore  and  even  if  future
classification omits it as a descriptor, it is nevertheless adopted in the present study.
Moreover, while nuanced power disparities may not be easily captured, extreme ones
should be. As this study will demonstrate in chapter 9, it is possible to observe power
ratio that clearly puts interest groups at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the party in power. 
In light of the above, however, a point of clarification needs to be added here. In
relation to the concern with the concept of power, the policy network authors above
do not directly relate its use to the literature that is dedicated to debating and refining
it, even if the concept is of central importance to policy networks. The uncovered
concern with power above is implicit in the literature and it may give the erroneous
impression that this is somehow part of the wider debate on power. However, that is
not the case. The network literature (Anglo-Saxon branch as per Borzel 1998) simply
states that power is part of the relationship between interest groups and venue policy-
makers. That is why, the following few paragraphs attempt to translate the use of
power  in policy-networks in the conceptual frameworks employed in the explicitly
power literature. However, most notable of those are the three dimensions of power
developed by Steven Lukes (1974; 2005).
The use  of  the  term  power  in  the  policy network literature  appears  to  primarily
overlap with what  Lukes has classified as first  and second dimensions of power.
(1974;  2005).  In  his  three  dimensions  of  power  typology  Lukes  reviews  and
systematizes some of the most influential works on the subject of power by early
1970s. In a second edition dedicated to his typology, published 2005, he reviews and
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revises  some  of  his  analyses  on  the  concept.  For  the  purposes  of  the  present
discussion, however, it is not necessary to venture deep into the debate spurred by
Lukes' three dimensions of power. Accordingly, this dimension is manifested when
policy-political conflict is observable, with clear preferences exhibited by all sides
involved in it (2005: 19):
this first, one-dimensional, view of power involves a focus on behaviour
in the making of decisions on issues over which there is an observable
conflict  of  (subjective)  interests,  seen  as  express  policy  preferences,
revealed by political participation. 
In other words, this dimensions concerns the situations where observers can indeed
observe  political conflict unfold, its parties and their interests. At the centre of the
first dimension, however, lies a dynamic which, according to Lukes, is evident in a
number of pluralist writings, most notably of Dahl, who defines the first dimension
thus (in Lukes 2005: 16):
A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B
would not otherwise do
This, in other words, could be seen as coercion. A forceful imposition of A's will onto
B, against B's interests and preferences.
Policy  networks,  therefore,  appear  to  demonstrate  such  dynamics,  although  the
authors discussing them have not at all made direct links to the power literature. For
example, the  issue network,  which will be discussed later in this chapter, is a text-
book example of a policy network entirely manifesting the first dimension of power.
Developed  by  Heclo  (1979),  this  network  models  policy  and  political  conflicts
waged  in  the  open,  between  two  (or  more)  clearly  visible  camps.  Each  camp
comprising  journalists,  politicians,  scientists  and  activists  openly  state  their
preferences  through  media  appearances  or  direct  protest.  Ultimately,  resulting
legislation could quite straightforwardly be attributed to either camp. That is, there is
a clear winner and an actor who has imposed their will. 
There  is  possibly  another  example  of  a  policy  network  whose  power  dynamics
relates to thee first dimension of power. We have to be more cautious here, for this
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conflict does not exactly appear in context which Lukes (above) prescribes, i.e. open
conflict. As already defined in the introduction, the parentela is a relationship where
the  parente,  or the ruling party and its privileged, insider group, exert control over
the civil service through the practice of party appointments of civil servants. Chapter
9, then, reveals that there is a new dynamic, part of that same parentela, which can be
observed in Bulgaria, labeled type 2 parentela. Accordingly, the parente can subject
their  political  oppoinents – the firms that are associated in an interest  group that
opposes party's policies or the businesses of intra-party dissenters – and the market
competitors of the party insider group to prejudiced regulatory inspections. The last
means that  the  control  organs  or,  elsewhere,  regulatory agencies  of  the  state  are
mobilised by the parente to inspect the businesses of said actors and find evidence of
malpractice at all cost in order to prevent them doing business. In that sense, the
parente  forcefully imposes its will on its various opponents to discontinue market
operations at latter's clear expense. 
The only difference from a clear-cut overlap between the type 2 parentela and the
first dimension of power could be in that conflict is hidden in open sight. It is a very
unusual situation as these inspections are publicly observable and within the law.
However, what is not observable is the true motivation behind them. As respondents
will argue in chapter 9, any inspection could be as lenient or stringent as the agency
director sees fit, which makes it hard to determine which inspection is prejudiced. At
the same time, an outsider put under such pressure is not always aware that what is
happening to their business is in fact pre-mediated. One respondent will argue in
chapter 9 that it is only by comparison to how inspections usually go that a given
business  owner  can  subjectively determine  for  themselves  that  they are  a  target.
Sometimes, others will know why and can definitely tell that this is not an ordinary
inspection. The bottom line is that conflict in the case of the parentela of type 2 is
observable only for those involved in the dynamics, while for external observers it
may remain hidden in the open, under the guise of the usual inspection of regulatory
agencies. 
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Lukes traces another body of works headed by Bacharch and Baratz (in Lukes 2005:
20).  They  responded  to  Dahl  arguing  that  policy  conflict  need  not  be  publicly
advertised and observable for power dynamics to take place. Essentially, ability to
control the political agenda, that is, to perpetually filter out undesirable discussions
or policies is another example of powerfulness. In their words (Bachrach and Baratz
in Lukes 2005: 20): 
Power  is  also  exercised  when  A devotes  his  energies  to  creating  or
reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit
the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those
issues which are comparatively innocuous to A.
As Lukes elaborates (2005: 20-22), A's power over B in the context of policy-making
is limiting the political debate on issues that matter to A and continuously ignoring,
i.e.  non-deciding,  on  issues  of  importance  to  B.  This  is  achieved  through  a
combination of a number of practices, such as manipulation and threat of sanctions
(Lukes 2005: 20-22). Thus, the conflict between A and B comes to the fore, so far as
external  observers  are  concerned,  that  can  only  be  visible  if  the  observer  can
ascertain the un-declared greivances of B that have not entered the political agenda
(Lukes 2005: 24). All in all, the second dimension is the ability of those who benefit
from the status quo to maintain it despite the pressure from any policy contestants.
In relation to policy networks, the second dimension appears at the heart of a number
of network types. These are the iron triangles, policy communities and the possibly
the  clientela,  although  authors  are  far  from  explicit  on  the  subject  of  second
dimension of power in policy networks. The common denominator among the three
networks (which will be reviewed at length later in this chapter) is that they model
cooperative  group-policy-maker  relations.  Essentially,  these  are  relations  between
civil  servants  and groups who possess policy expertise,  which is  of  value to  the
bureaucrats who are tasked with amending or advising on the amendment or drafting
of  new  legislation.  Thus,  an  exchange  relationship  forms:  in  exchange  for  their
expertise, the group is more frequently consulted on a wider range of issues. The
longevity of such an exchange relationship engenders trust among the participants
and  the  continued  preeminence  of  the  insider  group.  Normally,  such  groups  are
sectoral (peak) associations who possess considerable social/economic representation
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and a technocratic approach to policy-making. That is why, the potential effects of
drafted legislation on the respective social  or economic sector are discussed with
such  insider  groups,  who  need  not  necessarily  be  those  potentially  affected  by
prospective legislation. Even if potentially affected groups are consulted, however,
this still does not mean their views will be necessarily endorsed. Therefore, while
respective authors do not necessarily elaborate, it is not difficult to imagine that those
insider groups are best  positioned to keep the demands of outsiders out from the
political debate. 
Parenthetically, there is another author whose power conception is applicable to these
three networks. To the extent insider groups are able to influence the decisions of
policy-makers through reason, we can speak of influence in Russell’s terms (1986).
This is namely, when A is able to change the opinion of B (Russell 1986 [1938]: 19-
20). Again, this appears relevant to all cooperation-based network types, i.e. policy
community, iron triangle, clientela and parentela. 
In any case, La Palombara's parentela, too, could be provided as another example of
the second dimension of power. Although the earlier three network types operate at
the  civil  service,  in  a  parentela  relationship  the  control  over  the  agenda  is  done
through the ruling party. The dynamic is the same: a trusted  insider group is in the
position to filter undesired policies out by nominating new or utilising existing party
political appointees who are loyal to the parente. As it will be elaborated later in the
present  chapter  and in chapters 6 and 8,  parentela insider  status is  also achieved
following an exchange relationship, the longevity of which also renders the given
group trustworthy and its insider status confirmed. In the parentela, the insider status
is based on group's ability to mobilise its member-base to vote for the given party
and contribute campaign funds for future elections. In exchange, the party provides
the core insider access to the policy-making process, hosted by the civil service. This
is achieved by the practice of party political appointments, where individuals loyal to
the party and its insider are sent to work as key civil servants who have immediate
discretion on draft legislation. 
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Again parenthetically, on the note of campaign contributions, this and not meaning to
engage in an elaborate discussion on power, one can also make a reference to another
author  on  power,  whose  conception  of  the  term  is  also  relevant  the  parentela,
clientela, the iron triangle and the policy community network. Again, we stated that
in a parentela relationship, the driving force behind party’s recognition of a group as
an insider partly rests on that group’s ability to provide resources to aid party’s re-
election:  group’s  ability  to  mobilise  own  membership  and  its  ability  to  provide
campaign resources. In that sense, in a parentela relationship, a group could exert
influence  on  the  party on  the  basis  of  the  resources  it  commands.  This  is  what
Galbraith defines as compensatory power (1983: 214): 
in  the  modern  economy,  the  most  important  expression  of  compensatory
power is, of course, pecuniary reward – the payment of money for services
rendered,  which  is  to  say  for  submission  to  the  economic  or  personal
purposes of others
In  other  words,  economic  resources  are  a  source  of  power,  but  as  the  parentela
reveals,  in  the  party-group  relations,  this  translates  not  only  as  crude  campaign
contributions but also as votes which the party insider group is able to mobilise. If
we expand the notion of compensatory power, then expertise, too, can become one
such source of power. This means that policy networks such as the iron triangle, the
clientela  and  the  policy  community  manifest  this  power-relationship.  A  later
discussion will reveal that in those relationships, a group's insider access depends on
its ability to provide expertise to the respective venue policy-makers. 
Lukes  (1974;  2005) also  developed a third  dimension of  power,  which  concerns
those  groups  or  rather  more  generally  actors  whose conception  and  narrative  of
social reality is such that it is widely accepted despite that those groups or social
strata endorsing it are in fact at a disadvantage. In essence, this is a critique to the
earlier two dimensions which were primarily developed on the basis of an observable
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conflict  (2005: 26). It seems Lukes takes the second dimension further than non-
decision,  where decisions that change the status quo are not taken because of an
authority  that  manipulates  (or  otherwise  influences)  the  policy-making  process.
Rather,  an  authority  benefits  from  the  status  quo,  which  remains  unchallenged
because there is a dominant interpretation of social and political reality which is so
widely accepted that disadvantaged groups proactively defend it, oblivious that they
act against their own interest (Lukes 2005: 25-26). The dominant narrative may or
may not be issued by the benefiting actor but it may be structurally so (Lukes 2005:
26). In his words: 
Moreover, the bias of the system is not sustained simply by a series of
individually  chosen  acts,  but  also,  most  importantly,  by  the  socially
structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups, and practices of
institutions, which may indeed be manifested by individuals’ inaction.
That is to say, the third dimension of power stands for undetected injustice which is
brought about the social and political structure. Again, those who are disadvantaged
are unable to realise that they are such, simply because they are embedded in the
structure.  This is  quite evident in the definition of the third dimension of power,
locked in the following dynamic where (Lukes 1974; 2005: 27):
A may exercise power over B by getting him to do what he does not want
to do, but he also exercises power over him by influencing, shaping or
determining his very wants.
In other words, the third dimension is a situation where an unjust social order is
maintained by those disadvantaged because they have been manipulated or otherwise
made to believe that keeping the status quo is in their favour.
At this stage, however, no policy network types appear to have modelled any power
relations that fall along the lines of the third dimension of power. It appears that it
operates  on  a  macro  level,  while  interest  groups  and policy networks  are  social
dynamics on a meso level. In any case, it remains to be seen whether any policy
network type will manifest dynamics similar to the third dimension. Let us now turn
to the next policy network descriptor, network dynamics.
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2.3.2.  Network Dynamics
The second point that follows from Jordan and Schubert's classification earlier is that
the  network stability (stable vs ad hoc, table 7) descriptor seems to be universally
accepted.  It concerns whether there is conflict or cooperation between the group and
policy-makers.  The  concern  with  network  dynamics  is  evident  in  the
Atkinson/Coleman's concertation (Atkinson and Coleman 1989: 48-49) and pressure
pluralism (1989:  55) descriptors.   In van Waarden (1992),  Jordan and Schubert’s
network dynamics is addressed through the descriptors rules of conduct (1992: 35-6)
and  actor  strategies  (1992:  37-38).   The  concern  with  the  extent  of  cooperative
dynamics is also evident in Rhode/Marsh’s network classification (1992: 183), and of
Adam and Kriesi's type of interaction (2007: 134-5).  Given the wide-spread concern
of whether groups cooperate or are in conflict with respective state policy-makers it
is accepted under the label network dynamics. 
2.3.3.  Degree of Access
Third, consistent with van Waarden (1992), Jordan and Schubert (1992) include the
number of groups  descriptor which is metrics for a group's degree of access to the
policy-making process that the given venue provides. This is implied by Jordan and
Schubert with their low access threshold (1992: 25).  Basically, the fewer the number
of group participants, the higher barriers of access there are. This is also evident in
the  van  Waarden’s table  at  the  intersections  of  the  descriptors  state  agency and
interests dominant, on the one hand, and all horizontal descriptors, except parties or
parliamentary committees (table 6,  van Waarden 1992: 50). 
However, we have to note the difficulty in employing this indicator, as in the case of
Israel (Yishai 1992). However, weary of it, this situation is partly resolved by the
introduction of the new indicator  primary venue, discussed below. As of now, the
study deems degree of access as an expression of group's extent of overcoming the
barriers of entry to the respective venue it occupies. The phrase  barriers to access
means the extent to which a group meets the criteria for a trusted policy-making
partner, who is to be regularly consulted on a wider range of matters. Each venue has
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its  own  criteria  or  requirements  for  access,  such  as  resources  and  particular
behaviour. Therefore, the extent a group meets such criteria, it receives privileged
access to that venue.
 
That  a  low number of  groups in  a  network correlates  with deeper  insiderness  is
already evident in the insider/outsider status interest group typology developed by
Wyn Grant (1977; 1978), Jordan et al. (1992) and Maloney et al. (1994).  In Grant's
typology of interest groups,  core insiders  are a handful of interest groups that are
frequently consulted on most policies and draft legislative proposals. Those who are
less frequently consulted, usually en masse, are peripheral insiders, while those who
are  irregularly consulted,  yet,  on highly specific  and technical  matters  are  niche
insiders. Finally those who are not consulted at all have an outsider status.  In fact,
Jordan clearly states that the policy community network type is compatible with the
insider/outsider status interest group classification (Jordan et al 1992: 18, original
emphasis): 
Core participants (substantially the same as policy community members)
are seen as important and relevant sources by policy makers 
In  other  words,  Jordan et  al  above  state  that  there  is  a  conceptual  compatibility
between  the  deeper  degree  of  access  inherent  in  the  policy  community  network
(Richardson and Jordan 1979: 99-100)  and Wyn Grant's interest group category of
insider status. Therefore, this study employs the restricted descriptor used by Jordan
and Schubert (1992), but expresses it  with Grant's ordinal qualitative indicator of
access (core insider, peripheral insider and outsider), and applying the more intuitive
label degree of access (Grant 1977, 1978 Jordan et al 1992; Maloney et al 1994). 
However, it is not possible to apply Grant's typology without some adjustments. His
classification of insider group types also features a prisoner and niche insider types.
The  prisoner  insider  is  a  type  of  a  civil  service  core  insider  which  is  partly
institutionalised  and  is  financially,  legally  or  otherwise  dependent  on  the
government, hence constrained by it (Grant 1978: 5; 2004; Maloney et al 1997: 27).
The  prisoner  insider is  excluded from this  study as  a  possible  access descriptor,
because it rather stands for a new policy network type. The qualifier prisoner is also
an  indication  of  power-relationship,  which  suggests  the  group  is  at  a  power
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disadvantage. These complex dynamics render the prisoner insider a separate policy
network type as opposed to a network descriptor, which is why it is excluded as such
but listed in later tables as a separate policy network type. 
Niche insider, too, is  excluded here as a degree of access indicator. This type of
group is between the civil service departments and a highly specialist interest group
that only occasionally is elevated to a core insider status on policies that require
exceptional expertise that generally falls outside the capabilities of sectoral interest
groups.  The  niche  insider  descriptor  is  dropped  because  it  would  be  hard  to
distinguish  it  from peripheral  and  core  insiders.  While  it  is  possible  to  identify
groups that are more or less frequently in contact with party policy-makers that is to
distinguish between core and peripherals, the niche insider status denotes a group
which has as infrequent contacts as peripheral insider and is as expertise-laden as
core insiders. To distinguish niche insiders from either types one has to identify a
small-scale group that is infrequently involved to consultations and only occasionally
at  their  center.  Such  refined  metrics  are  not  available  at  present  and  may  be
particularly  irrelevant  for  the  party  venue,  because  it  does  not  necessarily  host
consultations  of  such  scale,  quality  and  intensity  as  the  civil  service.  Therefore,
including niche insiders would unnecessarily increase study’s complexity, which is
why it is excluded. 
2.3.4.  Primary Venue and Venue Scope
Finally, this study adopts the concept of primary venues (PVs) as a policy network
location descriptor.  The venue descriptor is used by van Waarden (1992: 42-50) and
Atkinson  and  Coleman  (1989:  55-59),  who  make  locational  references  when
comparing the different  network types.  Although only van Waarden distinguishes
among network types based on venues this study sees a benefit in doing so for three
reasons.  First, it is easier to distinguish between networks with identical dynamics,
such  as  policy  community  and  iron  triangles.  Second,  this  descriptor  grounds
network analysis deeper in the meso-level. Third, the concern of where to look for a
given  policy  network  increases  its  tangibility  or  rather  the  validity  of  the
observations. 
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This  study, therefore,  proposes  the  descriptor  primary  venue,  which signifies  the
main or first policy-venue which hosts the respective network dynamics. It is called a
primary because it attracts interest groups that perceive it as an effective access point
to the policy-making process. This follows from Yishai’s research on the parentela in
Israel in the 1980s (1992). She argues that the nature of group’s demand determines
group’s perception of venue’s effectiveness or in her words “[groups’] immediate
needs shape their map of targets” (1992: 282).  
She argues that the lower count of groups seeking the party route (venue) in Israel is
a result of the fact that groups’ demands are no longer relevant for or managed at that
venue (Yishai 1992: 282). The implication therefore is that groups find it ineffective
to approach the ruling party because policy-makers cannot process narrow, technical
demands.  The  Israeli  civil  service  has  a  considerable  degree  of  economic
interference,  political  autonomy  and  is  designed  to  process  groups’  narrower
demands  (Yishai  1992:  282).  Therefore,  the  party  in  power  becomes  less  of  an
effective venue for many of Israel’s interest groups, which is why they flock around
the civil service.
La Palombara also suggests that the above perceived venue effectiveness (or primary
venue)  motivates  groups  to  form  the  parentela.  This  is  evident  in  one  of  his
commentaries (La Palombara 1964: 315):
[Respondent's]  argument  suggests  that  if  Confindustria  wishes  to
continue  to  maximize  its  political  effectiveness,  it  must  achieve  a
parentela  relationship  to  the  Christian  Democratic  Party as  well  as  a
clientela relationship to the bureaucracy.
In  other  words,  according  to  La  Palombara's  respondent  above,  going  the  civil
service route is not enough. The Confindustria group needs to primarily establish
core insider access (status) with the ruling party, i.e. establish a parentela, because
that route is seen as more effective than the civil service (La Palombara 1964: 307). 
Furthermore,  his  other  insistence  on  party’s willingness  to  intervene  in  the  civil
service  as  an  independent  variable  (La  Palombara  1964:  306-316;  322-331)
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contributing to the parentela formation,  also reflects the idea that there has to be
some perception among groups that  the ruling party provides  effective access.  If
political parties do not demonstrate any ability to influence the behaviour of the civil
service,  then  groups  would  not  perceive  them  as  effective.  While  it  may  seem
obvious that groups would opt for venues that they see as effective, evidence of party
interference  is  important  as  it  indicates  whether  the  party  in  power  could  be  a
potential parentela host. 
All  of the above leads to the last  network descriptor:  venue scope. This  multiple
response  indicator  represents  the  venue-breadth  of  the  network  dynamics.  Some
policy  networks  inhabit  only one  policy-venue,  like  policy  community, which  is
found  in  the  civil  service.  Others,  say,  like  issue  networks  have  dynamics  that
involve more if  not  all,  policy venues. This descriptor marks  all  relevant  policy-
making venues that a policy network covers. Such specification increases accuracy
and ecological validity because it maintains some level of tangibility at that level of
abstraction. These are concrete and observable relationships that ground analysis on a
meso-level. The parentela, then, occupies the party and civil service policy venues
because of the practice of party political appointments, or party intervention in the
work of the civil service, more generally. The above discussion is summarised in
table 8 (p. 47):
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Table 8 Policy network descriptors
The table summarises all of the adopted network descriptors in this study. The last
descriptor (group strategy) is shaded because it is excluded from the present study.
Also, as the descriptors are indicators as well, they are defined in the table in terms
of the data type they assume, e.g. ordinal, binary, categorical or multiple response. 
Next, regarding causality, the above network descriptors are envisaged as dependent
variables  (DV).  As independent variables, the study recognises hegemonic parties,
parliamentary  elections,  the  drive  for  better  market  standing,  the  need  for  more
campaign funds and EU institutions, but those are discussed at later stages of the
thesis.  Second,  the  descriptor-based  expression  of  policy  networks  does  not
necessarily capture the totality of the dynamics part of the respective network. As the
parentela discussed in 2.4.5 demonstrates, the practice of party political appointments
(PPAs) appears to be peculiar to that network, which is why it is not included as a
descriptor. It is not added therefore to the categorical expression of policy network
types but in the functional description of what the parentela does (again discussed in
2.4.5).
2.4.  Policy Network Classification
The purpose of this  section is  to  classify the better  known policy network types
according to the network descriptors developed earlier. The present section will first
review the more prominent policy networks (2.4.1-5). Sub-section 2.4.6 will  then
apply the network descriptors developed above to the network types and in doing so
will offer a new policy-network classification.
2.4.1.  Subgovernments
US political scientists have identified a host of synonymous policy networks, such as
iron triangles, subgovernments or subsystems (to name a few) that account for the
bulk  of  US non-politicised  policy-making  decisions.  The  more  prominent  of  the
terms are the subgovernments, which Ripley and Franklin define as: 
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clusters of individuals that effectively make most of the routine decisions
in a given substantive area of policy. […] A typical subgovernment is
composed  of  members  of  the  House  and/or  Senate,  members  of
congressional staffs, bureaucrats,  and representatives of private groups
and organizations  interested  in  the  policy area.   (Ripley and Franklin
1987: 8) 
In other words, while a policy or legislative proposal is debated by the Legislature, it
is  informally  modified  in  policy  networks  that  span  across  or  combine  both
legislative  committees  and  executive  departments  (elsewhere  below,  state
administration, the Bureaucracy, the Executive or state agencies). In terms of internal
dynamics, the members of these networks exhibit the shared values of cooperation,
confidentiality, conflict avoidance and, if unobstructed, the relationships could prove
to be resilient in the long run (Ripley and Franklin 1987: 8; Jordan 1990: 319-320,
322,  324).   The  network  as  a  whole  and  the  insider  private  groups  have  a
disproportional ability to dominate policy-making over time in a given policy field.
According to the authors, such networks could be dismantled by purposeful public
and media exposure, by presidential inquiry or any such macro-political disruption,
and by an extreme internal dissent (Ripley and Franklin 1987: 9). As far as the power
ratio is concerned, authors strongly imply that there is power balance among the
participants in this policy network type. 
2.4.2.  Policy Communities
In  the  British  context,  Jordan  and  Richardson  (1979)  discovered  the  policy
community type of network,  which is  very similar to the subgovernments above.
The main similarity lies in that insider status is given to a small number of private
groups, who are frequently consulted on most of the policy matters affecting their
respective industry (1979: 98-100). There is cooperation and parity of power among
the  actors  constituting  the  network  (Richardson  and  Jordan  101-105).   The
difference, however, seems to be in that while subgovernments involve bodies from
the Legislature and the Executive, the policy community is locked in the civil service




Jordan and Richardson (1979: 59) also recognise that policy communities resemble
the  clientela  type  of  policy network,  discovered  by La  Palombara  (1964)  in  the
Italian  polity,  the  traits  of  which  were  later  found  in  France  by  Suleiman  (in
Richardson and Jordan 1979: 56).  Looking at the description of the clientela it does
overlap considerably with  the  policy community, as  far  as  internal  dynamics  are
concerned, because it too is about the tight cooperation between civil service and
privileged interest groups. La Palombara (1964) discusses two classes of conditions
that have to be met for a clientela to come into existence. The first class of conditions
related  to  the  state  administration:  the  agency  seeks  to  consult  regularly  (La
Palombara  1964:  272);  the  regulated  groups  cooperate  with  implementation  (La
Palombara 1964: 273, 275); the state agency solicits expert advice from the clientele
(La Palombara 1964: 274); the relationship is based on exchange of information or
commitments or some form of cooperation (La Palombara 1964: 285).  The class of
conditions pertinent to the interest groups consists: representation of entire sector;
good  reputation;  expertise  (La  Palombara  1964:  277-8;  294;  296,  respectively).
None of them really seem to be a departure from the policy community description
earlier. 
However, the cooperative relationship and bureaucrats' personal identification with
the problems of the sector they have to regulate confuses as to the power ratio inside
the network.  Richardson and Jordan quote La Palombara's dramatic characterisation
of  the  Italian  bureaucracy  in  his  Introduction,  where  he  argues  that  it  is  quite
common for agencies to be under the control of organised business groups which
they are supposed to regulate (1979: 55): 
The Italian bureaucracy, […] is correctly identified as a series of feudal
holdings  in  which  those  in  Italy  who are  theoretically  empowered  to
make the rules are strikingly at the mercy of others whom the rules are
supposed to control and regulate 
According to their reading of La Palombara's clientela, his position is that the interest
group overpowers the state agency.  However, a more detailed reading of his work
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makes it hard to say where he stands.  The purported power asymmetry in favour of
the group does not seem to be endorsed by La Palombara’s formal definition of the
term (La Palombara 1964: 262): 
when an interest group, for whatever reasons, succeeds in becoming, in
the eyes  of  a  given administrative agency, the  natural  expression and
representative  of  a  given  social  sector  which,  in  turn,  constitutes  the
natural  target  or  reference  point  for  the  activity  of  the  administrative
agency. 
This careful wording of the definition of the clientela, devoid of statements on power
allows one to say that La Palombara (1964: 262) was personally undecided on the
degree of power an interest group exerts on to the department, i.e. as Richardson and
Jordan (1979) imply above.  Yet, the present study sees that the toned down clientela
definition might not reflect La Palombara’s real position, but the dangers of publicly
giving credence to such a controversial statement. It is taken here, therefore, that in a
clientela the group overpowers the respective civil service department.
2.4.4.  Issue Networks 
In the late 1970s Hugh Heclo published an article which advocated the existence of
the issue network policy network type (1978).  Others also saw the emergence of the
issue networks (Gais et al 1984; Richardson 2000) in the UK arguing that they were
the antithesis of the iron triangles, subgovernments and policy communities.  The
issue network  stands for open, competitive free-for-all access to the policy-making
process  by  a  greater  number  of  participants.  Contrary  to  the  iron  triangles,  for
instance, the participants in the issue network are in a high profile conflict with one
another.  The access threshold is low, that is, it is a network of outsider status groups
as they initially do not occupy a policy-making venue, other than the Media,  but
make their way in through conflict.  This is a notable difference from the triangles,
communities or clientelas, which are situated within the Executive and in a close
cooperation with its policy-makers and other groups with equally privileged access.
Again, one of the most prominent debates since Heclo has been whether the iron
triangles and policy communities have been substituted by the issue networks as the
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dominant policy style in the UK and US, and whether the issue and subgovernment
(combined with policy community) networks are mutually exclusive (Jordan 1981;
1990:  330;  2005;  Grant  2005;  Richardson 2000;  Maloney and Richardson 1994;
Maloney and Jordan 1997; Gais et al 1984). 
2.4.5.  Parentela 
The parentela is mentioned here only for completeness of the list. Its definition was
discussed in Chapter 1. Again, this is a relationship where a party insider group gains
privileged access in the bureaucracy, as a result of its pre-existing privileged standing
within the ruling party. It may be that party factions or party leadership endorses that
group as a preferred policy-making partner. The influence of the party insider group
manifests when the party interferes on its behalf, and in its interest, in the work of the
civil service. So far, the literature has identified party political appointments as one
such form of interference, although chapter 4 later discusses civil service reforms as
another.  That  chapter  demonstrates  that  ruling  political  parties  can  change  the
eligibility criteria that groups must meet in order to enter consultations with the civil
service. In doing so, a ruling party in theory can filter certain groups out from the
policy-making process, while introducing new bureaucratic insiders. In any case, the
following section will try to summarise the above presentation of the existing policy
network types in terms of the network descriptors developed in section 2.3.
2.4.6.  Policy Network Classification Using Network Descriptors
On the basis of all hitherto reviewed network types and descriptors, the following
table 9 was constructed and adopted in the Bulgarian study:
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Table 9 Policy Network Classification Using Policy Network Descriptors
A few caveats need noting. First, prisoner insider is a hypothetical policy network
that  follows  from 1)  Wyn  Grant's  classification  of  insider  status  interest  groups
(Grant 1977) and 2) the present logic of policy network classifications. The question
marks indicate that there is very little information available on the dynamics of that
hypothetical relationship. Second, the primary venue of the subgovernment is placed
on the legislature, because while the executive agencies are also involved, Ripley and
Franklin (1987: 8-10) set the pivotal point of this network in the legislature. Third,
table  9  allows  researchers  to  add  or  remove  descriptors  as  they  see  fit  without
changing the logic of presentation, as long as the descriptive categories are discrete
(assumed), as few as possible, most relevant to existing network descriptions and
maintain  the  meso-level  focus.   Fourth,  it  should  be  explicitly  stated  that  the
literature tends to express the network descriptors from the perspective of the group
vis-a-vis the relevant venue policy makers. This perspective is also maintained in
table 9 (p. 52) above as well. 
2.5.  Conclusion
In order to test the hypotheses from chapter 1, the parentela policy network type had
to  be  operationalised.  However,  that  in  turn  is  also  dependent  on  first
operationalising  the  generic  term  policy  network.  The  chapter  argues  that  the
operationalization of  policy network definition  and  policy network types depend on
developing a small set of meso-level categories that reflect specific characteristics of
the public-private  relationships that policy networks stand for.  These are labelled
here descriptors and stand for indicators types that represent an aspect of the group-
policy  maker  relationship,  looking  from  the  perspective  of  the  interest  group.
Although  the  descriptors  adopted  in  the  present  study are  qualitative,  the  future
should see their quantification. 
In any case, the present study operationalises  policy networks  in terms of the five
qualitative descriptors:
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 Degree of Access, whether and how far a group has a privileged access to the
respective policy venue
 Network  Dynamics,  whether  there  is  conflict  or  cooperation  between  the
group and venue policy makers
 Power  Ratio,  whether  the  group  or  policy-makers  are  more  powerful  or
neither
 Primary Venue,  which of the four main venues (Media/Public, Legislature,
Civil Service and Ruling Party) is most effective (or first to be utilised) for
the group involved in that policy network
 Venue Scope,  the total number of relevant venues that collectively host the
policy-network dynamics (more than one)
To  illustrate  the  effectiveness  of  policy  network  classification  with  the  above
descriptors,  all  major  policy  network  types,  including  the  parentela,  were  also
expressed using them. The next chapter will discuss the second main methodological
challenge – the conduct of elite interviews and the methods used to overcome elite
respondent resistance and reluctance.
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CHAPTER 3:  Elite  Interviews,  Systems Design
and Case Studies
3.1.  Introduction
The present chapter discusses the research methods and the data collection process of
the  study. The  present  study consisted  of  two  stages.  At  the  first  stage  26  elite
interviews were conducted. That data provided guidance for the development of a
case  study  that  captured  the  parentela  and  its  features  in  action,  which  in  turn
constituted the second stage. Elite interviews were a useful scanning exercise that
captured so far unobserved dynamics in the policy network (parentela)  literature.
These new dynamics are discussed in Chapter 9, which is dedicated to a variation of
La Palombara’s parentela. Thanks to the in-depth elite interviews, it was possible to
observe an image of the initial parentela: that of conflict between the party and core
insiders versus specific outsider groups. However, the reason for the present research
was designed to  incorporate  specific  case  studies  is  that  interviews alone do not
allow for the observation of a parentela as a system in operation. The approach that
identified the parentela features in isolation from one another provided a segmented
image of  the parentela  that  is  less  reliable  than   presenting  an actual  case of  it,
particularly where all  parentela  features  are  observable in  action.  If  all  parentela
features are evident in a political system, then a parentela must be in existence, but
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that is not the same as actually demonstrating one in operation. A case in point of an
actual parentela in action will be discussed in chapter 8. 
The present chapter is focused primarily on the first research stage: the conduct of
the  26  elite  interviews.  The  intention  was  to  replicate  the  backgrounds  of  La
Palombara’s pool  of elite respondents (1964):  civil  servants,  politicians and trade
associations. This posed a challenge is it was necessary to develop a mechanism to
compare  both  respondent  pools  in  order  to  assess  the  validity  of  the  data.  If
respondent  backgrounds  matched,  then  the  parentela  model  observed  in  the
Bulgarian respondent pool is equivalent to the parentela derived from La Palombara's
elite respondent pool.
In order to address this difficulty, a counting system of respondent’s policy-making
embeddedness, or  positionality, was developed. This term stands for the count of
policy-making posts (relevant to the study) that a respondent holds or has held. These
metrics help measure respondent’s proximity to and embeddedness in the policy-
making process. This helps compare the respondent pools and the extent to which the
conclusions later are relateable (compatible) to one-another, policy-making and the
overall  policy  network  conceptual  framework.  The  counting  of  a  respondent's
positionality points could be done multipositionally, i.e. counting the policy-making-
relevant posts a respondent has held in total, up to and including at the interview. Or
conservatively, counting the single highest policy-making-relevant post held by the
respondent  at  the  time  of  the  interview.  The  available  data  on  La  Palombara’s
methods (1964)  allows  only for  a  conservative  comparison,  the  results  of  which
indicate an approximate equivalence between the two respondent pools. This means
that respondents from both pools came from the roughly same backgrounds and that
the information they provided is relatable to the policy network framework.
The  second  challenge  was  to  overcome  the  reluctance  of  most  of  the  elite
respondents. Target participants refused to be interviewed and even if some conceded
to  an  interview,  they  still  attempted  to  retain  information.  This  challenge  was
overcome  with  the  use  of  the  intermediary.  This  is  a  relatively  new  research
69
participant type that makes the formal introduction of the researcher to the target
respondent and vouches for former’s credibility (Petkov and Kaoullas 2016). The use
of a small network of intermediaries helped secure interviews with some of the more
reclusive political respondents. The other benefit using intermediaries came in their
inclusion in actual interviews. They helped with some of the more tense respondents
to calm them down and transform the interview into a discussion among equals. This
improved the respondent-researcher rapport and the quality of the data released by
the interviewee. 
Regarding  the  second  stage  of  the  research  process,  the  chapter  discussess  case
studies  (3.5.).  In  essence  the  study could  be  seen  as  a  case  of  the  parentela  in
Bulgaria, which comprises a number of nested case studies, each of which casts light
on a different feature of the parentela or on the network as a whole. The present
study could  be seen as  a  Most  Different  Systems Design comparative  project.  It
compares two quite different systems, i.e. 2010s Bulgaria to 1960s Italy, which share
the same dependent variable, the parentela, but differ on the independent variable. In
1960s  Italian  parentela  correlated  with  a  single  hegemonic  party,  while  2010s
Bulgaria shows signs of the parentela, despite lacking a hegemonic political party.
This  particular  absence  of  a  pre-known  cause  for  the  possible  existence  of  the
parentela in the Bulgarian case means that the case studies have to be geared towards
establishing the possible causes for the presence or absence of a parentela in the
Bulgarian  case.  That  in  turn  translates  into  the  utilisation  of  the  process  tracing
approach, known in the case study literature, where the researcher establishes a chain
of causal dynamics that connect the effect (say, presenece of a parentela, as it will be
revealed later) with its probable causes. This is discussed at more length in section
3.5 of the present chapter.
The present chapter therefore is structured as follows: section 3.2 is dedicated to the
comparative scheme between the Bulgarian and Italian elite respondents. Section 3.3
reveals  the  causes  for  respondent  resistance/reluctance  from  relevant  literature.
Section 3.4 then discusses the measures from the literature that were applied to this
study  (3.4.1.1,  3.4.2.2,  3.4.2.1,  3.4.2.2),  as  well  as  the  effects  of  including  the
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intermediary  at  the  respondent  selection  (3.4.1.3,  3.4.1.4)  and  interview conduct
(3.4.2.3) stages. The last section, 3.5, discusses the use of case studies in the present
research.
3.2.  Elite Respondent Pools Comparison 
Before  engaging  in  the  debate  on  the  techniques  used  to  successfully  solicit
interviews from elite respondents, it has to be explained who was identified as an
elite respondent. In this study, consistent with Lillecker (2003), Mikecz (2012) and
Smith (2006), the lowest common denominator among all respondents is whether the
person had held or was a holder of a post of authority in the policy-making process.
This concern with authority is partly informed by Smith (2006) who adopts Allen's
(in  Smith  2006)  position  that  it  would  be  better  to  speak  of  power  in  terms  of
individuals  possessing  uncontested  authority  (Smith  2006:  646).  This  position  is
similar to Lillecker (2003) and Mikecz (2012) whose elite respondents were selected
based on their position of political authority. For Lillecker, “Elites can be loosely
defined as those with close proximity to power or policy making” (2003: 207). As for
Mikecz (2012: 485), he sees elites as authority-bearing individuals who:
have been occupying powerful positions as senior government officials,
chief  executive  officers,  and  senior  managers  in  public  and  private
organizations. 
This study adopted the above conception of elite respondents and too focused on
individuals who held or influenced those holding positions of authority in policy-
making, coming from the three actors types that comprise the parentela:  political
parties, civil service (administration) and interest groups (trade associations).  They
were selected on the basis of the policy-making positions they held at the time of
carrying the interview and/or in the past. In addition, an unanticipated respondent
type was included in the study: business owners. While not immediate post holders,
they were included because some of them had direct (recurring) contact with leaders
and representatives of political parties in power, as well as with the administrative
policy-makers. In any case, table 10 below makes a preliminary introduction of the
cast of respondents:
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Table 10 Interview Numbers and Respondent Pseudonyms
The left column indicates the chronological order in which the interviews were taken,
while the right column lists the assumed names of the respondents.
In order to be able to effectively compare respondent pools it is necessary to examine
and compare their backgrounds. In doing so, it will be possible to gauge the extent to
which each study effectively represents each of the three actor types that constitute
the  parentela:  Administration,  Parties  and  (Interest)  Groups.  Moreover,  this  also
enables  us  to  assess  the  comparative validity of  the  present  project  to  its  earlier
Italian counterpart. Ideally, both respondent pools will comprise the same respondent
make-up and both will be fully embedded in the policy-making process.
In order to make this comparison, both respondent pools will be measured in terms of
units of representativity. A unit of  representativity is a respondent's career position
with  access  to  policy-making  that  they  occupied.  The  difficulty  in  making  a
representativity  comparison  is  deciding  whether  to  take  into  account  all  policy-
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making posts a respondent has held up to and including the interview, or to take into
account only the single, highest policy-making post an interviewee occiped at the
time of the interview. 
In the absence of details on his methods, La Palombara (1964) can only be assumed
to have adopted what is defined here as a conservative representativity. This means
that, what counts as an occupied post by a respondent is the highest position they
occupied at the time of the interview. A multipositional representativity  would then
be counting  all  relevant  post  a respondent  holds  and/or  has held in their  policy-
making career at the time of the interview. Posts are defined here as: any formal and
informal  position  in  political  parties,  state  administration,  interest  groups  and
business  firms  that  have  recurringly  made  policy-making  decisions  or  regularly
influenced those who make them. In light of the parentela, this ideally means direct
recurring interaction with a ruling party’s leadership (or factions, see Chapter 7). The
emphasis on informal is an acknowledgement of the observation that individual firms
largely informally access to the policy-making process (Chapter 7). The emphasis on
recurring is to highlight that the respondent had an insider status, as per Grant (1978)
and  Maloney  et  al  (1997).  Again,  while  the  chapter  argues  that  multipositional
representativity  is  a  more  accurate  mechanism for  comparison of  the  respondent
pools  and  a  measurement  of  data  validity,  given  the  scant  information  on  the
background of La Palombara's respondents (1964), we can only compare both studies
conservatively.
La Palombara (1964) conducted 25 interviews with respondents primarily from the
three backgrounds: administrative, political and interest group. In table 11 below for
the  purpose  of  comparability,  the  respondents  of  La  Palombara  (1964)  are
represented by the same categories used to code respondents  from the Bulgarian
study.  The  Bureaucracy  or  State  Administration  is  represented  by  the  categories
COM, DIR and MIN, where (COM) stands for a recurring participant or a convener
of a consultative committee and (DIR) is a director of a state agency or a state-owned
firm. La Palombara (1964), however, did not make any such distinctions (COM and
DIR), hence the question marks. The final category is MIN and it stands for whether
73
the respondent  was a  minister. There is  one caveat,  however. The MIN category
could be seen as simultaneously representative of the Party and the Administration,
because a minister is appointed by the party. From a strict point of view, however,
and  taking  into  account  the  fact  that  a  minister  deals  primarily  with  the
administration, a minister is counted as a representative of the administration.
Political  parties  are  represented  by  the  categories  MP,  LDR  and  ADV, which
respectively stand for Members of Parliament, leaders of political parties and their
respective (political cabinet) advisers. The category LDR in particular stands for a
chairman of a political party, and not simply a high profile politician from a given
party. These  three  distinctions  cannot  clearly be  picked up from La  Palombara's
(1964) work, hence the question marks. Furthermore, the categories that indicate the
presence of interest groups in the study are B and TA, which respectively stand for
business owners and directors of Trade Associations. 
Finally, La Palombara did not interview any business owners (hence empty boxes)
and makes no indication of what is meant by a “leader” of a TA: an important figure
or the respective director. Erring on the side of caution, this thesis assumes that a
leader is a TA director or of an equal rank, although the same concession cannot
reasonably be made when he refers to his respondents as “leader of a political party”
(discussed  in  this  section  below).  The  profile  of  La  Palombara's  respondents  is
summarised in table 11:
Table 11 Profile of La Palombara's Respondent Pool
74
Upon closer inspection, six respondents stand out. Two people were journalists (J),
one  was  a  writer  (W)  and  another  three  were  unassigned  a  background  (U).
Therefore, a conservative estimate on his pool of respondents would suggest that his
most  reliable  information  must  have  come  from  19  core  (total  core,  below)
interviews  of  immediate  practitioners  of  policy-making.  The  quantity  of  his
respondents could be summarised thus as in table 12 below.
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Table 12 Summary of La Palombara's Respondents’ Backgrounds
Note in table 12 above that MIN, COM, DIR, ADV, B are null because La Palombara
does not provide a breakdwon for such a respondent backgrounds. Let us now apply
the  conservative  rule  and  compare  respectively the  respondent  pools  in  table  13
below: 
Table 13 Conservative Respondent Pool Comparison, LaPalombara and this Study
Table 13 shows that there seems to be an imbalance in the representation of the state
administration. At the time of interviews only 2 Bulgarian respondents were holders
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of an administrative post:  one Minister and one agency director. Again,  the main
reason  for  that  is  the  interview  reluctance  among  the  active  staff  in  Bulgarian
Ministries. On the other hand, interest groups seem to be better represented in the
Bulgarian study. There is parity on the level of trade association directors at the time
of interview of 5 in each study. To the advantage of the Bulgarian study, however,
instead of La Palombara’s J, W and U categories, there is an additional interest group
related respondent category: business owners with access to policy-making. There
also is parity in the representation of political parties with 6 in total per respondent
pool.  Finally,  it  seems  that  overall,  the  Bulgarian  study  is  less  representative
conservatively than the Italian one with only 17 active postholders at the time of
interview, against 25. However, this ignores the fact that La Palombara makes use of
6 respondents who are rather non-policy-making participants. Ultimately, therefore,
discounting the miscellaneous (MISC) group from the Italian study, it is evident that
the  conservative  representativity  of  the  respondent  pools  is  comparable,  with  17
Bulgarian respondents to 19 Italian ones. 
In addition, multipositional respondent description allows for the representativity of a
certain time period. The variety of backgrounds in the Bulgarian study leads to high
temporal representativity because respondent’s careers cover almost the entire period
of  Bulgaria’s  recent  democratic  past  since  the  regime  change  from  totalitarian
socialism  to  capitalist  democracy  in  1989.  This  adds  another  layer  of  validity
particularly on those overlapping positions that are formed by respondents who have
formed those positions while holding posts at  different times.  Let us first  review
table 14 below which summarises both approaches with the multipositional one on
the extreme left:
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Table 14 Conservative and Multipositional Comparison of Respondent Pools
It  should  be  reminded  that  La  Palombara  (1964)  does  not  elaborate  on  his
respondents’ background, which enforces the  conservative positionality  assumption
that  they  were  active  single-postholders  at  the  time  of  interview.  A  strictly
conservative Italian-Bulgarian respondent pool comparison is  in the categories  In
2013*  and  In  1964,  which  shows  some  disparities  in  the  Administration  Total
category and strict parity in the Party Total category. Table 14 reveals that relaxing
the conservative rules increases the representativity of certain Bulgarian respondent
backgrounds.  In  the  Administration  Total  category,  where  conservative  under-
representation  in  the  Bulgarian  study  is  evident  (with  only  2  active  admin
respondents), a multipositional view that includes former administrative post-holders
(5) totals 7. From strict parity in the  Party Total category, including former post-
holders  (Prior  2013)  leads  to  a  slight  advantage  of  the  present  study  in  that
background type.  The last category Multipositionality, represents all relevant policy-
making  posts  the  Bulgarian  respondents  had  held  for  that  background.  That,
however, is only for information as no such equivalent measure is possible in relation
to the Italian study. 
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Table 15 below offers a full multipositional and temporal representativity breakdown
of the Bulgarian respondent pool at the time of the interview, which has served as the
source for the compilation of the above table 14:
Table 15 Detailed profiling of the Bulgarian Respondent Pool
In table 15 above, the left half is dedicated to describing respondents who represent
the three  parentela  background types, i.e.  positional representativity. The right half
denotes when the respondent was active holder of their posts. The time periods are
measured  in  terms  of  Parliamentary  sessions  because  given  that  political
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appointments  are  associated  with  the  party in  power,  a  postholder’s longevity is
linked to elections (chapter 5). 
So, for example Hristov has been an MP, a Minister, adviser, committee chairman,
agency director and a director of a trade association, with all of these positions held
from 38th to 42nd Bulgarian parliament or from 1997 to the time of interview (and
later). Table 15 is deliberately designed not to allow to match a parliamentary session
to a particular post. Each position on the left bears 1 positional representativity point,
while each parliamentary session covered, is marked with 1 temporal representativity
point. As noted above, the right half of the table marks respective respondent’s period
of activity, which contributes to the representation of a certain time-frame. The table
indicates that political parties tend to be a bit more represented in the study than the
administration  and  interest  groups,  with  22,  18  and  15  multipositional
representativity points respectively. With regards to the temporal representativity, it
seems to be a bit more balanced with the period from 2009 to the time of interview in
2013 being more represented than other periods (parliaments in session), with 11 and
10 temp-representativity points respectively.
The multipositional approach is also applied in demonstrating the extent to which
political parties are represented in the study. First, let us see how political parties are
represented conservatively in table 16 below:
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Table 16 Conservative representation of political parties in the study
Some of the names of the political parties and respondent pseudonyms have been
concealed. The parties are ordered from extreme left (EL****), to extreme right. It
has to be noted that EL**** above is a composite category of two parties. No hints
are provided on purpose as to which party is X, other than it is between extreme left
and  the  socialist  left  of  Bulgarian  Socialist  Party.  The  table  counts  the  party  a
respondent was in an active association, at the time of the interview. 
However,  a  strict  counting  of  MPs  is  an  incomplete  measure  of  political  party
representation.  Party appointments  both  ministerial  and administrative  also  allow
respective individuals to speak on matters of the party, even if strictly speaking they
occupy an administrative post at the time of the interview. The same goes for former
administrative/ministerial  appointees.  Political  advisers  are  another  category  of
individuals who are neither MPs nor appointees, but have an insider view on the
dynamics in political parties. 
In order to reflect the idea that people with positions of advisers or someoen from
outside political parties, too, can provide vantage point on the intra-party dynamics,
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the  Affiliated  /ex-Affiliated  categories  were  devised. The  criteria  for  assigning
respondents to the (ex-/)Affiliated  category was whether they held a post, which is
adjacent to political parties and which granted direct access to them. Therefore, if a
respondent  meets  any  one  of  the  three  conditions,  they  will  go  in  the  “(ex-)/
Affiliated” categories:
 If (former) MP of a different party (party nomads)  
 if (former) minister (MIN)   
 if (former) party leader of a coalition partner to a different party (LDR);  
 if (former) an administrative appointee:
 if in a commission (COM), 
 if in an agency director (DIR)  or 
 if in a State Owned Enterprise (DIR)  
 If (former) adviser to MP or ruling party leadership (ADV).
A multipositional look on the extent political parties are represented in this study
would produce table 17 below:
Table 17 Multipositional Representation of Political Parties in this Study
Note in the table above that the “non-political” column lists all respondents lacking
any party political connections. Similar to earlier, the multipositional look provides a
more  realistic  and  accurate  view of  respondents’ representativity.  The  seemingly
82
modest  conservative  representation  of  Bulgarian  political  parties  in  the  study
assumes quite generous proportions when acknowledging both the flow and nuances
of functionaries’ interconnectedness with them, as reflected in table 17. 
All  of  the  above  demonstrates  that  the  multipositional  counting  system  of
institutional  or  actor  type  representativity  is  more  realistic  and accurate  than  the
conservative one. However, it is not possible to tell what La Palombara’s respondent
selection criteria was, so comparison with his pool of respondents can happen only
on conservative level. Overall, the respondents from the present study are generally
comparable  to  those  from  La  Palombara’s,  save  for  the  group  of  respondents
representing the civil service. Yet looking at the Bulgarian respondent pool from the
multipositional perspective, then, that indicates the civil service is as represented as
the other two categories (political parties and interest groups). 
Moreover,  the temporal representativity measure shows that the experiences forming
Bulgarian respondents’ perception of the policy-making process are overall balanced
along the period from early 1990s to 2013, except for the 2009 to 2013 period, the
end of which overlaps with the time of carrying out of the bulk of the field work.
This period and the two Parliamentary Sessions it covers is twice more represented
than  other  periods.  This  means  that  the  study can  be  seen  as  a  snap-shot  2013
Bulgarian  politics.  However,  this  also  means  we  can  generalise  with  some
confidence within the 1989-2013 period.  The temproal  spread of  the respondents
shows high validity and generalisability of respondents’ responses, particularly when
overlapping  statements  were  issued  by  different  people  occupying  (or  having
occupied) different posts, at different times. After comparing the respondent pools
between the present study and that of La Palombara (1964), the discussion in the
following  section  3.3  moves  to  how  to  convince  elite  respondents  to  given  an
interview and how to ensure that they provide full and trustworthy answers. 
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3.3.  Causes  of  Elite  Respondent  Reluctance  and
Resistance 
Bulgarian elite respondents exhibited what Adler and Adler (1995) have labelled as
reluctance  and  resistance.  Key  target  respondents  refused  to  be  interviewed
(reluctance) at all, while thers, on the other hand, did not cooperate at the interview
and  sought  to  withhold  information  (resistance).  Many  of  them  were  also
emotionally unstable, e.g. too tense, irritable, loud, or the opposite, very quiet, very
brief and reclusive. 
It  transpired  that  the  main  cause  for  the  above  behaviour  was  researcher’s
positionality. Used in the context of elite interviews  positionality  refers to the idea
that certain dimensions of researcher's identity could cause reluctant and resistant
behaviour in the respondents. There are three major positionality types that could be
distilled from the literature insider/outsider, expert and adversarial.  The first relates
to the extent a researcher is seen as part of the social, cultural or otherwise group the
respondent  belongs  to.  The second relates  to  the  extent  to  which  the  respondent
acknowledges the expert status of the researcher. The third relates to the extent the
respondent perceives the researcher as a threat. Section 3.3.3 highlights adversarial
positionality as the main cause for reluctance and resistance in this study. In doing
so, it  also distinguishes  three subtypes  of  adversarial  positionality, which will  be
discussed in more details below.
3.3.1.  Insider/Outsider Positionality
The  first  type  of  positionality  is  insider/outsider  and  it  refers  to  whether  the
researcher is  perceived as part  of respondent's  social  or cultural  group. To be an
insider one has to highlight any physical, social, cultural, ethnic or other identity trait
in common with the respondent in order to advertise similarity with their cultural or
otherwise,  group  (Belur,  2014:  187;  Bondy,  2013:  582;  Herod,  1999;  Mertkan-
Ozunlu, 2007: 451–3; Mikecz, 2012; Mullings, 1999; Obasi, 2014: 65, 73; Paechter,
2013;  Sabot,  1999).  For  example,  a  researcher  is  employing insider  positionality
when they seek to highlight that they, too, like their respondent are: also working
class, of the same ethnic descent, of the same political views, basically anything in
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common that would make the respondent accept the researcher as “one of their own”.
However, practice has shown that advertising insider positionality does not guarantee
rapport and may backfire (Enguix, 2014: 84; Herod, 1999: 324–5; Mikecz, 2012:
189–90;  Paechter,  2013:  75–6;  Sabot,  1999:  330,  332;  Stephens,  2007:  206–8).
Another controversy is whether it is within the powers of the researcher to define
their positionality or it is conferred on them by those researched (Mullings, 1999:
346, 347). 
The present study can report  that relying on insider positionality was as risky as
approaching respondents from the position of an outsider. As it will be explained in
section 3.4.3, for some respondents, such as Hristov, the researcher being outsider
was a relief that he was disassociated from their political opponents. As for Dimitrov
on  the  other  hand,  being  associated  with  Western  universities  meant  that  the
researcher  was  a  foreign  threat.  Some  of  respondents’  prejudism  against  the
researcher support Mullings’ warning above: that positionality tended to be rather a
label stamped on the researcher by respondents, and not a matter of choice.
3.3.2.  Expert Positionality
Expert positionality refers to whether the researcher acts as an expert or a layman at
the  interview. The  ensuing power  interaction  at  the  interview usually causes  the
participant with an expert  status to try and control  the interview (McEvoy 2006:
185).  Odendahl  and  Shaw  (2001:  312)  report  that  age-difference  degrades  the
chances  of  novice  researchers  gaining  access,  which  indirectly  suggests  that
respondents interviewed by younger researchers will perceive themselves as experts
and  seek  to  dominate  the  interview.  Seldon  (1998:  11)  seems  to  address  these
negative  power  dynamics,  when  warning  that  doctoral  students'  letters  of
introduction are unlikely to be warmly welcomed by prospective elite respondents.
The dismissive interview attitude of expert-statused elite respondents from this study
is  a  reflection  of  the  experience  of  Welch  et  al.  (2002:  620-621)  where:  “On
occasions elite dominance extended to directing and commenting on data collection
and the analytical dimensions of the project”.  Many interviews also reflected the
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one-way  dialogue  type  of  power-asymmetric  conflictual  interviews  presented  by
Kvale (2006: 684-685). In fact his typology is largely based on the hidden conflict
over who would assume the “expert” mantle on the interview subject matter. For
example, in his conflictual interview types – interviewer monopoly of interpretation,
instrumental dialogue  and interviewer rules the interview –  the respondent dictates
the meaning of the interview responses and the exact course of the interview, because
they  have  the  status  of  an  indisputable  expert  (Kvale  2006:  484-485).  (His
manipulative dialogue seems more like a technique on dealing with resistance which
will be discussed later in section 3.4.2 (Kvale 2006: 484)). 
Expert positionality was a recurrent problem in nearly all elite interviews at the data
collection  stage  of  this  study.  This  usually  took  the  shape  of  Kvale's  one-way
dialogues,  where the respondent dominated the interview by both asking questions
and by using up the available time with bloated answers (2006: 484; and particularly
respondents Golemanov, Kuzmanov and Aleksandrov). In many cases a respondent
would reinforce their expert status by also asking the researcher questions, which in
most cases were impossible to answer or were rhetoric, although it was very hard to
determine either way (Kuzmanov, Konstantinov). 
What a researcher could do in such situation is generally described in the expert vs
ignoramus dilemma (McDowell 1998): when confronting an elite respondent, should
the  researcher  act  the  expert to  compensate  the  perceived  asymmetry  or  act  the
ignoramus as someone who seeks to benefit from the wisdom of their interviewee.
The views are divergent. Mullings (1999: 343), and Odendahl and Shaw (2001: 311)
advocate researchers adopt an expert role. Similarly, to exude expertise seems also
implicit  in the research of  Rivera et  al.  (2002:  685)  who report  that  their  expert
status, equal to those of the respondents, greatly facilitated the rapport and conduct of
their interviews. McDowell (1998: 2139), however, found that it was most beneficial
to switch between the roles ad hoc, depending on the personality of the respondent at
hand.  Leech (2002: 665)  however  takes  a more nuanced stance arguing that  one
should appear slightly less expert  than the respondent,  because the danger of the
86
strictly expert approach is to appear intimidating. The experiences of this study seem
to support his approach.
3.3.3.  Adversarial Positionality Types
While it ultimately relates to whether the respondent will perceive the researcher as a
threat,  three  sub-types  of adversarial  positionality could  be  distilled  from  the
literature. The first and most prevalent sub-type of adversarial positionality occurs
when there are two or more rival respondent groups (e.g. workers vs management,
Mullings 1999 above), and the researcher is perceived by either of them as associated
with the other. As a result, in what is termed here negative snowballing, being seen
supportive of either camp precludes access to the other. In the case of Mullings, the
mere  act  of  helping  a  member  of  the  managerial  respondent  group  in  a  trivial
accident  was  seen  by  the  workers  as  a  sign  that  the  researcher  had  sided  with
management, and she admits that this closed her access to the workers (1999: 347).
Similar  predicament  is  also  reported  by  McEvoy  (2006:  185-186),  who  in
researching opposing political camps in Northern Ireland, warns everyone entering
the field against  being perceived by their  present respondent as a member of the
opposing  respondent  group  (e.g.  pro-life  respondent  vs  pro-choice  respondent
groups). For the same reason, for instance Herod (1999: 323) did not see it prudent to
reveal the identity of her other target respondents at interviews. Woliver also reports
that  conflict  among  target  respondents  could  lead  to  access  being  denied  if  the
researcher is perceived to have favoured any of the camps in conflict by interviewing
their  opposition (2002: 677; also Neal and McLaughlin 2009: 694; Laurila 1997:
410).
The second type of  adversarial positionality concerns the situation when the target
elite respondent suspects rival elites as either sponsoring the study or in the position
of taking advantage of it. For instance, Sabot was ostracised by the domestic French
elites who were concerned that the information they provide will be used by their
party political competition (1999: 330-332). Her breakthrough at home came only
when she collaborated with a  US colleague who had earlier  been granted ample
access by the same elite respondents that had previously avoided her (Sabot 1999:
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331). Upon reflecting on her experiences, Sabot concedes that, immersed in local
politics, her respondents initially refused her access because they perceived her as
associated with their political rivals (1999: 332). 
For  the  same  reasons,  Mullings  highlighted  to  her  elite  Jamaican  executive
respondents  her  British  nationality  and  US  academic  background,  and  not  her
Jamaican descent (1999: 344). In the case of McDowell (1998: 2137) the data from
interviews were also of interest to the market competition, and that brought tension
in her interviews. The same could be said about Mikecz, who although had acquired
reliable connections among Estonian elites, still found it necessary to highlight his
Hungarian  descent,  as  well  (2012:  489-490).  Overall,  in  an  environment  of
competing business elites, as Herod (1999: 325) argues, in most cases a researcher
has to find the “harmless” outsider identity dimension. 
Given the varied sources of respondent prejudices in the Bulgarian study, it was hard
to guess pre-determine what positionality to opt for. At an interview with an active
minister, a third person had to convince them of researcher's disconnectedness from
Bulgarian  politics.  However,  at  other  occasions  as  described  above,  identifying
oneself as an outsider was counterproductive. This relates to  abstract adversarial
positionality discussed below. 
A new, third type of adversarial positionality can be the result of elites perceiving the
researcher  as  associated  with  an  abstract  adversary.  While  in  the  previous  two
adversarial  sub-categories it was possible to guess at least who respondent's rivals
might be, that is impossible in this third respondent category. For some interviewees
the perceived threat came from an either unknown or unverifiable adversary, such as
but not limited to the intelligence services. It is safe to say that in this situation the
respondents are concerned that the interview data would be intercepted and misused
by an ill-intended someone, whom they are unable to clearly identify. 
This respondent category, though unlabelled, is evident in the literature. For instance,
Desmond was treated with grave suspicion by a core female elite respondent and a
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scientific  staff  member who were concerned that  the competition  might  intercept
interview responses (2004: 265-266). In what appears to be the most extreme case,
Rivera et al. (2002: 684) were perceived by their respondents as spies, fearing the
study was a cover for an espionage by Russian or foreign agencies. In their ample
reference to the Denitch (1972) study, Rivera et al. (2002: 685) also appear to find
traces of the same concerns with his then Yugoslavian respondents who distrusted his
study's legitimacy (Denitch 1972: 153-154).
While all positionalities were experienced in some degrees, the Bulgarian study was
affected  primarily  by abstract  adversarial  positionality.  In  many  cases  the
respondents were prejudiced that either the intelligence services or that someone else
hostile would intercept and misuse the interview data. As a result, it was impossible
to generate rapport because it was impossible to demonstrate disassociation from an
adversary  that  (probably)  does  not  exist  (e.g.  that  you  are  not  a  spy).  The  first
indications of problematic positionality became apparent in the correspondence with
respondent Dimitrov. That also coincidentally exemplified Goldstein’s concern with
the  negative  effects  earlier  researchers  might  have  on  the  interviews  of  their
colleagues with the same respondents at a later stage (Goldstein 2002: 672, endnote
2). Based on experiences with previous Bulgarian researchers, respondent Dimitrov
refused to be interviewed. He feared the study would be politically exploited and
ideologically biased in favour of the West, just as with the other Bulgarian PhDs
studying in the West whom have interviewed him earlier.
In a similar vein, having read Dostena Lavergne's “The Experts of the Transition”
(2010), respondent Lyubenov had formed the view that given its proximity to the
subject of political  corruption,  the study was probably also financed or somehow
associated with any of the US foundations in Bulgaria which Lavergne exposes in
her book as serving US interests. That is why, in respondent's view, the study was
deliberately seeking to  establish  malpractice  and so be  used as  an  instrument  of
political pressure by the West. Yet, it is true that the dislike of Western affiliation was
not uniform. Respondents Hristov and Donchev were satisfied to find the researcher
had lived the last 10 years mainly in the UK. Nevertheless, it remained that it was
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unpredictable  as  to  how  a  respondent  would  react  when  hearing  of  a  Western
association. It was impossible to safely project neither domestic nor foreign identity
so to elicit trust.
While Lyubenov and Dimitrov saw the abstract Western political elites behind the
study,  others,  including  some  intermediaries  (defined  below, 3.4.),  suspected  the
equally abstract intelligence agencies of monitoring the research project at the very
least,  if  not  controlling  it  outright.  For  example,  Respondent  Nikolov  suddenly
changed the interview venue and it was apparent that it was chosen for its remote
location and noisy surroundings which would hamper any surveillance.  Later, an
intermediary (I2) made the occasional jokes that the researcher was doing a favour to
MI5, if not working for them outright. This musing assumed more ironic contours
when Dobromirov confided that in the past another Bulgarian researcher studying in
the US, had been exposed as working for the CIA. Some respondents, obviously
reacting on abstract adversarial fears, openly stated that the research thematics could
put  them  and  the  researcher  at  undue  personal  risk  (Rumenov,  Mihailov,  and
Dobromirov).  This  fear  was understandable,  because  for  many respondents,  their
lifetime political and business adversaries were still in power and in theory could
harm them.
Therefore, the tendency was for all respondents to resist employing specific names,
places  and  dates,  which  was  agreeable.  One  respondent  refused  to  continue  the
interview unless the Dictaphone was switched off (Mihailov). On another occasion
the mismatch between what was actually shared by respondent Stoyanov compared
to the information elicited earlier  through the intermediary was staggering as the
respondent had pretended there had been no party-political pressure on his business.
One could only guess the scale of such elite respondent information concealment.
While the present section discussed reluctance and resistance as the main interview
obstacles, the following one discusses the approaches taken to overcome them.
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3.4.  Reducing  Elite  Respondent  Reluctance  and
Resistance Using an Intermediary
The main solution to respondent reluctance and resistance was the involvement of a
new  research  participant  actor:  the  intermediary.   The  effectiveness  of  using  an
intermediary has  already been reported to  the methodological  journal  Qualitative
Research in a collaborative paper with Lambros Kaoullas (2016). The research paper
is  titled  “Overcoming  Respondent  Resistance  at  Elite  Interviews  Using  an
Intermediary” (Petkov and Kaoullas 2016). The present sub-section has served as a
basis for the Bulgarian data and some of the argument in that article. The present
sub-section argues that reluctance and resistance can be reduced with the help of
intermediaries.
The  literature  on  methodology  uses  a  number  of  terms  to  identify  the  different
research participants in addition to the  researcher:  Authors seem to inconsistently
associate  the  research  participant  labels  gatekeeper,  informant,  respondent  and
intermediary with the provision of contextual information, target respondent contact
details,  and  the  introduction  (advocacy)  of  the  researcher  to  target  respondents.
However,  gatekeeper  and  intermediary  labels  appear  to  be  more  widely  used  to
interchangeably denote the above functions. Healey and Rawlinson (1993: 346) see
the intermediary as someone who provides an introduction to the target respondent.
Herod sees gatekeepers as individuals who primarily provide contact details to target
respondents (1999: 316). In addition, both Healey and Rawlinson (1993), and Herod
(1999) seem to associate each respective term with the secondary ability to provide
contextual  information.  Other  authors,  appear  to  be  using  the  above  contents,
however, without consistently associating them to any of the two labels.
For  instance  Ostrander  appears  to  have  gatekeeper  in  mind  when  advising
researchers on the benefits of using peripheral research participants who informed
her  of  the institutional  setting and of  suitable  target  respondents  and of  "who to
avoid" (1995: 136).   Welch et al. (2002: 624) resorted to the help of respondents,
who also were contextually peripheral to the respondent sample, primarily for the
purpose of using their knowledge on the field context, making it hard to distinguish
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which research participant type out of the two was used. While being alone using the
term  sponsor,  Adler  and  Adler  (2001:  526) appear  to  refer  to  an  intermediary
research participant, i.e. someone who vouches for the integrity of the researcher and
who makes the introduction to the target respondent: 'One function a sponsor can
serve is as a referral to others in the setting, vouching for the researcher'. 
Furthermore,  in  advising researchers  to  make use of  additional  informal  research
participants,  Goldstein  (2002:  671)  oscillates  between  meaning  a  person  who
provides an introduction or someone who simply supplies contact details of target
respondent:
DC is really a small town when it comes to politics and the more time
one spends there, the more likely it is that one will make connections that
can help one schedule an interview. 
He is ambivalent whether he refers to gatekeepers or intermediaries defined above.
The same ambiguity appears in Odendahl and Shaw's advice to younger researchers
on  gaining  access  (2001:  307).  The  authors  do  not  make  a  distinction  between
providing contact details and making a formal introduction, when they advocate that
access to target elite respondents could be facilitated by their friends or gatekeepers,
i.e. the professionals who provide them with services (e.g. lawyers, accountants, etc.)
(Odendahl and Shaw 2001: 307). Moreover, their use of gatekeeper and informant is
inconsistent with that made by Mullings (1999) and Laurila (1997). While Mullings
(1999: 338-339) and Laurila (1997: 410) make it clear that informant is synonymous
to an  interviewee, Odendahl and Shaw use the same in the sense of someone who
provides  contextual  information  (“Acquiring the right  key informant  can set  the
course of the research, because "Who knows whom" matters”) and as someone who
can be an interviewee  (“gatekeepers may serve as key informants, and thus can be
candidates for interviews themselves”) (1999: 307). 
In short, the above indicates that interview quality depends on the interview-auxiliary
functions  some  participants  perform.  While  labelling  has  been  inconsistent,  the
literature seems to promote the terms gatekeepers and intermediaries with the cut-off
difference  between  the  two  being  intermediary's  personal  introduction  of  and
advocacy for the researcher  to  the respondent.   While  both participant  types  can
92
provide contextual details, the fieldwork experience in the Bulgarian parentela study
supports  the  distinction  that  an  intermediary  is  someone  who  vouches  for  the
credibility of the researcher and personally introduces them to the respondent. 
Conducting this research has showed that a good  intermediary is best described as
someone on researcher's side, helping them establish good contacts with the potential
respondents and maintaining good relationship with them throughout the interview
and after. An intermediary may not necessarily be a past interviewee and in the ideal
case is someone who can understand the research thematics and would be willing to
tactfully  communicate  them  to  target  respondents.  Intermediaries  would  possess
above average knowledge of the target respondents in terms of latter's personality
and  career  history.  They are  well  embedded  in  the  culture  that  they  are  able  to
effectively engage the target respondent in an informal setting. Therefore, they can
forewarn of any culture-specific behaviour the target respondent might exhibit. The
intermediaries  in  this  research  (001;  I1;  I2,  250i;  I3;  I4)  were  able  to  secure
interviews  without  causing  any  suspicion  or  undue  distress,  well-within  cultural
norms.
Another  important  attribute  of the intermediaries in this  study was their  personal
influence on target respondents. No favourable reception would have been secured,
had it not been for the influence that intermediaries had on target interviewees. The
source of this influence is not immediately apparent. For example I2 simply dialled a
number after another and the other side simply agreed to the interview. This may be
due to respondent's respect for the intermediary, indebtedness, friendships, or simply
the intermediary’s authority. 
However the best intermediary examples are provided by La Palombara himself in
his long list of persons who helped in procuring access, such as academics, clerics,
politicians and bureaucrats (La Palombara 1964: xiii-xv). For instance La Palombara
(1964: xiv) notes a certain Doctor who “can open many doors” and a professor, who:
seems to know everyone in Italy and passes that unique ability to lead the
sometimes  hapless  researcher  to  exactly  the  person  who  can  help  to
resolve a major field problem.
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La Palombara is clearly discussing an intermediary. The emphasis in both cases is not
only on the possession of contact details but on the ability of the doctor and the
professor  above  to  procure  interviews  for  La  Palombara,  i.e.  they  were
intermediaries.  The  following  subsections  will  reveal  what  techniques  from  the
literature were applied at respondent selection (3.4.1) and interview stages (3.4.2).
Also intended as contributions to the qualitative research literature, each subsection
3.4.1  and  3.4.2  features  a  sub-section  dedicated  to  the  use  of  intermediaries,
respectively at selection (3.4.1.3 and 3.4.1.4) and interview (3.4.2.4) stages.
3.4.1.  Respondent Selection Stage
3.4.1.1.  Specific Respondent Selection
Two main techniques were attempted to decrease respondents’ reluctance. The first
was  specific  respondent  selection,  which  stands  for  selecting  in  advance  those
individuals with highest propensity to be least inhibited to speak. Dean, Eichhorn and
Dean (in Adler and Adler 2001: 523) have developed a typology of such respondents:
 frustrated (dissatisfied/axe-grinding), 
 outsiders (those in the periphery of the policy-making process, while still
having a vantage point), 
 old-timers (those who are retired and cannot fear repercussions), 
 outs (not involved any more but still have some information), 
 neouveau statused  (those who brag about their new position), 
 rookies (those who are too naïve), 
 subordinates and 
 needy (attention seekers). 
Overall, the tactics was to focus on the fringes of the political elite. Most respondents
in the Bulgarian study were recruited from the outs, outsiders and old-timers. Other
respondents also came from the frustrated and the needy (also discussed below).
In addition, and specific to this research, a new category could be added on the basis
of  the  present  study. These  are  the  desperate  respondents,  who  do not  fear  any
repercussions or despite their fear do not care any more, because they feel they have
lost everything. The difference from outsiders  above is that the latter still calculate
the  participation  risks,  while  the  former  make  no  such  assessment  as  their
circumstances  cannot  get  any  worse,  even  if  an  adversary  finds  out  about  the
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interview. Some of the best interviews in terms of rich data and good rapport came
from that group. 
3.4.1.2.  Offering an Incentive
The careful respondent selection in this study went hand in hand with an incentive
offering. This is a non-material benefit that the respondent perceives to gain from
giving an interview. The benefit  was usually in the media platform the interview
provided.  The  fact  that  respondents  resisted  to  provide  full  answers  should  not
confuse  as  to  their  internal  desire  to  talk  on  these  issues.  In  most  cases,  it  was
obvious that despite the fear of repercussions there was a genuine willingness and
interest in discussing interview subject matters. In that sense, the interview offered
respondents the opportunity to be heard, although some found other uses as well. 
In this research this was most relevant to the groups of the frustrated,  the outs and
the needy (above), because therapeutically they wanted to share their views. Virtually
all respondents made some use of the interview to their own ends, in most cases
simply venting at the political system (Kuzmanov, Konstantinov, Zlatarov, Boykov,
Mihailov, Petrov, Dobromirov, Kirilov, and Donchev). Others used the opportunity to
pursue a party political line (Georgiev, Aleksandrov) or criticise a specific party in
particular, sometimes their own, (Kuzmanov, Georgiev, Penchev, Hadzhiev). Apart
from using the interview as a media outlet, surprisingly, some respondents also used
the interview as a party cadre recruitment opportunity (Aleksandrov, Georgiev and
Hristov).
The  “offer”  to  respondents  above was  made  in  the  letter  of  introduction,  as  per
Seldon (1998). Most of the literature on this subject focuses on the importance of
letters being concise and deriving legitimacy by noting sponsoring bodies (Denitch
1972: 152-153; Zuckerman 1972: 162; Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674). Others
highlight the importance of exuding expertise by providing indication of possible
questions and explanation of the study, as well as highlighting the importance of the
respondent by explaining why they are so valuable to the study (Lillecker 2003: 209;
Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674; Seldon 1998: 10-12; Richards 1996: 201-202).
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However, only Seldon makes  the  important  addition  that  a  letter  of  introduction
could also contain a section on the  offering  to the respondents, or a  carrot in his
parlance (1998: 11). The e-mails usually referred to statements respondents had made
in public on topics that are relevant to the study and which they were invited to
elaborate on. On other occasions, it was emphasised that the respondent is the sole
reliable source on these topics, which is why they are invaluable. That usually had
the effect of pre-determining the expert-supplicant relationship (see 3.4.2.) before the
interview.
3.4.1.3.  Intermediary’s Respondent Identification and Researcher
legitimation 
The main function of the intermediary in this study was to provide an introduction to
target respondents. They personally met them and verbally introduced the researcher,
the study and enquired of any interview availability. This contact is unregulated by
the researcher and for a period of time was a point of friction with one intermediary.
There was a risk that the study or aspects of it would be misrepresented – a point
already raised by Laurila (1997:  410).  However, taking into account their  deeper
cultural  embeddedness,  their  knowledge  and  personal  relationship  with  the
respondent, it was decided to leave full discretion with the intermediary. They knew
best how to approach the target respondents in a way that it would not jeopardise
their relationship. That is why, any confusions or additional information was to be
later addressed by the letter of introduction that usually followed the initial contacts.
It featured a more informative description of the study and explained in more detail
why the respondent was invaluable for the study. 
The secondary function of an intermediary was to provide  contextual information.
The literature has identified that such information could help improve: respondent
selection (Lillecker 2003: 2); rapport, by knowing the host culture better (Mikecz
2012: 485-486; Welch et al. 2002: 622); and the accuracy of researchers' questions
(Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 674; Gubrium and Holstein 1995: 46, 77). In addition
this study used intermediaries to help identify the network of people through which a
target respondent could be reached. In such situations, a good intermediary is a good
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analyst of people’s interpersonal relationships in order to reach the target respondent
(through other intermediaries or gatekeepers).
3.4.1.4.  Intermediary Snowballing
The  provision  of  contextual  information  was  also  useful  for  the  purpose  of
snowballing. This  is  a  method  of  accumulation  of  respondents  where  every  last
respondent  becomes  a  gatekeeper/intermediary  to  the  next,  who  is  usually  their
colleague. Depending on the intensity of reluctance, three types of snowballing could
be identified,  each of them with a  corresponding increase of the pressure on the
target respondent to cooperate. 
Reading through the literature, the first type is horizontal snowballing, detectable in
studies devoid of respondent vulnerability. The way Herod used snowballing was by
using gatekeepers from his local target organization to transfer him to other foreign
organizations of equal standing, i.e. transfer among equals without any notification of
distress involved (1999: 316). Lillecker (2003: 209), too, advocates the snowballing
across equal in standing respondents, say, among former colleagues. Davies (2001:
76) snowballed to gain access further in his elite respondent pool by asking each
respondent to provide access to any of their colleagues, also implying an equality of
status among former and future respondents.
The second type of snowballing is vertical (downwards). This is evident in the cases
where research is conducted inside organizations and where snowballing starts from
the organizational top. In this snowballing type a permission of conducting research
is  obtained  on  a  directorial  level  and  then,  once  obtained,  researchers  apply the
authority of this permission in persuading respondents to concede to be interviewed.
Healey and Rawlinson  (1993:  346)  advise  researchers  of  businesses  to  focus  on
gaining the permission of higher managers. Laurila (1997: 409-410) discusses their
access  as  a  result  of  top-down  negotiation  between  the  sponsoring  body  and
representatives of the target organization. 
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In the same vein,  the research in  other studies relied on an authority but from a
different source – the sponsoring organization (Rivera et al. 2002: 684-685; Adler
and Adler 2001: 526). This is also evident in the study of La Palombara (1964: ix-xv)
which was conducted under the auspices of a number of US and Italian universities
which negotiated access to target respondent organizations. The same is valid for the
study of Denitch, who negotiated access on top organizational level between US and
Yugoslavian  academic  and  state  authorities  (1972).  Likewise,  the  sponsoring
organization of Welch et al. (2002: 620) negotiated access with the host respondent
body. 
However,  horizontal respondent snowballing did not work in this study due to the
high reluctance among respondents. Many of them were weary of making it known
to outsiders that they had given an interview and were overall reluctant to suggest
consequent  respondents.  For  instance,  while  respondent  Aleksandrov  initially
boasted  knowing  many  people  that  would  be  suitable  respondents  for  following
interviews,  only after  some pressure  did  he  later  provide  the  number  of  another
prospective respondent. Upon inviting respondent Konstantinov to propose follow-up
interviewees, they loudly exclaimed with irritation that this was researcher's problem.
The same person clarified that they would not like any of their colleagues to know
they had had that interview. In agreement with Laurila (1997: 410) and Ostrander
(1995:  141-142)  that  access  was  continuously  negotiated,  it  became  clear  that
permission to an interview did not immediately lead to agreement to provide further
contacts, hence, respondent-based snowballing was hardly possible given their high
reluctance.
What  proved  to  be  highly  effective  strategy  in  the  Bulgarian  project  was  a
combination  of  horizontal and  downward  vertical snowballing  through
intermediaries. That is,  each intermediary promotes the researcher to another, and
also  where  each  intermediary  holds  vertical  downward  access,  to  a  handful  of
respondents, given the authority they have over them. As already explained above,
while it was impossible to make direct observations on how the intermediaries did it,
it seemed intermediaries had an aura of authority over the respondents, based on pre-
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existing  loyalties, friendships and simply trust between them. However, it has to be
acknowledged that considerable time was consumed securing an interview. On a few
occasions it was necessary to approach a target respondent through two (interview
with Lyubenov) or three consecutive intermediaries (interview with Bachvarov).
3.4.2.  Interview stage
Looking at the literature on conducting interviews, two approaches were devised to
reduce interview resistance. The first approach was to construct the interviews on the
basis of ad hoc, open-ended questions that were formulated on the spot, with the
occasional quotation of excerpts from earlier respondents (3.4.2.1). The second was
to adopt the  active interview style  of Gubrium and Holstein (1995) (3.4.2.2) and
combine  that  with  the  active  participation  of  the  respective  intermediary  to  that
respondent (3.4.2.3).
3.4.2.1.  Interview structure
The first technique was to start from the general and then move to the more specific
questions  (prepared  in  advance  of  the  intervew),  which  might  cause  greatest
resistance. It is beyond the scope of this discussion to enlist all authors, but suffice it
to say the idea was to save the most difficult questions for last (Lillecker 2003: 209,
210; Davies 2001: 76-77; Healey and Rawlinson 1983: 250; McEvoy 2006: 185;
Woliver 2002: 677; Adler and Adler 2001: 529). In our case such questions related to
several topics. The questions on circles in Bulgaria almost always caused discomfort:
how they work, what were respondents' experiences in interacting with them or what
were their life-time observations on the circles. The other difficult topics related to
the practice of political appointments, the relationship between the party in power,
and  big  business,  and  of  party  coercion  of  select  businesses  through  the  state
agencies. 
The  approach  rests  on  the  assumption  that  the  researcher  is  well  aware  of
respondent’s past in advance of the interview. Such contextual information is critical
for  the  approach  to  work.  Some  interviews,  however,  were  not  that  successful
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because it was not possible to know enough of respondent’s background in advance
so to ask relevant questions. 
A second technique was to ask semi-structured questions on the spot which emanate
from the topic at hand, as opposed to firing pre-determined ones (Davies 2001: 76;
Gubrium and Holstein 1995: 76; Aberbach and Rockman 2002: 673; Odendahl and
Shaw 2001: 310; Richards 1996: 202). Consistent with the literature, the benefit was
that the interview flow was more natural and the transitions from one topic another
fitted  very  well  in  the  overall  interactive  and  conversational  framework  (e.g.
3.4.2.2.).   All  of that was coupled with reiterated promises of anonymity of their
participation,  which  further  helped  relax  the  interviewees  (Richards  1996:  203;
Davies 2001: 77). 
However,  the  difficulty  in  this  approach  is  that  the  conversation  might  alternate
between  topics,  without  necessarily  finishing  them.  So,  the  researcher  has  to
remember  all  unfinished  topics  and  explore  them  later.  Where  it  worked,  the
approach  yielded  great  rapport  and  rich  responses.  However,  it  was  not  always
possible  to  follow all  unfinished  threads,  due  to  the  answer  complexity  and the
highly emotional respondents’ disruptive behaviour.
Finally,  while  not  specifically  designed  to  reduce  resistance and  though  more
relevant  to  a  debate  on  validity, the  practice  of  triangulation  was  also  useful  in
reducing  resistance. Davies  (2001:  78-9)  and  Richards  (1996:  203)  advocate
juxtaposing respondents'  answers to one another in order to ensure high response
validity. Applying  this  technique  had  mixed  results.  While the  most  suspicious
respondents would not believe the quotations of previous interviewees were genuine,
citing previous respondents relaxed some participants as they heard that other equally
important people had exposed themselves vulnerable by braving the subject. 
3.4.2.2.  The Active Interview
In trying to dampen  resistance, the  active interview  approach was attempted in all
interviews. The intention was to move away from the tense power dynamics inherent
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in classic elite interviews by developing a more conversational atmosphere among
equals  –  akin  to  Gubrium  and  Holstein's  active  interview  model  (1995).  Their
position  is  that  standard  interviews  that  forbid  intensive  interaction  with  the
respondent,  lest  data  is  contaminated,  unrealistically  assume  that  the  respondent
would  unemotionally  provide  “uncontaminated”  answers  (Gubrium  and  Holstein
1995: 9). The text-book perspective therefore wrongly sees respondents as "vessels-
of-answers",  while  in  reality  they can  only interpret  or  self-reflect  on  their  past
experiences and should be seen as "vessels-of-knowledge" (Gubrium and Holstein
1995: 30). Respondents, therefore, should be induced to use their self-reflective and
interpretative  abilities  to  produce  “knowledge”  in  an  interactive  event  with  the
researcher (Gubrium and Holstein 1995: 30, 59). Validity in other words becomes
about respondents constructing meaningful answers to the posed questions, based on
deep self-reflection on past experiences (Gubrium and Holstein 1995: 9):
the validity of answers derives not form their correspondence
to meanings held within the respondent but from their ability
to  convey  situated  experiential  realities  in  terms  that  are
locally comprehensible
In a way, the respondent becomes the "device" with which knowledge is produced
from the social world, and through the use of questions, the researcher becomes the
operator.   Looking  at  it  in  another  way,  Gubrium  and  Holstein  (1995)  appear
congruent  with  Berry's  position  that  “excellent  interviewers  are  excellent
conversationalists”  (2002:  679)  because  all  authors  emphasise  that  an  interview
generates  more  data  if  it  is  closer  to  a  natural,  lively,  conversation.  Therefore,
excellent interviews are excellent conversations. That is why the main attempt at the
interviews  was  to  create  an  analytical-conversationalist  atmosphere  between  two
nearly equal participants. 
This  approach  was  useful  because  it  moved  away from the  immediately  factual
review of past events, the details of which nearly all respondents resisted to provide.
Overall, the intention was to guide interviewees to use their professional experiences
in producing analytical responses in a more conversational context. Conducting the
interviews in this way served as a wall behind which one could hide all the facts and
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details  they  were  not  comfortable  with.  For  instance,  asking  a  trade  association
director  to  evaluate  the  relationship  between  interest  groups  and  the  state
administration, invited the respondent to use the totality of his experiences in dealing
with the civil service and exercise discretion as to what examples to provide. In some
instances, where respondents demanded a more detailed introduction to the theory
behind the study, they were happy to recognise their own thinking and experiences
summarised in the parentela dynamics. 
In  most  cases,  however, while  the  questions  did indeed probe into  personal  past
experiences,  the  conversationalist  element  was  rather  limited,  largely  due  to  the
discrepancy in age and status  with the respondent  (e.g.  expert  positionality).  The
approach also rests on the assumption that the researcher is well aware in advance of
the interview in order to formulate questions that more precisely tap on respondents’
experiences. This contextual information is critical for the approach to work and was
not always available, which reflected on the interview quality.
3.4.2.3.  Intermediaries at Active Interviews
While  trying  to  employ  the  active  interview  approach,  at  the  same  time,  some
interviews  provided  the  opportunity  to  include  the  intermediary  as  well.  The
usefulness of intermediaries taking part in the elite interview reduced respondents'
resistance and improved the received data. In fact, there is already some evidence
that  the  use  of  intermediaries  at  interviews  help  reduce  the  tension  between  the
respondent  and the researcher. Probably one of the earlier  documented deliberate
uses of an intermediary to that end comes from Shaw (in Odendahl and Shaw 2001:
307, emphasis added): 
While interviewing individuals on the topic of best practices for grant-
making  research,  Shaw (1997)  was  fortunate  to  have  a  member  of  a
wealthy family on the advisory committee who actually joined her on the
research team. This person's presence proved invaluable in establishing
rapport and making the interviews less guarded. People, regardless of
their status, like to converse with others with whom they feel comfortable
While it is only implied that they introduced Shaw to her later respondents, akin to
employing  an  intermediary,  she  included  in  her  later  interviews  an  authoritative
person,  with  good  reputation  whose  presence  at  interviews  reduced  respondents'
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resistance.  The  conversational  exchanges  between  the  intermediary  and  the
respondent are highlighted above as reducing the overall tension. To reiterate, having
befriended a colleague from the US (the intermediary), Sabot used him to procure
interviews with the elite respondents they both shared and who had earlier refused
her any interviews (but not to him) (1999: 331). 
The  intermediary-based  interviews  in  this  thesis  also  had  a  strong  emphasis  on
creating a conversation between the respondent and the intermediary because that in
turn facilitated the rapport  between the researcher  and the respondent.  While  the
downside of this approach was that the conversation between the intermediary and
respondent could veer off, the conversation was steered in the desired direction by
timely and accurate questions. Overall the sporadic involvement of the intermediary
created interviews of different dynamics, where that participant assumed a distinct
role of a providing balance between the researcher and the respondent. The net result
was increased rapport in otherwise highly conflictual and resistant interviews, also
leading to the collection of more information. With some pre-existing instruction, the
intermediary asked tough questions, which the researcher could not have afforded
raising otherwise (Nikolov, Dobromirov). In any case, the intermediary consistently
helped reduce  respondent  resistance  and  helped  uncover  information  respondents
usually sought to conceal. In sum, involving an intermediary at the elite interviews
provided the following two benefits:
1. Reducing the conflict between the respondent and the researcher:
o by behaving as if the academic interview is a casual conversation;
o by supporting the respondent;
o by supporting the researcher
2. Uncovering more information:
o by provoking the disclosure of information the respondent attempted
to conceal.
The study made use of intermediaries at 7 elite interviews out of 26. The next section
will  illustrate  the  points  above.  Before  continuing  further,  a  quick  note  on  the






/italics --X/ interjecting participant: S, R or I;
( ) author’s in-quote clarification or comment;
[…] author’s edits of quoted material;
mmss a time-stamp format for emphasis, mm-minutes; ss-seconds
A to Z letters used to redact an actual name, activity or event 
3.4.2.3.1  Casual Conversation
The first  way in which  the intermediary decreased respondent  resistance  was by
taking  part  in  the  interview  and  by  tactfully  engaging  the  respondent.  Some
intermediaries attempted to provide answers or provided opinions to posed questions
alongside the respondent and made the latter feel comfortable by talking directly to
them for a while on unrelated topics. This was another manifestation of the active
interview. The difference is that the active engagement with the respondent is made
by the intermediary and serves the purpose of increasing rapport by bonding with
them. The interviews with respondents Nikolov and Dobromirov for instance began
and  were  littered  throughout  with  friendly  exchanges  between  the  two.  The
interviews  with  Hristov  and Dobromirov featured  inquisitive  interjections  by the
intermediary  towards  the  respondent.  In  the  context  of  a  friendly  conversation,
humour was in fact welcome, as with respondent Petkov who took the liberty of the
following anecdote:
R:   Boyko Borisov, do you know why they hurried to sign him out from
the cardiology ward, the governmental one,  you know, they could not
print out even one EKG slip: he snipped the band as soon as it come out.
Another similar example was the moment when respondent Nikolov deflected the
topic of conversation in the direction of the future of young Bulgarians, focusing on
the  intermediary  as  the  conversation  partner.  In  this  situation  (and  as  with
Dobromirov),  the  researcher  decided  to  stand  aside  as  an  observer  and  wait  a
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reasonable period of time before intervening again the conversation and redirect it to
a relevant topic. 
3.4.2.3.2  Support to the Respondent
Another  way  in  which  the  intermediary  reduced  respondent's  resistance  was  by
providing emotional support to the respondent. This came in the form of spontaneous
interjections in agreement with the respondent and even speaking in their defence in
front of the researcher. The accumulation of such interjections created the impression
that the interview was dominated by “respondent’s team”. The brightest example is
the following critical moment for respondent Petkov:
S:  And what would be the effect of political appointments?
R: Well,  if  they appoint  kalinki1,  the effect  is  bad.  If  for  example for
political reasons I appoint Y because I know he will be doing a good job,
or let's not give an example with Y—I know for instance—The chief of my
political cabinet, which is not part of the state administration, but the
man with whom I have worked the longest in the ministry of X, was the
husband of my first  cousin. “But why did you appoint him?” /slightly
raises voice/ “I trust him most, you people!” He is capable, a colleague
of ours /”us” meaning intermediary and themselves/ and he is from state
security, but it does not matter--
I: It does not matter, it is important that they work!
R: /raises voice/ because I trust him! I don't want to be betrayed! (/in
agreement/  Ahem.  --I).  Governance  is  a  collective  job.  In  Bulgaria,
collective sports do not work, and that's including politics, if we take it
as a form of collective sport. (This is true –I) Because there has to be a
team! /raises voice/ and it is hard to make a team! (Yeah –I) In the team
there is  always someone who is  better, and they refuse to play in the
national  team!  For  example,  Berbatov,  (/laughing/  --I)  Kaziyski
/inaudible/ the same is with politics!
In the quotation above, the respondent experienced discomfort from the discussion of
the topic on political appointments, because they had personally made such in the
course  of  their  ministerial  duties.  Noticeable  is  the  sudden  interruption  in  their
response where they seem to switch from talking about appointments in the state
administration  to  a  less  confrontational  terrain  of  appointments  in  their  political
cabinet.  Emotionally escalating from the start  of  their  response,  the interviewee's
1kalinka, kalinki (pl.) – reference to the public case of Kalina Ilieva, who was appointed chief of the
State Fund for Agriculture, and who was later convicted of forging her diploma of higher education.
The word kalinka also means ladybug.
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stress culminates in the enactment of a scene where they are,  as if,  under public
criticism. They are not only raising their voice, but they make an explicit addressal to
the abstract adversary “you people!” The accusative “you people” also included the
researcher, because they raised the question, seemingly, on behalf of the perceived
adversary (the general public). 
At this  confrontation, a key role is played by the intermediary who defended the
respondent with “It does not matter, it is important that they work!” and supported
them emotionally by uttering the minute “yes” and by laughing at the appropriate
times. They sought to degrade the critical edge of the question and communicate that
the respondent is right. That is to say, those gestures were intended to protect the
respondent  from the researcher. A similar situation,  but  going out of control was
when respondent Lyubenov entered a short tirade against the researcher (again as a
representative  the abstract  adversary),  but  there was no one to  vouch for latter’s
reliability.
3.4.2.3.3  Support to the Researcher
An intermediary could also express support of the researcher to the effect of reducing
resistance, as well. In some moments an intermediary legitimized the researcher as
someone on the side of the respondent and whose behaviour was dictated by the
essence  of  the  academic  literature  and  not  by  personal  attempts  at  exposing
malpractice.  In  relation  to  Mullings’  concern  on  who  has  the  power  to  define
researcher’s positionality, this was a clear example of a more influential participant
favourably defining researcher's positionality. Example of that is the intervention of
the  intermediary  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  interview  with  Petkov,  who  had
immediately took control over the interview with the question:
R: /to S/ Any preliminary knowledge on these questions regarding
Bulgaria...  do you have any pre-existing knowledge,  what  happens in
Bulgaria, how these questions are resolved?
I:  Well,  I  apologise  for  interjecting,  your  question  is  very  accurate!
(/contemplative/ Hmm... --R) He left /Bulgaria/ at the age of 18, (Ah, you
have detached a lot from, yes –R) and during all those years, already
tenth year, he does not have the direct look on things. From one side this
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is good, because he is not (Yes, not burdened –R) burdened, /inaudible/
and  that  is  why  I  find  him  that  he  even  finds  Bulgarian  hard,  but
regardless. My point is that he is not burdened and that is why he is
asking like that. /pause, all quiet/ /with concern/ By the way, he made a
few interviews, he is collecting his materials so to speak, […] In fact, /to
the researcher/ you say, I interrupted...
S: Yes, yes, yes … /approvingly/
This case is an excellent example of the power asymmetry between the respondent
and  the  researcher  on  the  grounds  of  expertise  and  covert  adversarial  concerns.
Already  from  the  first  seconds,  the  control  over  the  interview  is  taken  by  the
respondent,  whose  questions  undermined  both  researcher's  right  to  attempt  such
thematics and their  motives  in doing so.  However, pleading in their  defence,  the
intermediary stresses that the interviewer had been so detached from Bulgaria that
they  even  found  it  hard  to  speak  Bulgarian,  hence  impossible  to  be  politically
prejudiced against the respondent. The intermediary took the initiative to redefine the
positionality of the researcher as uninformed outsider.
3.4.2.3.4  Eliciting More Information
The final benefit of involving intermediaries in elite was that they helped uncover
information the respondent deliberately attempted to hide. One way to do that was to
change the topic of conversation to another which was much closer to the topic of
interest to the researcher (Kuzmanov). The other way was to indirectly provoke the
respondent to expand on their answer. Sometimes there are opportunities for probing
which the researcher might abstain from in order not to aggravate the situation, and
delegate those to the intermediary, instead. At interview with Nikolov, for example,
the intermediary provoked on two occasions the respondent to expand their answer:
S: Ah, is it true that around Kostov was that circle, Olimp...
R: Yes, /pause/
I: /inaudible/ with them now?
R: Well no, they went elsewhere, I want to tell you that they, from that
circle Olimp, the only one left is –
S: X?
R: X is left, but he bends over to absolutely everybody, I want to tell you.
X is in a very good relationship with Boyko [Borisov].
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I: Huh?! /surprised; disbelief/
R: How else?! /confidently/
It is noticeable in the quotation above that there is a pause that follows the immediate
answer “yes”, which signifies that a certain hesitation had taken place, most likely
how much  to  be  shared  with  the  researcher.  As  a  result  of  the  question  of  the
intermediary, however, the respondent  enriched their  answer. Another  example is
offered in the interview with Hristov:
S: And what decreases the effectiveness of these relationships, […] what
hampers business, for example, to express clearly their position before
the  state  administration.  Is  there  any  inefficiency  innate  to  the  state
administration which inhibits it?
R: Well, business can very clearly declare that which is considered as a
problem. For example, if they deem that the state has overused her rights
with  the  control  organs,  they  could  say  that  categorically  and
unequivocally […]
I: I apologise, but do they really do that?
R: Some do, others are afraid.
S: Why would they be afraid?
In this situation one could better observe the unsuccessful attempt of the respondent
to  conceal  the  conflict  which  exists  between  some  business  groups  and  state
administration. Their attempt at hiding friction between interest groups and the state
administration  over  access  to  the  policy  making  process  is  discovered  by  the
intermediary, which is why they intervened with “do they really do that?” 
In the case of Dobromirov the concealment was not only expected but pre-empted.
The way the respondent began the interview was an early sign that they would be
pre-disposed to information concealment: “Your topic is so gruelling, in the sense
that it is one thing to write it /pause, thinking/ it is entirely another to reflect it [in the
thesis]”. The intermediary to Dobromirov was briefed on where the discussion would
ideally venture and twenty minutes into the interview they decided to expose the
undergoing deflecting manoeuvres of the respondent and position the conversation
on its right course:
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1820 I: /interrupting/  you  tell  him  in  your  field  how—from  which
moment did you begin as a main contractor with your own machinery -
[but ended up as] subcontractor? How did things turn around?
1833 R: /mumbling/ Well, when he came...
1835 I: /raising voice, interrupting/ WHO?
1836 R: /inaudible, mumbling/... to power...
1837 /silence/
1842 R: I simply... about this [Bulgarian] people... /brooding/
1845 I: /to respondent/,  tell  him about  [the highways]  how you were
paid?
1850  R:  Well,  look  now,  this  is  not  only  [the  highways]  —  it's  
everywhere.
In  this  final  example  above,  the  intermediary  had  clearly  noticed  the  evasive
language used hitherto by the respondent and hit the spot with the information which
the  respondent  tried  to  conceal.  It  is  clear  that  the  respondent  was  particularly
evasive in three ways: by resisting to answering the intermediary, by giving, though
self-reflective,  very  general  response  "about  this  [Bulgarian]  people..."  and  that
whatever happened to him was “everywhere”. Noticeable also is the silence of nearly
5 seconds (1837-1842). That signifies respondent's internal stress and most likely
calculation of the risks involved in sharing the information. 
After  the  1850  benchmark,  the  respondent  provided  an  answer,  which  the
intermediary  found  unsatisfactory.  What  followed  was  a  dynamic  which  clearly
demonstrated the benefits  of using an intermediary in interviews with researcher-
distrusting respondents on the grounds of abstract adversarial positionality. In the
enlivened conversation that follows the intermediary pushed the respondent again to
tell their story (emphasis added):
2020 I: Tell him about the highway, the highways.
2022 R: Well,  it’s the same story (explained between 1850 and 2020),
they take – /interrupting himself/ do you know what is worst, but I don’t
know how you will write it, because it is --
2038 I: /interrupting/ He knows how to write it--
2039 R:  No,  do not  hit  on  (reveal?  sic)  this  because  they  will  come
tomorrow, do  you understand me? That’s what  I  am talking about  --
/commotion, the three erupt talking, unintelligible/ 
2051 S: My respondent yesterday warned me “for your own safety”—
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2052 R: Yes, that’s it! […] I will tell you, I have a friend, whose daughter
was  connected  to  the  US,  that  [agency]  that  investigates,  do  you
understand? They called to warn him to [make her]  stop. I am simply
telling  you  this  straightforwardly.  And  that  was  recent  –  two  years
ago. /Yes, was she involved with a university? --S/ not with a university
but  with their intelligence services,  some foundation that  investigates,
similar  to  what  you  are  writing  about  but  hers  was  even  more
complicated and she – directly like an investigative journalist,  do you
understand? Only difference is she was on a US service. And he is not
young, a big director […] and they were here directly warning him and I
now think she is no longer in Bulgaria. She had begun to enter some
channels /I have no [interest] –S/ /all erupt, commotion, unintelligible/ I
am simply [warning you]! Because [the intermediary] brought you here,
and I was not going to tell you any of this! […] you must have a very
light  touch,  for  example,  ‘to  walk  on  top  of  the  wave’,  as  [the
intermediary] says, because […] you have to consider all these things,
as I said earlier. You simply have not had trouble as I have in my life… 
It was quite clear that the respondent was influenced by the hostile presence of an
abstract  adversary. The commotion occurred  when both the  intermediary and the
researcher sought to assuage the respondent that the study was not intended to expose
trafficking channels or organised crime. It is unascertainable where the threat came
from: Bulgarian or foreign intelligence services, organised crime or elsewhere. Still,
given respondent's confession at the end (emphasised) of the interview, it testifies
how an abstract  adversarial  positionality could  be reduced and more information
solicited with intermediary's active involvement and occasional interview leadership.
In sum, section 3.4.2 was devoted to the methods used to reduce elite respondents’
emotional instability at interviews and their proclivity to  resist  divulging important
information. Section 3.4.2.1 discussed some of the more basic methods used in the
study,  such  as  devising  a  semi-structured  list  of  questions,  with  the  more
controversial ones coming in late in the interview, which, also would feature excerpts
from  previous  respondents.  Section  3.4.2.2.2  emphasised  that  the  interviews
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attempted the adoption of a more relaxed style, which was far better attained when
intermediaries participated (3.4.2.3.). Sections 3.4.2.3.1-4 revealed that the benefits
of using intermediaries in elite interviews helped to increase rapport (that is, reduce
resistance;  sections  3.4.2.3.1-3)  and improve  data  quality  (3.4.2.3.4).  The  use  of
intermediaries is discussed in more detail by Petkov and Kaoullas (2016). Before
discussing  the  use  of  case  studies  in  the  project  later,  the  present  section  will
conclude with a short expose of the drawbacks related to the use of intermediaries in
dealing with elite respondents.
3.4.2.4.  Limitations to the use of the intermediary at elite interviews
Despite  the  benefits  listed  above,  there  are  some  drawbacks  to  consider  when
drawing intermediaries  into  the  fieldwork process  of  recruiting  elite  respondents.
These are discussed below.
The intermediary method is best suited to researchers who already approach their
project with at least one pre-existing intermediary who can facilitate both the first
handful  of  interviewees and at  least  one reference to  the next  intermediary. This
means  the  method  is  hard  to  replicate.  A potential  remedy  to  un-/dis-connected
researchers may be to invest time to develop interpersonal connections with around
the target respondent, as in Kaoullas’ case (in Petkov and Kaoullas 2016). These may
be anyone from a respondent's friends, family or collegial circles.
This, at the same time, is one of the drawbacks of the approach. It has the effect of
adding  to  the  time  and  resources  to  most  likely  already  time-  and  resource-
constrained research projects. More time being spent on organizing and conducting
interviews was also true for the present project, which is also why the rather low
interview count. Ultimately, for other qualitative projects this may reflect negatively
on the validity of the data if the low interview count does not reach a data-saturation
point  where  themes  consistently  emerge.  While  this  was  not  an  issue  with  this
research, it might as well be in future cases.
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Another  challenge  is  the  management  of  the  added  relationship  with  the
intermediary. While the present study argues that the potential intermediary also has
to  be  personally  invested  in  the  project,  either  emotionally  and  intellectually,  a
possible danger is when that person decides to exercise discretion on certain aspects
of the project. It may be that, an intermediary describes the project in a way different
from the way a researcher would, or they may shift the topic too far away. In short,
there  is  the  theoretical  danger  that  the  intermediary  may  not  cooperate  as  the
researcher would like them to. 
In the present study, the points of friction with one intermediary were mostly on how
the  interview  subject  matter  was  to  be  advertised  to  respondents  and  then
occasionally on how the discussion was to be steered at some interviews. In this
research project, intermediary's phrasing of what the research project was about was
clearly better than the researcher’s proposed one, yet an intermediary who has not
been briefed in advance of the aims of the interview may indeed cause undue time
loss in coaxing the respondent in off-topic chats. Such was the case of some of the
earlier interviews, when the idea of the role of the intermediary had not yet fully
emerged. Some of the earlier  interviews could have been made more efficient by
more  active  intervention by the  researcher  in  advance of  the interview by better
instructing the intermediary on the important points of the interview that need to be
covered. As it turned out, some of the earlier interviews with an intermediary had too
much of off-topic discussions.
Finally, a third challenge may be that the researcher is at the mercy of intermediary’s
interpersonal skills. Despite their best judgement a researcher may place their trust in
an individual who might limit the chances of the target respondent conceding to an
interview. Or, it may be that during the interview when the intermediary exercises
poor  judgement  and  with  their  behaviour  antagonise  the  respondent.  This  is
particularly relevant to cases where researchers have to undertake their study without
112
pre-existing intermediaries. So, they have to trust someone who they do not know
and who may not fully understand their role as an intermediary.
Distrusting  the  intermediary  at  some  point,  however,  is  not  necessarily  an
insurmountable pitfall. With clear, simple instructions, an appropriate behaviour may
be elicited from the intermediary.  For example, at the last interviews of the present
project,  where the idea of  intermediary’s role  had firmly taken shape,  prior  each
interview, the intermediary was given specific instructions. They were given the key
areas where to navigate the conversation to, they were told to coax the respondent,
even at the expense of the researcher, they were also told to begin the conversation
(interview) with a natural chat on unrelated matters, as they would normally do with
the respondent on a daily basis. Finally, because instructions usually happen some
time prior the interview on one occasion the researcher had the time to arrange the
chairs at the table so to place the intermediary closer to the respondent than himself
by putting his backpack in the empty chair between himself and the respondent. This
was intended to act as the psychological protective barrier that delineated the safe
space, within which were the respondent and intermediary and outwith of which was
the researcher. A similar strategy could also be performed by a researcher and/or their
intermediary prior an interview.
Overall,  it  has  to  be  reinforced  that  this  approach  is  suited  to  projects  where
respondents are reticent and/ or data is of significant value because the intermediary
approach is  costly. In  this  study, the  discovery of  new (sensitive)  data  was very
important and far more difficult because the matters are controversial and carry a
degree  of  realistic  personal  risk  to  the  respondents.  So  naturally,  they  are  more
reluctant to participate,  but the importance of what they have to say justified the
considerable  sacrifice  of  time  and  money  in  organizing  and  conducting  the
interviews.  For  example,  this  study  came  across  the  phenomenon  of  prejudiced
regulatory inspections (chapter 9) which happened early in the field work interviews.
This was apparently of grave importance to many policy-makers and businessmen,
but at the same time exposed them to some personal risks, which is why many were
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reluctant to discuss. As this was an important novelty in the parentela network, it was
worth exerting the extra effort in bringing intermediaries in the interviews so that this
theme could be explored. This is different, from, say, when respondents are asked to
comment on well-known historic events (e.g.  elections) or social  phenomena that
already  are  in  public  circulation  and  the  discussion  of  which  may  bring  lesser
personal risk. 
Having  covered  the  benefits  and  drawbacks  from the  use  of  intermediaries,  the
following section will turn to the composition and use of cases in the study, before
concluding the chapter later. 
3.5.  Causality,  Comparative  Designs  and  Case
Studies
The operationalisation of policy network types, or the group-venue(s) relationship as
discrete  combinations  of  descriptor  values  also  allows  for  the  descriptor
operationalisation as  dependent variables (DVs). In terms of causality, this means
that we are interested in the external forces (independent variables, IVs) that affect
one or many of the network descriptors. This ultimately facilitates the application of
comparative case study designs. 
The suitability of the comparative approach is visible in a post-hoc rationalisation,
where lining up Bulgaria (2013-2015), Italy (mid-1960s), Northern Ireland (1920-
1970) and Israel (1980s-1990s) demonstrates sufficiently odd quartet2 (in terms of
time and space) of cases with which authors sought to determine the existence of the
parentela. On that note, the present research design was not necessarily intended as a
comparative study, although it could be seen in that light, given that Bulgaria is fairly
removed from the other cases and was selected because of the absence of hegemonic
parties  (on  the  IV).  However,  introducing  a  causal  relationship  by  defining  the
network descriptors as the DVs allows us to review them in retrospect as malleable
to MDSD. 
2 Apt expression credited to Richard Parry
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The present study in Bulgaria sees the unit of analysis as the relationship between
political parties, interest groups and the bureaucracy (i.e. the constitutive parentela
actors). The Bulgarian case of the parentela is a combination of elite interviews and
four nested cases (Yin 2003; 2009). Elite interviews served three purposes. First, the
pilot study could not identify any potential cases of the parentela. Instead, those were
identified in the course of interviewing the elite respondents. Second, elite interviews
allowed for a much wider view on the unit of analysis and in doing so helped identify
new  aspects  of  the  parentela  relationship  such  as  group’s  multi-party  approach,
volatile  insiderness,  group’s  party  faction  insider  access  (chapter  7)  and  type  2
parentela (Chapter 9). Finally, elite responses were used to corroborate other data
such as other reports, particularly within the context of case studies (Chapter 5, 8).
In the course of the interviews’ conduct, 4 parentela-relevant cases emerged. Three of
them  exemplify  a  particular  parentela  feature  existent  in  Bulgaria  and  one  La
Palombara’s original parentela in action. The first is the  NCTC Case  (Chapter 4),
which demonstrates party’s ability to interfere in the workings of the civil service.
The  second  is  the  Case  on  The  Law  on  Administration  and  Party  Political
Appointments (Chapter 5), which demonstrates the scope of political appointments in
the  civil  service  and  explains  the  origin  of  this  practice.  Third  is  the  Case  on
Multigrup (Chapter  7),  which  demonstrates  that  groups  seek  to  avoid  losing  a
parentela  relationship  when  ruling  political  parties  change  by  working
simultaneously  with  those  which  are  in  opposition.  It  also  shows  that  parentela
insider  status  fluctuates.  Finally,  the  Case  on  Public  Tenders (Chapter  8)
demonstrates  all of the original parentela’s elements together at work in Bulgaria.
While a  process tracing  element was intended in all  cases, Chapter 8 is  the best
example of it. 
An  attempt  was  made  to  apply  process  tracing  in  the  case  studies.   This  is  an
interpretive  narrative  of  causal  stages  that  connect  the  independent with  the
dependent  variable.  In  doing  so,  the  causal  chain  it  follows  to  make  such  a
connection  also  reveals  the  intervening  variables  that  facilitate  it  (Tansey  2007;
Falleti  2009;  Falleti  2006;  Checkel  2006).  Its  application  was attempted  in  all  4
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cases,  in  order  to  address  the  criticisms  in  the  policy-network literature  that  the
models  lack  any  causal  dynamics  (Thatcher  1998;  Dowding  1995,  2001).  The
approach was most effective in the Case on Public Tenders (Chapter 8). The utility of
that approach depended heavily on the available documentary data. The parentela
relationship is highly informal and it leaves very little documentary traces. That is
why, for instance, La Palombara’s establishment of the parentela is based only on
respondent accounts (1964: 306-348) and Greer’s claim on the parentela is based on
a handful of personal letters (1994: 411-412).  This meant that process tracing relied
primarily on analysing the relevant legal provisions and then on interview responses,
corroborated  with  public  sources,  such  as  news  articles,  scientific  reports  and
memoirs.
3.6.  Conclusion
The  present  chapter  is  dedicated  to  the  two  main  research  method  approaches
employed  in  this  study:  elite  interviews  and  case  studies.  Sections  3.2  to  3.4
discussed  the  difficulties  using  elite  interviews  and  the  techniques  employed  to
overcome them. Three main difficulties were observed in the use of intermediaries.
First was the need to devise a mechanism for comparison between the Bulgarian and
Italian respondent pools. It was necessary to ensure that the Bulgarian study featured
the same number of respondents with the three parentela-constitutive professional
backgrounds:  politics,  civil  service  and  interest  groups  (trade  associations,
businesses). The comparison suggests that both respondent pools are very similar,
with the Bulgarian pool possibly better representative of interest groups, with the
inclusion of business owners. While the civil service might seem to be slightly under-
represented in the Bulgarian study, it is compensated by the fact that many of the
respondents have held more than one policy-making post in the past, also including
experience in the state administration.
The second and third elite interview difficulties related to respondents’ reluctance to
be  interviewed  and  resistance  during  their  conduct.  The  main  cause  for  such
behaviour was respondents’ association of the researcher with an unknowable and
unverifiable threat, or abstract adversary. While many techniques from the literature
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were  applied,  they also  included  a  new research  actor:  the  intermediary. This  is
someone on researcher’s side who possesses excellent field-contextual information
about prospective elite respondents and personally introduces the researcher them,
vouching  for  former’s  credibility.  The  use  of  intermediaries  at  resistant  elite
interviews increased rapport and interviewees’ response. 
Finally, the chapter discussed the use of case studies in the present study and the
possibility of application of a Most Different System Design comparative study. The
cases formed the second stage of the data collection process. This is so, because no
suitable cases were identified prior the start of the research project. Elite interviews
were  first  used  as  a  starting  point  to  identify  any  suitable  case  studies.  Once
identified, those were analysed using the process tracing approach, on the basis of
documentary evidence, news articles and legal analysis. Given the high informality
of the parentela relationship, very little documents were identified to elucidate on
that network type, which is why legal provisions, news articles and memoirs were
used as a mean to corroborate respondent statements (and vice versa). For the same
reason, some cases (Chapter 8 in particular) focused on analysis of legal procedures.
The following chapters 4, 5, 6 are based on the elite interviewees and reveal the
elements of the parentela in the party-group relationship in Bulgaria.
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CHAPTER 4:  The Party in Power as a
Parentela Primary Venue:
The  Case  of  National
Council  on  Tripartite
Cooperation (NCTC)
4.1.  Introduction
Chapter 2 operationalized the policy network and its types in terms of 5 qualitative
descriptive  indicators  (or  descriptors),  where  the  value  of  each  expresses  one
characteristic feature of each policy network type. Therefore, policy network types
are operationalized as discrete combinations of descriptor values. The descriptors,
according to which policy networks are classified, were:  degree of access, power
ratio, type of interaction, primary venue and venue scope.
The present chapter 4 is dedicated to the primary venue descriptor. Chapter 2 defined
it as a combination of two earlier ones developed independently. These are, perceived
venue  effectiveness  (based  on  Yishai’s  group  strategy  (1992))  and  bureaucratic
intervention  (La  Palombara  1964).  They  were  conflated  because  both  of  them
reflected  the same idea:  that  as  far  as  groups are  concerned,  the party in  power
provides effective access to policy-making. Therefore, one major characteristic of the
parentela  is  the  primacy of  the  political  party  as  a  focal  point  in  that  network,
particularly  vis-à-vis  the  civil  service,  which  it  dominates  either  through  direct
interference  by  means  of  party  political  appointments  (PPA)  or  legislative
amendments. In the case of La Palombara’s 1960s Italy, political parties interfered in
the work of the civil service primarily through party political appointments (PPA)
(1964). 
However,  the  following  case  study  on  the  National  Council  for  Tripartite
Consultations  (NCTC)  demonstrates  that  such  intervention  could  also  be  done
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through  legislation  that  regulates  the  eligibility  criteria  for  participation  in  civil
service consultations. The case demonstrates the conflict of access to the NCTC by
two opposing camps: groups representing Big (Business) Enterprises (BE) versus
groups that stand for Small and Medium (Business) Enterprises (SME). In the NCTC
context, the former are represented by Chamber of Industrialists and Employers in
Bulgaria (CIEB) and the latter by the Bulgarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry
(BCCI). The immediately available data on the case only allows for the observation
that  any  barriers  of  access  BCCI  experienced  are  the  result  of  political  party
machinations and much less due to CIEB being a  party insider  group seeking to
block NCTC access to its  competition.  In fact  CIEB demonstrates the traits  of a
peripheral  party insider:  a group that  has  occasional  contacts with venue policy-
makers and is in no position to bargain or negotiate with them (Maloney et al 1997).
While still  highlighting that political parties interfere in the workings of the civil
service, the chapter argues that the NCTC is a case of a wider phenomenon of covert
of political power centralisation in the party leadership. According to another group
of  respondents,  Bulgarian  policy-making  is  an  oligarchy, where  political  parties,
interest groups and other private actors meet and rule together. However, as it will be
explained later, this view is conceptually flawed and the fact that eventually CIEB
faced  becoming  an  outsider  to  NCTC along  with  its  competition  –  the  BCCI  –
disproves the possibility that on this occasion, the NCTC case is an example of an
oligarchy.
The above is  discussed in  the following order:  The next  section,  4.2 reveals  the
details  of  the  NCTC.  Each  of  the  two  competing  explanations  are  discussed
respectively in subsection 4.3.1 and 4.3.2. 
4.2.  Party Intervention and the National  Council  for
Tripartite Consultations (NCTC)
The  National  Council  for  Tripartite  Consultations  (NCTC)  is  Bulgaria’s  main
consultative body where business,  workers and the State (civil  service) meet and
discuss  matters  of  primary  interest  to  the  entire  economy,  e.g.  minimum  wage,
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standards, contracts, etc. A number of respondents commented on the competition
between  Big  Business  (BE)  and  Small/Medium size  Business  (SME)  in  gaining
access  to  the  Civil  Service consultations  and NCTC in particular. The numerous
comments,  triangulated with news articles and publicly available qualitative data,
were collected in a case study on the National Council for Tripartite Consultations or
NCTC. 
At first, for many respondents NCTC was a case of the battleground between BE and
SME.  The  dominant  position  among  them was  that  SME was  the  victim of  BE
colliding with the ruling party. While that proposition has some merit, the case of
NCTC  is  indicative  of  a  more  prominent  phenomenon.  This  is,  namely,  party
centralisation  of  power and  its  manifestation,  party  interference  through  party
political appointments (PPA). However, on a second read, the NCTC (BE vs SME)
dynamics in fact demonstrate that the party in power can strongly interfere in the
civil service negotiations. Any core insider status within the civil service could be
negated by party’s ability to shape or at least disrupt the usual consultative process
hosted  by the  civil  service.  This  demonstrates  its  willingness  to  intervene  in  the
bureaucracy and thereby its ability to perform the function of a parentela primary
venue. Ultimately, this coincides with the description of the ruling party which hosts
parentela relations (La Palombara 1964). 
There  was  virtually  no  disagreement  among  respondents  that  the  Bulgarian  civil
service  consulted  business  on  legislative  proposals.  Speaking  on  behalf  of  peak
associations Petrov and R30352 confirmed that the state seeks to consult. Zlatarov
and  Lyubenov  explained  that  business  prefers  to  consult  through  the  state
administration,  particularly because  they would  communicate  with  equal  experts.
Hence,  in  principle,  access  is  easier  this  way.  Speaking  as  a  business  owner,
Respondent Stoyanov gave a positive feedback on state consultations overall arguing
that while consultations could still be better, it is definitely an improvement since
2009 that civil servants invite their representative body to consultations.
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Most importantly, however, many respondents stressed that one of the consultative
fora that has greatest importance for business is the NCTC. Respondent Lyubenov
argued there are consultations at all levels of the civil service, the treasury, Bulgarian
National Bank, including the NCTC.  Respondent Hristov singled out the National
Council  for  Tripartite  Cooperation  (NCTC)  as  the  main  and  most  important
consultative  body.  Other  respondents  such  as  Zlatarov,  Konstantinov,  also
highlighted  the  prime  importance  of  NCTC  that  has  for  business.  Respondent
Zlatarov  noted  50  consultative  bodies  where  their  peak3 organization,  Bulgarian
Chamber  of  Commerce  and  Industry  (BCCI)  was  in  frequent  bureaucratic
consultation, also highlighting the “supreme” NCTC. 
While noting the importance of NCTC, many respondents also saw this consultative
body as a contested ground between Big Business and Medium/Small Business. The
Big  Business  vs  Small  and  Medium  Business  distinction  was  introduced  by
Respondent  Nikolov,  where  Big  Business  comprises  monopolistic  actors  in  the
economic niche they occupy, including individual firms, corporations or individual
business owners. Without any hesitation other respondents also added in the same
category the so called  circles (a  number of firms acting informally in  concert  to
protect their interest, Chapter 7). SMEs consists of small shop owners, producers,
merchants, also including what Respondent Zlatarov termed “micro” firms of just a
few people.
Nikolov was the first respondent to voice this conflict and immediately attempted to
explain  it,  quoting  two main  reasons.  First,  the  corresponding consultative  body,
Agency for Small and Medium Size Businesses (ASMSB), is both under resourced
and incompetent to consider SME’s interest. To makes things worse, ASMSB does
not deal with a consolidated actor that represents SME interests as a whole, either. 
Speaking  on  behalf  of  BCCI,  under  what  Konstantinov  termed  unsatisfactory
relations, he argued that by definition SME is left out of decisions of core importance
to them,  despite the fact that the civil service consults in general. In other words,
3 A trade association that represents an entire sector(s) of the economy.
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SME only had peripheral access to policies of interest. In agreement with Nikolov,
the civil service is not capable to carry out the necessary legislative consultations, or
what is otherwise known in Bulgarian policy-making: the assessment of the potential
effects of draft legislation on business.
Their observation was also corroborated by the state report on the development of the
state  administration 2014-2020,  We are Working for the People:  Strategy  for the
Development  of  State  Administration  (“Council  of  Ministers  Accepted”  2014;
Bulgarian Council of Ministers 2014). The document clearly specifies that one of the
current  deficiencies of  the  state  administration  and  government  is  the  turbulent
production  of  secondary  legislation  that  lacks  any  assessment  of  its  effects  on
businesses  (Council  of  Ministers  20142014:  10).  In  other  words,  this  voices  the
argument  that  the  civil  service  does  not  provide  effective  consultative  venues
because it inherently incapable to do so. The report concludes that the Bulgarian civil
service does not carry out the necessary level of intensive consultations to determine
whether  any  proposed  legislative  amendments  are  palatable  to  those  potentially
affected  (Council  of  Ministers  2014:  11-12).  The  report  attributes  the  deficient
consultations in general, to civil servants' general disinterest in taking up the issues
voiced by interest groups and much less, if at all, to the lack of material resources
(Council  of  Ministers  2014:  12).  Again,  this  means  that  SME  are  ineffectively
consulted primarily because the administration has limited professional capacity to
facilitate such consultations. 
This is at odds with what Lyubenov argued. While he is correct in principle that
access to policy-making is reciprocal to group’s ability to provide expertise (e.g.,
Richardson and Jordan 1979; Grant 1977, 1978, 2001, Chapter 2), this is a minority
position.  Lyubenov  allows  that  the  civil  service  may  not  always  be  capable  of
conducting meaningful interest group consultations, he nevertheless stressed that any
perceived group exclusion is usually due to groups’ insufficient sectoral expertise.
They argued that the degree of access granted to SME may also depend on the degree
of competence the group bears. Although his position is correct in principle, with
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relation to assessing the effects of legislative proposals on industry, the civil service
administration de facto admits that (Council of Ministers 2014: 12): 
[t]he  directors  and  civil  servants  […]  do  not  recognise  this  duty  as
primary and do not input the necessary effort to understand better the
approach and logic of the effects of the [respective] legislation.
In  other  words,  the  deficient  consultative  access  SME  experience  is  primarily
attributable to an inherent civil service disinterest in assessing the detailed effects of the
policy proposals that it handles.
While consultations might be hampered by internal problems of the administration,
both Nikolov and Hristov agreed that another contributing factor is the absence of a
coherent representative body of SME. The ineffective group mobilisation that adds to
the  diminished effectiveness  of  consultations  is  also  reflected  in  the  same report
(“Council of Ministers Accepted” 2014; Bulgarian Council of Ministers 2014 p. 16):
A main problem is that in given fields and policies the representatives of
NGOs are too numerous and the communication with them is hampered.
A cause for that [among other things] is the dispute over representability
among the organizations.
Speaking  on  behalf  of  the  civil  service,  the  report  informs  that  the  state
administration  finds  it  is  hard  to  consult  a  sector  that  lacks  a  coherent  and  an
agglomerated representative body. However, the report  is  unclear  whether  and to
what extent that is also valid for the peak SME associations like Bulgarian Chamber
of Commerce and Industry (BCCI). Evidence suggests that while it may be true that
their mobilisation is difficult a single and coherent representative of SME is clearly
identifiable in the face of the BCCI which is represented at more than 50 consultative
organs, indicating thereby that the group is bearer of expertise (Zlatarov). Likewise,
BIA is another association with a wide business base (Konstantinov).
Another, possible explanation – and the more dominant – behind SME’s perceived
consultative ineffectiveness could be attributable to the possibility of core insider
groups trying to create barriers of entry to other groups who too compete for policy-
making access. Zlatarov provided two cases indicating a disruption of the existing
consultative mechanisms (NCTC). In the first case, the respondent cited the 2011
attempted amendments in the Labour Codex as evidence of BCCI being targeted for
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exclusion from the tripartite consultations because it was the only organization, part
of NCTC that did not meet the new participation criteria. Zlatarov’s analysis led him
to  suspect  that  their  rivals,  the  Confederation  of  Industrialists  and  Employers  in
Bulgaria (CIEB) were behind it and that BCCI not meeting the legal participatory
requirements for participation at NCTC was simply the necessary pre-text for their
removal  from  consultations.  As  Zlatarov  explains,  according  to  the  latest
amendments  in  the  Labour  Codex  at  the  time,  any interest  groups  that  received
subsidies  from  the  state  were  forbidden  representation  as  independent  actors  at
NCTC consultations. However, the internal legal analysis of BCCI concluded that it
did not receive subsidies from the state, but had been paid for services that had been
outsourced to them. According to Respondent Zlatarov, ultimately, that was a move
by CIEB to eliminate their rival interest groups from competing for influence in the
NCTC policy venue, e.g. BCCI which Zlatarov represents. 
Support  of  this  thesis  provide  a  number  of  respondents  who  argued  that  it  is
commonplace  for  the  more  affluent  businesses  to  split  away from their  sectoral
organization and seek direct representation to the party in power. The explanation is
that the party is seen as the more effective route to policy-making than the civil
service. Respondent Nikolov was quite specific that individual Big Business actors
sought the access to ruling political parties. In exchange for benefits to individual
MPs or the party parliamentary groups, they received favourable legislation. That is
why one  could  observe  legislation  that  directly  harms the  interests  of  small  and
medium  size  businesses.  But  the  thrust  of  the  argument,  however,  was  that
consultations outside the ruling party are meaningless. He argued that once decision
is in direct party-group negotiations its consequent consultations in parliament serve
no purpose. Moreover, the position of the peak association is undermined, when such
splinter  large  corporations  express  independent,  and  often  opposing,  positions  in
private to the party in power (e.g. the respective Trade Association). 
The view that single big business owners (groups) would seek to circumvent their
respective representative body and directly negotiate with the ruling party was also
reflected by Kirilov. They argued that sectoral bodies that represent the interests of
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small and medium size businesses, such as BIA (Bulgarian Industrial Association)
are  not  an  effective  medium of  representation  for  Big  Business.  Single  affluent
businesses find it more effective to engage directly with ruling political parties. This
observation is also made by the directorial representative of BIA, Konstantinov as
well. In an overlap with the Council of Ministers report (2004) they argued that civil
service does not enquire of business as to the possible effects on the economy of the
legislative  drafts  in  progress,  and  a  reason  for  that  is  the  observation  those  are
legislative decisions taken in direct consultations between the ruling party and party
insider groups. He argued that the civil service consults, but those consultations on
legislation  of  interest  to  party insider  firms  are  either  sabotaged or  non-existent.
Similar to Nikolov above, he also implied that there specifically are more influential
party-group  relationship  which  are  sustained  on  the  mutual  exchange  of  policy-
making access against campaign resources, which is also discussed in Chapters 6, 8,
9. The interview with Hristov on Big vs Small and Medium Enterprises revealed the
same observation: the party route is more effective than the civil service one, as long
as  the group is  able  to  negotiate  its  provision of campaign resources  for desired
policy concessions. Hristov also added that SME were ineffective also because their
interests were not expressed through a major representative body. 
Zlatarov also agreed that the party route is more effective and influential. Speaking
from personal experience and on a different matter, Zlatarov explained how the large
corporation they personally represented sought to amend the details of a piece of
legislation  that  directly  affected  it.  They  were  very  particular  that  the  state
administration would not have listened to them. Instead, they found it most effective
to seek a personal endorsement from a member of the ruling party who facilitated the
contact with the responsible Minister in question. 
The effectiveness of the party route is also discernible in the accounts of Petrov who
spoke from the perspective of an outsider sectoral organization that failed to gain
party  insider  access,  despite  their  numerous  representations  to  consultations
organised  by  each  of  the  major  parties  in  Bulgaria.  With  great  discontent  the
respondent  recounted  how  a  particular  party  gradually  stalled  action  on  policy
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promises  made  personally  to  them.  They  concluded  based  on  their  immediate
observations that it  was the more affluent business actors who eventually secured
effective party access. 
Ultimately, a public statement from BCCI from 16th December 2011 also identifies
CIEB as  the  group that  stands  to  gain  from the  legislative  amendments  (bcci.bg
2011b):
The statement from the interested in the removal of BCCI organization,
CIEB is an absolute insinuation that at some point in the past […] the
European Commission or any other such body had stated that BCCI was
the inaccurate social partner. 
The MPs Pavel Shopov (bcci.bg 2011f) and Todor Velikov (bcci.bg 2011f) clearly
voiced the same concern. From the parliamentary tribune, the latter states (bcci.bg
2011f)):
You (to  MPs from ruling  party)  are making  this  in  service  to  CIEB,
because these people (BCCI),  deprived from their representation,  will
have to find it in CIEB. But who does CIEB represent at the moment in
our country? -- Large capital! […] We will deprive small and medium
business  from representation  and  we will  redirect  them to  the  larger
capital  which is  of  a  doubtful  origin.  Why  are we doing all  this? In
whose service? In service of someone who at the moment wants to take
over the entire employment market, to stand next to the government and
say: "I am the legitimate one, I want all [public tenders] to be given to
me and I will dictate the status quo in this state"!
Although not spelling CIEB out, the MPs Rumen Petkov (bcci.bg 2011d) and Martin
Dimitrov  (bcci.bg  2011e)  also  confirm the  parliamentary opposition’s stance  that
BCCI are the intended group for exclusion. The gravity of BCCI’s reaction and the
numerous MP statements indicate that CIEB most likely were in some sort of a tacit
agreement with the ruling party, although no such direct evidence could be found.
However, this is an irrelevant inquiry. 
The  ability  of  the  ruling  party to  impose  criteria  for  participation  in  the  NCTC
consultations makes the inquiry into CIEB vs BCCI irrelevant. The ability to control
who sits at NCTC means that the ruling party is the most effective route to policy-
making,  because  it  has  the  authority  and  ability  to  shape  the  NCTC.  This  is
evidenced by respondent Zlatarov who cited the amendments in the Law of Public
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Property of Former State Workers (term for civil servants, sic) 20134. He explained
that  according  to  those  amendments,  the  chairmanship  of  all  groups  seeking
representations  at  tripartite  consultations  (labour,  business  and  the  state)  had  to
declare  their  income  to  assume  such  posts.  Access  to  the  consultations  was
conditional on chairpersons of the boards from all represented groups disclosing all
sources of income. Zlatarov claimed firstly that this is against the spirit of the law,
which  was  originally  intended  for  state  agencies  only  and  not  interest  groups.
Secondly, as a result, members of the business in the boards of their representative
groups become unnecessarily vulnerable as they had to reveal personal data and thus
risk  becoming  victims  of  blackmail.  That  position  could  be  clearly  observed
expressed  collectively  on  the  website  of  BCCI’s  adversary,  CIEB,  where  all
employer  associations  at  NCTC  signed  a  declaration  of  discontinuation  of
participation in the tripartite consultations (CIEB 2013). The declaration highlights
the  anti-constitutional  provision  of  the  amendment  and  clearly  states  that  the
requirement of income disclosure puts groups’ directorial boards at personal risk. But
most  importantly,  it  acknowledges  that  such  barriers  are  also  ruling  party’s
mechanism  of  shaping  NCTC  consultations.  The  statement  reads  (CIEB  2013,
emphasis added):
II.1. The members of the executive and directorial organs deem that
[… requiring] data of their assets be published online, creates conditions
for pressure (on them and their families), not only political but criminal
as well.
As those amendments were seen by all industrial representative peak associations,
their sole purpose, de facto was to facilitate party’s entire control over the NCTC,
because  the  new  rules  rendered  them  ineligible  for  further  membership.  The
narrowest view on the NCTC case, immediately based on the more accessible data is
that  CIEB  was  a  party  insider  who  attempted  to  place  barriers  of  entry  to  its
competition, BCCI, to the consultations at NCTC. However, the fact that CIEB, too,
eventually nearly lost its access to the NCTC suggests that CIEB had a status of a
peripheral insider. Although CIEB had had some access to the ruling party, it could
not eliminate its competition and remain the sole group at the NCTC. Eventually, just
as with BCCI CIEB was barred access to the NCTC. In any case, establishing the
4 Law for Publicity of Assets of Individuals Assuming High State Public and other Duties in the
Public and Private Sector
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CIEB-party  link  requires  more  data,  particularly  from  relevant  party  political
functionaries and business members from CIEB, which falls outside the scope of the
present study. Yet, with regards to the parentela, whether CIEB was a party insider, is
irrelevant,  because  the  available  evidence  clearly  indicates  political  parties  are
capable of significant bureaucratic intervention as per La Palombara (1964). That is
to  say,  they  are  a  primary  venue  and  therefore  to  that  extent  fit  the  parentela
description. 
4.3.  Alternative  Perspectives  on  NCTC:  Prime-
Ministerial Democracy or Oligarchy
The  available  data  above  reports  that  political  parties  are  capable  of  direct  civil
service intervention.  Yet,  it  does  not  explain why, nor does  it  provide any wider
context that would help assess the significance of these findings related the parentela.
Taking a wider look on the available data on the parentela as a whole allows us to
test two theories or rather propositions developed by respondent discussing parentela
dynamics. These are namely that Bulgaria is a  premier democracy  and that it is an
oligarchy. The  reason why results  from later  chapters  will  be  anticipated  in  this
section is because they bear immediate explanatory power on this case and in doing
so still demonstrate the fundamental importance of party’s bureaucratic interference,
both  for  the  functioning  of  the  parentela  and more  encompassing  policy-making
dynamics.
4.3.1.  Prime-Ministerial Democracy
The case above suggests that political parties can interfere with the NCTC. But why
would they do that? The quick answer is party political power centralisation. While
many respondents above argued that splinter groups saw the party in power as the
more  effective  route  to  policy-making,  another  group of  respondents  went  much
further. They argued that the ruling party was the more effective policy-making route
because Bulgaria was a prime ministerial democracy, because of the powers already
vested in the prime minister (i.e. party leader). According to this  perspective,  the
practice  of  party  political  appointments  (PPA)  in  the  civil  service  facilitates  the
centralisation of power in the political party leader, also known as the prime minister.
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This perspective also explains why groups from the trade associations split away and
directly negotiate with the ruling party. If power is centralised in the party leadership,
it follows that the binding decisions are taken on that level and outside the confines
of civil service negotiations. According to that view, civil service consultations are of
low quality precisely because of the high turnover of political appointees with every
change of the party in power. The civil service is staffed with political appointees
who  are  always  new  to  the  job.  They  usually  cannot  apply  their  accumulated
experience after a party change. Based on the data on the parentela as a whole and on
the NCTC case, the premier democracy perspective appears most persuasive. 
Respondent Hadzhiev argued that it is political parties who rule the state, and not
elected  MPs.  The  legal  perspective  on  policy-making  is  blind  to  the  reality  that
informal pacts between ruling parties and insider groups lie at the core of policy-
making:
R:  Actually  in  Bulgaria  it  is  everywhere  written  down  that  it  is  a
parliamentary  republic  and  respectively  the  supreme  law  is  the
constitution.  [However,]  since  10th  November  1989,  the  state  is
parliamentary republic only de jure. De facto [...] Bulgaria is ruled by
miscellaneous parties. /emphasises/ It  is entirely different the question
who is connected with those Parties and how is this entire government
done more generally.
Likewise,  respondent  Petkov  shared  the  rather  cynical  position  that  power  rests
exclusively with the prime minister:
By the way Bulgaria is actually only formally a parliamentary republic.
The  parliament  is  a  structure  for  psychotherapy  for  the  Bulgarian
citizens, who need to know how bad the politicians they themselves elect
are.
In other words, the parliament and parliamentary consultations deflect the attention
from the real locus of power. They are meaningless because it is the party leadership
that dictates the decisions of elected MPs. The parliament and MPs are reduced to
objects of misdirected hoi hatred of the political system. 
Like Petkov, Penchev was as also cynical about the same 24 year period of transition
to democracy. He argued that the party ruled the state unimpeded and the powers
vested in the party in power – the premier – can also be at the disposal of the party
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insider groups. Therefore, a group can gain control over parts of the civil service,
also including the judiciary, the prosecution and secret services:
R After  23  years,  democracy  has  not  arrived  yet.  Everything  is
[politically] controlled in Bulgaria. And that is something which they see
in Brussels. But they have given up on us and say that things in Bulgaria
happen only with diktat and pressure. So [… it is all] about the control
over  the  political  system  and  political  class  through  which  [those
groups] realise this power, [and it is] in the same way they control the
judiciary, the state prosecutor and the services.
The above was probably one of the earlier  statements  directly attributable to  the
parentela. Other respondents also argued that the real power locus lies with political
parties. Stoyanov ended the above positive note thus:
We have to walk more until we run away from those – how should I say it
– interpersonal relationships which are not on the plane of real business
What  interpersonal  relationships implies  above,  are  the  direct  personal  contacts
some business actors establish with the party in power. Respondent Stoyanov shall be
revisited again in Chapter 9 elaborating on this point. Speaking as member of the
directorial  board,  Respondent  Konstantinov  made  the  argument  that  the  interest
group they represent,  BIA, too,  like BCCI was an occasional outsider (peripheral
insider) to decisions of core importance to its constitutive members:
[Business] does not make decisions; that would be the government. The
National Council for Tripartite Cooperation [...] is a consultative organ
and it  does  not  make decisions  [but]  we  are often  witnesses  of  how
without  any consultations parameters  are changed which in  any case
influence negatively on the business environment.
That the party is the key venue providing most effective access to policy-making is
inferred from the difficulty groups experience in maintaining a long-term meaningful
representation at the consultative administrative bodies. The respondent implies that
key decisions are taken at the level of ruling political parties, whose governments
only consult ad hoc the relevant sector-wide interest groups. Therefore, according to
respondent Kirilov lobbying efforts have to target the prime minister.
However, the above perspective raises the question of how political power could be
centralised. One answer is through the practice of party political appointments or
PPA. Other chapters of the study are also dedicated to PPAs. Chapter 5 is entirely
dedicated to  the causes of PPA and the scope of  this  practice.  Chapters 8 and 9
130
feature PPAs in case studies,  which exemplify how PPAs are applied in practice.
However, the present section will discuss the role and effects of PPAs in the party-
civil service relationship. PPAs do not only explain the centralisation argument, but
also why the civil service provides ineffective consultative fora.  
In the same self-evaluative report mentioned earlier, the Bulgarian civil service tries
to  argue  that  the  regulatory agencies  are  not  necessarily  independent  from party
political  interference.  The  report  seeks  to  diminish  party  political  influence  by
confusing  the  reader  with  convoluted  phraseology (emphasis  added)  (Council  of
Ministers 2014: 21):
The lack of success of some independent regulatory agencies should not
be  sought  in  the  deficit  of  their  independence  from  political  power
(ruling  party),  but  more  in  the  absence  of  adequate  mechanisms  for
responsibility  allocation  when their  guaranteed independence  remains
unused 
While  the  report  admits  to  an  open secret,  that  political  parties  control  the  civil
service, it is not up to the body, which politically controls the civil service (Council
of Ministers, or the government) and which also authors the report,  to assess the
extent of its own party political control over the regulatory agencies. The fact that
such control exists and is wide-ranging is evident in the emphasis that staffing the
civil  service has to happen on the basis of competition and merit  (see Chapter 5
dedicated specifically to the scope of PPA). Immediately following the preceding
quotation, the report insists that:
[...]  the  practice  of  competition  among  civil  service  candidates  for
employment  has  to  continue  to  be  emphasised  [...]  and  clear
transparency mechanisms be also created
Such insistence gives a loud voice to the politically unpalatable point the report is
trying  to  hide:  that  party political  appointments  are  the  norm.  Coupled  with  the
earlier nebulous explanations regarding party control over the civil service the latter
quotation implies that PPAs are the shift gear that translates party authority down to
administrative  levels.  In  both  quotations,  the  authors  are  trying  to  deflect  our
attention from two points: that the civil service regulatory agencies are politically
controlled and that PPAs are the standard practice of staffing the civil service. This is
a point discussed at length in Chapter 5 and amply exemplified in Chapters 8 and 9.
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However,  the  other  important  point  is  that  in  light  of  the  above,  the  inefficient
consultations the civil service provides are also a direct result of the PPAs. In a much
later section of the same report,  the authors are still  very careful not to admit to
PPAs, when they recommend more competition-based employment is necessary in
order  to  improve  the  administrative  consultative  capacity.  They  clearly  correlate
employment  not  based on competition  to  civil  service  incompetence  (Council  of
Ministers 2014: 31):
Another problem is connected to the avoidance of the regulations in the
Law  on  the  State  Worker  (civil  servant),  of  appointment  of  servants
without the conduct of a competition. In this way preconditions are laid
out for the employment of servants who lack the necessary knowledge
and skills for the assumption of respective position.
In an obvious attempt to avoid the phrase political appointments, the report discusses
“appointment of servants without the conduct of a competition”. The only way to
appoint civil  servants without competition is through party political  appointments
(Chapter 5). However, speaking as a former minister and a lawyer working on a case
of appealing the results of a civil service competition, Petkov was largely sceptical of
the effectiveness of civil service competitions as an alternative to PPAs. On the one
hand, even if experts are appointed, they soon, forcefully or not, become politically
different to their patrons. As for civil service competitions, those too are entangled
with ruling party machinations. 
Yet,  the  civil  service  report  has  to  be  commended  for  raising  the  point  that  the
massive civil servant substitutions, following every party change, degrade the overall
competence of the state administration. Other respondents were united in the view
that  civil  service consultations  are  significantly hampered by PPAs (chapter  5  in
more details). Respondent Kuzmanov was particularly vocal on this issue:
R[…] [in Bulgaria]  with the change of the political subject (party),
there  exists  the  exceptionally  damaging  practice  to  kick  people  out,
including  the  nether  echelon  [of  the  civil  service].  /To change  their
posts? --S/ Yes, yes... Simply the changes are to the lowest level /locally?
--S/  Yes,  yes.  After  all  we  talk  about  the  [loss]  of  administrative
experience. We talk about entering in a given rhythm, acquiescence with
a heap of requirements with which one has to work and in one moment
when someone has accumulated 4-5 years [of experience ...]  they may
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not be the best, but they got it, nevertheless, they [had finally] got what is
needed of them, what they have to do, [and] how to do it. On top of that
they fight every year with our absolutely explosive dynamic, the legal
and  normative  framework  [especially  when  it]  is  written  in  quite
nebulous  terms,  [...]  and  that  is  a  fact!  [...]  You  come  to  power  --
/theatrically  enters  the  role  of  a  politician  giving  orders/  "Get  out!"
/throws an object on the table, bottle cap? / "Here, this one, this one is
good,  because  he is  [my appointee]!  [...]  He will  learn!  What  is  the
problem? I learned all by myself [in the past], he will do, too!" This is
the principle. Consequently we fall in some situations, where we enter
complete nonsense and that is on the top levels. Like "Kalinka", or the
other one [...] who did not have the education, too. 
The use of the term “Kalinka” above is of particular interest. Many respondents who
discussed appointments gave the example of Kalina Ilieva,  former director of the
Fund  for  Agriculture  in  Bulgaria.  She  was  appointed  at  the  start  of  the  GERB
government in 2009, her career quickly deteriorated as rumours were confirmed that
she had forged her  University Diploma which  permitted her  to  assume that  post
(Mitev 20012). While the case is long gone, her first name was used as a term for
anyone  who  was  politically  appointed  (kalinka  (sg.)  kalinki  (pl.)  meaning
“ladybug”). Many respondents used the term “kalinka” to express their disapproval
of this practice. For example, Petkov exclaimed ‘If you appoint kalinki – the effect
[on the administration] will be bad’. Respondents Kirilov and Petkov, in addition to
Hristov either made a clear use of the term or respondent to its use.
Based  on  personal  experience,  Dobromirov  had  similar  observations  to  the
respondents above. Fresh appointees need time to come to grips with the knowledge-
base needed to address the needs of business groups. Respondent Varbanov equally
argued:
R: So, the state administration in Bulgaria /self-interrupts, thinks
hard, pauses/ there are no good professionals [they] are very slow [and]
cannot respond to the problems in the respective [fields], whether those
are industrial or [related to] construction; we confront this problem on a
daily basis. [...] there is no constant long term plan for the development
of  the  state,  which  every  self-respecting  state  has:  a  long term plan,
regardless of which party is in power. This is at least how I see things
ought  to  be.  /pauses/  and  those  who  sometimes  are  appointed  as
directors  to  given  [agencies]  do  not  possess  the  respective  intellect,
[and] do not have the necessary education.
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Therefore, the common position between Varbanov, Kirilov, Petkov, Dobromirov and
Kuzmanov is that the uprooting and subsequent substitution of the civil service staff
with  new  appointees  at  every  party  change  decreases  the  overall  civil  service
professional  capacity.  For  Varbanov  in  particular  this  is  a  result  of  the  political
parties’ attitude of ignoring national interests for much more narrower and short-term
party ends. In more practical terms this leads to civil servants being professionally
incapable to partner or assist interest groups in legislative consultations because they
lack the necessary knowledge to do so. That is why single large business groups seek
to directly negotiate with the ruling party at headquarters, as opposed to through the
civil service channels of representation. 
Second, although the data from the study was not intended to be used in an analysis
of  the  state  of  democracy  in  Bulgaria,  it  also  allows  furthering  the  premier
democracy  thesis above. The suppression of political dissent, both intra and extra
party, could also be done through PPAs. Political parties can appoint the directors of
regulatory agencies and departments which can impose sanctions on groups that the
ruling party sees as an opposition. The report authored by the Council of Ministers
(the  government)  ineffectively argues  that  appointments  have no relation  to  civil
service politicisation and subordination to the ruling party (present chapter). In fact,
all elite respondents, including ex-ministers, from the present study are unanimous
that  PPAs  are  intended  to  facilitate  ruling  party’s  control  over  the  civil  service
(Chapters 5, 8, 9). 
Chapter 5 reveals that party control over the civil service originates from the analyses
of BSP’s leaders of mid 1990s with their “triangle of power”. Sitting atop of the
isosceles triangle, on the one hand the party leadership can dictate to its own MPs by
enforcing iron-clad party discipline.  Following the second isosceles line,  and still
sitting at the top, the party leadership controls the civil service by appointing trusted
individuals as heads of departments and agencies. As chapter 5, 8 and 9 indicate, the
philosophy is maintained by all political parties to-date. Party political appointments
are wide-spread to this day, while MPs are marginalised and virtually no respondent
addressed MPs and the parliament as of any relevance. 
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The  recent  study  has  generated  data  that  also  lends  itself  to  this  power-centred
analysis  (chapter  9).  In  what  would  be  argued  as  a  variation  of  La  Palombara’s
original  parentela,  chapter  9 reveals  a new parentela-like dynamic,  which is  also
based on political appointments. On the basis of responses from immediate victims
of such pressure, that chapter reveals the party in power is in the position to eliminate
firms and put pressure on entire trade associations. When in the position to appoint
political  trustees  as  regulatory agency directors,  the  party is  enabled  to  instigate
deliberate inspections against any business actors, to the effect of bankrupting them.
Responses  indicate  that  such  forms  of  pressure  are  directed  both  at  intra-party
dissenters  and firms whose owners  take an active part  in  the lobbying efforts  of
dissenting trade associations. That is why some respondents (Chapter 9) also argued
that some interest groups’ leadership found it more prudent to cooperate with the
ruling party, even if that is against the interests of own membership. 
4.3.2.  Bulgarian Oligarchy
Interest group leadership colliding with party leadership, however, is an argument
that relates to a similar but more extreme respondent thesis that Bulgarian politics is
an oligarchy (reviewed at more length in chapter 9). Including 2 former ministers and
one very affluent entrepreneur, a number of respondents advocated that Bulgaria is
an active oligarchy. Applying this view on the NCTC case, this means that CIEB
would have sided with the ruling party. However, while it is true that fingers were
pointed at  CIEB, it  is unclear why in the end CIEB was also excluded from the
NCTC just as its rival, BCCI.
Moreover, the oligarchic thesis advanced by the respondents, seems underdeveloped.
The  term  oligarchy  implies  a  limited  number  of  cooperating  actors  presiding
unlimitedly  over  policy-making.  However,  no  immediate  evidence  was  found  to
support this solid view. The most one could say in support of the oligarchy argument
is  that  the  combined dynamics  of  the parentela  and its  variation do create  some
oligarchic  dynamic  (Chapters  8  and 9). What  the  present  study on the  parentela
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inadvertently demonstrates is that political  power can be shared between a ruling
party elite and party insiders (Chapter 9). 
In its most simplistic form, the party-group dynamic allows for certain combinations
of ruling parties with insider groups to dominate policy-making on issues of interest,
which tend to last until next parliamentary elections are lost. Such close cooperation
(Chapter 7, 8, 9) gives the impression of an existing oligarchy, and that is further
compounded by the fact that party insider groups seek to maintain insider access to
all relevant political parties simultaneously (Chapter 7). Doing so increases group’s
chances of survival when hitherto party patrons lose elections and a new party comes
to power – ideally one that the group would have already established insider relations
while it was in opposition (Chapter 7). 
In addition, and particularly on the party-party insider side of the argument, chapter 8
shows  how  groups  supporting  the  status  quo  are  awarded  for  their  loyalty.  It
demonstrates the skewed process of granting public tenders to party insiders, which
relies exclusively on populating the decision-making public tender committee with
loyal political appointees. Up to and including the August 2014 amendments of the
Law on Public Tenders, the party in power has the ability to directly determine the
recipients of public tender contracts (Chapter 8).
Therefore, with regards to the NCTC case, more evidence is necessary to establish
the  link  between  NCTC  and  the  ruling  party  at  the  time  that  the  proposed
amendments rendered BCCI as ineligible to compete. At the same time, it is also
against  the oligarchic thesis  the fact  that  eventually both CIEB and BCCI found
themselves outsiders from NCTC. Given the available evidence, the NCTC case is
seen here more of an example of singular party’s attempt at covert centralisation of
political power, rather than a case of oligarchic dynamics However, either way, the
most important point remains that the party in power can act as a primary venue,
because the NCTC case demonstrates that the party in power is a venue that it is both
seen as effective (as admitted by respondents themselves) and was shown to interfere
in the civil service.
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4.4.  Conclusion
The present chapter focused on the case of Bulgaria’s National Council for Tripartite
Cooperation (NCTC). This is Bulgaria’s civil service top consultative body, where
Big Business, Small and Medium Business, trade unions and the State (represented
by civil service) discuss matters of relevance to the Bulgarian economy and labour
relations. The case lends itself to three possible interpretations, all of which advance
the same point: that political parties in Bulgaria are both effective policy venues and
do interfere in the work of the civil service. That is to say, the party is a primary
venue. At first sight, it might seem as case where Big Business attempted to exclude
the representative groups of Small and Medium Enterprises. However, taking into
account the totality of available data, a second and a third view transpire. The second
perspective states that the NCTC is a case of party political power centralisation, or
the  premier  democracy  thesis.  The  third  perspective  is  again  premised  on  party
centralisation  of  power,  but  it  goes  further  by positing  the  thesis  that  Bulgarian
politics are an oligarchy and the NCTC case is an example of that with CIEB trying
to exclude BCCI from the NCTC consultations by colliding with the ruling party.
However, the NCTC case does not seem to support the third perspective because
there is  not enough evidence to link BCCI with the ruling party at  the time and
because of the fact CIEB was eventually excluded on par with BCCI from the NCTC
consultations.  While  the  chapter  supports  the  middle-ground  argument  of  party
centralisation,  even if we see these second and third perspectives as extreme, the
lowest common denominator among all versions remains the same: that the party in
power has the capacity and willingness to intervene in the civil service (also Chapter
8 and 9). 
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CHAPTER 5:  Party Political  Appointments and
Venue Scope
5.1.  Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to focus on the venue scope policy network descriptor
and to argue that such a party-group relationship characteristic which is pertinent to
the  parentela  could  also  be  observable  in  Bulgaria  at  present.  The  venue  scope
descriptor suggests that certain policy-making relationships could extend into many
policy-making  venues.  It  is  the  number  of  venues  that  are  together  involved  or
facilitate  the  respective  policy  network  dynamics.  In  the  parentela  context,  this
primarily is in the shape of civil service subordination to the ruling party, through
latter’s ability to make party political appointments. However, that should not imply
any specific dynamic, i.e. any sort of subordination, rather it is to convey the idea
that the dynamics of a policy network span across a number of policy venues.
The parentela venue scope indicates that the civil service is subordinate to the party
in power. Identifying then such connectedness between Bulgarian political  parties
and the civil service would be indicative of a parentela in Bulgaria. At this stage, the
literature has identified one major form of connectedness between the party in power
and the civil service: party political appointments (PPA). 
On that note, Chapter 4 also demonstrated that it may be possible for the party in
power to  intervene in  the work of the civil  service through changes  in  the legal
framework which regulates the internal processes of the civil service. In doing so, the
case on the tripartite council suggested that such legislative changes could act in the
interest of party insiders. And that too could be evidence of venue scope that involves
the civil service and the party in power. The reason this is not discussed here is that
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this is a matter of a separate study. The case of tripartite council (chapter 4) does
allow  discerning  whether  the  legislative  amendments  which  blocked  access  to
consultations  for  some  groups  were  indeed  a  result  of  pre-existing  agreements
between the party and insider groups. That is why, at this stage, the study discusses
links between the two venues of political parties and civil  service: party political
appointments. 
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to elucidate the extent of party political
appointments in Bulgaria, as a party-civil service relationship characteristic which is
in common with La Palombara’s parentela. The present study initially attempted to
retrieve statistical  data  on the regularity of political  appointments  and possibly a
correlation between a new party in power and the rate of deposed civil  servants.
However, as discussed in section 2 firm quantitative data could not be obtained. The
study therefore looked at statistical surveys elsewhere, such as those of Kopecky and
Spirova (2011) (KS 2011) and Kopecky, Mair and Spirova (2012) (KMS 2012) and
compared their results to the qualitative responses from the present Bulgaria 2013
parentela project. The main contribution in this chapter, therefore, is that it adds to
the explanation of the PPA causes and how they function, which KS (2011) and KMS
(2012) discuss.
The responses  from the present  project  confirm the conclusions  of  Kopecky and
Spirova (2011) and Kopecky, Mair and Spirova (2012) on the prevalence of party
political appointments in Bulgaria and on their  causes, respectively. Kopecky and
Spirova (2011) argue that agencies of ministries and the council of ministers (the
Prime Ministerial Council or Council of Ministers, the government) are subject to
wide-scale of appointments. Appointments, the authors also argue, spread, to a lesser
extent, to other administrative structures, which ought to be filled strictly on merit
and professionalism, such as hospital directors or principals. Data from this study
confirms this spread.
KMS 2012 also argue in more general terms that PPAs are used both as a form of
control and reward.  While the evidence from the present project agrees with that
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argument,  it  nevertheless  adds  nuances  to  their  argument  and  substance  to  their
statistical data. First, political parties use political appointments as a form of control
because they distrust any external, autonomous experts, be it from an autonomous
civil service or sectoral interest groups. Parties see such independent participants as a
threat, because their technocratic decisions fail to acknowledge party interests.  A
second form of administrative control spurred by distrust  is  when parties remove
civil servants from office at the turn of new elections because the new incumbent
distrusts the appointees of the deposed rival. Appointees of the previous party are
expected to sabotage the new one. Third, also in agreement with KMS 2012, parties
need political appointments in order to help maintain intra-organizational cohesion.
However, the study elaborates that this  use of PPAs is  a form of award to party
insider  groups  and  factions.  Finally,  it  also  needs  highlighting  that  the  above
practices are facilitated by the legal framework (5.2.) which enables party political
appointments at central and local administrative level.
In any case, however, all of the above causes for political appointments and legal
framework, that enables them, ultimately relate to the descriptor venue scope, which
in the context of parentela, stands for any indications of connectedness between the
party and civil service. The venue scope that the party-led policy-dynamics exhibit in
Bulgaria overlaps with that of La Palombara’s parentela. This is namely, that both in
Bulgaria 2013 and in Italy 1964, the party in power seeks to achieve its policy or
party  ends  by  expanding  its  influence  into  civil  service  by  party  political
appointments.
The chapter is divided as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the scope of party political
appointments in Bulgaria statistically, by reviewing the data from KS (2011) and
KMS  (2012).  Section  5.3  discusses  the  legal  framework  that  enables  political
appointments,  which  also  gives  a  perspective  of  the  possible  scope  of  such
appointments, and which also overlaps with the data from KS (2011). Section 5.4
focuses on the causes for party political appointments.
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5.2.  Scope  of  Party  Political  Appointments  in
Bulgaria
In order to estimate the extent of political appointments, the study initially lodged a
Freedom  of  Information  Request  to  the  Administrative  Register
(http://ar2.government.bg/ras/). Among many others, this administrative structure is
created by the Law on the Administration 1998 (art. 61) for the purpose of collecting
information on the number of employed staff in the Bulgarian Civil Service. The
request attempted to capture the extent of party political appointments by looking at
the  number  of  servants  on  directorial  (rakovodni,  ръководни)  and expert
(експертни) positions in any of the state agencies that were removed from office at
the turn of new political parties coming to power. In this way it would have been
observable  how the  new party  in  power  removed  the  previous  directorial  office
holders  and  appoints  new  ones.  However,  the  request  failed  because  the
Administrative Register ignored the request. 
Nevertheless,  this  setback  had  no  adverse  effect  on  this  project,  because  the
qualitative data from the present study corroborates the statistical data of Kopecky
and Spirova 2011 and Kopecky, Meir and Spirova (2012). In a comparative study on
political  appointments in Eastern Europe for the period 2006-2008, Kopecky and
Spirova (2011) develop a coefficient (index) of patronage. At the centre of their study
lie Bulgaria, Czech Republic and Hungary. Their data shows medium rate of party
political appointments in the three states (2011: 906-911, Table 18, p 125, Kopecky
and Spirova 2011: 907):
Table 18: Levels of PPA (Kopecky and Spirova 2011: 907)
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The  index  values  are  grouped  in  three  levels  of  party  political  appointments  as
follows (Table 19, p 126):
0.65 appointments occur in most institutions at all levels;
0.4 appointments occur in most institutions at top levels;
0.1 appointments are very limited and if any, at top levels.
An index of 0.42 is a measurement of a medium level of party political appointments
(Kopecky and Spirova 2011: 906). Although this value places the state in the middle
of a European-wide rank list of states with political appointments, the coefficient of
0.42 is a mean and that hides significant internal imbalances in favour of positions
assumed on the grounds of political appointment as opposed to on merit. There still
is a wide spread of political appointments both horizontally among top directorial
levels  of  most  institutions  and state  agencies,  and,  vertically, down to  local  and
middle level in each ministry, that is also including positions far removed from party
politics, such as school principals, hospitals, museums, etc. (Kopecky and Spirova
2011: 908-909), summarised and discussed in table 19 (p. 126) below.  
Kopecky and Spirova (2011) break down PPAs in three policy venues: Ministries,
Non-Departmental  Agencies  and  Commissions  (NDAC),  and  what  the  authors
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Table 19 PPA in Ministries and agencies, (Kopecky and Spirova 2011: 908)
describe as executing institutions (table 19). Looking at the first category from their
study,  Ministries, the  patronage  coefficient  is  near  0.61,  which  suggest  that  the
practice  is  prevalent  across  nearly  all  Ministries,  including head  secretaries  and
directors of ministerial agencies, down to civil servants on a middle level, possibly
also including experts form the Ministerial  Administration (Kopecky and Spirova
2011: 908-909; Kopecky, Mair and Spirova 2012: 59). 
The next administrative section is the NDACs, or the “non-departmental agencies
and commissions” which stand for those agencies and commissions created by and
under the direct control of the Prime Minister. As the authors describe them, “These
include institutions that are not part of the ministerial structures and have regulatory
and consultative functions within each policy area.” (Kopecky, Mair  and Spirova
2012: 60). At an index value of 0.34 the level of appointments in these structures is
considerably  lower  than  in  Ministries.  This  means  that  while  appointments  only
occasionally reach the lower levels of such administration, the top levels, however,
are  routinely subjected  to  political  intervention  (Spirova  2012:  61;  Kopecky and
Spirova 2011: 909).
Last is that segment of the Bulgarian civil service that encompasses “state-owned
companies,  national  financial  institutions,  the  embassies  and consulates,  hospitals
and  schools,  museums,  and  similar  state-run  entities.”,  or  executing  institutions
(Spirova 2012: 61). Among the three states under scrutiny, Bulgaria scores second
with a coefficient of 0.32, which according to the authors indicates that (Kopecky
and Spirova 2011: 909):
parties  […]  uniformly  appoint  at  the  top  levels  of  the  executing
institutions – to positions such as managers of state-owned companies or
directors  of  schools  [although]  the  overall  score  is  driven  by  the
extremely high level of patronage practices in the executing institutions
of several of the policy areas
Despite  the  low score  it  is  indeed a  cause  for  concern  because  by default  these
structures ought to be remote from party politics and policy-making and ought to be
strictly staffed by professionals, who are free from party political loyalties. These
structures  deliver  state  services,  such as  medical  care  and education,  or  generate
revenue  such  as  state-owned  enterprises  (Kopecky  et  al  2012:  61-62).  Overall,
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Kopecky and Spirova agree with other authors that the scope of appointments in the
Bulgarian civil service could in fact be wider because that could be disguised under
civil  service  re-structuring  or  optimisation  (Toshkov  2003  and  Stanev  2005  in
Spirova  2012:  62-63).  The  only  civil  service  structures  less  prone  to  political
interference  through  appointments  are  either  those  under  immediate  scrutiny  of
outsider institutions such as the EU or those which are extremely technical, such as
finances (Spirova 2012: 61; Kopecky and Spirova 2011: 910-911).
In  a  2012  follow  up  article,  Spirova,  Meir  and  Kopecky  review  political
appointments in the Bulgarian civil service but for an earlier period between 2000
and 2005, conducted by the private polling agency MBMD (2012). The data from
MBMD also indicated a high level of political appointments as of 2005. In fact, both
studies combined from 2000 to 2005 (MBMD in SMK 2012) and from 2006 to 2008
(Kopecky and  Spirova  2011)  indicate  an  overall  upward  trend  of  party  political
appointments in Bulgaria. In the MBMD study conducted in late 2005-early 2006,
asked 922 civil servants the question “Do you believe that political appointments in
the state administration happen often/sometimes /never?” twice: in 2000 and in 2005.
The results indicated an upward trend of political patronage. Those who believed no
political  appointments existed in 2000 (40%), reduced in half  by 2005 (less than
20%). Those in 2000, who believed that there were often political appointments, rose
approximately 3 times by 2005 (Figure 1 p128).  Overall,  if  we add the  MBMD
results to the results from Kopecky and Spirova (2011) we could observe an upward
trend of political patronage in the Bulgarian civil service from 2000 up to 2008. 
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Figure  1 Do  you  believe  that  political  appointments  in  the  state  administration
happen often/sometimes /never? (Spirova 2012: 60)
Their results clearly demonstrate that in the Bulgarian polity hosts a high scope of
political  appointments.  However, the data  from the Kopecky and Spirova’s study
does not allow to ascribe deviation of political appointments vis-à-vis other European
states,  even  if  some  categories  may warrant  concern  in  absolute  terms,  such  as
NDAC or  executing institutions  above (2011). The main point is that even at these
similar  levels,  the  scope  of  political  appointments,  particularly  in  the  ministries
remains considerable and that may prove enough for a parentela formation.
In any case, in terms of the classificatory system, the above data is enough to claim
that the ruling party and civil service venues are connected by the practice of party
appointments, which accommodates the parentela formation. In these circumstances,
any relationship the party in power enters will extend into the civil service. The value
of the descriptor venue scope, therefore, in the present study is equivalent to that of
La Palombara’s parentela. In fact, the evidence is stronger than that. In her attempt to
describe  these  party-civil  service  relations,  Spirova  inadvertently  describes  the
parentela (2012: 64-65):
As  a  result,  a  lot  of  the  positions  in  the  agencies  that  regulate  the
economy  [including]  agriculture,  transport,  and  infrastructure  were
staffed  with  party  appointees  who  could  ensure  that  the  important
decisions  were also taken with the  economic  interests  of  the  political
parties, or of private companies friendly to them, in mind.
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The description above identifies political appointments as the possible result of pre-
existing  agreements  between  the  party  in  power  and  possible  insider  groups.
However, while the data provided by Kopecky and Spirova (2012) demonstrates that
Bulgarian and Italian polities shared a key parentela feature, there is the pressing
question of What is the evidence of political appointments from the present study? 
Interview  responses  from the  present  study  strongly  corroborate  the  findings  of
Kopecky and Spirova (2011).  Respondents indicated an overwhelming breadth of
party political appointments to the extent that asking  how far appointments spread
rendered the question irrelevant. Stated with confidence, nearly every one respondent
who was asked to address the topic of appointments complained on the depth of
appointments down to local level. Extreme anecdotal examples included the ejection
of school janitors at the turn of elections. It soon became clear other questions were
more relevant, i.e.  how  PPAs function and  what  has led to the prevalence of this
political  practice.  They  are  important  for  the  study  on  parentela,  because  they
provide the details of how the parentela functions, i.e. what circumstances ease its
dynamics (intervening variables), and what has contributed to this particular practice
(independent variables that explain the venue scope). These two broad questions of
how and why, are dealt with below. 
As a final note, maybe by now the discussion of Kopecky and Spirova’s data has
raised the question whether their methods could have been employed in the present
study (2011). Their methods, however, were not used for a number of reasons. First,
there is insufficient disclosure of their methods to warrant replication. They do not
disclose  the  process  of  calculations  that  led  to  the  division  of  corresponding
coefficients. They also do not discuss the raw type of data: qualitative or quantitative.
The authors briefly note that the Bulgarian appointments coefficient is developed on
the  basis  of  surveys/elite  interviews  with  elite  respondents,  academics,  media
professionals, politicians and civil servants (2011: 905). That approach in particular
was irreplicable  in  the  present  study because  the  survey questions  are  unknown.
Moreover, it adds to the problem of access to elite respondents, which already proved
to be costly in terms of time. 
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Second, the above leads to the question of data validity of their methods, because
only formal statistical data from the administration itself could yield the necessary
validity on any data pertinent to political appointments. The question, ultimately is
how the coefficient was composed: on the basis of statistical data provided by expert
respondents or from some form of ordinal code quantification, e.g. as in How often
do you think political appointments occur? A) Never; B) Rarely; C) Sometimes; D)
Often; E) All the time?  If the latter, then, that reduces some of the validity on the
scope of appointments because the data is not so much statistical as it is a reflection
of elite respondents’ impression of the scale of the practice. The difference between
that approach and the interpretive one employed in this study is the extra stage of
ordinal coding, which most likely has been employed. 
The  composition  of  the  categories  does  not  fit  the  needs  of  the  present  study.
Kopecky and Spirova’s categories do not reflect the distinction between politically
appointed directors and technical staff (2011). This makes it difficult to demonstrate
the scope of political appointments affecting purely technical positions, as such posts
are also evident in the Ministries. A more accurate civil service category composition
could be developed using the Classificator of Positions in the Bulgarian civil service
(Classificator 2015). The Classificator is a table provided by the Council of Ministers
that  defines  all  civil  service  positions  in  the  civil  service,  which  is  directly
subordinate to the prime minister (Council of Ministers) and individual Ministries.
The Classificator clearly distinguishes between politically appointed and technical
positions.   In an ideal case scenario, a response to an FOI request that adopts the
hierarchy defined in the Classificator would facilitate the more accurate construction
of variables and provide a level terminological ground for any enquiries. However,
this complaint is relevant to the present study on parentela in Bulgaria. It has to be
recognised that the Kopecky and Spirova study is comparative and so, they had to
construct categories that are relevant across a number of states (2011). The point is
that  their  categories  are  inapplicable for  the present  research project.  Section 5.3
discusses the legal provisions that enable and facilitate party political appointments
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in the civil service. Section 5.4 reviews the historical and structural causes for the
political appointments.
5.3.  Structure of Appointments on Central and Local
Level
The present section argues that the prevalence of political appointments is enabled
and facilitated by the provisions in the Law on the Administration 1998 (LA) and the
Law  on  Local  Self-Government  and  Local  Administration  l991  (LLSGLA).  The
analysis of the legal framework that regulates political appointments is provided by
the  Bulgarian  parentela  project  as  another  mean  to  complement  Kopecky  and
Spirova’s  study  on  political  appointments  (2011).  The  early  clues  as  to  the
importance of  these  pieces  of  legislation  came from Kopecky, Mair  and Spirova
(2012: 56) who identify a handful of authors discussing the legislation that governs
the conduct of the civil service, i.e. the Law on Administration 1998 (LA) and the
Law on the State Servant 1999 (LSS), and the historical origins of party political
appointments  (Shoylekova  2004;  Dimitrova  2002;  Velinova,  Bozhidarova  and
Kolcheva 2001). However, there is very little in terms of discussion on how exactly
the Laws facilitate appointments, which is of importance for the present study on the
parentela.  Focusing on the Law on the Administration (1998) reveals the  de jure
connection between the party and civil service venue, as it clearly enables the ruling
party to make political appointments.
Compared to  the LLSGLA, the LA is  the more important  piece of legislation in
relation  to  the  parentela  as  it  defines  the  structure  of  the  Bulgarian  state
administration  and  demonstrates  the  hierarchical  structure  of  appointments
(summarised  in  the  figures  below).  This  is  different  from the  Law on  the  State
Servant  1999,  which  is  more  detailed  on  the  procedures  governing  employment,
publicising  vacancies,  and  competitions  for  recruitment,  as  well  as  rights  and
responsibilities  during  employment.  While  the  political  appointment  is  itself  a
contract  of employment,  the Law on Administration 1998 codifies the authorities
which  have  the  right  to  offer  employment  without  open  competition,  hence
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appointments. The importance of LLSGLA became evident after reviewing LA, as
the former is a local mirror image of the latter, as it codifies the rights of political
appointment on a local level. The legislative framework that both Laws constitute
evidences  that  the  scope  of  venues  in  the  Bulgarian  policy-making  process  may
involve both the party in power and the civil service.
There are  a few points  worth noting before engaging with the discussion on the
abovementioned laws. Bulgarian Administration is  divided into central and local
levels (Law on Administration 1998 article 37) (LA 1998 37). The central executive
administration  comprises  the  administration  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  (the
government), of the Ministries, of deputy-ministers, of state commissions, as well as
of the state and executive agencies, and ad hoc executive bodies created for specific
tasks  (LA  1998  38(1)(2)(3)).  The local administration  is  comprised  by  two
concentric  units  of  administrative  division: oblast (region)  and  within  them,
obshtina, (municipality) (LA 1998 38(2)). Provinces have two local executives: the
oblast (regional) governor who represents the central executive locally, and elected
municipality mayor (LA 1998 19 (3))  who represents the local  executive branch.
Finally, it has to be noted that usually the leader of the political party in power is the
prime minister. Therefore, the entire study adopts the perspective to speak in terms of
the party leader (or chairman) and less of prime minister; of party in power and less
of the government or parliamentary majority.
Figure 2 (p. 134) charts the vectors of appointment in the Bulgarian civil service. The
shape where an arrow starts marks the appointing body and where the arrow ends
mark the politically appointed position. The main appointing bodies are the prime
minister and individual ministers, denoted with blue triangles. The main and most
relevant  in  our  case  appointed  bodies  are  the  agency  directors  or  commission
chairmen, which are denoted with blue rhomboids.  Other less relevant to our case
appointed positions are political cabinets and oblast governors, which are denoted
with blue squares. In addition, there are trapezoid shapes whose purpose is to give
more details on the specific articles from the Law on the Administration 1998 that
govern the appointment in question. The respective articles are denoted in brackets
149
“( )”. The same reference system is employed throughout all elements in the figure,
where relevant articles from the LA 1998 that codify the relationship are noted in
brackets. Finally, every one element has a unique reference number, noted between
two short dashes, e.g. “-12-“. Overall, a relationship of appointment is expressed as
the collection of all shapes that lay at the start, middle and end of any given arrow,
and the LA articles contained within them.
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Figure 2 Hierarchical Structure of Party Political Appointments as permitted by the
Law on Administration (author’s analysis)
The LA offers direct and indirect procedures available to the central party leadership
(the prime minister and party functionaries equal in rank) to make party political
appointments. The direct ability to make a PPA is embodied in the right of the leader
of the party in power (the Prime Minister)  to offer and terminate employment of
directorial  (top  level  decision-making)  positions  in  the  agencies  that  regulate  the
business and public activities in the state, and deputy-ministers. The LA is quite clear
that the Prime Minister has the right to offer and terminate employment to directors
in the state agencies (LA 1998 47(6), -1, 19, 27, 28-) and state commissions 50(5)) (-
24,  26,  28-). The  former  are  agencies  created  by  the  Ministerial  Council  (the
Government) ((LA 1998 47(1), -28-) in order to support the policy-making activities
of  the  Government.  The latter  is  a  structure  created  to  manage issues  related  to
permits emanating from and related to legislation (LA 50(1) -26-). 
The LA 1998 also specifies that the Prime Minister can offer and revoke  deputy-
ministers  positions  (LA  1998  23(6),  -1,  19,  20,  21-).  These  rights  are  further
facilitated by the provision in the LoA 1998 19a(2) which states that whoever makes
the  appointment,  be  that  the  party  leader  (Prime  Minister),  the  Minister  or  the
Government (the Council of Ministers), has the right to an immediate retraction of
such contract (-19-). In other words, not only is the central political leadership of the
party in power able to make appointments in the central executive agencies, but these
are further eased by the ability to remove from office without the obligation to give
notice to the respective civil servant.
The powers of the party leader to appoint do not stop there. There are indirect ways
in  which  they  can  influence  political  appointments  in  the  administration.  These
powers relate to the employment of directors of executive agencies. These are created
by the Council of Ministers (LA 1998 54(1) -18-) in order to help carry out the duties
of the Ministry. Here, employment and its termination are vested in the Minister with
Prime Minister’s coordination (LA 54(5)  -17,  18-).  The only positions  under  the
direct control of a minister are the executive agencies established locally to support
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the operation of their  ministry,  directorates (-16-),  and the staff of each ministry
(40(1) -14, 15-). The law states that it is the Minister who has the sole right to offer
and terminate employment in their Ministry (LA 1998 42(5) -14- ). 
However, given the fact that the Minister owes their position to the party leader (-2,
3-), it is highly likely that informal coordination occurs for specific appointments of
interest to the premier. This means that even those positions that do not directly fall
under the powers of appointment of the prime minister could be informally subject to
their influence because ministers owe their positions directly to them. 
For sake of completeness, we should mention head secretaries of the central and
local administration and political cabinets. The former positions stand for top level
civil  servants in the state administration whose duties are primarily to ensure the
internal departmental cohesion and legality of all taken actions. These positions too
are  political  appointments  made  by  the  relevant  Minister  (-10,  11-).  As  it  was
established above, this should not obscure the fact that due to internal party loyalty, a
Minister's right to appoint does not preclude the political leadership of the party in
power from influencing the nomination.
Political cabinets are committees of advisers in the office (or kabinet in Bulgarian) of
each of the organs of central and local executive power: e.g. Minister (-13-), Prime
Minister (-32-), Regional Governor (-6, 7, 8-), Mayor (next section). They do not
have immediate  duties and responsibilities  with regards  to  the functioning of  the
administration, but advise their patron on political and administrative matters. It is
possible, in theory that a parentela could occur at these levels, although it was only
Petkov who discussed political cabinets as examples of political appointments under
external nominations. 
Overall,  the  discussion  so  far  sought  to  primarily  demonstrate  that  political
appointments  of  directors  of  central  (subordinate  to  the  council  of  ministers)  or
executive (subordinate to the minister) agencies are both under the control of the
political leadership of the party in power. The following subsection makes the same
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point. The party whose candidate has assumed the mayoral post has the same powers
of appointment across all important positions within the civil service within the local
city  council.  In  other  words,  such  mayoral  powers  of  appointment  facilitate  the
formation of a parentela on a local level. This is especially relevant to Chapter 8
which documents precisely that.
Powers  of  appointments  vested  in  town mayors  manifest  themselves  in  mayor’s
ability to appoint their deputies and the civil service in the city council (obshtina) as
permitted by the Law on Local  Self-Government  and Local  Administration 1991
(LLSGLA). Article 39 of LLSGLA grants a mayor the power to appoint deputies.
Article 43 refers to the administration of local councils, where “[t]he mayor of the
obshtina appoints  the  secretary of  the obsthina for  an  unlimited  period  of  time”
(43(1)).  The  duties  of  the  latter  are  to  internally  organise  the  work  of  the
administration of the city council. Article 44(1)3 specifies that the mayor appoints
and removes deputy mayors, the chairmen of the administrative units on an obshtina
budget, directors and servants in the obshtina administration. It has to be stressed that
on a local level, the party a mayor represents is able to make political appointments
throughout the middle and top levels of the city council  administration.  Figure 3
below summarise the discussion:
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Figure 3 Appointments at Local Level
Overall  the  purpose  of  the  present  section  was  to  demonstrate  that  the  legal
provisions set out in the LA 1998 and LLSGLA 1999 laws facilitate a wide scope of
party political appointments. The legislative analysis above, part of the study on the
parentela in Bulgaria, also demonstrates that the central executive positions which
KS 2011 identified as largely subject to political appointments are indeed so, because
LA 1998 allows for the central party leadership (i.e. the prime minister) to appoint or
remove directors of agencies that are either subordinate to the Council of Ministers
(i.e. the government) or individual ministries. The review of LLSGLA 1991 indicates
that a mayor of an obshtina has analogous powers of appointment to those of a prime
minister in that the former can appoint or remove from office any director of any
important city council administrative unit.  Both laws demonstrate that a parentela
could form locally or centrally because the party that holds executive power can
influence  the  work of  the  institutionally  adjacent  administration  through political
appointments. 
However,  more  importantly,  the  legal  framework  above  clearly  testifies  for  the
connectedness of the party and civil service policy venues. In doing so it shares the
same characteristic with the parentela. Being unable to contribute statistically to the
debate on the scope of political appointments in Bulgaria, then, the remainder of the
chapter is dedicated to contributing to the research of SK (2011) and KMS (2012) on
the  causes  for  party political  appointments.  However, in  doing so,  the  following
section 5.4 also provides immediate examples of how the party and the civil service
could be connected, thus showing evidence of venue scope that spans from the party
itself to the civil service.
5.4.  Explaining Party Political Appointments: Political
Distrust
The present section (5.4) is dedicated to discussing the various forms of distrust that
ultimately lead to the use of political appointments. There are a number of authors
who link the practice of political appointments is a heritage of political culture of
previous authoritarian political systems. Kolcheva, Bozhidarova and Velinova (2001)
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link PPA with the heritage of Ottoman political culture and Soviet influence, both of
which rested on personal allegiance to a centralized executive. The authors stress the
present practice of political appointments is reminiscent of the Bulgarian civil service
during its totalitarian socialist period (Kolcheva et al 2001: 3-5). Accordingly one of
the main characteristics of the Bulgarian socialist civil service was the extra layer of
civil servants, i.e. the political nomenklatura, which were politically appointed and
were tasked to oversee the work of expert  civil servants, observing thereby party
policies implementation (Kolcheva et al 2001: 5-6). The same argument is also made
elsewhere by Kopecky and Spirova (2011: 898-901), Raychev and Stoychev (2008),
and Chalakov et al (2008). 
Data from the present study tends to add credence to such historical indebtedness to
previous authoritarian Bulgarian forms of government. Kuzmanov was probably the
strongest supporter of the argument that the predisposition to corruptive behaviour is
a  residue  from  the  times  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,  where  informal  monetary
compensations were the norm when dealing with Sultan’s civil service. Similarly,
Georgiev argued that “to give in order to receive”, or  do ut des,  was the core of
Bulgaria’s  policy-making  informal  mode  of  interaction  with  the  central
administration. Golemanov was vehement that the informal administrative dynamics
employed today are direct application of the repressive style of socialist  Bulgaria
pre-1989.  However,  while  many  respondents  had  tidbit  historical  references  to
socialism, overall with the exception of Golemanov, no respondent made an explicit
link  between  political  appointments  and  any  other  preceding  Bulgarian  form  of
government. 
While many respondents saw some similarities to previous times of Ottoman Empire
and  socialist  totalitarianism,  however,  those  do  not  necessarily  explain  political
appointments.  Saying  that  “We employ political  appointments,  because  we  have
always done so”, does not explain the need for such appointments. We have to look
for some structural or systemic explanations.
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Overall, the present research indicates that  political distrust  necessitates the use of
political appointments (sections 5.4.1, 5.4.2). The ruling party distrusts experts from
interest groups, because their loyalty lays elsewhere and their solutions to policy-
problems do not necessarily reflect the salience of party political expedience (5.4.1).
Reciprocally,  interest  groups  distrust  political  parties  for  their  cadres’  lack  of
necessary  expertise  to  arrive  at  industry-efficient  decisions  (5.4.1).  This  mutual
distrust manifests itself in the appointment of civil service department and agency
directors,  and  in  the  question  whether  at  all  the  civil  service  should  be  left
autonomous from party political intervention. As a compromise, party members may
promote experts from the party ranks that may combine both recognition of sectoral
groups  and  party’s  trust  (5.4.1).  However,  it  is  doubtful  whether  this  alleviates
distrust because as Petkov explains regardless of the loyalty the appointee may have
at the start, it will always shift towards the party political patrons soon after assuming
the appointment. Ultimately, as the legal framework (5.3) gives the ruling party the
right to determine political appointments, the distrust towards all other non-insider
actors causes them to maintain a firm hold over civil service nominations.  
As a result of the same distrust, newly incumbent parties do not hesitate to sweep out
their predecessor’s appointees. Respondents from section 5.4.2 were unanimous that
no party in power can afford to retain appointees from rival parties. The threat is that
civil  servants  of  rival  political  parties,  acting  on  the  commands  of  their  former
patrons,  would actively seek to sabotage the new ruling government. As a result,
every new election is accompanied by “sweeps” of mass replacement of “old” civil
servants with new ones. These were clearly detected by Kopecky and Spirova (2011)
and  the  negative  consequences  of  this  practice  were  discussed  at  length  in  the
previous chapter.
Indeed  there  are  some  cases  where  nominations  could  originate  outside  of  the
immediate party in power, although effective appointment is still sanctioned by the
party in power. These cases usually relate to agreements between party and insider
groups,  or  when the  party needs  to  appease  party factions  and (lesser)  coalition
partners (Kuzmanov, section 5.4.3). Likewise, party factions in particular may feel
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un-represented in the executive branch. At the same time, long term functionaries
may also grow resentful if they do not see their contribution to the party rewarded
with a prestigious post. This is a corroboration of the same argument KMS (2011)
and KS (2012) make. In congruence with their findings, evidence suggests that party
leadership attempts to appease intra-party factions by endorsing their nominations in
order to maintain inner party cohesion (section 5.4.3). The arguments above will be
elaborated in the subsections below.
5.4.1.  Party’s Distrust of Independent Expertise
The most important dimension of the PPA debate that comes up from respondents’
statements is the conflict between expert and political appointments (or civil society
and the ruling party, respectively). Sectoral groups distrust government's ability to
lead  using  party  political  appointees,  which  is  why  they  seek  to  resist  policies
particularly  when  those  are  promulgated  by  individuals  whose  professional
background is remote from that sector. 
This problematic is first noted by former Prime Minister Zhan Videnov (in Petev
2001) in his memoirs (in an interview format). In response, he attempted to form a
government of experts, entirely supported by the respective sectors, or another of
ministers  entirely  backed  by  the  party  and  party  factions.  As  chapter  7  will
demonstrate, many of those expert appointees could have come from the structures of
Multigrup, because many of the experts from the then defunct socialist civil service
assumed  employment  there.  However,  Videnov  regrets  opting  for  the  expert
appointments route (Videnov in Petev 1998: 159-169). He admits underestimating
the party-incapacitating rift of distrust between the party leadership, appointees and
members of the parliamentary group, caused by the lack of support from key party
factions around the leaders Lilov and Lukanov (in Petev 2001: 159-161). He reports
that the party political leadership distrusted the experts in his government because
their technocratic policy solutions do not necessarily conform to what party ideology
dictates, nor what party leadership considers party politically expedient.  
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He describes this distrustful relationship by evoking the popular image at the time:
the isosceles triangle of power. In this relationship model the central party executive
bureau sought to ensure its dominance over policy-making by exerting pressure on
its own group of MPs and on the prime minister, who is also a member of the same
bureau. This isosceles triangle reflects central party executive’s distrust towards its
own MPs and the expert cadres that the prime minister endorsed (appointed). The
latter particularly reveals the hidden conflict over appointments in the civil service:
whether they should be strictly expert and independent, or political and subservient
(Videnov in Petev 1998: 173-180, 228).  Ultimately, in order to prevent any such
friction  based on distrust,  Videnov (in  Petev  1998:  174)  explains,  other  political
parties such as SDS that followed his government solved this friction between the
central executive bureau, the premier and MPs by concentrating party leadership into
a single leader and by predominantly sending out political appointees in the state
administration.  The  account  from  Videnov  demonstrates  that  party  political
appointments  largely  reflect  the  tension  between  appointing  cadres  with  expert
qualities or such that are immediately sponsored from the party.
Other  politicians,  too,  implicitly  identify  the  same  dilemma,  also  responding  in
similar vein: balancing between appointees with sectoral recognition and such with
party sponsorship. In response to this confrontation, Respondent Hristov, a former
Minister,  explained  that  he  had  made  consultations  with  interest  groups  in  his
ministry. Hristov, a minister  at  the time of  interview, admitted to  the practice of
political parties seeking to ensure control over the state administration:
R I mean, sometimes appointed are not the necessary specialists,
but people who have nothing in common with the job //inaudible/ why?
Why does it happen? --S/ This is the interference of politics in the state
administration, which categorically has no place there. But as much as it
is not there if you look at the law, in practice it does happen. We should
not  lie  to  each  other  about  it.  I  am telling  you the  truth  of  what  is
happening.
This statement above comes as a big political confession. This is not only another
piece of evidence of the party political interference in the civil service. This is also a
confirmation that party political expedience may also dictate political appointments
at the expense of sectoral group. However, as far as he was personally concerned, he
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also tried to consult interest groups for possible candidates. In his words, he tried to
find the “right man for the right job”, implying that, he attempted to balance between
party loyal and expert appointees. That is to say, while accepted nominations may
come from outside the party, the appointee had to retain loyalty to the appointing
political  party.  They overlap  with  Videnov  above  on  the  latter  point  of  political
control. 
Hristov’s policy to negotiate appointments is also reflected by Lyubenov who stated
that political parties need not always have the best ideas on the table or the best party
cadres  to  send to  the  administration,  because  those  are  supplied  by the  industry
interest groups. According to him, political parties consult sectoral interest groups
hoping to find mutually agreeable sectoral expert nominations. Respondent Zlatarov
observed that the recent interim government of Oresharski was the product of such
consultations where each appointment resulted from consultations with, and approval
by, respective sectoral group. Respondent Penchev, in turn, recounted their personal
involvement in the nomination and appointment of Oresharski as a prime minister. At
the interview, he reached over to the drawer and took out a number of hand-written
A4  sheets  of  paper  with  names  on  them,  and  gave  them  to  the  researcher  for
inspection. Those were the names Penchev had proposed to the leader of the party in
power.  All  of  them,  he  argued,  were  experts  supported  by  sectoral  (peak)
associations. For Penchev it was of paramount importance for the BSP-DPS coalition
government to gain recognition from the sectoral interest groups by promulgating
their appointees in the executive branch. Whether and how far that was a successful
policy remains to be seen. The important point is that the accounts of Lyubenov,
Hristov and Penchev indicate that (sectoral) interest groups take advantage of the
opportunity to limit  party political  influence over the civil  service by nominating
own appointees. Also, the above indicates that parties, too, are concerned with the
expertise they introduce with their appointees.
However, still operating in an environment of political distrust, parties, would still
largely rely on loyalists than on experts. As Petkov loudly exclaimed in defence of
the appointments they had made as a former minister, “I don’t want to be betrayed!”
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Petkov  argued that  the  distinction  between  appointees  who are  expert  and  those
which are political is meaningless. The mere act of political appointment constitutes
an obligation to the one appointing. Therefore, even if pure experts are appointed,
they  become  politically  subservient  immediately  after  their  party  appointment.
Reflecting the same thinking, Hadzhiev intimated that lost in bargaining, political
parties blur the distinction between political and expert civil service appointments.
Ultimately,  then,  the  overarching  consideration  when  making  an  appointment  is
whether the person could be trusted. 
As a result, more recently, respondents saw the administration as nothing more than
an adjunct organisation to the ruling party. Respondent Nikolov was rather cynical:
S Political appointments in the state administration, do they help
to improve the relationship between the administration and the
interest groups
R […] the state administration de facto is one extension […] of
any  one  political  party  in  power.  This  is  very  clearly  and
accurately  said.  It  (the  administration)  is  sometimes  doing
functions which are not inherent to it and directly services every
four  years  the  change  of  this  or  that  political  class  (party)
/pauses/ so everything which could change things in Bulgaria is
turned upside down.
Note the expression above “not inherent functions”. What he implies is that party
political expedience governs the behaviour of the administration. The details of this
experience will be revisited when introducing a ‘type 2’ parentela in Chapter 9. At
this stage it is important to note that the state administration may be used by ruling
political  parties as an instrument  to  achieve narrow party goals  (Petkov).  Others,
equally disgruntled respondents were also equally forward. Kuzmanov for instance
stated:
S In the context of the relationships between the political elite in
power and the economic networks, what is the role according to
you of the political appointments in the state administration?
R Technical  [...]  If  you  are  single  party  in  power,  all  of  the
appointments are yours. If you are a coalition, you have given
sectors and they are yours.  Respectively  you put  people first
whom you trust. Second, [you appoint] those whom if you tell
them "Do this" they do it. [That is] to reach your given goals,
and third [you appoint people] to actually get something done,
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because the system simply has to function. But this is last. And
that is it.
The respondent's ordering of the reasons behind an appointment indicates that the
most important consideration when making political appointments is for the party to
have trust in the appointee.
Similar to Petkov, in criticising political appointments Zlatarov noted that the main
ailments of the Bulgarian civil service are namely the broad party loyalist political
appointments because they reduce professionalism in the service and constantly reset
industry’s  consultative  relationships  with  the  administration  (also  Stoyanov,
Rumenov). The importance of the latter is that relations with the civil service are
essentially interpersonal and it is arduous to establish productive consultative ones
with new civil servant counterparts. However, while he did not argue that political
parties deliberately seek to appoint people who are unqualified, Zlatarov argued they
will sacrifice good relations with sectoral interest groups and turn a blind eye on
expertise in order to ensure the subservience of the administration to the executive
(Kuzmanov, too). Trust, again, is the prime motivator behind political appointments.
Finally, on a basis of a statistical survey KMS (2012: 63-65) demonstrate that trust is
of utmost importance when a party considers a candidate’s appointment nominations.
Accordingly, authors’ respondents rated the three qualities an individual had to have
to  be  successfully  sent  into  the  administration:  political  allegiance  90%,
professionalism  58.5%  and  personal  allegiance  58%  (KMS  2012:  66-67).  Their
survey confirms that first and foremost party political loyalty is the requirement for
making new appointments.  That in  turn extends to-date  the validity of Videnov’s
point  above  that  political  parties  heavily endorse  party  political  appointments  of
loyalists  because  they  are  distrustful  towards  any independent  expertise,  be  that
embodied  in  an  autonomous  civil  service  or  nominations  from  sectoral  interest
groups. Political distrust however has another dimension. It is also observable in the
attitude newly incumbent parties harbour towards former political party civil service
appointees. This is discussed in the following section.
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5.4.2.  Distrust of Appointees of Party Electoral Losers
Another dimension of the political distrust that causes parties to appoint relates to
appointees of the political party voted out of office. As respondents Dobromirov and
Kirilov explain former appointees need to be weeded out, because they will likely
continue to work for their political patrons. As Kirilov and Dobromirov argue, owing
to longstanding loyalties, appointees of electoral losers will seek to sabotage the new
government. Respondent Kirilov highlights that the prime motive behind political
appointments  is  the  trust  in  the  cadres  that  would  inhabit  the  administrative
structures, rather than any focus on professionalism. That is why cadres of former
political parties have to be swept out. Trust was at the centre of Petkov's emotional
and negative reaction against the question on political appointments:
S: And what would be the effect of political appointments?
R: Well, if they appoint kalinki, the effect is bad. If for example for
political reasons I appoint Y because I know he will be doing a
good  job,  or  let's  not  give  an  example  with  Y—I  know  for
instance—The chief of my political cabinet, which is not part of
the state administration, but the man with whom I have worked
the longest in the ministry of X, was the husband of my first
cousin. “But why did you appoint him?” /raises voice/ “I trust
him most, you people!” He is capable, a colleague of ours ('us'
meaning  intermediary  and  themselves)  and  he  is  from  state
intelligence services, but it does not matter--
I: It does not matter; it is important that they do their job!
R: /further raises voice/  because I  trust  him! I  don't  want to be
betrayed! //in agreement/ Ahem. --I/. Governance is a collective
job.  In  Bulgaria,  collective  sports  do  not  work,  and  that's
including politics, if  we take it  as a form of collective sport.
/This is true –I/ because there has to be a team! /further raises
voice, screams? / And it is hard to make a team! /Yeah –I/ in the
team there is always someone who is better, and they refuse to
play in the national team! For example, Berbatov, /laughing --I/
Kaziyski /inaudible/ the same is with politics! /calms down, next
topic/ (243)
It  is  important  to  note that  in  the  excerpt  above the respondent  deflects  a  direct
answer to the question on political  appointments.  Note that they discuss political
appointments as a whole with reference to their advisers to their political cabinets
(permitted and required by the Law on the Administration 1998 above). This means
that while they speak with reference to political cabinets they make the same, general
163
point regarding political appointments in the State Administration, avoiding getting
entangled in compromising elaboration on the details of their tenure as a Minister. In
short,  fear  of  betrayal  exists  across  the  entire  administration,  including  political
cabinets. Fear of betrayal is not only on personal level but on top political level as
well. However, there is one final reason for party political appointments: as a type of
reward in order to maintain inner party cohesion.
5.4.3.  Insider Agreements and Resource Exchange
Evidence suggests that political appointments could also be used not necessarily for
the  implementation of  a  specific  policy but  in  the pursuit  of  specific  policies  of
interest to the party in power, particularly as rewards to party functionaries and core
insider groups. KMS argue that appointments serve as a reward to party factions
(2012:  63-65).  As  an  example  KMS provide  the  so  called  “Tripartite  Coalition”
Government (2005-2009) where though informal, publicly discussed division of civil
service positions was in place, where each of the coalition partners received positions
in the proportion 3:5:8, NDSV:DPS:BSP, respectively (2012: 69-72). However that is
a reiteration of an observation that Videnov makes regarding his own tenure as a
prime minister (in Petev 2001: 179):
And this is what concerned me the most. […]: to seek not so much “a
man for the post”, but a “post for the man”. Obviously, the dominant
position in the party elite was that within the package of being in power
we have also received mainly benefits (and not solely responsibilities),
which they have yet to distribute as appointments to high places (and not
distribute heavy responsibilities). I already knew then that this way of
thinking is  very  dangerous  for  all  of  us  and could  put  us  in  making
thoughtless  decisions  regarding  the  cadres  (appointments),  which  our
political  opponent  would  not  have  missed  the  opportunity  to  take
advantage of.
For many party functionaries their loyalty to the party should be rewarded with a
post in the state administration, even if they are unqualified. In any case, the point
remains,  political  appointments are the result  of political  parties’ distrust  towards
other possible policy participants, such as interest group experts.
The  present  study  can  also  confirm  the  use  of  appointments  as  a  form  of
appeasement  or  award  of  party’s  partners:  insider  groups  or  coalition  partners.
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Respondent Kuzmanov narrated the story of their personal involvement in Bulgarian
politics  as  an  appointed  director  of  a  State-Owned Enterprise  (SOE (or  a  firm)).
Those  are  firms  owned  by the  state  and the  profit  they make goes  to  the  state.
Kuzmanov’s mission was to bring one decrepit SOE back to its feet. Consistent with
the  need  for  politically  loyal  appointees’ discuss  above,  Kuzmanov’s  immediate
appointment, as he himself admits, was the product of his close friendship with the
minister at the time, which ultimately acted as a guarantee of his loyalty to the party.
However, he implied that his party leadership had other aims: the future revenues to
be redirected party factions and party functionaries for the purpose of elections and
intra-organizational  cohesion.  For  a  brief  period  at  the  start  of  his  appointment,
Kuzmanov worked relatively unimpeded, given their Ministerial protection and the
fact they had satiated the demands of most of the actors interested or involved in this
appointment and its goals. However, ultimately, due to party in-fighting Kuzmanov’s
political  patron  –  the  respective  Minister  –  had  to  resign  removing  thereby  all
protection  around  Kuzmanov.  Soon  after  his  patron’s  withdrawal  from  politics,
Kuzmanov was deposed as a director of the SOE he had been in charge of and which
he helped to become a viable firm, and was replaced with locally more favourable
appointee.  These  circumstances  support  the  arguments  of  primacy  of  loyalty  in
making political appointments and that such appointments could also be motivated
by the need to appease internal party factions.
A number of respondents also identified political appointments as a form of reward,
which should be seen as nuance of the overall practice of appointment. While top
level  policy-makers  such  as  Hristov,  Videnov,  Lyubenov  and  Penchev  discussed
appointments as a matter of negotiation between parties and sectoral interest groups,
another  set  of  respondents  saw  such  appointments  as  rewards  to  individual
businesses (firms) with party insider status. As an active politician at the time of the
interview,  Bachvarov  clearly  admitted  that  third  actors,  such  as  party  donors
sometimes had the exclusive right to have a say on the appointments. Bachvarov’s
emphasis was that party donors can expect many benefits from the party in power.
While most of them are favourable public tender auction outcomes, some of them are
favourable appointments, which could also occur locally. However, again, it has to be
165
stressed that the difference in this sort of appointments is that those are subject of
negotiation  between  the  party  in  power  and  a  single  non-representative  group
(individual firm, company) with insider status.
Respondent Zlatarov too identified appointments in the local administration as forms
of  rewards  or  reciprocal  benefits  to  party  insider  groups.  Being  particularly
disgruntled he indulged on the importance of local administration to facilitate these
contractual relationships  between  political  parties  and  insider  interest  groups.
However, similar to Bachvarov, Zlatarov added that ultimately decisions on local
appointments tend to be determined by the central leadership (not the local) of the
party that has won the mayoral seat.
Likewise on a local level, Respondent Kirilov argues that local businessmen who
find their fortunes at risk may attempt to take part in politics in three ways: become
party campaign donors,  promote  a  nominee  to  the  city  council  administration  or
businessmen themselves enter the political competition. Kirilov, however, argues that
the second and third option, respectively, are most reliable for local businesses. As a
result, owners promote themselves or someone they trust to directly represent them
in the city council administration, e.g. as a deputy mayor or councillor. Doing so
increases  that  business’  participation  chances  to  take  part  in  public  tenders  or
participation in any other major local business project. Gospodinov elaborated that
direct involvement in the city council politics gives business groups the chance to
ensure favourable appointments to the Public Tender Committees, which decide on
the main contractor at public tenders. An exemplary case study of that situation is
discussed in chapter 8. This is so because it is the obshtina mayor who is in charge of
appointing the members of  the Committee that  decides on the winners of  public
tender auctions.  Stacking the committee with loyal  appointees ensures favourable
outcomes (discussed at length in Chapter 8).  
Overall, the evidence in this section indicates that party political appointments are
due  to  three  main  causes:  party’s  distrust  towards  independent  experts,  party’s
distrust towards appointees of previous parties and the need to maintain intra-party
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cohesion through the distribution of favourable appointments as rewards to factions
and insiders. Second, it also demonstrated with more specific examples how both
political parties and civil service policy venues are connected through the practice of
political appointments, which reflects another one of the parentela’s features: venue
scope that includes both the party and the civil service. 
5.5.  ConclusionThe  chapter  demonstrates  that  the  party in  power  and  the  civil
service  venues  are  connected  thanks  to  the  practice  of  appointments  in  the  civil
service and that the venue scope of party-led dynamics involves the civil service as
well. That characteristic of Bulgarian policy-making, the chapter argues, is a clear
overlap with the original parentela. Political appointments are wide-spread. While the
present research project was unable to generate statistical  data on its breadth,  the
available qualitative one clearly corroborates the datasets of KS (2011) on the wide
scope of political  appointments.  Appointments involve nearly most state agencies
subordinate to the Council of Ministers and Ministries, also reaching down to local
administrative posts. The present research seeks to contribute to that of KS (2011)
and KMS (2012) on Bulgarian appointments arguing that there are three causes for
political appointments: party-political distrust to independent experts (civil service or
sectoral interest group ones), distrust appointees of former ruling parties and the need
to reward intra-organizational supporters (factions and insider groups). As section 5.4
demonstrated, political parties primarily seek to enforce political appointees whom
the party leadership trusts, both personally and institutionally. Yet, the need, after all,
to  ensure  that  competent  individual,  rather  than  incompetent  party  loyalists  are
appointed has torn some political leaders between nominating experts, recognised by
the respective industrial sector, or individuals who are nominated by the party. In
more  detail,  another  reason  why  political  parties  would  tend  to  monopolise
appointments is to appease internal forces. Both party donors (core insider groups)
and party factions need to be appeased by granting them the opportunity to make
their own nomination, as a form of reward for their party support.  The next chapter
continues the review of party-group relations characteristics that conform to those of
the parentela. Chapter 4 reviewed the primacy of the party in power in the policy-
making process, i.e.  primary venue.  The present chapter 5 reviewed the breadth of
the practice of party political appointments, which, too, overlaps with the parentela
167
characteristic  where  the  two  venues  –  party  and  civil  service  –  are  connected.
Chapter 6 will review the remainder of policy network descriptors that overlap with
the parentela:  degree of access, type of interaction and power ratio.
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CHAPTER 6:  Insiderness,  Cooperation  and
Power Symmetry
6.1.  Introduction
The  purpose  of  the  present  chapter  is  to  reveal  the  remaining  features  of  the
Bulgarian party-group relationship, which match those of the parentela. These are
namely:  insiderness,  cooperation  and power  symmetry. While  the  chapter  clearly
demonstrates elements in the Bulgarian party-group relations that are consistent with
the  parentela,  the  application  of  said  descriptors  indicated  some  degree  of
indiscreteness  among  them,  thus  limitations  in  the  classificatory  scheme.
Nevertheless, that does not invalidate the results, but means that the study effectively
employs not  3  but  1 or  2 dynamic-descriptive categories  (excluding venue-based
descriptors). Depending on their definitions some categories could be synonymous
on a definitional level, although primarily it is their dynamics, which connect them to
one another. 
For example, degree of access is connected to type of cooperation. While the present
chapter is formally dedicated to the descriptor degree of access, the indiscreteness of
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the  concept  means  that  the  discussion  of  evidence  on  insider  status  is  also  a
discussion  of  evidence  on  type  of  interaction.  The  descriptor  insider  status or
insiderness was originally developed by Wyn Grant (1977, 1978; chapter 2), with
reference to the interest group-civil service relationship in the UK. This concept was
later endorsed as compatible in the state-group relationship in the policy community
network by Maloney et al (1992) in their revision of Grant’s insider/outsider status
classification of interest groups. The concept of insider status stands for the situation
where policy-makers from a certain venue recognise an interest group as a reliable
partner in the policy-making process. There are four categories of that express degree
of access: core, niche and peripheral insider, and outsider status (chapter 2). 
However, this is where degree of access overlaps with the next descriptor:  type of
interaction and its value cooperation. The literature on policy communities, clientela
and  iron  triangles  (chapter  2)  amply  demonstrates  that  policy-makers  provide
privileged  access  to  their  venue  only  to  those  groups  that  cooperate  with  them.
However, the literature has also identified that at the centre of cooperation is the
exchange of policy (or political) resources. The clientela, policy community and iron
triangle network types emphasise that the exchange which grants groups core insider
status is expertise. To be invited to frequent consultations and become a core insider,
in other words, a group has to provide policy-makers with expert position on policy-
related questions.
The other case of categorical indiscreteness relates to the power ratio and type of
interaction. The concern of the relationship between these two descriptors emerged
later  in  the  study with  the  evidence  presented  in  chapter  9,  which  suggests  that
political  parties  are  able  to  deliberately  repress  companies  and  firms,  through
prejudiced inspections from the regulatory agency. Therefore, this study sees power
as a type of action, as opposed to a resource that could be measured. Actors are not
more or less powerful compared against a variable called power. Rather, the study
sees power ratio as the act of one actor overpowering another, following the logic of
Lukes’ 1st dimension of power (1975). That, however, still adds to the conceptual
limitations of the classificatory scheme, because if power ratio is understood as the
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1st dimension of power, then that equates it to the descriptor type of interaction. The
1st dimension of power is by definition about conflict: where A enforces its own
interests  on  B,  which  are  the  opposite  of  B’s,  and  to  which  B  also  resists
unsuccessfully (Lukes 1975). In any case, however, the latter route is still preferable
because it obviates quantification, hence, demonstrable in a qualitative study. In any
case, the indiscreteness among some of the categories does not invalidate results but
means  that  the  three  descriptors  under  scrutiny  here  share  the  same  qualitative
database. 
The present chapter demonstrates that Bulgarian interest groups succeed in gaining
core insider status with political parties. Without repeating the exposition in chapter
2, core insider status suggests the highest degree of access that policy-makers can
grant to a given group. The cases of La Palombara (1964) and Greer (1992) indicate
that insider groups gain core insider status within the ruling party as a result of their
provision of campaign resources, such as primarily, voter support. Both CA in Italy
and UFU in Northern Ireland carried a considerable number of supporters, who could
be mobilised to vote in favour of the respective party. Evidence from the Bulgarian
case, however, suggests that groups in the possession of campaign funds can gain
core insider status within political parties.
The  present  study  demonstrates  that  Bulgarian  parties,  too,  harbour  parentela-
consistent dynamics vis-à-vis interest  groups.  Interviewees shared the observation
that every political party works closely with a select group. Consistent with CA and
UFU, they also indicated that the closer cooperation between political parties and
their  insider  groups,  also  rested  on  the  exchange  of  campaign  resources  against
privileged  access.  However,  the  campaign  resource  in  the  Bulgarian  case  are
campaign funds,  as opposed to electoral support. Also speaking as former political
candidates,  the  unanimous  position  among  those  respondents  was  that  actual
campaign  costs  are  exorbitant  and  much  of  what  is  spent  on  campaigns  is  not
reported formally. This is why these costs place the premium on campaign funds as
the main resource for access through the ruling party venue.  There is  also some
limited evidence that provision of expertise could provide some access but that is not
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any further than peripheral insider status. In any case, the fact that access, power and
cooperative  dynamics  overlap  means  that  the discussion  on core insiderness  also
implies that political parties are in a power-balanced form of cooperation with their
insiders (unless stated otherwise, the study assumes core insiderness).
In addition to campaign funds,  ideological proximity  to the party in power is also
discussed as a group quality that facilitates its insider status. Although not exactly a
resource, it is included primarily because of its importance in the cases of UFU and
CA. Particularly in the case of Catholic Action and satellite catholic trade unions
gained  advantage  over  rival  groups  of  equal  capabilities  thanks  to  their  close
ideological  proximity  to  the  Christian  Democratic  Party.  Evidence  from  the
Bulgarian case  indicates,  however, that  ideology is  irrelevant  for  political  parties
when determining their engagement with prospective insider groups. 
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 6.2.1 reviews whether the provision of
expertise as a mean to gain core insider status. The subsection argues that expertise
could provide only peripheral insider status within political parties at most, if any at
all. Section 6.2.2 discusses voter support and ideological proximity as factors that
contribute to gaining insider status within ruling political parties in the cases of Italy
and Northern Ireland. In section 6.2.3 these two group properties are applied to the
Bulgarian case, arguing that none of them have any significant effect. Instead, the
section argues, it is campaign funds that facilitate the provision of core insider status
within political parties.
6.2.  Core  Insider  Status,  Cooperation  and  Power
Parity
The literature has identified a number of ways for a group to establish core insider
status. The first and most prevalent is that insiders status is granted as a result of an
exchange of group's expertise against policy-makers' provision of access. This form
of exchange was observed in the interaction in the US and UK executive branches
between civil servants interest groups (chapter 2). Another form exchange, but this
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time to political parties, could be in the form of voter support for access. This is the
dominant form of exchange that has facilitated both UFU and CA access to their
respective ruling political parties. In a similar fashion, both La Palombara (1964) and
Greer  (1994)  also  discuss  ideological  proximity  as  a  group  feature  that  further
facilitates insider status, although not necessarily concerned with an exchange. The
Bulgarian case, however, does not show that groups gain party insider status neither
on ideological proximity, expertise or the provision of electoral support. Consistent
with Greer (1994) and La Palombara (1964), core insider status is provided for the
exchange of a campaign resource but of different type: campaign funds (6.4). 
In any case, the present section could also be read as a discussion on cooperation and
power parity. The fact  that  political  parties  provide access  to  certain groups also
carries  along  the  implication  that  the  relationship  between  the  two  is  free  from
power-struggles. The introduction already warned that discussing core insider access
is also a simultaneous discussion of cooperation and power parity. The section below
therefore  though  primarily  geared  towards  discussing  core  insiderness  it  quickly
morphs into a discussion of cooperation and by implication – evidence of power-
parity between the ruling party and the insider group, which is characteristic of La
Palombara’s parentela (1964).
6.2.1.  Expertise for Access
The dominant perspective in the policy network literature is that privileged access,
that  is  insider  status,  is  conferred  upon  groups  as  a  result  of  an  exchange  of
resources. The form of exchange which is most widely document is that of expertise
for access. This exchange has been documented particularly with reference to the
structures of the civil service (clientela, iron triangles, policy community, chapter 2).
Insider status, then is measured either with real numbers or with ordinal metrics.
Jordan and Schubert (1992), for instance, determine that insider status is limited to
two groups. Another way of measuring groups is through Grant’s ordinal indicator
comprising a number of categories (Grant 1977, 1978, 2000; Maloney et al 1992,
1997). First, involvement in consultations on legislation with wide reach (close to
macro  politics)  yet  with  a  strong  technical  element  is  core  insider  status.  In
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circumstances  where  usually  inconspicuous  groups  become  leaders  on  almost
exclusively technical  issues  with  low public/policy implications,  thus  temporarily
assuming core insider status, is a niche insider status. Last, those groups that tend to
only respond to consultations with written statements are  peripheral insider status
(Grant 1977, 1978, 2000; Maloney et al 1992; 1997).  In sum, typical core insiders
are those groups which are frequently invited into face-to-face consultations with
primarily  macro,  sector-wide  implications,  possessing  a  considerable  degree  of
expertise. 
In any case, however, quantitatively or not, both metrics converge around the same
idea that privileged standing within the civil service depends on group’s ability to
provide expertise. This is so because that venue operates with that form of resource.
Civil servants are tasked with revising existing legislation or drafting new one and
what they need is an easier method of acquiring the necessary data and analysis.
Groups who are rich on such expertise are more often consulted than others. This
was  clearly  argued  to  be  the  case  by  Lyubenov,  in  the  Bulgarian  civil  service.
However, the question is whether such dynamics are traceable in Bulgarian parties’
relations with interest groups. The original parentela model clearly expects that the
party in power grants privileged access to a single (or number, if practically possible)
group. The question in relation to the Bulgarian case is whether the data suggests
that. 
However, the question here is whether such dynamics occur in the relations between
the ruling party and prospective core insider groups, because those were established
with reference to the Western civil service and not to the parentela. Grant’s typology
of groups’ degree of access seems applicable to the party-group relations, because
both La Palombara (1964) and Greer (1994) make references to consultations of CA
and UFU to their respective party hosts. It is also possible to discern in those cases
how UFU and CA, respectively, were better represented than competing groups, that
too enjoyed some access to the party in power.  The only difference seems to be in
the scales of consultations vis-à-vis the civil service. While consultations held by the
party and civil service are not discussed in either case, the impression is that of very
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limited extent. Evidence from the Bulgarian case suggests that political parties do
consult and occasionally a group could gain limited access, i.e.  peripheral insider
status.
The  account  of  Petrov  indicates  precisely  that  other  groups  and  not  those  with
expertise are  valued the most.  Respondent Petrov in  particular  recalled occasions
where he was invited to informal meetings organised by political party C to discuss
the  state  of  the  business  environment  in  Bulgaria,  and  to  formal  consultations
organised by the Party A.  In both cases respondent’s policy-proposals were given
ample consideration.  However, in agreement with Maloney et al (1994) that access
does  not  equal  influence,  Petrov's  proposals  did  not  generally  materialise  into
legislation.  Few  of  them  were  adopted  and  those  portions  of  the  concurrent
legislation,  which  before  stood  as  respondents  previous  lobbying  victories,  were
rolled back to  their  initial  state.  In doing so,  Petrov argued that  other  individual
actors in fact made more effective representation and convinced the party to roll back
the  legislation  to  its  previous  unfavourable  form.  The  shared  position  among
respondents,  in fact,  was that expertise  is  irrelevant to political  parties,  or to  the
extent it is, it is still insufficient to provide a group with core insider status. 
A strong indication for expertise being irrelevant to political parties is also the fact
that consultations held by political parties with interest groups appear sporadic and
ad hoc. Respondents Hristov (party C) and Mitrev (party A) at a given stage in their
response addressed the structures  designed by their  own respective party used to
facilitate consultations with groups. However, as respondent Lyubenov noted from
his  personal  involvement  in  party-sponsored  consultations  the  level  of  technical
engagement  at  such  fora  is  extremely  low  to  allow  groups  to  be  persuasive.
Consultations with political parties do not appear to be geared towards establishing
the right policy decision on the grounds of expertise. One has to speak in a different
language  to  politicians,  who  are  more  interested  in  the  general,  macro  points,  a
policy covers (Lyubenov). As Lyubenov explains, political elites neither grasp the
details of the policy options, nor, as Videnov argues, do party political elites trust
technocrats  in  the  civil  service  (see  previous  chapter).   Lyubenov also  made the
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explicit point that in the course of his advisory sessions with political leaders of party
C, the latter  were unable to  comprehend the details  and technicalities of a given
policy where civil servants would.  As a result he felt that most appropriate forum for
his suggestions would be the civil service consultations. 
Responses from the executives from sectoral groups indicated outsider status vis-à-
vis political parties. Although one might respond that there is nothing wrong with
that, because TAs have civil service consultations at their disposal, it is still unusual
because  parties  nevertheless  consult.  That  in  turn  suggests  that  those  who  hold
highest expertise would still be consulted. However, reports indicate to the contrary.
Speaking as a director of a trade association, respondent Gospodinov highlighted the
resistance of the ruling political party, who apparently had been cooperating with
select affluent groups from their own Trade Association, against the amendments to
the  Law  on  Public  Tenders  proposed  by the  same  organization.  The  respondent
explained that while he was in consultations with the state administration, given the
unconvincing explanations on behalf of the civil servants, it became apparent that
certain drafts were particularly unpalatable to the political party in power and groups
with insider access to it. Similarly, respondent Konstantinov was deliberately vague
as to single out the firms from the trade association he represented that had benefited
economically from a  closer  relationship  with  the  ruling  political  parties.  He still
pointed out that those insiders are firms with abnormal profits at times of an average
economic downturn and high turnover yet very low profits (R31035). Overall, their
combined positions allow for the observation that policy expertise is not a resource
that would facilitate insider status with political parties.
In the same vein, speaking as a former director of another sectoral interest group,
Donchev argued that party-group cooperation is driven by common interests that do
not rest on improving policies but to maintain their collective long-term access to
political power. Donchev complained from his relationship with the ruling party at
the time. Details of his position will be reviewed in chapter 9 but it is necessary to
say now that the description of the relationship of his former organization with the
ruling party was antagonistic. In discussing the general party-group relationship, he
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strongly emphasised that consultations are largely contained within the civil service
and that political parties in practice are trying to subvert them by only permitting
servile  interest  groups  to  civil  service  consultations.  While  this  was  said  with
reference to the consultative process facilitated by the National Council on Tripartite
Cooperation,  this  served to  advance another  point.  According to him (and others
reviewed in Chapter 9) political parties collude with a number of affluent participant
and act  against  the interest  of the wider civil  society represented by interest  and
advocacy groups,  and Trade Associations.  In  what  he argued to be an oligarchic
policy-making  model  in  Bulgaria,  expertise  did  not  feature  in  the  party-group
relationship. It was reserved for the civil service and those groups who catered to any
insider status within political parties had to provide party-relevant resources, such as
campaign funds. 
6.2.2.  Voter Support and Ideological Proximity for Access
Both  La  Palombara  (1964)  and  Greer  (1994)  make the  note  that  the  ideological
proximity between CA and UFU, respectively, and their ability to provide campaign
resources  to  the  ruling  party  facilitated  their  privileged  standing.  La  Palombara
(1964) explains that in the case of the Italian parentela party insider status is granted
in  exchange  for  campaign  resources:   voter  support  or  campaign  funds  (La
Palombara 1964:  318,  331,  333,  335).  Voter  mobilisation  in  particular  played an
important part in Catholic Action's ability to gain insider status with the Christian
Democratic  Party (DC) (La Palombara  1964:  333,  335,  336).  La  Palombara  also
makes a particular note of Confindustria's attempts to gain insider status with the DC
on the grounds of being able to contribute to latter's party campaigns (La Palombara
1964:  318).   That  is:  campaign  funds  might  facilitate  access  to  policy-making.
However, this was a vain effort for Confindustria's at the time, as such resources had
already been provided by Catholic Action (CA), where in addition to being able to
contribute financially, and CA also carried massive electoral support (La Palombara
1964: 318).  Similarly, while Greer does not discuss the provision of any campaign
funds,  he  too  implicitly  agrees  with  La Palombara  in  that  the  ability  to  provide
campaign  resources  could  facilitate  party  insider  status  (1994).  Ulster  Farmers'
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Union  (UFU)  endorsement  by  the  Stormont  government  was  granted  primarily
because UFU could muster wide popular support (Greer 1994: 406).
Particularly on ideology, La Palombara emphasises that Catholic Action and catholic
trade unions in its close orbit were successful in gaining insider access also because
of their ideological proximity to the Christian Democratic Party (1964). Similarly,
Greer also highlights that Ulster Farmers' Union's access to the party in power was
greatly facilitated by the fact that UFU shared the same ideology with the Stormont
government on "parity" (Greer 1994: 406; 410; 412). 
Here, it is also interesting the question of whether any of the two resources could act
as the necessary and sufficient condition for a group to assume core insider status
with the party in power. Ideological proximity seems neither necessary nor sufficient
prerequisite for core insider status, but it can still act as a catalyst, if present. The
cases of La Palombara (1964) and Greer (1994) indicate that ideological proximity
could  be  decisive  when  determining  the  core  insider  among  groups  of  similar
characteristics  vying  for  party  insider  status.  Catholic  Action  and  Catholic  trade
unions did have some closer ties with the Christian Democratic Party in 1960s Italy
than others (La Palombara 1964: 310-311). Likewise although UFU did not claim
representation of more than 50% of Northern Irish farmers, it  still  maintained its
insider access in the face of splinter farmer unions, and as Greer implies, thanks to its
overlap with Stormont’s unionist policies (1992: 405-406). 
With specific reference to Italy, the fact that there were other competing groups with
insider  status,  means  that  campaign  resources  guarantee  insider  status,  although,
again, core insider status will be determined by ideological proximity. The UFU case
seems supportive of the same argument, although more information is necessary on
the  UFU and other  organizations.  Particularly,  how did  the  rest  50% of  farmers
unionise  and  did  they  have  any  access  to  the  Unionist  party?   In  any  case,
irrespective of their ideological proximity, both UFU and CA provided their political
partners with considerable electoral  support,  which was the main resource of the
exchange. UFU still carried at least 27 000 votes (Greer 1994: 406), while CA had
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influence over the entire catholic population in Italy at the time and particularly over
DC’s voters (La Palombara 1964: 318).  However, finally, while close ideological
proximity provides core insider status only when coupled with high electoral support,
ideological juxtaposition with the ruling party leads to exclusion (outsider status)
irrespective of popular support (Grant 1978; 2000; Maloney et al 1992, 1994). 
On ideological proximity, evidence from the Bulgarian case suggests that ideology
plays no significant part in the calculations of ruling parties whether to partner with
prospective  groups.  Although  ideological  proximity  or  its  more  watered  down
variants, such as support to the party line, may theoretically act as catalysts to a shift
to core insider status, precisely ideology seems irrelevant. There is virtually no data,
both as direct statements in support of that proposition, nor indirect, i.e. implicit in
respondents’ positions,  that  ideology factors in the calculations of ruling political
parties whether to engage in a cooperative relationship with a given group. 
No respondents addressed the argument, that access to political parties is dependent
on ideological compatibility between the group and the ruling party.  No evidence
was  found  that  whether  groups  share  the  ideological  goals  is  a  matter  of
consideration to the party in power. Instead a number of respondents emphasised on
the  absence  of  any ideological  considerations  in  the  policies  of  certain  political
parties and in appointing individuals of contrasting ideological background to their
own (Georgiev, Nikolov, Cenov, Georgiev, and Bachvarov).  That suggests that in
their  interactions  with  groups,  too,  ideology is  irrelevant.  Interviews  gave  ample
space  to  respondents  to  discuss  the  party-group  relationship,  where  should
ideological proximity have been a factor that would have been aired.
Respondent Nikolov on several occasions argued that it is the exchange of electoral
resources that counts  most  (also Golemanov, Gospodinov, Kuzmanov, Bachvarov,
Mitrev, and Valentinov).  In that context, neither Nikolov nor others saw ideology to
be of any significance.  Although the passage below has a second interpretation, the
main and more evident one is that cooperation is on the grounds of the exchange of
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campaign resources, i.e. campaign funds. Key names of individuals are deliberately
letter-coded:
S: And, that circle around [old party leader L], it was the so called
Z, right?
R: Yes, /pause/
I:  /inaudible/ with them now?
R: Well, they went elsewhere, I want to tell you, that they from [that
circle], only one is left, that one –
S: V?
R: V is left.  But V bends over to absolutely everyone, I want to tell
you.  V is in very good relationship with [the leader of party C].
S: Huh?
R: How else! /confidently/.
S: But that he worked for [L] in the past – did not that get in the
way of V's cooperation with [the leader of party C]?
R: Why should that be a problem at all?  He is just now working
for [D]!?
I: [Party Leader of C] obviously does not mind, either! /laughing/
R: But  why  would  [having  cooperated  with  a  different  political
party  in  the  past]  be  of  any  consequence,  when  a  bagful  of
money is emptied in front  of  [C's party leader].   And that  is
several times?  /rhetorically/.
In the exchange above the assumption of the researcher in approaching the topic was
that each political party would prefer to cooperate with ideologically similar groups
or  individuals.   The  excerpt  however  exemplifies  that  former  party allegiance  is
irrelevant in the calculations whether to establish a relationship with a new group. In
the quotation above, the businessman V found no difficulty in cooperating with two
different  governments.  This  indicates  that  the  party-group  relationship  is  not
constant. While in this case the two parties in question were ideologically similar, it
is hard to say whether ideological proximity has played any role, the fluidity of such
party-group relations makes it implausible that ideology would provide such a strong
bond. 
Respondent Nikolov cited another case where the oligarch, Mr W, had contributed a
significant  sum to the political  campaign of party A in exchange of adopting his
nominee as Prime Minister H. (the making involvement of oligarchs is a theme that
was echoed by a significant number of respondents, including respondents from both
the  entire  political  spectrum  (Hristov,  Mitrev,  Valentinov,  Bachvarov,  Georgiev,
Donchev, and Cenov)).  It was an interesting fact that before their appointment as a
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prime minister, H had established their political career working for the ideologically
opposite political parties.
At the same interview with Nikolov, the intermediary, an active functionary for party
A,  gave  another  example  of  a  high-ranking  individual  within  party A,  who also
assumed  a  high  post  in  spite  of  a  contrasting  ideological  past.   The  implicit
suggestion  made  by  the  intermediary  was  that  such  party  functionaries  with  a
political past with the exact opposite parties on the ideological spectrum were the
result of cooperation between party A and (usually) oligarchic party donors.  Nikolov
agreed.
However, given his inclinations towards party C, Nikolov could have deliberately
used  the  opportunity  to  discredit  party  A.  Respondent  Cenov  therefore  was
deliberately targeted as a former high-ranking functionary from party A, to comment
on whether party A had conceded to agree to that same oligarchic nomination of
Prime Minister H. The respondent overtly supported that thesis:
S: Today, could it be said that there is any one circle which has
entered cooperation with [party A]...
 R: Well, that one -- [oligarch W].
 S: I  am  a  bit  surprised,  that  I  had  not  heard  of  him  recently
/deliberately acting uninformed in order to provoke the release
of more information/
 R: But why are you surprised?
 I: W might not exactly be "working with [party A]", but “with”
the Prime Minister H.
 R  /laughing/ categorically!  /Categorically --I/ Yes, yes, yes.
In the quotation, the surprising bit is namely that the respondent did not receive any
prompts that would give away which individual the researcher had been interested in.
He identified W as the main partner of party A without any cues. His argument above
is  similar  to  Nikolov’s:  it  may  not  necessarily  be  the  case  that  H  is  a  prime
ministerial appointment of the oligarch W, but it might just as well be that H and W
had  cooperated  in  the  past  and  just  continued  their  cooperation  under  the  new
circumstances of party A's electoral victory. However, it is unlikely that their direct
cooperation with H would have been at all possible without party HQ's acceptance
and involvement. 
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In addition, Cenov (also Bachvarov and Georgiev implicitly) further argued that the
party A had significantly departed from its ideology and as a result found it entirely
natural to be indiscriminate with the choice of groups and single actors to cooperate
with  on  the  basis  of  campaign  resources,  which  in  fact  is  illustrated  with  the
nomination of H. The fact that he laughed while affirming three times this argument,
indicates that while seemingly correct, there is more information which he refused to
discuss.   The  respondent  further  added  that,  based  on observations  and  personal
experience  in  the  past,  it  is  better  to  conceive  of  those  party's  politicians  as
businessmen, supporting the position of Respondent Nikolov and others that "politics
is business".
The case of this particular appointment of H emerged again, at the interview with
Respondent Penchev. He generously explained his life-story and involvement in the
policy-making  process  in  Bulgaria,  as  an  active  member  of  party  B's  executive
bureau. The respondent made an explicit effort to ideologically differentiate himself
from party A.  This is important because at the end of the interview he showed the
researcher a hand-written list of names of nominees for premier H's government. He
confided he was personally involved in  the selection process and recounted their
personal  telephone  calls  with  the  closest  aides  to  leader  of  party  A.  Finally,  he
claimed that he personally advocated the appointment of H as a prime minister, but
did not elaborate on any possible involvement of W. 
However,  it  is  possible  to  connect  Penchev,  H  and  W as  they  share  the  same
ideological inclinations and also because they are united in their association with
former party leader  L.  Cenov and respective intermediary (below) argued that  H
owed the start of his political career to L when L had been in power. Likewise, W
owed his  initial  affluence  to  during  L’s tenure,  as  well.  Finally, Penchev in  fact
boasted personally to the researcher of his close friendship to L, dating from before
L’s  tenure  as  a  prime  minister,  as  well.  However,  most  importantly,  the  above
indicates in party A’s engagement with W and endorsement of H were devoid of any
ideological considerations because A conceded to an appointment of an individual
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from an  opposite  ideological  background.  This,  too,  was  confirmed  by someone
(Penchev)  who  can  reasonably  be  associated  with  H,  and  who  is  also  from the
opposite ideological spectrum from party A.
In  the  same  vein,  respondents  Aleksandrov  and  Georgiev  identified  the  same
ideological departure of party A from its true ideological riverbed. Both respondents
extensively and avidly condemned the cooperation between party A and an oligarch
(X), resulting in the latter's monopolistic position on the market.  In doing so both
respondents independently criticised party A’s cooperation with actors who solely
focused on own self-interests. Party leaders of minor coalition partners of the same
party  A  (Valentinov  and  Mitrev)  voiced  similar  concern  regarding  that  A’s
cooperation with economic actors is devoid of any consideration of any ideological
compatibility, even if we bring the term down to its lowest common denominator, to
mean 'common good'. That is to say, not only was the party devoid of ideological
consideration as a guidance determining which groups to cooperate with but it was
also devoid of any “moral compass” such as 'the common good' which would act as
help determine partner suitability of aspiring insider groups.
There  is  only one  case  which  approximates  a  situation  where  ideology mattered
somewhat in the prospective relationship between oligarch X5 and political party A,
where ironically, it  was  X who sought  ideologically compatible  individuals  from
party A.  This was particularly the case with Respondent Aleksandrov. He reported
that in the distant past he had been approached by X. Through his own network of
party sources respondent Aleksandrov was informed that X particularly asked for
him  and  did  indeed  offer  a  substantial  party  contribution  in  exchange  for
Aleksandrov's inclusion in the party lists of MPs to be returned to parliament. The
same respondent  also  recounted  a  different  occasion  with a  different  yet  equally
ranked big business owner, X2, who also had a particular affinity to him based on the
respondent's  policy position.  Again,  in  both cases  cooperation was sought  on the
grounds of similar understandings and attitude towards a specific policy field, which
is watered down ideology, but even then this is far from sufficient to indicate any
5 This is still the same individual. Letter codes are consistent throughout the entire thesis.
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express  concern  with  ideology  and  an  ideological  line.  This  was  based  on
interpersonal  sympathy  and  most  likely  having  a  common  political  opponent  –
political party E (Aleksandrov). However, even if cooperation in those cases was
sought on the grounds on common policy positions, that is less than gaining insider
access  based  on  common  ideology.  In  conclusion,  data  on  the  Bulgarian  case
demonstrates that the practice of granting insider status to groups on the grounds of
ideological compatibility is non-existent. 
6.2.3.  Campaign Funds for Access 
The subsections so far demonstrated that neither expertise, nor group’s ideological
proximity have an effect on a group’s core insider status. Data from the Bulgarian
case indicates that it is possible for groups to establish core insider status within the
ruling party under the provision of a different campaign resource than UFU and CA’s
voter mobilisation, namely: campaign funds. That was first exemplified by Petrov,
who was fed empty promises at party A consultations, only to maintain his support
until  after  elections  when respondent's  proposals were watered down by political
expediency and according to Petrov in the interest of competing groups.  At both
seemingly  consultative  meetings  they  participated  in  with  party  A and  C,  the
consultations lacked much substance.  Respondents Petrov and R31035 also implied
that affluent actors had gained much better access to the respective political party,
although both were also reluctant to speak with names. 
Respondents are unanimous that the high costs of electoral campaigns put political
parties at great dependency on campaign funds, which has become the main currency
of  core insider  access  to  political  parties.  Although in order to  combat  the over-
dependence of political  parties on campaign funds each political  party is  given a
subsidy for the electoral campaigns, respondents who campaigned either for mayoral
or MP positions report that actual costs of elections is several times higher than what
is declared for reimbursement. A number of respondents from political and business
background argued that the cost of political campaigns forces political parties to seek
out  any  reasonably  affluent  business  actors  who  can  contribute  (Golemanov,
Bachvarov, Petkov, and Kuzmanov). Many used the terms oligarchs, grupirovki or
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circles to identify the private actors that parties cooperated with in order to receive
the  rest  of  the  necessary funds  for  carrying  out  the  campaigns.  In  the  words  of
Georgiev: 'do ut des' or give in order to receive.
Groups tend to use campaign funds as the currency of core insider status. However,
as  already  explained  in  the  introduction,  and  while  they  may  seek  favourable
appointments in exchange, it seems the prime good they seek in return is privileged
access to public tenders. Chapter 8 documents this exchange in great detail. In the
words of Gospodinov, at the one end of the bargain we have groups who possess
campaign funds to cover the actual costs of the campaigns:
In Bulgaria there is an absolute merger between the party and business,
between party and money, absolutely, because parties cannot  function
without money, and money is obtained through business and this process
is not regulated. There are laws, that specify how much it could be spent
[on elections] [...] Yes, but I know what the real costs are, say, for TV
commercials and the sums parties declare are insulting (under-reported,
sic) and ridiculous.  And they declare such sums because it  is on the
basis of such sums that they account to the State Auditor (agency) and
this is how much the law permits them.  But the money they spend is 2, 3,
4  times  higher. [...]  I  have  an  immediate  experience  in  this  respect
because I have taken part in many campaigns.
Also  speaking  from  personal  experience  in  politics  and  political  campaigns,
Respondent Petkov explains the same:
 [...] We have a mutual interconnectedness between services of the state
of the past, the present, and the grupirovki, which are those [actors] who
make it possible for a political party to come to power.  This happens in
two ways. First, through the financing of a political party.  It is known
that elections cost a lot, [or rather] "increasingly cost more".  Of course,
I do not have statistics with me, but a political party which wants to leap
over the 4% barrier, if it does not have 10 million (leva), should not even
attempt going to elections. And this is not a question of buying voters; it
is a question of [expenses on] one serious and structured organisational
work.  [...] It is very naïve to believe that the members of a given party
collect enough money for electoral campaigns. This could not happen
because Bulgarian citizens are too poor.  [...] the grupirovki have [that
resource] as well as the interconnected structures with them [intelligence
community],  [...]  so  grupirovki  are  of  importance  and  they  are  of
importance  for  the  party  infrastructural  organisation,  financing  and
resourcing, so that the party can approach elections adequately.
In the same vein, Respondent Golemanov states:
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So, say you are some party; you have a state subsidy of 2.5 million leva
for presidential campaigns.  But you cannot do anything with those 2
million leva!  Because one interview or debate on national TV costs you
200 to 300 thousand leva!  Well, the minute there is between 1.5 to 2
thousand leva!  That's  scary!   You,  without  you having this  economic
circle behind your back, the one we are talking about right now, [you
cannot make it because] it actually costs you 6 million leva.  After that
you declare them to the  State  Auditor. [As for the firm,]  half  of  that
money the firm sponsoring you is accounted as New Year’s calendars for
1.2 million leva, while in reality these are placards with your muzzle on
them!  But it is not you who pays for that!
In other words, the actual costs above that political parties declare to the authorities
are covered by the party donors directly. No campaign funds, in excess to what the
party receives as subsidies, is actually received by the party. To substantiate his point,
Golemanov provided an example with their own mayoral political campaign:
When I decided to become a mayor [...] I went from one firm to another,
[and]  to those [people]  with whom I  was on good terms.   [...]  They
would say, "Listen,  3 thousand leva,  we can give to you!” [...]  and I
bought placards with that, but they did not give the money straight to me!
I do not take any money!
By making this analogy, Golemanov argued that political parties need not necessarily
possess the campaign funds. Those could be spent on their behalf by their sponsors.
The question of actual expenses on political campaigns is intriguing but requires an
independent study on its own to fully verify. Identifying such a discrepancy would
require much deeper access to party functionaries and accounting documentation that
is not in the public purview. 
Still, some of the more prominent NGOs, such as Transparency International, who
monitor  elections  (transparency.bg),  seem to  confirm respondents’ concerns.  In  a
recent report, the authors Hristova-Valtcheva and Toneva-Metodieva (2014: 16-17)
argue that there are mechanisms in place to reimburse for their electoral costs with
state subsidies, imbursed to parties passing a 1% threshold at parliamentary elections,
however, Bulgarian parties still do not fully disclose the sources of their funding.
With an index scale from 1, lowest, to 10, highest degree of party donor financing,
Bulgaria remains at about 4 (2013 Parliamentary Elections), which still means high,
and very much likely, deliberate concealment of financing sources. This is clearly
indicative of the fact that Bulgarian political parties could be expending more than
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what  they  declare  to  the  authorities.  Both  the  report  and  the  results  from  this
subsection, therefore, complement each other.
Before moving on to the next section we should remember that the above discussions
on  the  forms  of  cooperation  between  ruling  political  parties  are  simultaneously
indicative of cooperation and power parity between the two actors. All of the forms
of  exchange  are  also  forms  of  cooperation,  which  in  turn  diminishes  the  direct
application of power. Again, the position here is that power is an action along the
lines of first dimension of power (Lukes 1975). Cooperation and power parity are
strongly implied in the discussion of insider status above, primarily because they are
impossible in the face of evidence, which suggests that Bulgarian parties engage in
exchanges with groups that can provide campaign resources. The indiscreteness of
these three categories is one of the few limitations this study demonstrates. 
6.3.  Preliminary Results and Limitations
At this stage in the study the thesis has described the parentela. Chapters 4, 5 and 6
focused on dimensions in the party-group relationship in Bulgaria, each of which
followed  the  policy  network  descriptors.  There  is  an  overall  match  between  La
Palombara’s parentela and the Bulgarian party-group relationship elements,  which
the project identified. The present chapter identified that as with parentela, political
parties do endorse groups as insiders. That in turn also means that they cooperate
with them in a power-neutral manner (power ratio, type of interaction and degree of
access). Earlier chapters established the primacy, or rather overall importance of the
ruling party as a policy venue in the policy-making process (primary venue). Still,
further overlapping with the parentela, previous chapters also demonstrated that there
is an intrinsic link between the party and the civil service through the wide-spread
practice of party political appointments (venue scope). Ultimately, the type of party-
group  relations  described  so  far  overlap  with  those  of  La  Palombara’s parentela
(Table 20):
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Table 20 Policy Network Descriptors Expressed with Network Features
 
Using the descriptors of the parentela identified in chapter 2, the study has shown
that this form of network exists in the context of contemporary Bulgaria, summarised
in table 20. Horizontally on top, the table lists the five network descriptors which are
used to  classify the  policy network  types.  Vertically  on  extreme left  we see  the
different  policy  network  types.  Note  the  prisoner  insider  is  only  a  theoretical
proposition.  Every  descriptor  is  a  qualitative  indicator.  The  descriptor  degree  of
access is composite of a number of subordinate categories that constitute a gradient
of access core, peripheral (for groups with insider status) and no access (for outsider
status groups). The descriptors network dynamics and power ratio stand for whether
there is conflict or cooperation, and, respectively, whether either the group or policy-
makers dominate each other or there is a parity. The first is represented in the binary
subcategories conflict and cooperation, while the latter by the ordinal subcategories
of  group overpowered, parity  and group overpowering.  The categorical descriptor
primary venue and the multiple response one scope of venues denote respectively the
main venue for the given policy network and the total of all venues that the network
dynamics cover. The X sign denotes the active descriptor value. All descriptors from
left to right up to and including primary venue can have only one value, except for
scope  of  venues,  which  can  have  more  than  one  values.  Thus,  each  unique
combination of descriptor values represents each of the better known policy network
types to-date.
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The parentela at the bottom of table 20 (p. 170) is essentially the combination of
descriptor values found by the present study based on the 26 elite interviews. Each of
the shaded in dark descriptor values is discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 6. The results
clearly indicate that the party-group relationship in Bulgaria at about the year 2013,
revealed  through  the  26  elite  interviews,  falls  within  the  description  of  La
Palombara’s parentela policy network (1964).
However, at this stage four limitations are apparent: 
1. it is uncertain whether some categories are discrete enough
2. the parentela as a process (dynamically) is not immediately evident
3. the private actors in a parentela relationship are not immediately evident from the
interviews, and
4. it remains unclear what groups want in exchange for their campaign funds. 
The first limitation relates to the fact that the concepts of cooperation, power-party
and core insiderness are interrelated: one implies or overlaps with another. The fact
that groups are engaged in an exchange with the party in power implies they are also
cooperating  with  it.  To the  extent  that  insider  status  and  cooperation  imply  one
another, this means we are measuring or describing the same phenomenon twice.
First by calling it cooperation and then by calling it core insider status. Likewise, to
the extent we are discussing cooperation, we are also implying power-parity. Given
the  state  of  the  literature  at  present  the  study concedes  that  the  three  concepts,
cooperation, core insiderness and power parity imply one-another. Thus, for instance,
the present chapter on core insider access could just as well be read as evidence of
both power-parity and cooperation.
However, future research might indicate that this limitation might be overstated. The
questions is: Can insider status co-exist with conflict? At first sight this combination
seems illogical, if not impossible. Still, it does exist in the literature, under the guise
of prisoner insider groups, introduced by Wyn Grant (1978). Grant defines prisoner
insider thus (1978: 5) thus:
“Prisoner groups” are those groups which find it particularly difficult to
break away from an insider relationship with government either because
they are dependent on government for assistance of various kind (e.g.,
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loan  of  staff  or  provision  of  office  accommodation)  or  because  they
represent parts of the public service (e.g., local authority associations or
the chairmen of nationalised industries). However, such groups are not
necessarily condemned to a lifetime of servitude. Desperation at lack of
success by acting through the normal channels may lead them to make a
risky attempt to “break out”. […] However, unless they have exceptional
resources, such groups are unlikely to be able to survive “on the outside”
for very long.
In other words, there are groups or near-autonomous structures of the civil service
which are involved in the economy (Grant's example are the nationalised industries)
whose existence depends on the resources provided by the civil service. The question
then is what their relationship is with the civil service, and whether it demonstrates a
seemingly impossible combination of insider status and conflict?
The quick answer is  yes,  Grant’s definition above is  a case of  both conflict  and
insider  status.  Accordingly a  semi-autonomous group with  core  insider  access  to
relevant policies tends to be dismissed by state policy-makers, because of its resource
dependence on the government. The fact that Grant gives examples with nationalised
industries  suggests  that  those  seemingly impossible  combinations  may indeed  be
possible in more centralised forms of government in the border zone between public
and private actors. That in turn poses the other question of how should we look at
departments  of  the  civil  service,  who lobby outside  their  immediate  channels  of
communication.  For  instance,  the  National  Assembly  of  Municipalities  of  the
Republic  of  Bulgaria  (NAMRB) is  essentially  an  interest  group of  all  Bulgarian
municipalities  who  lobby  both  Bulgarian  government  and  the  EU  institutions
(projects-narmb.org). 
The prisoner insider category demonstrates that seemingly impossible combinations
caused by what appears indiscreteness could be resolved by looking at the fringes
between  the  state  and  the  free  market.  Another  place  to  look  for  such  unusual
combinations could also be less than fully democratic states, where the relationships
between institutions and participation of interest groups is ambiguous. After all, it
should be reminded that the policy network literature rests exclusively on accounts
from the UK and US, which is why studying policy networks in states at the very
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early  stages  of  their  democratization  process  will  demonstrate  unusual,  i.e.
conflicting, descriptor combinations.
There are three other limitations of this segmented descriptive approach. First, it did
not demonstrate any consistent profile of the type of group political parties seek to
engage with.  Partly a limitation of the approach,  partly a limitation of Bulgarian
circumstances, there are no conspicuous interest group organizations of the scale of
CA or  UFU in  Bulgaria  that  have  clearly cooperated  or  otherwise  engaged with
Bulgarian political parties, save for the Multigrup corporation of early 1990s. That is
why, chapter 8 is dedicated to profiling the type of actor who assumes core insider
status with political parties.  Second and in the same vein, the segmented descriptive
approach does not necessarily demonstrate what exactly groups expect from their
exchange with ruling political parties. This limitation is in turn dealt with in chapters
8 and 9. Finally and most crucially, the segmented approach does not demonstrate a
parentela  dynamics.  The  segmented  description  lacks  any  causal  angle.  This
limitation, too, is dealt in chapters 8 and 9. 
6.4.  Conclusion
The present  chapter revealed the last  three remaining policy network descriptors:
degree of access, type of cooperation and power ratio. It argued that there is evidence
that Bulgarian political  parties do provide certain groups with core insider status.
This  provision rests  on a form of an exchange.  The party provides access to the
group, while the group provides campaign funds. This is consistent with the parentela
literature  because  La  Palombara  (1964)  and  Greer  (1994)  show  that  campaign
resources  were  the  main  resources  which  Catholic  Action  in  Italy  and  UFU  in
Northern Ireland, respectively, provided in order to assume core insider status. The
chapter also discussed the possible role ideological proximity between the group and
the party might have. The previous two studies also highlighted that there was an
ideological congruence between the insider and the ruling party. That seems to have
acted as an intervening variable that catalysed the closer relations between the party
and the groups. Such a variable, however, was not found in the Bulgarian case, which
one would expect. In the context of the discussion on political parties and interest
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groups, respondents primarily emphasised on the role of financial donations and the
fact  that  certain  parties  are  open  to  cooperate  with  groups  who  have  previously
cooperated with their opponents.
The present chapter also reveals that the concepts of core insiderness, cooperation
and power symmetry overlap or imply one another. First  of all,  establishing core
insider status is on the basis of a cooperative exchange between the group and the
ruling party. The presence of such cooperation in turn implies that there is power
balance  between  the  actors.  The  chapter  reveals  that  while  respondents  do  not
necessarily discuss power relations, those are strictly implied by the fact that those
two actors. Therefore, while the discussion of core insiderness above is essentially a
discussion of cooperation, that is predicated on power symmetry between the actors.
The question of power in particular will be revisited in chapter 9.
In  any  case,  this  conceptual  overlap  does  not  invalidate  results,  nor  makes  the
Bulgarian  party-group  description  dissimilar  from the  accounts  of  La  Palombara
(1964).  Instead it  concludes that the 26 elite  interviews successfully describe the
features parentela policy network. The only drawbacks of this approach, and which
will  be  discussed  in  later  chapters  are  that  there  is  no  consistent  image  of  the
parentela (addressed in chapter 7); that there is no more concrete evidence of groups
expecting something in return (chapter 8) and that the parentela features are not seen
in action, as a whole (chapters 8 and 9). The next chapter addresses the question of
what types of group could enter a parentela.
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CHAPTER 7:  Profiling Private Parentela Actors
7.1.  Introduction
Previous chapters demonstrated the different aspects of the party-group relationships,
all  of  which  conformed to  the  foundational  features  of  the  parentela.  Chapter  6,
however, highlighted some weakness of the descriptor-approach. It argued that such
a check-box classification and elite interviews has not yielded the identification of a
single actor who is in an unequivocal parentela relationship with the party in power.
The purpose of the present chapter is to address this limitation.
It argues that at present a slightly larger number than just a few core insiders inhabit
a  parentela  policy  network.  These  usually  are  number  of  firms  who  can  offer
campaign contributions of relevance to the party in power. Those firms usually work
in an informal concert,  although this does not exclude the possibility for a much
larger  number  of  individual  small  business  owners  to  enter  a  parentela,  usually,
through a formal association. However, single, monolithic, publicly associated actors
appear less relevant in the Bulgarian case than compared to earlier parentela cases.
The Multigrup (MG) Corporation of 1990s, reviewed below, is one such example. It
is  a  single  massive  private  actor  in  a  parentela  policy  network,  comparable  to
Catholic Action with an equally imposing social, political and, in our case, economic
presence.  However, despite  the attempt at  profiling the private  groups entering a
parentela, they remain anonymous, very much along the lines of Finer’s observations
of the private partners to British political parties (1958).
In late 1950s Finer (1958) was one of the earliest authors to scan the UK policy-
making horizon for pressure/interest groups and  the lobby  activity. His position on
the party-group relationship closest matches the general air of obscurity evident in
the  Bulgarian  case.  He  famously argued,  with  particular  reference  to  the  British
political  parties  on  their  relationship  with  the anonymous  empire of  the  myriads
businesses that cooperate with them (Finer 1958: 133):
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This secrecy, this twilight of parliamentary debate envelops the Lobby in
its own obscurity. Through this, above all, the lobbies become – as far as
the general public is concerned – faceless, voiceless, unidentifiable'  in
brief, anonymous
In the appendix of his study, he lists the business and group association of all MPs at
the time (Finer 1958). Likewise,  this study demonstrates that unlike in Italy and
Northern  Ireland,  the  counterweight  to  the  political  parties  in  the  parentela
relationship are  groups and businesses unknown and generally anonymous to  the
general public, whose insider status is justified on the grounds of their party electoral
campaign contributions. 
In addition to the above, the chapter also reveals other parentela-relevant dynamics.
First,  insiders’ status  is  a  state  of  flux,  as  opposed  to  a  subscription  to  power.
Parentela  insiders  have  to  continuously negotiate  and  fight  for  maintaining  their
status. Just as access does not mean influence (Maloney et al 1997) as core insider
status implies, access is not a constant for the parentela insiders but a variable. This
view  differs  somewhat  from  the  core  insider  literature  inherent  in  the  policy
community network types,  which implies insider status is immutable (Richardson
and Jordan 1979). Second, groups seek to establish parallel core insider relationships
with all  relevant  political  parties,  because parliamentary elections are  an external
variable that could jeopardise a group’s core insider status within a party. If a party
loses an election, then the insider would have to re-negotiate its access with the new
party in  power,  which  is  risky.  Finally, a  parentela  can  be  formed  around  party
factions and not necessarily around party headquarters. Both the MG Corporation
and the circle Orion (discussed below) gained core insider access to BSP through
rivalling party factions.
In the following subsection (7.2.), the chapter will discuss the so called  circles  of
businesses as a general phenomenon and will demonstrate traces that allow us to link
those formations as the private side partner parties in a parentela relationship. Section
7.3.,  will  discuss  the  Multigrup  Corporation  as  an  example  that  most  closely
approximates UFU and CA: a single,  visible  actor  with large public  prominence.
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Section 7.4 discusses the possible generic profile of the private partner in a parentela
network, before concluding with section 7.5.
7.2.  Circles of Big Business and the Parentela
The Bulgarian terms krag and obrach, or  collectively circles are phenomenon of
Bulgarian policy-making of a network-like interaction between the party in power
and privileged businesses or interest groups. The term krag was coined in 1994 by
the journalists who asked the prime Minister at the time, Zhan Videnov (Democratic
Left), to explain who the business circle (or group) – dubbed Orion – was and how at
the time its proximity to the Bulgarian Socialist Party could be explained? In that
infamous response, he stated that those were simply a circle of friends who merely
did business together (chapter 1, pp. 20-21).  A similar term, obrach, which also
means a circle in English, was advanced in 2009 by the leader of DPS, Akhmed
Dogan. He confessed in the media that he himself had helped businessmen related to
his political party in their business deeds (chapter 1). Again, both terms krag and
obrach are used synonymously, which is why they are collectively addressed herein
as circles. The introduction of the thesis listed a number of past and present circles,
which are of relevance for the Bulgarian policy-making process in Bulgaria.
The present  subsection is  devoted to  a  number of interviewees,  whose responses
indicate similarity between circles and the parentela. For a number of respondents
circles are relationships where the ruling party provides direct access to a privileged
group on the basis of a resource exchange. The exchange is usually of campaign
funds against what some respondents call “protection” (Chapters 8 and 9) and Public
Tenders (Chapter 8). Important element in that relationship are the party political
appointments which serve either as a resource which the ruling party exchanges with
the privileged group or as the infrastructure that facilitates party insider's interests.
These features of a circle closely follow the outlines of a parentela. The following
subsections show in more detail the match between the parentela and circle features.
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7.2.1.  Core  Insider  Status,  Exchange,  and  Party  Political
Appointments
Similar  to  the parentela,  the circles  host an insider-type relationship between the
ruling party and a privileged group. Respondents' descriptions demonstrate that circle
formation rests on the ability of a one business to assume privileged access to the
party in power. In other words, this means to assume core insider status. In this case,
“privilege” stands for direct access to the party in power and the ability to bargain
and negotiate. 
Zlatarov and Nikolov argue that circles form among groups that have already gained
the  privilege  of  direct  access  to  the  party  in  power.  According  to  Nikolov,  the
reiteration  of  successful  exchanges  leads  to  solidification  of  the  party-group
relationship (higher trust and mutual reliability) implying thereby that other groups
can also join so long as they prove to be constructive in that exchange. In a clear
overlap with the parentela, and as it will be demonstrated in Chapter 8, they explain
that the exchange boils down to groups providing campaign funds or other favours in
exchange for Public Tenders or other forms of market advantage such as but not
limited to administrative protection (see also chapter 9). The protection Nikolov has
in mind will be discussed at length in Chapters 8 and 9, but it suffices to say that
insider groups can instigate inspections against their competition, and by implication
be exempt from effective regulatory oversight. 
Other  respondents elaborated on the party-group exchange of resources,  which is
usually  of  campaign  funds  against  policy-making  access.  Respondent  Georgiev
argued in his analysis on the circles that cooperation with ruling parties depends on
the exchange of electoral support against benefits such as Public Tenders. He labelled
this dynamic do ut des: give in order to receive. Although being sceptical of circles'
existence, Petkov argued similarly that the  circle  narrative is indicative of a wider
trend of  businesses  seeking to  convert  their  capital  into political  resources  while
political parties the reverse:
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As a common phenomenon, every one [economic] structure which has a
lot  of  money, wants  to  have  even  more  money,  but  through  political
power. The reverse is also true. Every one political power (party, sic)
wants to have more money and it has more money if it  connects itself
with the circle of business.
Likewise, Aleksandrov was particular that  earlier circles were borne out of the desire
of the waning nomenklatura to capitalise financially on their monopoly over access
to policy-making and so to benefit from the privatization of state enterprises. In any
case, this is also another overlap with the parentela’s reliance on the exchange of
resources.
The circle, according to Zlatarov, forms around the core insider group, which acts as
a gatekeeper to the party political leadership. This means that peripheral or outsider
groups that seek to engage with the ruling party and normally have close to no access
to the ruling party go approach the core insiders first for two main reasons. One: the
core insider has better contextual information on the party leadership and so is able
to navigate the intra-party dynamics with highest chance of a positive outcome. Two:
given  the  trust  the  party  has  to  the  core  insider,  the  latter  is  in  the  position  to
effectively vouch for the reliability of the peripheral group. 
The above, however, does not suggest the circular argument that in order to become a
core insider group, a group has to be granted access by the already established core
insider group. Zlatarov's argument is those businesses that lack the resources, which
would  otherwise  make  them relevant  to  political  parties,  can  only gain  effective
access to the ruling party through an existing core insider group, that would vouch
for  outsider  to  the  party  in  power.  Therefore,  according  to  the  respondent  the
constellation of outsider groups or peripherals around groups with direct access to
political parties in the end leads to the formation of a circle.   
7.2.2.  Circles and Party Political Appointments 
The suggestion that the parentela overlaps with the image of the circles is further
perpetuated by a number of respondents speaking on the importance of party political
appointments in circle dynamics. This is usually within the context of the exchange-
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based relationship inherent in a circle. Respondent Bachvarov explicitly noted that
party  political  appointments  are  a  resource  which  the  party  exchanges  with  a
privileged firm (core insider).  Kirilov argued that the circles (obrachi  originally),
which Mr Akhmed Dogan referred to publicly (Chapter 1), rely on ruling party's
ability  to  make  wide-ranging  political  appointments  in  the  civil  service.  The
administrative appointments a party has already made are employed to facilitate the
provision of what the party has promised to the core insider group: policy-making
access and resources (e.g. Public Tenders). Additionally, specific appointments might
be  what  a  core  insider  expects  to  receive  for  their  provision  of  campaign funds.
Kirilov emphasised that such groups rarely have a second chance of engaging this
way with political parties. Along the same lines, Hadzhiev argued that the exchanges
that  circles  entered  with  political  parties  allowed  the  insider  to  make  or  to  take
advantage of already existing party political  appointments.  They too,  like Kirilov
highlighted that Mr Dogan was correct when publicly admitting that the importance
of electoral victories lies in the scope of appointments the electoral winners can make
in the civil service.
Zlatarov and Petkov strongly emphasised that political appointments are largely the
result of negotiation with anonymous companies, firms or oligarchs (core insiders).
Zlatarov observed that the numerous experts a party appoints is a cover for private
nominations that come from the circles. Speaking as a former minister, Petkov went
further  arguing  that  the  distrust  which  businesses  might  have  towards  political
parties, also including core insiders vis-a-vis ruling party, might be so strong that
business  owners  would  rather  seek  to  nominate  themselves  personally for  public
office. Golemanov also voiced the same argument, providing the oligarch Kovachki
and his party LIDER as an example of someone following the same logic but taken
to the extreme. In his distrust to political parties, Mr Kovachki in fact created his
own party. In any case, Petkov argued that the practice of buying out appointments
allows private groups to slowly conquer political parties and the civil service:
R[…] In the beginning the grupirovki  created their own parties but now
things  are  intertwined  and  actually  we  have  enough  examples  of
grupirovki  bosses  seeking  direct  participation  in  politics  […]via
members  of  parliament,  via  ministers  //exclaims/  He himself!  –I/  Yes!
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Because power is sweet! Another way is to “buy” the politicians, who
would work for them. And this is precisely the connection, because this is
a very complex question, because I [voted in the past] for the increase of
party  subsidies  in  order  to  ensure  party  independence  /commotion,
exists, interruption/.
Do note above that the respondent agrees to the notion which was voiced by the
intermediary, namely, that leaders of the circles (or grupirovki) put themselves up for
election.  Section 7.4.4 below reveals how the vice-president of the prominent at the
time Multigrup Corporation, Mr Dimitar Ivanov had the intention to set-up a political
parties representing big business which would act as a coalition partner to the BSP
government of 1995.
7.2.3.  Existence of the Circles
While there is an overlap with the parentela, respondents are divided on whether the
circles  exist  or not.  This does not have significant implications for the parentela,
because the negation of circles' existence is not a negation of the practices, hence, of
parentela. Respondents seem to disagree not  on the above practices but  on whether
the alleged groups acted necessarily in concert. Some argue the image of the circles
is distorted and that circles are artificially manufactured and sold by the media. For
another set of respondents, the inability to clearly determine their  influence is an
indicator of circles' actual non-existence. Others, finally, accept the idea of the circles
or  at  least  that  some  business  achieve  direct  access  to  ruling  political  parties,
although some of them begrudgingly admitting that this is nearly impossible to prove
(Kuzmanov, Dobromirov).
Respondent  Dimitrov,   being  of  the  first  group  exclaimed  that  the  circles  were
“media  phantoms!”,  conspiratorial  entities,  perpetuated by the media.  The circles
were names given to a set of business actors, who among themselves probably did
not hold such a collective identity, i.e. that they were a circle. As Cenov commented,
the members of the alleged circle Orion, did not refer to each other as such, but were
branded as such by the Media and Opposition. Other respondents, such as Georgiev
argued, along the lines of Finer (1958), that the circles are anonymous.  His position
also overlapped with that of Finer (1958) primarily because Finer's research presents
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an atomised nature of the groups seeking party political representation. As Georgiev
stated, it could be a single or a whole herd of “wild hares” that engages with the
ruling party.. Respondent Petkov was of the opinion that we simply have too little
information on the circles that allows us to claim that they even existed.
Kuzmanov argued that one normally hears of a circle only post factum, when it has
disbanded. They argued that the fact that circles may be publicly illuminated speaks
both  of  their  ineffectiveness  and mythologised influence.  According to  them, the
circles are brought into existence by the media and a curious public, or by opposition
politicians looking for fodder to compromise rivals. On the other hand, to the extent
they are indeed network formations, they rather are splinter groups from the party in
power, where each faction cooperates with its own core insider group (Kuzmanov). 
Respondent Bachvarov was equally uncertain of their existence. He argued that the
circles merely indicate that political parties tend to favouritise certain businesses. As
in Maloney et al (1997), he also argued that access does not immediately translate
itself into influence, and to the extent circles have any, that certainly does not suggest
domination over political parties. Both Kuzmanov and Bachvarov agree that if the
circles really existed,  their  influence would be felt,  because by definition,  circles
dominate the party in  power. (This  is  a  position that  contradicts  the view in the
present study, which argues that private actors have no significant power leverage
over ruling political parties, discussed in chapter 9.)
The idea that their influence indicates circles' existence is also at the heart of the
research  of  the  investigative  journalists  Lilov  (2010)  and  Bakalov  (2010).  Lilov
(2010)  argues  the circle Monterrey,  named  after  a  restaurant  in  Sofia,  was
responsible  for  the  successful  political  career  of  Premier  Boyko  Borisov  (Lilov
2010).  Conducting  a  deliberate  study  on  the  Monterrey  circle,  Bakalov  (2011)
presents the  position of an elite respondent from the former Bulgarian Communist
Party, who confirmed that (following Kuzmanov's line that circles are party factions)
there certainly is a party faction that has contacts with businesses but their collective
(faction and business') influence is  grossly exaggerated (Bakalov 2011: 236-237).
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That said, there is no evidence that Monterrey was involved in the political success
of Premier Boyko Borisov (Bakalov 2011). Therefore, according to Bakalov (2011:
237) since there is little evidence of their influence the solid existence of the circle
Monterrey is an overstatement.
However, the tension which the uncertainty on the existence of the circles causes is
best observed in the response of Stoyanov. The Respondent argues that while there is
observably unusual regulatory scrutiny which stalled their operations and benefitted
their market competitors, there are no immediately observable insiders. Therefore,
“The  circles  must  be  there”. As  the intermediary to  Stoyanov  intimated  to  the
researcher that rival business groups had used their access to ruling political parties
and  by an  extension  to  the  regulatory agencies,  in  order  to  disrupt  the  business
operations of Stoyanov under the guise of regulatory inspections.  This is  a point
developed at length in Chapter 9. This respondent, as well as Zlatarov, Bachvarov,
Kirilov does not see the circles as a fabrication, even if circumstances surrounding
them are skewed or occasionally exaggerated. The common position is that there are
numerous anonymous (big) business actors, working individually or in groups, vying
to assume a core status in the ruling party, on the grounds of their significance as
party donors.
One explanation of the tension on the existence of the circles lies in the fact that the
existence of a circle largely depends on whether the external observer will “connect
the dots” between perceivably core insiders and ruling political parties, and claim a
circle. Consistent with the position of Cenov on Orion and Dimitrov in principle,
respondent Kirilov admitted that they personally were responsible for the christening
of at least two circles whose names continue to circulate in Bulgarian media. The
circles therefore  are  a  label  for  a  number  of  businesses  acting  as  a  network  in
cooperation with the ruling party in power. The position here is  that  taking their
effectiveness as an indicator of a circle's existence is an incorrect approach. It rests
on  the  flawed  assumption  that  circles  are  necessarily  influential,  that  is,  access
automatically translates into influence. The present study adopts the view that the
question whether these specific circles that we are aware of, as of now, exist is moot
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and not worthy of pursuit. What matters is the fact that on a larger scale the circle
dynamics overlap considerably with those of the parentela. Therefore, even if one
disproves that a certain combination of firms (dots) that is claimed to be a circle, is in
fact  not,  this  does  not  negate  the  overall  parentela  dynamics.  For  as  we saw in
chapters 4-6 and as we will  see in  chapters 8 and 9,  the parentela dynamics are
clearly there,  outside  the  circles.  The position  here  essentially  is  that  any party-
insider  group  douette  is  a  circle.  However,  let  us  now turn  to  a  more  concrete
example of a parentela actor who is less anonymous and more monolithic. The case
of the Multigrup corporation. 
7.3.  MULTIGRUP
The  present  section  focuses  on  the  Multigrup  (MG)  Corporation.  A number  of
respondents provided very thorough elaboration on the importance of that actor and
the accumulated data (triangulated with memoirs and news articles) indicates that it
is possible to provide MG as an example of a single monolithic actor in a parentela
relationship, probably the equivalent of CA in 1960s Italy, with its socio-political
palpable  presence.  However,  its  relevance  ends  with  the  late  1990s.  No  such
comparable, recent business actor was identified by the respondents as a possible
partner to the ruling party in a parentela relationship.
The Multigrup Corporation was established in the late 1980s and its most prominent
owner Iliya Pavlov owned it from the early 1990s until his assassination in 2003.
Multigrup was one of Bulgaria's first and largest business holdings. It was a market-
dominant  actor  and  until  the  government  of  Ivan  Kostov  1997-2001,  MG  was
arguably the single largest economic actor in the state.  Respondents Aleksandrov,
Penchev, Dimitrov pointed out that MG was set up with the capital of the waning
political nomenclature. Along the lines of Chalakov et al's  molecule of conversion
(2008), Aleksandrov and Dimitrov also observed that the origin of the corporation
was the exit  strategy of the retiring communist  elite  (including intelligence)  who
sought  to  privatise  state  assets  in  economic  actors  (firms,  companies,  banks,
holdings,  etc.)  where  the  owners  would  be  select  proxies,  personally  loyal  and
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dependent on the retiring elite (also Ganev 2001 for a more detailed overview of
MG’s origins).
7.3.1.   Multigrup and New Parentela Dynamics
Overall the relationship of MG with major political parties until 2001 overlapped
with the features of the parentela: an exchange-based relationship directly with the
party leadership, where campaign resources are exchanged for favourable political
appointments. As it will be explained below, MG secured their own ministers in three
governments,  of Berov in 1992, Videnov 1994 and very briefly of Simeon Saxe-
Coburg-Gotha 2001. The case of MG also demonstrates additional parentela-related
dynamics.  First,  core insiders do not seek to  orbit  a  single party, rather  establish
simultaneous insider contacts with all  relevant  parties.  Here “relevant” stands for
being potentially electable. The demise of the corporation began with its inability to
negotiate  core  insider  access  to  SDS  leadership  when  Mr  Kostov  assumed  the
position  of  premier. This  also shows that  parliamentary elections  are  an external
variable capable of disrupting a group’s parentela relationship and that maintaining
parallel core insider relationships to relevant parties is one such solution.
Second,  MG shows that  core  insiderness  can  be  within  a  party faction,  and  not
necessarily with the party HQ itself. This is a point also made by Stoyanov. Although
discussed later again, he argued that the regulatory pressure which he felt on their
business  was  rather  the  work  of  a  party  faction  in  combination  with  their
competition,  rather  than  matters  moved  by  the  party  headquarters.  Moreover,
attaching  to  a  party  faction  is  also  risky,  even  if  privileged  access  is  provided,
because a competition between the insiders ensues. Also demonstrating how insider
status  is  variable,  the  confrontation  between  the  circle  Orion  (below)  and  MG
demonstrates how a group’s insider status could evaporate if a rival party faction
wins the party in-fighting.
And third, as a result of core insider status being variable, one has to distrust the
dominant narrative of MG being a group overpowering the ruling party, because that
holding had to constantly (re-)negotiate and reaffirm its status. The evidence suggests
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that MG’s success with political parties rests on its ability to bargain and exchange its
resources for political access. Although the question of power will be discussed in
Chapter 9, it has to be noted that there is no evidence that MG could coerce political
parties,  as  in  the  first  dimension  of  power  (also  discussed  in  chapter  9).  With
particular reference to Ganev (2001) and Barnes (2007) who discuss with conviction
that  MG and Bulgarian circles,  respectively, somehow forcefully dominated over
political parties, any influence an external observer perceived in relation to MG and
the circles is in fact the result of bargaining and cooperation. The MG Corporation
was influential, but that was not a matter of some form of a constant connection to
power but a matter of constant negotiation. In other words parentela insiderness is
unstable because the venue itself is internally unstable, particularly when there are
competing party factions.
7.3.2.   MG and DPS
Respondent Dimitrov (speaking as a former prime minister), and Penchev (speaking
as a former Member of Parliament and elite party functionary), pointed out that DPS
was the first political party MG sought to establish any relationship with. Penchev
testifies  that  in  1991,  during  the  time  of  the  electoral  campaign  for  the  Great
Parliament,  DPS  was  heavily  under-resourced.  During  that  time  MG established
excellent working relationship with DPS's leadership. In exchange for much needed
resources  for  the  set  up  and  reach  of  the  young  party,  also  including  benefits
personally  provided  to  the  leadership  of  DPS,  the  corporation  received  direct
personal access to the party leader. As a member of the party leadership at the time,
Penchev personally met Iliya Pavlov in 1991. 
Both Dimitrov and Penchev above recall  MG and similar groups,  that  originated
from the capital possessed by the political nomenclature and pre-1989 intelligence
services, and which provided support for access to other political parties. In the case
of MG it gave resources to several parties simultaneously (Penchev):
During this process of preparation for the Great Parliament, all of these
people became service personnel for all leaders from all party centrals of
all political formations […] including SDS and BZNS, including DPS,
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parties that got in the Great Parliament. But they usually worked through
the leader of the political party
Note  that  a  stress  is  also  put  on  the  relationship  with  the  political  leadership.
However, what ensued was a gradual formation of factions within DPS. On the one
side was Penchev, on the other Mr Dogan and MG. The conflict was over the control
of  the  nomination  of  MPs  in  the  party  lists  as  well  as  on  the  party  political
appointments in the civil services. Respondent Penchev noted a few key events in the
lifespan of DPS that signified the true influence of MG on Mr Dogan, when many
nominations both in the civil service and future MPs were made under the near-diktat
of MG’s representatives.
Another example of MG's influence over DPS was the vote of no confidence against
the coalition partner (SDS) on 24 July 1992. Being directly involved, Respondent
Penchev  stated  that  their  faction  assumed  the  position  of  unconditional  support
towards  SDS  and  the  government  of  Mr  Dimitrov  (08  November  1991  –  30
December 1992). Instead, the position of the party leader Mr Dogan was ambivalent.
This uncertainty was one of the earlier signs of external influence (Penchev). While
the latter  had personally negotiated the party political  appointments with premier
Dimitrov, in 1992, Mr Dogan personally voted against their coalition partner at the
vote of no confidence. Voting in tune with the opposition and against his own MPs
suggested to Penchev that there was external pressure on DPS with a view to topple
Mr Dimitrov. Not much later, public pressure forced Mr Dimitrov to concede the
government’s resignation in a vote of confidence on 28 October 1992 which he lost
as MPs from SDS voted against their  own leadership.  In the meantime,  Penchev
recalled the pressure exerted personally on them and their faction-leadership from
representatives of MG to cease resisting the policies MG and the supporters of Mr
Dogan promoted.
7.3.3.   MG and the Berov Government
Speaking as an immediate participant, Penchev explained that the government of Mr
Berov, following that of Mr Dimitrov, allowed MG to procure their own nominations
in the state administration. Respondents Donchev, Kuzmanov also gave precisely this
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government as an example of MG wielding an excessive power by means of party
political  appointments.  The more  glaring  example  of  such appointments  was  Mr
Stoyan Denchev who was a head secretary of the political cabinet of Lyuben Berov
and at the same time vice president of Multigrup.
Ultimately, MG made use of such positioning in the government by absorbing the
larger  sectors  of  the  industry  (Georgiev,  Penchev)  through  the  processes  of
privatisation and the so called “entry-exit” economy. This means private firms (MG)
would act as resource suppliers to state-owned enterprises (still  an overwhelming
majority in the nascent free market), that is at the “entrance”. At the same time firms
still under the umbrella of MG would act as exporters or distributors of the final
product (Raychev and Stoychev 2008).
MG was not the only firm engaged in this practice. Other oligarchs of the rank of
Iliya Pavlov also succeeded to establish a near monopolistic presence in the field
they operated respectively, more or less following the same practice. Such as in the
fields  of  heavy industry and banking:  Borislav Dionisiev, Valentin  Mollov Dobri
Gushterov, and Borislav Dionisiev (Penchev).  Collectively, those were known as the
G13 and later circle Vazrazhdane (or Renaissance as per the Italian colleagues of
Kirilov)(Penchev).  Those  were  the  formal  representative  organizations  of  big
business owners (oligarchs with monopolistic businesses). More detailed descriptive
information could be obtained from the formal communications of US Ambassadors
Beyrle (2005) and Pardew (2005).
7.3.4.   MG and BSP
Following the fall of the Berov government, MG focused its attention to the next
relevant party, BSP, however while still  maintaining its core insider status within
DPS.  As  Penchev  recounts,  after  a  certain  satiation  in  capital  accumulation,
Multigrup, then as part of the informal G13 organization representing big business,
sought the attention of BSP with the idea of a coalition government between BSP and
a smaller partner, namely a party of Big Business. As the vice president of MG (Mr
Dimitar Ivanov) also reminisces in his memoirs about 1994, then the time was ripe
206
for a new party political coalition  between BSP and a coalition partner representing
the interests  of big business (the “+” in BSP+ in the quotation below, in Toshev
2004b):
In Bulgaria, VIS and SIK (single large corporations, usually associated
with  the  “security  business”  and  racketeering,  sic)  were  picking  up
speed. There were shootings and people killed.  But we were still  safe
from harm. Iliya Pavlov, Valentin Mollov, Ventsi  Yosifov, Emil Kyulev,
Dobri Gushterov were like business-gods, but everyone felt the need of a
new  state  government.  The  Berov  government  could  not  offer  them
anything else, while at the same time it was not suitable for projects on a
larger scale: oil, gas, coal, electricity, carbamide... The political class,
so far as it existed, could not have made it alone… So, flicking through
the newspapers on that May morning, I read that Ginyo Ganev [… will]
register a new political party – the Union of Fatherland. That gave me
the key to the formula, which had to be used – “BSP+”, where “+” had
to be a few centrist parties and citizen movements.
The leaders  of big business  groups in  Bulgaria  felt  that  any actions  to influence
political events to change the government were entirely justified and necessary. Mr
Ivanov writes that the objective was to help a new political party get into power.
While  the  government  of  Berov  had  been  based  on  experts,  and  the  cadres,  as
exemplified above, recruited from big business, larger and more lucrative projects
could be realised with the help of a new party in power, which would be the “plus”. 
The “plus”, it is implied, would be individuals coming directly from the offices of the
single large corporations. The attempt to control the cadres of the future government
as an element of the parentela is quite visible above. However, later in his memoirs,
Mr Ivanov draws attention to the episode where he sought the private counsel of a
handful  of BSP leaders,  such as Andrey Lukanov, Lyuben Gotsev and Alexander
Lilov. What Mr Ivanov fails  to mention is that the first and last  of the list  were
leaders of party factions (while officer Gotsev was later pointed as the leader of the
circle Monterrey, which Bakalov researched more recently). This indicates that MG
was probing the attitude of the BSP factions towards big business and their  own
corporation for a possible form of cooperation.. 
In his visit to the above party functionaries, and as instructed by MG's owner Iliya
Pavlov, Mr Ivanov proposed the establishment of a new political party that would
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coalesce with BSP (in Toshev 2004b). That party would be headed by Mr Ganev
(from the  newspaper  earlier),  who was  in  the  final  stages  of  establishing  a  new
political party, but that party would essentially represent the interests of big business.
In the presence of the then prime minister, Mr Videnov, who was summoned at that
meeting  between  Lukanov,  Gotsev  and  Ivanov,  Mr  Ivanov  retells  that  he
“emphasised strongly on the opportunity to attract big business in support of one
post-electoral coalition with BSP.“ What this clearly means, according to Mr Ivanov,
is  that  the  “+” sign  would  be  the  political  party expressing  the  interests  of  Big
Business (in Toshev 2004b). By implication this means that that party would also be
in the position to make party political appointments at the very least, if not influence
the general policy of the state thus equating national interests to those of business
groups with near-monopolistic market standing. All of the above, so far is a very
detailed evidence of MG’s attempts to establish a parentela with as many relevant
parties as possible, e.g. DPS, BSP, BSP+, by exchanging electoral support against
political appointments and favourable policies.
Before the electoral win of the Democratic Left (a coalition between BSP and other,
smaller, parties, unrelated to MG), which brought Mr Videnov to power, there had
been an earlier agreement that BSP would coalesce with the Patriotic Front of Mr
Ganev (the MG-dominated party). As part of those agreements, Mr Ivanov reveals,
there  had  been  several  consultative  meetings  with  Videnov, where  he  personally
nominated ministers and top civil servants (but later never realised) by writing them
on a piece of paper, in an identical way the researcher was presented with a similar
list by Penchev. At some of these meetings Mr Pavlov of Multigrup was also present.
He offered in exchange for MG-sponsored nominations which BSP would endorse,
the  research  and  expertise  capabilities  of  his  corporation.  Immediately  after  the
Democratic Left assumed power, Mr Videnov, along with Mr Nikolay Dobrev (MP
and a minister from the BSP at the time) visited the office of Mr Dimitar Ivanov,
vice-CEO of MG. Mr Ivanov writes (in Toshev 2004b):
I had to personally introduce him (Mr Videnov, sic) to Mr Iliya Pavlov.
Both of them came prepared and expressed respect to one another and I
felt that trust had emerged between them. Iliya informed him about all
projects in the business-structures of Multigrup and Zhan desired to start
208
looking at each one of our analyses. […] We created the following order
– we would meet periodically in my office on different topics – depending
on the analyses which came out from our structure – oil, gas, electricity,
metals, banks, insurance... Iliya came to these meetings with one black
leather  bag,  replete  with  business-plans,  correspondence,  referent
literature,  and after we finished our conversation he would give it  to
Zhan [Videnov] for “homework”.
Until early 1995 the relationship between MG and BSP falls in line with what the
parentela  prescribes.  There  is  trust,  cooperation,  as  well  as  ministerial  and  by
implication non-ministerial appointments discussed between MG and BSP. There is
also  an additional  exchange element:  policy-making access  through appointments
against  expertise  on  draft  economic  policies,  in  addition  to  campaign  funds.  Mr
Ivanov  emphasises  on  the  expertise  MG  was  to  provide  (and  provided)  to  Mr
Videnov, although from another  angle that  might  appear  to  merely be disguising
MG's goals in specific sectors as policy expertise. Then again in general, it is hard to
draw the line between a group’s expert opinion and its toned down interests, when
reading draft legislation. Finally, Mr Ivanov elsewhere (in Toshev 2004b) also shares
that MG had also provided BSP's 1994 campaign with a far more considerable for
those times sum of contributions. 
All in all, the relationship MG established with BSP up to 1995 approximates that of
the parentela. We have a group with clearly privileged direct access to the venue's
central  policy-makers,  and in the position to bargain and negotiate with them. In
addition  to  that,  MG  is  in  a  cooperative,  power-balanced  exchange  relationship,
where they nominate party political appointments against campaign resources and
expertise (although it is not clear whether these are MG's policy goals or MG's expert
position) that they provide.
However, core insider status oscillates and is a matter of continuous re-negotiation.
Although MG enjoyed close relation with BSP's leadership, it did not last long with
Mr Videnov but with other party factions. Soon after the electoral victory of BSP as
part of the Democratic Left, Mr Ivanov recounts bitterly that the final names of the
civil service and ministerial appointees were none of those agreed with Mr Videnov
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previously. Most of them, instead, he identified, were related to the so called circle
Orion.
7.3.5.   MG vs Orion
With the regime change in  1989,  not  only did the state  change from totalitarian
socialism but from command economy to free market. This also entailed that all or
nearly all hitherto State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) be privatised. While most SOEs
took  shape  of  factories  and  companies,  there  were  the  cooperatives,  commonly
known  as  Labour-Cooperative  Agricultural  Farms6 or  simply  cooperative  farms
(TKZS).  They,  too,  were  subject  to  privatisation.  That,  however,  was  not  a
straightforward process. Starting at the early 1990s, the process of transformation of
ownership from collective to private meant that nearly all individuals involved in the
cooperative farms would have to lose that source of income and employment. The
name of the circle Orion, comes from a number of such cooperatives which after
their privatisation had been re-named after stars of the same constellation.
The data on the circle Orion primarily came from an interview with Aleksandrov,
who spoke both as an MP at the time and an insider to the Orion circle. That was then
triangulated in an interview with Cenov, who was a close colleague to Aleksandrov,
Georgiev (colleague to Aleksandrov and close observer of the early dynamics in BSP
in 1990s) and news articles, primarily from the Kapital newspaper due to the ease of
accessibility of articles from that period. That circle existed, even if it was still-born.
On the one hand, one can identify the political and business actors, who would gain
by working in concert, which signifies the existence of the circle Orion. Politically,
one could identify the politicians who could potentially gain voters by promoting the
policies that the cirlce stood for.
The  circle  Orion  appears  to  be  an  attempt  to  merge  economic  profit,  successful
political  careers  and  actual  support  to  agricultural  producers.  Three  main  actors
transpire. First, there is the political wing in the circle. These are Merrs Dimov and
6 Phonetically,  TKZS  (Trudovo-Kooperativni  Zemedelski  Stopanstva);  ТКЗС,  Трудово-
кооперативни земеделски стопанства
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his closest aide Orsov. The role of the former was to provide the political access to
the policy-making process, while the latter to facilitate the legal technicalities. Both
of  them  are  the  submitters  of  a  number  of  legislative  drafts  intended  to  assist
agricultural  producers,  most  prominent  of  which  are  the  Law  on  Protection  of
Agricultural Producers (LPAP draft, reference number 102.33-638 of 23rd December
1993)  and  the  Law  on  Guaranteeing  and  Protection  of  Agricultural  Producers
(LGPAP draft, ref: 102-33-334 of 23rd June 1994). 
Second, Aleksandrov explains that the personal involvement of Mr Dimov comes as
a result  of the plight  of agricultural  producers in his  constituency in  the Plovdiv
region.  During  1992,  the  already  dysfunctional  socialist  cooperatives  were  in  a
process  of  privatisation.  However,  the  first  stages  of  that  process  entailed  their
liquidation,  meaning  all  equipment  sold  and  land  coverage  reorganised  (Cenov).
Many  of  the  farmers,  instead,  wanted  to  retain  the  structure  of  the  very  same
cooperatives and without any reorganisation become collective owners of the same
(Cenov). The agricultural producers from the Plovdiv region were mostly affected by
this  new  policy  and  found  a  natural  expression  of  their  interests  in  Mr  Dimov
(Cenov, Aleksandrov). As an MP at the time, Cenov reported personal involvement in
the  investigation  into  the  open  farmers'  revolt  during  that  time,  who  physically
resisted  the  authorities  coming  to  seize  machinery  and  evict  people  from
cooperatives' premises. Cenov also noted the dedication of Merrs Dimov and Orsov
to redress the tension. 
While the cooperatives could not be saved, one solution Mr Dimov saw was to setup
a state-owned agricultural fund which would operate with moneys from the national
budget and will assist agricultural producers by providing them with specific loans
that are tailored to the peculiarities of farming. Aleksandrov explains that as a result
of promoting this idea, the Plovdiv cooperatives freely associated in the Union of
Agricultural  Cooperatives (SZK) and provided some of the starting capital of the
Bulgarian Agricultural and Industrial Bank (BZPB), which was to be the banking
authority that would operate with the state moneys and distribute it in the form of
loans to the ailing now private cooperatives. 
211
Essentially, at  the core of this  cicle  lays  the mutual  benefits  of  the business  and
political wings in the circle Orion. While such capital would guarantee the success of
the BZPB bank, the over 1000 cooperatives would provide a significant electoral
boost to Mr Dimov, which is what he would gain politically, while the cooperatives –
potentially – gained loans on favourable terms. Merrs Mircho Spasov and his son
Rumen Spasov would be the formal owners of BZPB and placing BZPB between the
Agricultural Fund and the agricultural producers motivated them to take part. That
would put their bank in a dominant market position because it is guaranteed fresh
capital from the Agricultural Fund every year and the ability to provide better loans
than their competition. As Cenov reiterated the publicly known fact, the name of the
constellation Orion comes from the fact that a number of said cooperatives were
owned by the Spasov family and were named after stars from the constellation. As it
turned out, astronomy was their hobby. 
In any case, the circle did not come into existence, because BZPB never received its
license for operation. At first sight, the circle was born: the actors were in place and
necessary legislation set into motion. However, the fact that the intended goals  never
materialised that birth was still. As Cenov and Aleksandrov reminisce, Mr Lukanov
and his faction were particularly displeased when informed of the plan of Orion. As a
response Mr Lukanov actively advocated the substituted Bank for Agricultural Credit
(BZK) (Aleksandrov, Cenov). Cenov and Aleksandrov agreed that Mr Tilev was as a
close associate to MG and Iliya Pavlov. 
While the author could not establish direct evidence of ownership of BZK by MG,
their association appears an indirect one. In a very succinct yet well detailed case
study, Sugarev (2014) documents the details of the confrontation between Orion and
their BSPB and Lukanov and the bank the latter supported, BZK, owned by Mr Tilev.
The link between Tilev and Iliya Pavlov is not related to ownership but related to the
unprecedented scope of non-guaranteed credits given out by BZK to numerous MG
firms. This occurred in the turbulent times, immediately following the 1989 regime
change, which saw plenty of misconduct, particularly in the banking sector where
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banks-owners would give out non-guaranteed loans to firms of friends and family.
Sugarev (2014) reveals that the link between Mr Pavlov and BZK is through two
intervening  individuals:  Mr  Iliya  Iliev  and  Mr  Kalchev.  The  former  is  a  Ruse
business  owner  and  a  direct  recipient  of  one  of  BZK's  non-guaranteed  loans  in
millions of leva, which were spent on the construction of an oil depot. The latter
person at  the time was the mayor of Ruse and former branch manager of Credit
Bank, owned by Mr Pavlov. Sugarev (2014) implies that Mr Iliev was a proxy of Mr
Pavlov, because Mr Kalchev was frequently recorded by the intelligence agencies
phone-tapping him, to respond to Mr Pavlov with "Yes, boss!", promising on one
occasion that the Ruse oil depot would be built. Indirectly, then, that gives credence
to  Aleksandrov's  statement  that  Messrs  Tilev  and  Pavlov  were  in  close  contact.
However, even if the link between BZK and MG appears exaggerated, the evidence
does not disprove that MG stood to gain from installing BZK as a dominant bank
because its owner, Mr Tilev, would reciprocate any support to that end, which Merrs
Iliev and Lukanov provided in the conflict against Orion’s BZP Bank. 
Evidently, both Orion and MG set up parentela relations with BSP on the basis of
establishing  core  insider  status  with  each  of  the  respective  factions  inside.  MG
clearly sided with Mr Lukanov's faction, while Orion with that of Messrs Orsov and
Dimov. By an extension, each of the groups had insider representation in the party in
power. The only difference is that Orion's access to the civil service was not enough
to put political pressure on the administration in order to defend itself. Mr Dimov
was  able  to  vouch for  the  credibility  of  the  Cooperative  Union before  the  State
Prosecutor  and prevent  thereby the intended legal  action against  the Cooperative
Union.  Yet,  he was not  able  to  prevent  the  legal  action taken against  the  BZPB
(Aleksandrov).  Meanwhile,  Mr  Lukanov  proposed  Mr  Orsov  for  an  intra-party
inquiry  to  remove  him  from  party's  agricultural  committee  (Aleksandrov).
Furthermore,  the fact that Mr Rumen Spasov had drawn a loan from BZK years
earlier in order to set up BZPB was exploited politically by Merrs Lukanov and Tilev
to claim BZPB as incapable to return that loan, and a pretext for not granting the
latter a license of operation (Aleksandrov, Cenov). 
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Finally, respondent Georgiev, speaking as a well-connected opponent to BSP, with
connections to BSP, commented that Orion never wielded any (significant) influence
comparable  to  that  of  Multigrup.  The  circle's  instrument  of  influence  was
intimidation  based  on  its  proximity  to  the  Prime  Minister  Videnov,  but  not
necessarily with latter's approval or knowledge. In fact Georgiev spoke in defence of
Mr  Videnov  and  for  his  non-association  with  Orion.  Orion  therefore  had  not
managed to  gain  enough  influence  on  the  grounds  of  its  core  insider  status  and
provided by Merrs  Dimov and Orsov and in what  closely resembles  a  parentela
relationship.
At  the  same  time  MG appears  to  be  the  more  effective  group  in  exploiting  its
parentela relationship. Not only did it win on that occasion, but Ganev (2001) reveals
in  his  3  cases  on  Multigrup  how the  corporation  achieved  some of  its  goals  in
relation  to  other  projects  of  national  importance.  Out  of  the  three,  the  case  of
Topenergy is  most  relevant  here as it  follows the contours  of a rather successful
parentela: an insider party group which seeks to procure favourable appointments in
the civil service (Topenergy was administered by the government). In short, the case
is about the decision from Berov's government to establish a mediator company –
Topenergy – between the Russian Gazprom and the Bulgarian state for the provision
of  natural  gas.  Multigrup's  plans  were  to  appoint  Mr  Lukanov  as  the  Bulgarian
representative at Topenergy's directorial board. While those attempts were thwarted
thanks to moves from Videnov's government and Mr Lukanov was denied that post,
Multigrup still managed to gain 16.5% of the Topenergy shares (Ganev 2011: 9-11).
Given the opposition of Mr Videnov to MG and given that MG had to side with Mr
Lukanov demonstrates the constant uncertainty of a core insider status (Ganev 2001).
While  Mr  Lukanov  succeeded  to  bring  in  MG as  a  stake  holder  in  the  nascent
company, Topenergy, MG failed to help install him as a member of the directorial
board.
7.3.6. MG and DPS 2
As the  events  above unfolded in  1996,  parallel  to  them,  Multigrup attempted  to
maintain its core insider status by preventing their own ejection as a party insider
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from DPS.  Respondent  Penchev  recalled  the  push  of  Multigrup  to  dissolve  Mr
Oktay's faction and prevent its merger with SDS in a larger political party: ODS.
This historical decision for DPS was to be taken at a special party assembly in 1996.
On the day of the vote, however, the faction of Mr Oktay was locked up in their hotel
rooms by supporters of Mr Dogan and MG, thus being unable to attend the vote. All
those loyal to the central leadership however were present and such proposals were
voted  down.  All  members  of  the  faction  of  Mr  Oktay  were  removed  from  all
executive posts. Finally, the internal party regulations were also changed to the effect
that  Mr  Dogan  was  specified  as  the  sole  unchangeable  leader  of  the  party.  By
eliminating internal opposition and particularly by both preventing the dissolution of
DPS  and  solidifying  the  leadership  position  of  Mr  Dogan,  MG  succeeded  in
maintaining  their  core  insider  access  (also  Dimitrov).  The  above  episode  is  an
example of MG trying to maintain core insider status in parallel to two parties: DPS
and BSP.
However, despite  their  victories  MG entered  into  gradual  decline  with  the  party
change  and  the  coming  of  Mr  Kostov  to  power,  whose  party  ODS  formed  a
majoritarian government in 1997. As a result, MG remained an outsider during the
tenure of ODS. A conflict between the two gradually emerged and using their control
over the state administration, ODS ejected all cadres of MG from the civil service.
As a result MG had no access to the main stages of the privatisation process of state
assets in Bulgaria at that time. Instead of MG or Orion, a new circle was reported to
around the premier. That was Olimp, named after one of Mr Kostov's frequented
restaurants. The ability to make political appointments also enabled Mr Kostov to
exert  regulatory  pressure  on  the  firms  under  the  MG  Holding  (Aleksandrov,
Kuzmanov). Mr Pavlov had become a subject of aversion and never achieved any of
its earlier insider access. At that point, Mr Pavlov desperately sought any access to
BSP which was in opposition, offering “PR” money to its leadership only to promote
an  MP he  favoured.  That  attempt  succeeded  but  to  no  avail.  At  the  start  of  the
government of Mr Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (National Movement Simeon II, NDSV), MG
achieved some access through the G13 association representing big business, but that
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was not the same any more (Penchev). Mr Pavlov was assassinated in 2003 and with
that MG discontinued active participation in policy-making as an interest group.
7.4. The Profile of Private Parentela Actors
The case on Multigrup and the circle Orion suggest that those who are on the private
side of the network are firms with electoral or financial capabilities of relevance to
the party or party factions. The count and size of those firms are irrelevant as long as
they  either  individually  (MG)  or  collectively  (the  Orion  cooperatives)  generate
sizeable  electoral  resources  such  as  campaign  funds  (MG)  or  electoral  support
(Orion). This is nothing different from UFU or CA, where the former is a collective
of firms, while the latter is a single monolithic representative of the Catholic Church.
The Orion circle in particular shows that the actual count does not matter, so long as
the collective of then free-market cooperatives (represented by SZK – the Union of
Agricultural Producers) provided relevant electoral resources, i.e. votes to Mr Dimov
in particular and by an extension the BSP. Overall, this description is not different
from the picture based on the general  discussion on circles  in  section 7.2 where
respondents were ambivalent whether insiders were a few or many but agreed that
groups’ influence lies in the campaign funds they exchanged for party favours.
The only new perspective is the brief discussion by a number of respondents on the
role of oligarchs in the policy-making process. The description some interviewees
gave on oligarchs’ interaction with political parties, too, conformed to the parentela.
That is why, to the above list of single large firms or a collective of many, we can
also add oligarchs as an example of the private actor in a parentela network. 
There is some evidence of some oligarchs trying to influence the nominations in the
civil service, with Nikolov and Cenov going so far as to say that one of Bulgaria’s
prime minister H was also the result of the negotiations between the oligarch W and
political party A. This claim is not entirely unfounded. Respondent Penchev gave the
researcher a handwritten list of ministerial nominations that they compiled for one of
Bulgaria’s more recent governments. He explained that they personally vouched for
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the nomination of H. A link between Penchev, H and W could exist in theory because
the common trait between the three is their centre-right ideological leaning, and their
ties to Mr Kostov’s government. Such dynamics of campaign funds for favourable
nominations are clearly attributable to the parentela.
In  addition,  respondents  Rumenov  and  Dobromirov  also  discussed  W and  their
suspicious rate of winning public tenders, in exchange for campaign contributions.
They discussed the oligarch Q along the same lines of exchange. The difference is
that they exchanged their contributions for favours from the state administration to
revoke  the  business  license  of  their  competition,  respondent  Mihailov.  Although
Mihailov has the interest in portraying themselves as a victim, they mentioned that at
the time they also had direct representation to the coalition party to which Q had no
access  to.  This  means  both  had  equal  access  to  political  parties  and  engage  in
confrontation, very much along the lines of Orion vs MG. Overall, then, to the list of
private firms, or collectives thereof, we could also add individual oligarchs.
However, if the respondents from the general discussions on the subjects were unable
to be specific, the image that the case on Multigrup provides is no different. The
parentela,  and  insider  status  in  particular,  is  not  reserved  to  a  single  monolithic
private actor, such as Multigrup or Catholic Action. Although individuals considered
as oligarchs could engage in a parentela, a collective of single, small-scale firms such
as with Orion and UFU is also possible. What matters most is the ability of the actors
to accumulate a critical mass of party-relevant resources: campaign funds or electoral
support. For those small-scale firms working together to express their interests, they
usually formally associate as UFU and SZK. However, what most of the respondents
from the general discussions found hard to communicate was the idea that while
firms  or  companies  acted  together  they  did  not  necessarily  do  so  in  formal
association with one another. 
It  seems that  the  more  recent  image,  provided by the  circles  is  of  a  larger  than
expected number of mid-size firms, working in an informal association with the party
in power. It is hard to provide a number but it is more than what one would expect by
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looking at the cases of Northern Ireland and Italy. Respondent Nikolov spoke first of
10,  then of  100 families  in  total,  while  Rumenov spoke of  about  5  firms in  the
construction sector. We are probably looking at  a  slightly larger  total  number of
privileged actors from all sectors who seek to establish a parentela with the ruling
party, if we adopt Rumenov’s estimate of about 5 per sector. 
7.5. Conclusion
Following the example of La Palombara (1964) and Greer (1994), the purpose of the
present chapter is to a single, tangible actor who could be involved in a parentela
relationship with a ruling political party.  The absence of a conspicuous actor of the
scale of CA or UFU, puts a question mark over whether a parentela really exists. The
Italian and Northern Irish cases clearly identify a corresponding insider actors that
are easy to identify and observe.  The interview approach leaves us in a situation
where on the one hand respondents claim that there are party insiders, but on the
other  no  such  organization  was  clearly  identified  by  them as  such.  The  present
chapter, therefore attempted to solve this issue by identifying any specific actors that
have acted as party’s insiders.
It  argued  that  a  large  number  of  private  firms,  single  companies  or  individual
oligarchs could potentially enter a parentela relationship, as long as they accumulate
the necessary level of party-relevant resources. While single actors like Multigrup are
more  relevant  for  the  past,  oligarchs  presently  are  potential  parentela  partners.
However, the main profile of a parentela is that of a slightly larger number of firms,
say, 5 (Rumenov) per sector that informally work together to establish party insider
status with the party in power and quite likely its party factions (Stoyanov).
In addition to that, the featured case study on Multigrup in this chapter also revealed
additional  parentela-relevant  dynamics.  First,  parliamentary  elections  act  as  an
external shock to the existing party-group relationship and as a result more affluent
groups could seek to establish parallel core insider relations with all relevant political
parties. In doing so, groups ensures to be always “in power”. Second, groups can
establish a parentela with a party faction. This is different from UFU or CA who
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worked  straight  with  the  party  HQ.  Third,  insider  status  is  variable.  The  case
confirms the argument that access does not mean influence (Maloney et al 1997) but
it also adds that access itself is not a constant. Both Orion and Multigrup in particular
had to incessantly negotiate,  that is fight, for their continued privileged access to
BSP, with MG also in DPS.
In the next chapters 8 and 9, the parentela will be discussed as a policy network in
action.  Chapter  8  will  demonstrate  a  Bulgarian  case  that  looks  typical  of  La
Palombara’s parentela (type 1) while Chapter 9 will introduce a slightly different one
(type  2),  a  parentela  based on conflict.  Both  chapters  will  eventually distinguish
between type 1 and type 2 parentela networks in order to highlight two different
albeit parentela-related dynamics.
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CHAPTER 8:  La  Palombara’s  Parentela:  The
Case of Bulgarian Law on Public
Tenders (2004)
8.1.  Introduction
The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate the existence of the parentela in
the Bulgarian polity. Following the research plan to find a suitable case study on the
basis  of  elite  interviewees’  responses,  the  present  study  succeeded  in  finding  a
typical  case  of  La  Palombara’s parentela  in  Bulgaria  as  of  2014.  The  parentela
disclosed in the present chapter is manifested in the application of the Law on Public
Tenders 2004 (LPT), with its 2014 amendments, in Bulgaria’s construction sector.
Essentially, the case explains the observation among respondents and the Bulgarian
construction sector as a whole (discussed at length later in this chapter) that some
construction firms unusually often win public tender auctions. The explanation is that
this is done through a parentela relationship. However, the chapter also argues that
this parentela formation is the result of the combination of two major independent
variables: construction firms trying to survive in a market in decline and at the same
time political parties trying to find campaign funding.
The  chapter  is  structured  as  follows:  Section  8.2  introduces  the  Law  on  Public
Tenders 2004, up to its 2014 amendments and discusses the sector-wide position of
construction firms that political parties pre-select their party insiders at construction
tenders. Section 8.3 explains the mechanism of how in principle certain firms can be
tacitly pre-selected as tender winners. Section 8.4 discusses the sector-wide reports
that  political  parties  pre-select  favourite  firms  as  construction  tender  winners.
However, it  is  section 8.5 that  explains  how  political  parties do that.  Section 8.6
discusses the evidence that suggests that the major reason for groups to seek a ruling
party’s help  to  take  advantage  at  construction  tenders  is  the  construction  market
decline, compounded by the fact that firms predominantly depend on public tenders
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for continued market survival. Before concluding, section 8.7 looks at the case from
the perspective of the parentela and expresses its dynamics as a causal chain.
8.2.  The Law on Public Tenders 2004
The Law on Public  Tenders  (LPT)  was first  introduced in 2004.  It  regulates  the
provision of goods and services to the public (the State) by private firms. In many
cases these are large construction projects, such as highways, dams, bridges, etc., the
completion of which is contracted out to private construction companies. According
to  LPT  2004,  the  process  of  transfer  of  the  permission  to  construct  is  not
straightforward. The civil service (the employer)7 has to organise an auction of offers
submitted  by prospective  contractors  interested  in  the  completion  of  the  project.
Before an auction is convened, the employer (the civil service or the State) specifies
a list of criteria for eligibility of participation and the criteria according to which
offers will be considered for selection. Some of the criteria offers have to meet are
the price range for carrying out of the announced public project and essentially any
other  criteria  the  employer  deems  important  to  ensure  a  quality  service.  Once
prospective constructors are allowed to participate in the bid their offer is weighed by
the employer in terms of price and quality and are considered for selection as the
prime contractor for the completion of a highway section, public hospital, school,
etc., is made.
A number of the respondents from the present study, short of a consensus, argued that
public  tenders,  particularly  in  the  construction  sector,  demonstrate  the  exchange
mechanism between insider groups and the ruling party. In a recent study conducted
by the Chamber of Bulgarian Constructors (KSB) and the Higher School for Agri-
Business  and  Regional  Development  (VUARR),  a  predominant  observation  of
construction  firm  owners  is  that  firms  with  direct  party  access  tend  to  locally
dominate the market for construction tenders (VUARR 2014). The study was carried
out  in  the  form  of  a  survey  among  the  construction  firms  in  the  Bulgarian
construction  sector  in  2014.  According  to  the  report,  the  second  (37.5%)  most
7 According to article 7 from LPT, employers of public tenders is essentially the civil service, such as
ministries, agencies, local level administration. 
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important  difficulty  that  Bulgarian  construction  firms  face  is  the  disloyal
competition,  i.e.  the  firms  that  win  public  tenders  thanks  to  party  political
interference in their favour (2014: 16-17, original emphasis):
The fact that the larger category investors are not private […] places the
larger sector before the larger problem of corruption, the dictation of
foreign and/or those firms having political protection and investors, as
well as disloyal competition (using non-market means to gain advantage
over competition, sic). This is the position of more than one third of those
participated in the questionnaire. Part of the construct [ion firms] and
experts describe classical cases of eventual competition elimination with
“specific” criteria, which decrease the possible competitors to a few. [9]
That in turn allows for the easier arrival to cartel agreements.
The report states that a dominant position among construction firm owners is that
political parties interfere in favour of party insider groups to the effect that the latter
become  disproportionate  construction  tender  winners.  This  is  worded  above  as
corruption and  “those  firms  having  political  protection”  (VUARR  2014:  16).
Towards  the  end,  the  quotation  above  also  indicates  that  the  most  often  used
mechanism for tacit pre-selection (of party insider groups) is the careful wording of
the eligibility criteria for participation at the auction. Limiting the number of eligible
participants, the report concludes, leads to cartel agreements among them. Finally,
the report also notes that foreign firms also exercise diktat on domestic competition,
although this is not elaborated. 
The VUARR report, however, has a main weakness, which is that it does not provide
any evidence that links the party in power and the outcomes of the public tender
auctions. The present study on Bulgarian parentela contributes to the VUARR project
by showing that this is a two-stage process. First, the party appoints the members in
the Public  Tender  Committee (PTC), which publicly announces the opening of a
competition for the best construction offer of a given site and decides on the winning
tenders. And second, once the PTC is staffed with party loyal appointees, they then
limit  the  competition  among  firms  by the  careful  specification  of  the  eligibility
criteria for auction participation. Ultimately, however, once both stages are complete,
then we can observe a parentela formation.
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However, a large part of the above explanation rests on the understanding of what the
report means by “classic cases of elimination of eventual competitors with “specific”
criteria, which decrease the possible competitors to a few” (VUARR 2014:16-17). In
order to understand the two-stage process, it has to be explained what those specific
criteria are in relation to public tenders and why are they significant in this case.
Therefore, before approaching the two-stage process, discussed in section 8.4, the
chapter  will  discuss  the  question  of  specific  criteria  that  limit  the  public  tender
competition.
8.3.  Public  Tender  Contractor  Pre-Selection
Mechanism
Essentially  the  VUARR  report  above  relates  to  the  criteria  that  govern  firms’
eligibility for participation at  public tenders and the consideration of their  offers.
Making the eligibility criteria more stringent is the prime mechanism for the covert
pre-selection of intended tender winners. Of particular interest  here is the second
version dated 28.08.2013 (the first one being on 26.07.2013) of the Motives i that
support  and  explain  the  LPT  October  2014  amendments  which  bear  reference
number  302-01-14 and in  effect  from 01.10.2014.  (Unless  stated  otherwise,  the
section refers to these amendments with the phrase “the amendments to LPT”.) The
second version states that the LPT amendments are also motivated by the decision of
the  Bulgarian  Commission  for  the  Protection  of  Competition  (CPC)  570  /
20.05.2010, which also lists the forms of manipulation of public tenders which LPT
permitted due to its imperfection.  
The  CPC  Decision  570/20.05.2010  classifies  public  tender  manipulation  in  two
categories:  public (employer)  and  private (contractor)  (CPC570/20.05.2010:
paragraph  9).  According  to  the  CPC Decision  employer-related  forms  of  public
tender  manipulation  could  serve  as  a  mechanism  to  pre-select  party  insiders.
Paragraph  10  (CPC570/20.05.2010)  states  that  the  free  competition  of  offers
submitted by wannabe contractors can be inhibited by actions, inactions and legal
acts that are within the legal purview of the employer, which in the LPT case is the
223
civil  service  (discussed  below).  However,  Paragraph  11  (CPC570/20.05.2010)
directly describes how employers can pre-determine the grant of tenders to desired
firms (or party insiders as this chapter argues) (emphasis added):
The public form of tender competition circumscription could be realised
by the employers themselves through  the introduction of discriminatory
conditions and requirements on the participants at  the start  of  public
tender  assignation  procedure,  which  narrows  the  circle  of  potential
contractors,  creates  unjustified  access  barriers  to  candidates  or
favouritises in advance a specific market participant. The violation of the
principle of free and loyal competition is possible when some applicants
are unlawfully decreed permission to enter the auction and their offers
considered when in fact they should have been disqualified.
In other words, the criteria of eligibility to participate in a tender and the criteria
according to which each offer will be assessed for assignation can be worded and
devised  in  a  way so  as  to  fit  a  desired  firm.  As  it  will  be  demonstrated  below,
respondents from this study and that issued by the industry report a ubiquity of this
practice as of 2014.
Employer-related  forms  of  contractor  pre-selection  are  also  observable  in  the
adjoining paper produced by the CPC to be read with decision 570ii. Unfortunately,
that document does not explicitly identify public (employer) forms of competition
disablement leading to pre-selection of intended constructors. Instead, it features a
list of circumstances that might arise at public tenders and thus be indicative of either
public  or  private  malpractice.   In  the  list  of  manipulation  indicators,  the  focus
appears  to  be  on  indicators  related  to private forms  of  competition  limitation,
although one could still  discern circumstances of employer-based forms of public
tenders manipulation:
1. […] an offer is submitted by a candidate who is publicly known to be
unable to execute the tender. […]
On this note both Rumenov and Dobromirov mentioned in their experience cases
where firms with background of market operation in another sector win tenders for
road constructions.
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The next indicator relates to cases where candidates do not enquire for nor include
the necessary technical specification for the execution of the project:
3. One or a few of the enterprises who have submitted offers, have not
required from the employer the technical specifications on the object of
the tender or their offers lack such data that would normally follows to
be included […]
At first  sight,  this  scenario  is  also  fitting  a  case  where  private  participants  have
agreed in advance who would win the bid (i.e. formed a cartel) and so, all save for
one submit technically flawed offers. However, in cases where a firm lacking such
technical  specifications  is  selected  as  the  main  contractor  that  does  indicate
suspicion.
Point 30 offers the clearest case of public form of competition disablement:
30. Given participants regularly win the procedures for the assignation
of a specific type and volume of public tenders, or procedures opened by
specific  employers,  or  in  specific  geographical  regions  often  win  the
same participants from the market, although there is evidence of real and
potential competition.
Accordingly, employer-caused pre-selection at public tenders is most visible where
there  is  co-variation  between  the  success  rate  of  a  given  constructor  and  given
employers, job, or region, particularly in the face of proper competition. In any case,
the  presence  of  this  document and the  practices  outlined therein  is  based on the
hitherto experience with public tenders in Bulgaria. Now that it is explained how
specifying the criteria for participation at public auctions can limit the number of
participants, the following section 8.4 demonstrates how political parties are still in
the  position  to  employ  this  practice,  with  the  October  2014  LPT  amendments,
through the Public Tender Committees.
8.4.  Scope  of  Contractor  Pre-Selection  at  Public
Tenders
Based on the personal experiences of the respondents in the VUARR (2014: 76-104)
study, the VUARR report  demonstrates that the prime (if not the only) source of
manipulation of the public tenders lies with public bodies that skew the criteria for
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participation so to narrow the competitors down to the intended ones. Commissioned
by the Bulgarian Construction Chamber, the VUARR report is representative of the
construction sector in Bulgaria, with about 350 surveys featuring open and close-
ended questions (VUARR 2014: 5-11). While the report does not feature a technical
discussion  on  any  statistical  representativity  measurements,  given  the  target
audience,  certainly  the  overlap  of  its  qualitative  data  with  this  study’s  results
mutually reinforces the reliability of both studies. The VUARR study reveals that
construction  company  owners  mostly  complain  that  administrative  bodies  that
organise construction tender auctions skew the selection criteria in the interest  of
party insiders. VUARR respondents make no relationship identification between the
employer and the contractor, but between the political party and the contractor, via
the public body organising the tenders. 
The results of the VUARR study are a clear testament of the unimpeded practice of
pre-selection of party political insiders entirely according to the logic of public forms
of competition manipulation at public tenders, specified in paragraph 11 of the CPC
decision CPC570/20.05.2010 discussed above. The responses are too voluminous for
proper analysis but a few quotations succinctly summarise the above. For example,
some respondent state:
Sometimes it happens so that the conditions are so specific to one firm
that  the  only  thing  missing  in  the  [selection]  criteria  is  its  name.
(VUARR 2014: 104)
The construction sector is hostage to politicians. (VUARR 2014: 77)
Real  market  competition  is  shifted  aside  by  the  fight  for  maximal
proximity to party political tenders. (VUARR 2014: 104)
The created proximity between politics and the construction sector limits
free competition. (VUARR 2014: 104)
There is an accelerated liquidation of small construction firms through
LPT and  more  specifically  the  introduced  criterion  of  “economically
most  suitable  offer-technical  offer”.  The  options  are:  remaining  of  a
small number of big firms that dictate on the market. Which ones would
they  be  depends  not  on  their  technological  and  technical  or  cadre
capabilities,  but on whether their owner is in close relations with the
ruling political party. (VUARR 2014: 101)
Overall, however, the question of the public forms of manipulation of public tenders
is largely evaded in the conclusion of the report above. It is surprising, then, how the
report  does  not  discuss  at  any considerable  length  the  practice  of  administrative
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(public)  pre-selection  of  party  insiders,  particularly  in  the  presence  of  such  an
abundance of responses from construction work owners, who claim on the basis of
their experience, that the selection criteria public tender committees is skewed so to
fit only the profile of the intended (party insider) firm.
Given  the  available  data  within  the  VUARR 2014  report,  its  conclusion  quoted
earlier (8.2) is imprecise because corruption, disloyal competition and party political
protection are equivalent to the notion that in far too many cases the auction winners
are  also  the  informal  party insiders.  The VUARR respondents  note  the  keyword
corruption,  but  nowhere  do  they  associate  that  with  any  forms  of  private
manipulation  of  public  tenders.  To the  extent  the  competition  is  affected  by the
actions  of private  firms,  which is  what  may appear  to  be referred to  as disloyal
competition, VUARR  respondents  associate  that  with  the  practice  of  main
contractors not paying what is due to the sub-contractors in the hierarchy of project
contractors. There is virtually nothing in the respondent interview excerpts in the
VUARR (2014)  report  that  indicates  construction  firms  complained from cartels,
which is along the logic of private forms of manipulation (CPC 570/20.05.2010). As
for  cartels and  foreign  firms,  there  is  virtually  no  mentioning  of  those  in  the
interview responses summary in the Annex to the report (VUARR 2014: 76-104).
That  is  to  say, the  argument  that  VUARR respondent  firms  also  complain  from
cartels and other foreign firms is unfounded, as no such references could be found in
the  Annex  of  respondent  quotations.  Therefore,  the  use  of disloyal  competition,
corruption and foreign  firms misleads  from  the  main  problem:  party  political
interference with the principle of competition with public tenders. In addition, the
gentle  mismatch  between  the  responses  and  their  interpretation  suggests  that  the
authors of the report had engaged in some degree of auto-censorship.
In unison with the VUARR (2014) respondents,  those from the present  study on
parentela are overwhelming in their identification of political parties as the source of
public tenders malformation. There is no deviation here from the view that political
parties attempt to pre-select party insiders at public tenders in order to reciprocate for
latter's earlier campaign contributions. A considerable number of respondents argued
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ruling parties are in the position to control the decisions of PTCs. The difference was
in the nuances of the argument. Two active policy-makers at the time of interview,
respondent Hadzhiev and Gospodinov, explained that insiders expect public tenders
or appointments in the state administration in return for their campaign resources.
The idea that public tenders are exchanged for access is at the heart of Gospodinov's
position:
R: So, we start from here (inability of parties to meet the actual
costs, sic) and we finish with the sources.  Sources [of financing]  are
clear: the business [for parties], the big Public Tenders [for business].
We (on behalf of industrial sector) are trying to win Public Tenders.  At
present this is the only source of income for business.  When there were
big foreign investors in the recent past, there was not such a high level of
pressure, but now, things are serious.  So, parties, coming to power, there
is nothing for free.  Once you have taken the money, you have to give it
back.  And this is done through state power (government).
Respondent Bachvarov directly admitted that party political donors approach parties
with the intention to exchange that for public tenders and appointments:
 R So, the business groups in Bulgaria take part in the entire chain
of conduct of politics in this state. From one angle, business participates
as  early  as  the  formation  of  the  branches  of  power, which  is  at  the
electoral  campaign,  through  sponsorship  of  various  political  powers,
and in another way – in the formation of the future government. Very
often specific ministerial and high positioned civil servants are appointed
under  the  influence  of  business  structures.  And  third,  they  (business)
participate in the process of real politics, which is primarily through the
distribution of public tenders, where every business structure attempts to
tear as big a share (contract, sic) as they can for themselves.
As the respondent elaborated further, business groups see campaigns as a form of
investment.  If the party becomes incumbent,  then the group should expect public
tender  in  return.  Respondent  Gospodinov, spoke  with  particular  reference  to  the
entire construction sector:
R: Our aim is to try and decrease subjectivism (i.e. administrative
pre-selection of  intended tender  winner, sic)  to minimum. We tried  in
various ways. One was through the direct introduction of the German
legislation  [...  or]  with  very  simple  things,  such  as  everything  to  be
uploaded online on the day of opening of the offers. However, we were
met with a stark resistance, because there is a manipulation between the
process of announcing the criteria and the process of the opening of the
offers. So, the process of opening of the technical criteria [for the job]
lasts until the offers are opened. There is a gap of 2 to 3 weeks between
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these two processes, when manipulation could be done, such as cross-
checking the prices in the offers.
S You mentioned some resistance...
R The resistance comes from the administration which does not
want to make the procedures public--
S Why?
R /laughs/ because for the reasons I have just told you. So that the
ability  to  manipulate  the  end  result  remains.  This  is  done  through
transparent envelopes and all other ways, nearly criminal. I am telling
you like this but there are colleagues claim for such cases.
S It is curious for me, how is it that the administration is doing that on
own initiative or under influence from elsewhere
RWell,  here  things  are  intertwined.  The  administration  says  that  the
European rules allow it, which is a manipulation and a lie. Here is the
connectedness between the administration and the people who rule at the
moment  and the  entire  politics  is  towards  directing  [the  outcome of]
public  tenders.  Overall,  the  general  solution  to  this  problem  is
transparency,  internet  transparency  and  every  step  of  the  process  be
announced  publicly.  There  is  no  single  impediment  for  that  to  be
achieved.  [...]  but  it  is  not  happening  [...]  they  are  voted  in  the
committees but do not enter into effect.
The contribution of the present parentela study to the respondents' position VUARR
(2014), that public tender committees pre-select party insider firms, is in that the
statements  come  from  respondents  who  at  the  time  of  interviews  were  active
politicians and civil servant experts. The respondents from the parentela study only
add to the validity of those from the VUARR (2014) report.
In any case a detailed comparison of the answers between the respondents is hardly
necessary.  Respondents  Donchev,  Kirilov,  Bachvarov,  Gospodinov,  Zlatarov,
Rumenov, Dobromirov, Varbanov, and  Petrov  spoke  with  particular  reference  to
public tenders in relation to insider groups securing insider access as a result of an
exchange with ruling political parties. Arguably the more important statement is from
Donchev who argued that  the  law is  deliberately imprecise so as  to  allow party
insiders and the party itself to be able to tilt the outcome of public tenders in favour
of party insiders.  This is  also another confirmation of the argument that the core
weakness as of 01.10.2014 is party interference. Speaking as a director of a peak
construction  association  prior  01.10.2014,  Gospodinov  stated  that  LPT’s
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imperfections allowed for party appointed experts took part in the PTCs decisions,
however, without elaborating what the process is.
However,  another  missing  link  in  the  analysis  of  this  case  is  that  between  the
political party and the actual application of the mechanism of pre-selecting the tender
winner.  The  presence  of  discriminatory  criteria  that  leaves  only  one  suitable
competitor at public tenders does not alone constitute a party political intervention,
for  the  selection  of  competitors  for  public  tenders  does  not  directly  connect  to
political parties. Even if there is a uniform choir of voices in the VUARR report
(2014) saying “party political interference”, the actual link is still missing. Neither
the CPC Decision mentioned above, nor the VUARR 2014, nor the respondents from
the present study elaborate how political parties pre-select the party insider firms at
public  tenders.  They  provide  no  evidence  linking  the  malformation  of  the
participation criteria for public tenders with political parties. The following section
will address namely that: how political parties intervene administratively in order to
covertly pre-select the party insider firm as the winner of public tender auctions. 
8.5.  Party  Interference  in  the  Public  Tender
Committees and Contractor Pre-Selection
Political  parties  could  pre-select  party insider  firms  at  public  tender  auctions  by
shaping the membership of the administrative body that decides the winning tenders:
the Public Tender Committee (PTC). These committees are specified in art  34(1)
from the LPT and they are established by the state employer, i.e. the civil service.
Overall, the members of the PTCs have to administer the conduct of public tenders:
from the formal announcement of the prospective auction to the final selection of the
winning  bid,  and  the  maintenance  of  necessary  legal  or  administrative
communication with third bodies,  such as trade associations, EU institutions,  and
ministries. 
The controversy around the PTCs is about who will sit as their members, because
those who do define the criteria for participation and assessment of the offers made
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by prospective constructors. The parentela forms when the PTCs are predominantly
staffed with party political appointees, because those are in the position to pre-select
the party insider auction participant. While the October 2014 amendments provide
for non-political experts to sit at such committees, the legal provisions are in fact
permissive  of  the  continued  political  appointments  practice.  First,  there  is  no
obligation on part of the employer to staff PTCs with external experts, and second,
there are no criteria to assess the professional capacity of those experts, appointed by
the employer to sit at the PTCs.  This means that specifying that the Agency on
Public Tenders has to maintain a list of experts does not necessarily limit political
interference  because  determining  who  counts  as  an  expert  in  the  eyes  of  the
politically appointed civil service is a matter of party political convenience and not a
matter  of  rules  and  licenses  confirming  that  those  individuals  truly  are  experts.
Staffing  a  PTC  with  political  appointees  therefore  allows  insider  pre-selection
through targeted definition of the participation and “winning tender” criteria to fit the
profile  of  the  party  insider  participant,  i.e.  public  form  of  tender  manipulation
described above. All of this ultimately relates back to the VUARR 2014 report above
which posited that a major impediment to the public tender auctions execution is the
party interference in favour of certain firms. The present section explains how this is
done.
Let  us  delve  in  the  evidence.  A recent  report  by  Bulgaria’s intelligence  agency
DANS, presented by Mr Kalin Krastev concerning  oblast  8Shumen, states that the
careful  selection  of  the  members  of  the  PTC facilitates  the  tacit  contractor  pre-
selection. In his summary to the public (Shumenska Zarya, (40/12420)/27.02.2015,
p2) he confirms that the main mechanism of pre-selecting an intended contractor
offer is through the malformation of the criteria for participation and the criteria for
assessing offer feasibility. However, he also notes that this is the result of political
parties influencing the work of the PTC, which sets the criteria for eligibility and
main contractor selection. In his words (emphasis added):
Interconnectedness  exists  between  the  employer, contractor  and  sub-
contractors where in many cases; the servants on a governmental post
8 Oblast is the largest regional unit, which consists of smaller units called obshtina (sg; -ni, pl.).
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exert  influence on the selection of  specific  constructor or consortium.
[...]
A defining factor is that the committees are convened by servants of the
respective  administration  which  are  directly  subordinate  to  and  find
themselves in hierarchical dependence on persons holding governmental
posts.
The DANS report then clearly corresponds to one of the main complaints stated in
the  VUARR  report  above,  that  political  parties  interfere  in  the  market  for
construction work in the interest of party insiders. The DANS report above explains
this to be the result of parties shaping the staff and decisions of PTCs. 
This argument, however, becomes increasingly more tentative as we move further
away  from  2014.  The  time-period  the  DANS  report  and  the  VUARR  (2014)
interview responses refer to is the status quo before the 1st October 2014 amendments
of LPT. The Motives behind the LPT October 2014 amendments also state that a
common complaint among groups (those had sent written statements in response to
the consultations) was that there previously had been a strong political interference in
the work of the civil service tasked to carry out the public tenders (LPT Motives
2013a: 3; LPT Motives 2013b: 3). This further suggests that the conclusions from the
DANS report above are more pertinent to the time-frame before the October 2014
amendments.
Yet,  the generalizability of the DANS 2015 report might extend past the October
2014 benchmark. Political parties are still able to interfere in the work of the PTC
even with the LPT (302-01-14) amendments, which came in effect in October 2014.
The first version of the motives to the LPT changes openly recognises that a major
objective of the proposed amendments is to sever a party’s interference in the work
of the PTCs (2013a: 18-19, section IV.2.3). Surprisingly, the section IV.2.3 is entirely
missing form the second version (28.08.2013). This sudden omission indicates either
a surprising lack of confidence in the effectiveness of the intended measures to curb
party influence or possibly an attempt to hide that conflict. The latter is namely about
who will  sit at  the PTCs: experts  sent from sectoral peak associations or experts
appointed by party political civil service appointees. 
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In his written statement on the LPT 302-01-14 amendments, Docent Doctor Gancho
Popov  (Popov  written  statement,  2013,  reference  167/27.09.2013)  argues  that
ultimately the party is  still  in  the position to pre-determine the outcome of PTC
decisions. Popov’s critique is that facilitated by a chain of political appointments, the
absence of obligation on employers to use experts from the list of external experts
(nominated by trade associations) in the PTC allows the administration to continue to
use  civil  servants  who are  political  appointees  when preparing  for  public  tender
procedures and who in turn will design the assessment and participation criteria in a
way that will fit the profile of the party insider firm (section 8.3) (Popov 2013: 1-3).
Another factor that enables the use of politically appointed civil servants is that LPT
does not specify the criteria that determines who is qualified as an expert to sit at the
PTC. Therefore, state-appointed experts are an extension of the party in power. This
is  entirely  consistent  with  former  minister  Petkov’s  position  earlier  that  any
individual, regardless of the expertise they hold is never free from the party that has
appointed them. Popov argues therefore that politically appointed civil servants will
always seek ways to recruit experts from the rank and file of the state administration,
when public tenders have to be organised. This is facilitated by the absence of any
provisions in the LPT, which enforce objective criteria for any expert appointments.
As it stands, experts sponsored by the civil service are left to the discretion of civil
service directors to determine their expert status (2013: 2).  
He rests his critique on the interplay of articles 8(7) and 20(1) of the LPT October
2014 amendments, although for completeness, one also has to add the importance of
articles 34, 19(2)8, 20(1) from LPT and 19(1-4) from Law on Administration. Article
19(1) from LPT clearly states that the director of the agency that regulates public
tenders is a political appointee: ‘the Agency on Public Tenders (APT) is directed and
represented  by  an  executive  director,  who  is  appointed  by  the  Minister  of  the
Economy, Energy and Tourism.’ This demonstrates the party-civil service link. The
party-public  tender  link  is  evident  in  article  19(2)8  which  states  that  it  is  the
politically appointed executive director who has to maintain a general list of external
experts:
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[T]he Executive Director of the agency creates, maintains and updates a
list of external experts for participation in the preparation and conduct
of procedures for granting of public tenders 
In addition, article 20(1)1 regulates where experts could be recruited from: the trade
association of relevant expertise to the tender, the civil service and any individuals
who consider themselves as experts in the respective field of the tender auction:
The list according to art. 19(2)8 includes persons who have professional
competence,  connected  with  the  […]  public  tender,  and:  1.  are
nominated  by  professional  associations  and  organizations  from  the
respective sector or from bodies according to art. 19(2-4) from the Law
on the Administration, with a notice of their professional competence, or
2. Individually have submitted such a claim […]
In other words, the APT director is a party appointee, who in turn can make political
appointments of experts. Those experts are then used to formulate the specifications
public  tender  offers  have  to  meet  in  order  to  be  allowed  to  compete  and  be
considered at the auction. Article 8(7) of LPT states that prospective employers have
to include experts in the execution and assessment of public tenders, where if they do
not have any such experts at their disposal, they can call external ones: 
In preparing for the procedure of granting a public tender, employers are
obliged to  provide for  the preparation of  technical  specifications,  the
methods  of  assessment  of  offers  in  the  documentation  for  tender
participation […] at least one expert who has professional competence
connected with the tender object. When the employer does not have at
their disposal [civil] servants, who can meet the professional competence
requirements, then he provides external experts from the list specified in
[19(2)8]  
The crux of the matter is essentially here. According to Popov, the law implies that it
is up to prospective employers to determine whether they have or not the necessary
experts  to  carry out the public  tener (2013: 1-3).   In Popov's  parlance,  these are
appointed experts (2013: 1-3): 
If the employers have an interest not to observe the suggestions in art.
8(7),  [they  can  appoint]  a  convenient  for  them  expert,  [who]  will
establish criteria which will  only be met  by the desired public tender
candidate. […] We are left [to depend on] those who will nominate the
experts  to  forego  their  own  personal  interests  and  to  demonstrate
righteousness in carrying out their mission.
In  other  words  political  appointments  in  the  civil  service  facilitate  the  covert
selection  of  the  party insiders  at  public  tenders.  In  the  absence  of  any formally
stipulated criteria for assessing one's level of expertise, there is nothing to prevent a
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prospective employer to appoint his subordinates as “experts” in the preparation and
execution of public tenders. Ultimately, because of being dependent on those who
have appointed  them,  those tasked to  oversee and select  the winning tender  will
develop such criteria for tender participation and bid assessment, which will narrow
the outcome more or less to the only one participant (firm), as desired by the party
bosses.
The  only clarification  one  could  make  to  the  above  is  to  add that  this  dynamic
materialises  in  the  Public  Tender  Committee  (PTC)  which  is  the  actual  body of
experts  and  servants  that  presides  over  tender  auctions  and  selects  the  winning
tenders.  Article 34(1) states that ‘The employer appoints a committee in order to
conduct the public tender.’ Articles 34(2-3) also specify that the membership of the
PTC has to be at least 50% manned by experts and if those are not available, those
should  be  recruited  as  per  article  19(2)8.  And  it  is  exactly  here  where  Popov's
dynamics above take place.  Employers convening a PTC determine whether they
have the necessary experts amongs their staff to carry out the public tender, without
having any obligation on include external experts. In other words, a party’s ability to
interfere  in  the  work  of  PTCs  allows  it  to  pre-select  desired  groups  as  main
contractors.  This means that articles 20(1), 19(2)8 from LPT (October 2014) and
articles 19(1-4) from the Law on Administration allow the party in power to control
the membership of  the PTCs by first  appointing the head of the central  or  local
executive structure and then by specifically allowing the same political appointees to
make their own appointments to staff the PTCs. 
Despite the critical tone above, there are a few points that need to be aired. First,
article  20  from LPT above  is  a  step  in  the  right  direction.  LPT  versions  until
01.07.2014 deliberately or not overlooked the forms of extra-administrative, citizen
control over the work of the committee, which alone is a positive development. The
LPT (October 2014) version of article 20 is re-instated. In fact, earlier versions of the
law did not address the problems posed by selecting the members of PT committees,
nor did they always feature an article 20. This is the other formal acknowledgement,
next to the first versions of the Motives to LPT (2013a), Popov and Mr Krastev, that
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party  political  influence  on  public  tender  outcomes  manifests  itself  in  the  PTC
decisions. It also has to be conceded that even despite their best intentions political
parties may not always find the proper experts to staff the PTCs. The provisions, in
fact, generously assume that there is an ample reserve of relevant experts outside the
civil service, who are ready to staff the myriads of PTCs on the double.  While the
question in this  section has been how political  parties intervene in the interest  of
party insiders, the following section 8.6 discusses why groups seek to do that.
8.6.  Parentela as a Market Advantage
Evidence suggests that all groups who have gained insider status have done so in
order to ensure a better economic standing for themselves. Many respondents from
the present study reported increasing difficulties staying afloat in a market that is
now  in  decline.  The  chairman  of  the  Chamber  of  Bulgarian  Constructors,  Mr
Svetoslav Glosov, announced on 23.03.2015 that 80% of the work undertaken by
firms rests on public tenders (2013). This means that, Bulgarian construction work
firms  remain  dependent  on  financing  sources  that  are  subject  to  party  political
control, given the PTCs above. Respondent Donchev noted that the financial crisis
since  2008 has  left  many firms with a  choice:  announce  bankruptcy or  seek the
cooperation of ruling political  parties. In fact, the number one impediment in the
sector, reported by construction work firms in the VUARR 2014 report, is the bad
economic  state  of  the  market.  This  means,  firms  as  of  2014  report  significant
economic and financial difficulties (VUARR 2014: 14). 
Therefore, this section argues that this forces firms to make a choice of existence on
the brink of collapse or to fight for party favours. The evidence is that firms choose
the latter. In a zero-sum game, party outsiders have two options: to go bankrupt or
further  seek  closer  cooperation  with  the  party in  power,  reinforcing  thereby this
vicious  circle.  The  answer  of  Respondents  Kirilov  and  Dobromirov  in  particular
reveal the gradual concentration of resources in party insiders at the expense of the
rest of the market participants, whereas per Dobromirov:
R[…] they hold everything, particularly the public tenders. I am working
99%  public  tenders  and  the  percentage  of  independent  investors  in
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Bulgaria  is  very, very  small  compared to  six,  seven years  ago,  when
private firms were booming. But this is no more. And they used to build
resorts by the sea […] but this is dead now. […] And the relationship
with the ruling party, it is all based on the public tenders. […] But what
happened with us, the small fry in the sector, is that the larger sites are
given to a defined circle of firms. That is it. These are around the party
political power. There have always been such circles but earlier there
was [an unwritten principle that], “we should leave some tenders for the
others”9. Give or take, nearly every one observed this thing, but during
the  mandate  of  the  previous  government,  there  were  no  such
considerations. [Tenders to the tune of]  one and a half billion (leva?)
were spread among ten firms. That is it. These are some strange public
tenders. […] Then, I also gave up participating when I saw those firms
at the auctions.
This  is  remarkably close to  the position of a respondent  from the VUARR 2014
study,  that  'Real  market  competition  is  shifted  aside  by  the  fight  for  maximal
proximity to party political tenders.' (VUARR 2014: 104). The sections so far have
described  the  process  of  party  political  intervention  in  the  work  of  civil  service
public tender committees and how that helps predetermine party insider groups to
receive public tenders. The following section, 8.7, however, will operationalise this
description in as a causal parentela model. 
8.7.  Public  Tender  Committees  in  the  Construction
Sector and the Parentela
The present case of Bulgaria's Law on Public Tenders 2004 (LPT) demonstrates that
groups'  prime  motivation  in  seeking  a  parentela  relationship  is  to  oust  the
competition. The economic downturn in the construction sector has forced groups to
seek party political cooperation in order to improve their own market standing. This
means: small-scale businesses seek party political protection in order to survive; mid-
size businesses to  gain advantage against  the competition,  while  big business,  to
maintain  a  monopolistic  market  standing.  Businesses  from all  shapes  and  sizes,
9но по-рано имаше едно такова, тва за нашите да има, ама и да има за другите също
да работят, горе-долу всички се съобразяваха с тва нещо,
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therefore, attempt to survive at the expense of the competition through an exchange
with political parties.
At the same time, political parties use the ambiguities of LPT to honour their side of
the exchange relationship. In the case of construction sector LPT 2004, provision of
access to the insider takes the form of the political party interference in the work of
the  Public  Tender  Committee  that  decides  which  contractor  companies  will  be
granted the given public tender. As the case demonstrates, the party insider groups10
tend to win far more tenders than their  competition.  This is  possible because the
party interferes in the work of the PTC through political appointments and deliberate
ambiguities in the LPT 2004. A party’s prime motivation to cooperate with insider
groups  is  to  secure  funds  for  future  campaigns.  A secondary  motivation  is  also
observable,  though  a  bit  less  pronounced,  stems  from the  logic  of  molecule  of
conversion.  Better  observable  in  chapter  9,  parties  could  also  be  motivated  to
cooperate with insiders with a view of converting the policy-making access that they
provide into economic capital for the setup of party-controlled businesses.
Following the process tracing approach, however, it is clear that this relationship is
not that straightforward. The parentela forms gradually, as opposed to in a single
strike. Its formation happens on a number of causal stages, or causal chains. Taken
together, these stages reveal a chain of dependent (DV) and independent variables
(IV), as well as intervening variables (IntV), which are responsible for the parentela
formation in the market for construction public tenders. Figure 4 (p221) summarises
the chain of causal relationships that collectively constitute a parentela.  Figure 4 also




(1-9) a reference number to a box from the diagram
Also  note  in  the  diagram  below  that  because  the  process  is  a  chain  of  causal
relationships,  some  DVs  are  also  IVs  because  they  in  turn  exert  an  effect  on
10 Any firm or a collection of firms, that may belong to an oligarch, involved formally or informally
in policy-making are seen as groups
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consequent variables, e.g. elements 5 and 7 from the diagram. In the commentary
that follows figure 4, a reference system is used, where each variable is referred to its
respective location box in the diagram, denoted with “(variable type, box number)”,
e.g. (IV, 3). 
A declining construction work market (IV, box number 1 in Figure 4) forces firms
(groups) to seek negotiations (DV, 5) with the ruling party, with a view to improve
their market standing. This is compounded by the fact that construction firms are
heavily  dependent  on  public  tenders  (IntV, 2).  Simultaneously,  a  ruling  political
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Figure 4 Parentela Formation Process in the LPT Case
party’s campaign fund deficiency (IV, 3) also causes it to seek out groups in order to
exchange its  access to policy making against campaign funds.  Though much less
pronounced, another reason why ruling parties also seek out groups for negotiations
is the logic of the molecule of conversion (IV, 4), where party’s access to policy-
making  is  converted  to  business  capital  at  party’s  disposal  for  the  purpose  of
sustainable source of funds. This is more clearly visible in chapter 9. Both sets of
Independent and Intervening Variables (1-4, Figure 4) above ultimately lead to an
episode  of  party-group  negotiations  (DV, 5).  Facilitated  by  group’s  qualities  to
assume insider status (IntV, 6 (also Chapter 6)), the successful negotiations (IV, 5)
force the party to meet her side of the bargain, hence party intervention in the civil
service  (DV, 7).  This  intervention  is  not  an  end  in  itself  (IV, 7)  but  leads  to
interference in the work of the Public Tender Committee (PTC) (DV, 9), whose task
is  to  impartially decide which public  tender  offer will  win the contract.  In other
words, facilitated by the ability to make party loyal political appointments in the PTC
(IntV, 8), the party engineers the selection of the offer submitted by the party insider
group (DV, 9). 
In essence and except for the very first IVs (market decline and campaign funds), all
of the above causal relationships and intervening variables reflect the characteristics
of the parentela. Cooperative network dynamics: this is evident in fact that there is a
form of exchange between the group and the party, which is locked in elements 5, 6
and 9.  Balanced power ratio:  this  is  implied by the fact  that the party in power
reciprocates  a  favour  to  the  insider  group  (element  9).  Group  insider  status  is
expressed by elements 5 and 6, where a group is given access to directly negotiate
with the ruling party, and as a result of the group meeting the requirements for being
an insider group (element 6) the party seeks to reciprocate.  Party primary venue is
evident in the group first seeking to enter direct negotiations with the ruling party (5),
and then have its interests met following party’s bureaucratic intervention (7, 8, 9).
The fact that the ruling party intervenes in the work of the civil service, or the Public
Tender Committee, to be precise, indicates that the party-group relationship spans
from  the  party  into  the  civil  service.  The  significance  of  the  Public  Tender
Committees is that they are part of the civil service structure and they decide the
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winders of construction tender auctions. The case demonstrates that through the use
of political appointees facilitated by the Law on Public Tenders 2004 (7, 8) the party
in  power  is  capable  of  interfering  in  the  work of  the  PTC,  thus  informally pre-
determining the party insider group as the winner of a given construction tender (9).
8.8.  Conclusion
The purpose of the present chapter was to demonstrate a typical case of the parentela,
which  follows  La  Palombara’s original  description  of  the  relationship.  The  case
demonstrates  the  parentela  with  the  controversy of  who staffs  the  Public  Tender
Committees.  First,  according  to  the  Law  on  Public  Tenders,  employers  have  to
appoint  experts  to  PTCs  with  expertise  in  the  field  of  the  public  tender.  If  the
employer organising the public tender is unable to find any from the list of intra-
institutional experts that they are obliged to maintain, those have to be recruited from
the relevant sectoral peak association or from self-nominated individuals as experts.
The crux of the matter is that an employer will never find themselves in the position
to run out of experts simply because, in the absence of a clear criteria that specifies
who counts as an expert,  they can sign in  anyone in the list  of experts  for PTC
appointment. In doing so, party appointed experts specify the offer characteristics so
that  they  match  the  profile  of  the  desired,  party  insider,  firm.  This  form  of
bureaucratic interference is at the heart of the parentela in the case of construction
public tenders in this chapter. The following chapter will reveal a broader parentela-
related  dynamics,  also  including  additional  set  of  dependent  and  independent
variables.
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CHAPTER 9:  Parentela: Two Types or One?
9.1.  Introduction
Chapter 9 reveals a new party-group dynamic, which is similar to La Palombara’s
original parentela,  described in chapter 8.  While this  dynamic resembles a policy
network, it is better conceived as an add-on to La Palombara's parentela. Essentially,
a number of respondents reported that the party and its insider, or  parente,  in La
Palombara's parlance, engage in confrontation with party outsider groups. Similar to
La  Palombara's  original  parentela,  or  type  1,  for  short,  interviewees  argued  that
political parties engaged in what they described as prejudiced regulatory inspections.
These are forms of regulatory agency investigations of businesses, whose purpose is
to incapacitate targeted businesses under the guise of regular inspection, which, say,
the Fiscal Officers or Health and Safety inspectors would usually carry out. 
So, facilitated by political appointments, regulatory agencies would target the market
competitors  of  the party insiders  with  the intention  to  incapacitate  their  business
operations. This is simply a mechanism available to a party insider group to deal with
its market competition. Such  prejudiced inspections,  respondents claim, were also
used by political parties. For example, the business enterprises that constitute certain
interest groups that oppose certain governmental policies could be targets of such
inspections. Internal party dissenters, too, could be brought back in line with such
coercion,  if  those  have  own  businesses.  A third  use  of  prejudiced  inspections,
according to some, was simply extortion of some of the more lucrative businesses.
Some respondents argued that extra campaign funds could be generated when the
party approaches suitable candidates and offers them the opportunity to collaborate
in  a  public  tender.  In  that  case,  we  would  observe  a  public  tender  of  the  kind
described already in chapter 8. If the approached business entity refuses the offer,
they are punished with prejudiced inspections. It is this practice that is at the heart of
type 2 dynamics. 
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The main questions, then, are (1) whether the observed dynamic is essentially a new,
discrete network and (2) to what extent does it relate to policy-making at all? On the
first question, type 2 is best seen as an additional dynamic within and part of the
parentela policy network framework. At the core of both types lay the same party-
insider core, the parente (in La Palombara's parlance).  The dynamic which the initial
parentela  concept  referred to  was within the parente.  Given the present  research,
however, we are now able to observe one additional dynamic, between the parente
and outsiders. The addition of this new, second dynamic does not change the overall
concept (La Palombara's parentela) but merely expands it. Both types concern a form
of party interference in the work of the civil service. However, the only difference is
that the party in a type 1 interferes in the civil service in order to extract legislative
and  policy  benefits,  or  to  provide  deeper  access  to  its  party  insider  group.  For
example, the party can appoint a nominee of the insider group, or pressure its own
bureaucratic appointees to heed the interests of its insider. In type 2, however, while
the  party  also  intervenes  in  the  bureaucracy  in  the  interest  of  its  insider,  such
interference  takes  the  shape  of  aggressive  elimination  of  a  pre-selected  outsider
businesses through what respondents described as prejudiced regulatory inspections. 
On that last note, it then appears that this dynamic is unrelated to policy-making, and
by an extension, to policy networks. While type 2 was reported as a mechanism of
party  insiders  to  parry  their  market  competition,  a  number  of  respondents  cast
regulatory coercion  in  policy-making  light.  The party in  power  in  particular  can
resort to this practice in order to pressure into submission policy dissenters. Interest
groups that adamantly oppose a ruling party's (government's) policy can be coerced
informally  through  prejudiced  inspections.  Likewise,  internal  party  dissenters  or
otherwise opponents could be dealt with by targeting their businesses with prejudiced
inspections. All in all, type 2 dynamics can potentially be used in the policy-making
context, which means that this concept fills up the conceptual space between policy-
making and political malpractice.
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Respondents indicate three main causes for type 2 parentela. First, and common to
type 1 in chapter  8,  is  insider’s need for a better  market  standing or to beat  the
competition.  That  was  first  manifested  in  Chapter  8,  where  insiders  sought  to
dominate construction tenders. However, interviewees reveal that this could be done
by making one-sided offers to outsiders (an insider’s market competitors) of, say,
buying out their businesses. Alternatively, facilitated by political appointments, the
third option is to directly interfere in their business operations through prejudiced
regulatory  inspections. 
The second and third causes for type 2 dynamics relate to political parties. Given the
need for funds (for campaigns or otherwise), they too resort by making similar offers
to lucrative outsider businesses (groups),  and they, too, may be coupled with the
threat  of  prejudiced  regulatory  inspections,  thanks  to  practice  of  political
appointments.  Finally,  type  2  could  follow  from  party’s  attempts  at  coercing
dissenting internal  party members  or external  interest  groups.  Those who oppose
party’s policies, depending on the gravity of disagreement, may be pressured into
submission through incessant regulatory inspections.
Following  the  establishment  of  type  2,  the  present  chapter  also  discusses  the
implication  of  both  dynamics  for  Bulgarian  democracy.  While  at  first  sight  the
extended  parentela  types  of  behaviour  (type  1  and  2)  appear  to  be  cases  of
corruption,  the  available  evidence  suggests  that  these  dynamics  are  part  of  the
informal structure of the Bulgarian polity. The chapter looks at both dynamics from
micro, meso and macro perspective. On a micro perspective, both dynamics appear
as forms of corruption, while on a meso-level they appear as processes that lead to
social and economic imbalances. Then on a macro level both dynamics appear to
constitute an oligarchy. However, that is not entirely correct. There is no evidence of
a single, stable elite minority that has usurped all policy-making. Instead, we have a
number of competitive elites who occasionally are able to dominate policy-making
some  of  the  times  but  ultimately,  given  elections  and  prejudiced  regulatory
inspections,  are  in  a  constant  state  of  instability  and  unable  to  consolidate  an
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oligarchy. Therefore, both parentela dynamics together share oligarchic-like features
but do not constitute an oligarchic community.
In order to discuss the above, the chapter will precede as follows. Section 9.2 will
describe and define the second parentela dynamic. Section 9.3 will discuss the causes
for  type  2  in  more  details.  Section  9.4  will  discuss  the  validity  of  the  findings.
Section 9.5 will discuss the implications for Bulgarian democracy. Section 9.6. will
discuss  the  possibility  of  an  influence  coming  from  the  EU  instiutions,  before
concluding in section 9.7.
9.2.  Understanding Type 2 Parentela Dynamic
Type 2 parentela dynamic (also type 2 parentela, or simply type 2) could be better
understood when compared to La Palombara's original parentela dynamic, or simply,
type 1. In order to make such a comparison, the discovered type 2 dynamic in this
section is  “converted”  or  explained in  terms of  a  policy network,  employing the
network descriptors developed earlier  in the thesis.  The comparison reveals  great
similarities between type 2 and type 1, which indicate that type 2 is best classified as
an add-on dynamic, which is part of La Palombara's parentela policy network. This
new dynamic fills up the conceptual space between the original parentela relations
and political malpractice, without constituting a new discrete network type. If La
Palombara's parentela focused on the relations between the party and a privileged
group (insider),  type 2 parentela  (dynamics)  focuses  on the relations  between an
outsider with the party and its insider group combined (i.e. the parente).
The existence of a second dynamic was first detected in the answers of two of the
earlier respondents in the study: Golemanov and Kuzmanov. Quite remarkably their
mutually independent thinking was identical in distinguishing between types 1 and 2
dynamics. They accept that parliamentary elections act as an external shock to the
existing party-groups relationships. But more importantly and similar to Chapter 8,
they revealed that insiders could gain better market standing in three ways. The first
one is by dominating public tender decisions, which was reviewed in Chapter 8.  
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Second, an insider could further gain market advantage by absorbing its competition
through what appears to be prejudiced regulatory inspections.  On the surface these
are inspections of market regulatory agencies, some of which in reality are used as a
“weapon” of incapacitation of the party insider's market competitors. Such dynamic
also often comes into place in the context of what some respondents called an offer
of cooperation. The  offer  is an informal communication either from the party, the
party insider or both, which requests the targeted firm (outsider group) to discontinue
its market operations against some form of compensation – usually to transfer firm's
ownership to the party insider. Refusals to such an  offer  are met with deleterious
inspections by the regulatory agencies, which are mobilised by  the parente.  Such
prejudiced investigations are a convenient instrument to eliminate business actors
because they within the law and immediately require the investigated business to
stall all business transactions. In a turbulent market, halting operations for a long
time means that a firm would irreversibly lose its market share and risks insolvency.
Quite curiously the views of both respondents on the party-interest group relations in
Bulgaria overlapped with the initial,  type 1,  parentela  dynamic of La Palombara.
Respondent Golemanov argued that Bulgarian elections are an opportunity for the
formation of a new close party-group relationship. Using the Bulgarian circles as the
epitome of these dynamics, he argued that ruling parties are the natural center of
gravity for many individual business players who are eager take advantage of their
possible privileged intra-party standing. Vice-versa, political parties are equally open
for such possibilities, as long as there is a mutual benefit. The deal between the two
is while the party provides some form of market advantage to the given business
actor (the insider), the latter would give something in return. 
Moreover, further along the lines of parentela,  Golemanov argued  that it is part of
the  party-insider  deal  that  the  latter  nominates  their  own,  trusted  proteges  for
appointment by the party as key civil servants or vice-ministers. In his view, at the
heart of politics lays the battle for appointments:
S: So, you have...
R: /interrupts/  a  battle  for that  appointment  [...].  Say, /enacting
theatrically/ "If Mr. X gets appointed, I will be fine, and my firm will be
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fine!  If  not,  there is  a  chance they  will  "draw the knife  on me".  For
example, the construction of highways. The most tolerated firm in our
region  is  Hidrostroi!  Hidrostroi,  if  you  notice,  in  the  presence  of
Avtomagistrali  Cherno  More  –  who  possess  immeasurable  resources,
Patno Stroitelstvo Shumen, and the firm BAS – the three of them are from
Shumen [and are out], while Hidrostroi is from Varna. Second, the entire
winter [road] maintenance is from Hidrostroi. Here is one example of
one firm being tolerated.
Golemanov  essentially  describes  type  1  parentela  from Chapter  8.  He  identifies
Hidrostroi as the local insider firm known for its staggering track record of wining
local construction tenders. But that is thanks to their ability to negotiate access with a
sequence of ruling political parties on a local level. This is nothing different from
those economic network members who successfully orient themselves to every new
political  network in power, as per Kuzmanov. All  in all,  both respondents so far
describe the features of type 1.
However, not only do both respondents converge on the classical parentela dynamics,
but they also converge on an additional dynamic that emanates from the parente.
Both respondents indicated the existence a  new, conflictual  dynamic between the
party (plus insider) and an outsider group.  For example, Golemanov concluded his
elaboration on Bulgarian politics with the suggestion that such a dynamic is rooted in
the party-insider parentela core: 
But to establish this circle of [privileged] firms, you need to remove the
competition and to create monopoly. /You mean to eliminate the other
circles --S/ Precisely! Well, not exactly, but to parry them. To parry them!
Hence,  battle  for  political  power.  You  use  state  power  for  personal
interests [...]
The respondent's hesitation on the meaning of remove the competition implies some
form of pressure on third actors,  i.e.  the market  competition of  the party insider
group.  Note,  however,  that  in  his  statement  on  political  appointments  of  insider
group nominees that the mentality of those groups vying for party insiderness, if the
competition is lost,  they will  “draw the knife on me”, implying the losing,  party
outsiders,  might  suffer  as  a  result. What  is  actually  meant  behind  this  veiled
expression of the seeking political correctness Golemanov is revealed by Kuzmanov.
He too stated earlier that somehow the ruling party and its insiders, or in his parlance,
the  political  networks  are  in  the  position  to  overpower  the  economic  ones
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(emphasised string above).  Kuzmanov states that while the common state of affairs
between insider groups and ruling political  parties is that of an exchange (9.3.1),
parallel to that, there are more conflictual dynamics that might befall outsider groups
who refuse to cooperate with an expanding political network in power, i.e. the offer
of cooperation of the party or its insiders (9.3.1, 9.3.4):
R[…] However, there are some who have said, "I will not pay them
any more" and naturally that is bad for them. In the frame of a few years
they  (parties,  sic)  can [purposefully]  destroy  his  business  using legal
means. [...] What you observe now is precisely that. While the previous
[political  parties]  have given  preferences  to  some businesses  and the
latter pay back, [… a] t present, they are destroying businesses. Say, you
have business which is "of interest" and they make you an offer [...] to
which you tell them to go to hell. After that strange legal things begin to
happen to your business until  a point  where you cannot  function any
longer. You then either sell out or go bankrupt.
S: Who makes the offer?
R: You can never go back and identify the chain of individuals and
say: "Here, that one made the offer and he is connected to that one".
Everyone knows that those men are connected /emphasises/, but this is
impossible to prove. If after all by accident someone decides to prove
said relationships, [they will] get fired. 
This dynamic is essentially what Golemanov stated earlier  that as soon as a new
party goes to power and as soon as it recognises its insider group, the latter begins to
expand its  market presence.  This offer  is  simply a peaceful  attempt by the party
insider to expand its market shares, namely, by forcing the competition to sell its
business to him.
Towards  the  end  of  the  excerpt  above  the  interview becomes  quite  cryptic  with
regards to the nature of the offer. As section 9.3.1 will demonstrate, the offer is an
informal request made by a party insider onto an outsider business owner to transfer
ownership  of  the  firm  to  the  insider  (Varbanov)  or  some  other  form of  market
elimination. If the offer is made solely by the party in power, it could be an offer to
ensure that the target outsider is granted a public tender, in exchange for redirecting
some  of  the  public  moneys  paid  for  the  tender  project  to  the  party  (Rumenov,
Dobromirov).  As Kuzmanov however emphasises, the offer comes from the locus of
the party in power (Kuzmanov):
S: Is the origin of the offer political? [...]
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R: Entirely political. I am telling you again: We have had periods
as with the government of Berov, or that of Videnov, if you will, when the
economic actors  pursued their interest  /unintelligible/  [but]  they were
interested  only  to  take  for  themselves.  They  were disinterested  in  the
politicians. However, there is another scenario [...] where the politicians
exert powerful pressure on business one way or another – the whole is
motivated  politically. And I  am saying again,  how could  you explain
[seeing] a struggling businessmen rush to enter politics?
S: To protect their business?
R: And  to  expand  it  [...]  therefore  it  follows  that  the  political
network dominates over the economic one.
According  to  him,  while  in  the  past  business  groups  may have  been  in  a  more
favourable power position vis-a-vis ruling parties, this is no longer the case. Political
parties and their insiders today are in the position to eliminate businesses through the
use of  prejudiced regulatory inspections.  This is the label given to the practice of
elimination of businesses under the guise of a common regulatory agency inspection,
when in fact, the ulterior objective is to sabotage the business in the interest of the
party insider. While Golemanov only implies that the ruling party and its insiders can
harm the political and market opponents of the parente, Kuzmanov is more explicit
and states that this is through litigation and inspections. 
This is the essence part of type 2 parentela dynamics: it is the conflictual relationship
between the combined party and insider on the one hand (parente), and an outsider
group, on the other. In terms of policy network classification, type 2, however, is not
a new policy network type but an extension of the existing parentela (type 1). What is
tentatively labeled type 2 is essentially the same party-insider core of La Palombara's
type  1,  which  is  why  it  is  the  same  network.  However,  prejudiced  regulatory
inspections (the essence of type 2) add new dimension to the parentela relations: the
parente and outsiders.. Yet, in order to better analyze it in comparison the parentela,
type 2 parentela dynamics can be expressed as a policy network. Thus, in terms of,
network dynamics and power ratio, therefore, this is a conflictual network  where the
policy-making side, i.e. the parente,  overpowers  the  outsider groups. The ability to
make appointments in the civil service allows the political appointor the ability to
mobilise the entire regulatory and security state apparatus against select groups or
individual  businesses.  Section  9.3  exemplifies  the  inability  of  targeted  groups  to
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resist the State. As the minister at the time of interview, Hristov, argued – no actor is
stronger than the state, so long as the latter has full control over its agencies.  The
dynamics inherent to type 2 parentela are described in Table 21 below:
Again, sharing the same core of participants with La Palombara's parentela, the table
above raises the question of whether to classify type 2 parentela as a genuinely new
network type or as an adjunct to the parentela established by La Palombara (1964)?
The chapter leans towards the latter. La Palombara focuses on the dynamics within
the parente, i.e. between the party and its insiders. Type 2 on the other hand focuses
on parente's relations with outsiders. Therefore, type 2 is an extension or an add-on
to  La  Palombara’s  original  parentela  policy  network  dynamics.  It  describes  the
aggressive dynamics between La Palombara’s parente and select outsiders but does
not constitute a new policy network in itself. That type 2 is not a discrete network is
evident by expressing type 2 in terms of the network descriptors. 
The purpose in this section was to elucidate the new concept before discussing it in
causal terms in section 9.3, where four independent variables will be reviewed as
explanations for the emergence of type 2 parentela dynamic.
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Table 21: Table 21 Classification of Type 2 Parentela 
9.3.  Behaviours within Type 2 Parentela Dynamics
Section  9.3  explains  why  political  parties  and/or  insiders  enter  a  conflictual
relationship with outsider  groups,  i.e.  type 2 parentela  dynamics.  There are three
reasons for that. Party insiders engage in type 2 to gain a better market advantage,
which manifests in three forms. First, this is by monopolising public tenders, which
was  already  discussed  in  Chapter  8.  The  second  form  is  by  making  insider’s
competitors (outsiders) a highly disagreeable offer of cooperation, which ultimately
drives them out of business in the long term (9.3.1). Third, such an offer is usually
combined with the third form of gaining market advantage – the threat of prejudiced
administrative  inspection,  which  can  also  be  employed  irrespective  of  the  offer
(9.3.4). 
The  offer  is interesting because it is also an instrument of the ruling party to put
pressure on outsider groups primarily as a result of the  logic of conversion  (9.3.1).
This appears to be a residual dynamic from the disintegration of Chalakov et al’s
(2008) molecule of conversion – a sociological network in early 2000s. The logic of
conversion stands for party’s informal generation of additional funds, some of which
could be used for campaign purposes. Political parties, too, like their insiders, offer
one-sided public tender bargains to outsiders, where the latter is guaranteed a public
tender in exchange for giving back some of the moneys dedicated to public project's
completion.  Outsiders  too  can  be  threatened  by the  party  with  direct  regulatory
inspections, crippling their businesses, if they refuse to cooperate. Furthermore, the
needs  to  suppress  internal  dissent  (9.3.2)  and  to  quell  external  group  policy
oppositions (9.3.3) are the other two reasons why a party would engage in type 2
with outsiders. 
All in all, section 9.3 explains type 2 and what leads to the situation where regulatory
agency inspections are used as an implement of repression both by the party and its
insiders. Again and though ultimately legal, the purpose of inspections is to disable
the business operations of the targeted firm (outsider) mainly by rescission of any
licenses of operation or formally identifying administrative offenses that are  then
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used  as  grounds  to  take  immediate  legal  action.  These  dynamics,  labeled  here
prejudiced regulatory inspections are at the centre of attention in type 2 parentela and
section 9.3.
9.3.1.  The Logic of Conversion and the Offer one Cannot Refuse
Figure  4  in  Chapter  8  addressed  the  work  of  Chalakov  et  al  (2008)  and  their
sociological network molecule of conversion. Their model was discussed in sections
1.4.1 and 1.4.2. The main idea behind that network was that many individual policy-
makers  from the  ruling  political  parties,  during  Bulgaria’s transition  to  full  free
market  economy,  sought  to  convert  their  access  to  policy-making  in  economic
capital. A similar idea of conversion is already present in the Western literature on
policy-networks stressing on the exchange nature of the policy-network participants,
including civil  servants (2.2). However, Bulgarian sociologists emphasise that the
conversion  they  observed  was  geared  not  so  much  towards  exchange  of  policy-
resources, which will help with policy-drafting and -implementation, e.g. expertise
(in policy community). The purpose of the exchange was to set up party-subservient
businesses,  which  the  retiring  nomenklatura  and  sponsoring  political  party(ies)
would benefit from long term. 
While this study cannot provide firm evidence of the existence of the  molecule of
conversion,  it  can  certainly  identify  similar  logic  of  conversion in  respondents’
description  of  political  parties’  behaviour.  Kuzmanov  argued  that  groups  seek
political  parties in order to improve their  market standing, but at  the same times
parties, too, proactively approached groups to find ways to monetise their control of
the policy-making process. Similar is the position of Golemanov when he used the
phrase “feeding rack” which describes firms as subordinate and highly dependent on
political parties for their benefits and whom they “later pay back”, or in other words
reciprocate with electoral contributions. On that occasion, Golemanov also implied
some form of  party enrichment,  separate  from campaign funds-related  exchange.
Kirilov  stated  that  at  the  turn  of  election,  hitherto  insiders  might  be  superseded
particularly by firms owned or under the control (somehow) of active politicians.
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This  directly  overlaps  with  the  molecule:  a  business  owned  by  active  party
functionaries. 
In fact, Petrov’s account provides closest evidence of the molecule. The respondent
described a situation in the timber sector, where the local administrative units, acting
as monitors and regulators of timber extraction and sales, legally assumed the powers
to  act  as  timber  market  participants,  as  well.  Following  the  practice  of  political
appointments and the fact that those state/private entities were controlled by the party
in power, Petrov suggested that the market revenues could be used for any party
purposes,  including  campaign  financing.  Therefore,  while  the  network  of  the
molecule does not exist, the thinking which created it still does. The evidence above
demonstrates  that  parties  seek to  convert  policy access  into economic capital  for
party needs, part of which could be to finance political campaigns. 
And  finally,  it  is  this  logic  of  conversion  that  partially  explains  the  conflictual
relationship between the party and outsiders. Motivated by the need to convert their
policy resources  into  capital,  political  parties  can  be  proactive  in  some cases  by
initiating negotiations with individual outsider companies, whom they make an offer.
Respondents stated that the offer is usually an assurance that the invited outsider will
win  a  public  contract,  however  against  splitting  with  the  party a  fraction  of  the
moneys dedicated to the execution of the public tender project. This is what many
respondents  described  as  the  offer  you  cannot  refuse. Kuzmanov, Rumenov  and
Dobromirov argued for the existence of such offers and their purpose, so far as the
party is concerned, is to generate funds by forcing a suitable group into cooperation,
usually by influencing the  outcomes  of  public  tenders.  On other  occasions,  such
offers came from party insider groups, who presented the outsider with two options:
transfer  their  assets  or  company  ownership  to  them  against  some  monetary
compensation. The motivation of the insider group in the latter case is the same as in
chapter 8: to improve its market standing by buying out its competition (discussed
thoroughly 9.3.2).
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However, in in any case, an outsider’s refusal to the offer of the party or its insiders
leads  to  a  conflictual  relationship  with  the  ruling  party  as  the  control  centre  of
regulatory agencies, i.e. type 2 dynamic. A refusal of any such offer is followed by
regulatory inspections, whose purpose is, to be blunt, to drive the targeted outsider
out of business. Dobromirov stated with relief the fact that they had worked at a loss
for the past 5-6 years which saved them from being approached with any offers.
Rumenov, however, was not that lucky. Operating at a net profit of millions of leva,
Rumenov was approached by an envoy of the ruling political parties who directly
offered him the opportunity to win a fuel sector tender (which was pending public
announcement)  against  giving  back  a  fraction  of  the  state  budget  dedicated  to
tender’s  execution.  That  would  have  been  party’s  fee  for  doing  this  favour  to
Rumenov. As a  result  of  respondent’s refusal,  he  subsequently had to  undergo a
sudden barrage  of  inspections.  Given its  importance,  the  account  of  Rumenov is
quoted at length in order to demonstrate its authenticity (party’s offer of exchange is
emphasised below):
R But I can tell you what happened exactly /yes – S/ if you are
interested more specifically /yes, yes, yes – S/. What happened when the
new party came to power /rhetorically/? So, a representative of a given
party  central  attended the firm and introduced himself  and said “We
have reviewed your firm as a suitable economic subject over which we
can put an umbrella and calculating the economic interests, there are
benefits for the respective party as well.” That is. Those were party B
and A. And now, what happens when you decline, /rhetorically/, as I did.
My question was “This party  configuration at  present,  how long is  it
going to rule: until New Year, until May, the whole mandate?” [the reply
was] “However long we can last, as far as we can make it.” And I said,
“Fine, but my firm is 20 years old and so far I have not had such attacks
to participate in the circumvention of the law, crudely put, contraband
and such things. I have not had such problems and I do not intend to.”
[…]
S It is interesting for me when that representative came, what did
he have in mind by saying “an umbrella”?
RThis  means  the  securing  of  exclusive  access  to  public  tenders.  In
Bulgaria  there  is  no  stock  exchange  market  for  public  tenders.  It  is
fictitious. You just go shopping there. You go in and say, the Ministry of
Internal Affairs (police) is seeking to purchase fuel for [some] prisons or
whatever, and they tell you for instance that “The respective contract is 5
million  leva  [and]  if  following  the  market  prices,  you  will  win  100
thousand leva. However, we will increase the price for delivery with 20%
and you will give 40% of the total profits back to us, and if you agree,
254
you will take the tender”. This is what was meant: 20% for the players,
20% for the party coffers. This is only half of the story. The participation
– whatever it is – in the Public Tenders /self-interrupts/ even now with
my  partner,  my  son,  /inaudible/  there  is  a  new  tender  coming  up
tomorrow on the stock exchange market for public tenders. It is about the
delivery of fuel to army airplanes for 6 million leva [but] with the stern
warning [against me]: “Careful what you are doing. Make sure you are
not seen here because heads will fall”. 
In  short,  with  the  change  of  government,  the  respondent  was  approached  by  a
representative of the ruling political parties at the time with the offer to become a
core insider and be privileged in the competition for public tenders in the fuel sector.
In this offer, what they have to do in return is give back to the ruling party a fraction
of the budget they will receive to carry out the tender.  In the case of Rumenov, as far
as the party is concerned, the proposal for targeted grant of public tenders provides it
with the opportunity for additional sources of finances. In this party offer, the price
for the completion of the project is artificially increased with 40%. However, while
the costs to the prospective target contractor will remain the same, they will have to
give 40% of the total budget that they will receive back. These 40% will be split
between the party central and those who facilitated the deal. 
The quotation above (253-254) also corroborates the dynamics outlined in the case of
LPT (chapter 8) because it provides evidence of the link between party bureaucratic
intervention and the outcome of public tenders. It also shows the importance of new
elections as an external shock to pre-existing parentela relations (as per sections 7.3).
However, the emphasis here is that the party  initiates the negotiations and that a
refusal to cooperate leads to repercussions, i.e. type 2 dynamic. Rumenov was barred
from taking part in fuel-related public tenders with the direct threat that “heads will
fall”. On that point, he continues (emphasis added):
R They have organised against me, as soon as I declined, those
[men]  organised all  of  that  against  me. I  was now a bit  late  for the
interview because of the commission at the State Reserve is investigating
me for  a  second day  now. […]  Now on Monday, the  state  transport
inspectorate  (STI)  will  come  because  I  have  15  trucks  and  the  STI
decided to  check  the  itineraries  […]  and whatever  you can think  of,
despite the fact I have never been caught in an offense, neither me or my
drivers,  that  relate  to  the  Laws  on  State  Automobile  Inspection,  the
Movement on the Roads or on the Transportation of Dangerous Cargoes,
but all possible instances (agencies) were sent, to show me that “Since
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you are not  one of us,  you are against  us.” [...]  Ever since then,  all
possible  state  regulatory  agencies  –  all  /emphasises/  –  such  as  the
agency  on  the  environmental  protection,  on  labour  protection,  fire
brigade,  customs,  labour  inspectorate,  auto-transport  inspectorate,
[agency on] emergencies and natural disasters, everything that you – the
State Reserve /exclaims/ – think of. Total inspections, all day long! With
the sole aim to justify the issuance of an Act of Misconduct – whatever it
is:  overt,  covert  or whatever. This  is  the situation in  Bulgaria  at  the
moment. […] [According to] the Law on Excise and State Storage, with
three such Acts of Misconduct one is in danger of being suggested for the
rescission  of  hitherto  granted  license  of  operation.  So,  the  excise
department of Sofia Customs is holding me constantly with two such Acts
(of Misconduct, sic) which I fight successfully in court, but in their place
new ones grow like mushrooms for all sort  of  absurd reasons entirely
devoid from fiscal considerations, that is, not because I evade taxes.
In short, the respondent above explains that the number of agencies that were sent to
inspect his businesses is in an avid response to him refusing to engage with the party
in power in biasing the outcome of fuel tenders in his favour for mutual gain. The
message is simple: either with us or against us.
Dobromirov also confirms the practice of parties pro-actively offering select groups
an insider type of exchange. Just as with Rumenov, he also expressed the common
position of his construction peers that it was those “intelligent men” who made visits
on behalf of political parties. According to Dobromirov, political parties and their
insiders  usually study a firm (outsider)  for overall  profitability before an offer is
made. If it  is declined, the targeted group can only expect vociferous inspections
from all  regulatory agencies,  particularly tax and police.  In these unusually strict
inspections, civil servants look for all sorts of minor or major offenses which almost
always  lead to  court  cases  or license revocations.  Sudden police raids for  illegal
software are just the beginning.
Similar to the offer made by the party in power, Varbanov reported being made an
offer by a party insider group also working in the field of construction. In his case the
offer acted as a condition to participate at a construction tender of a section from a
highway. If Varbanov wanted to win the tender, he would then have had to sign off
half of his firm away to the insiders. While he did not report any repercussions on
their business as a result of that, he strongly agreed with the argument in principle
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that state agencies are used by political parties and their insiders to destabilise the
outsider businesses with a view of absorbing them. 
The accounts of Varbanov and Rumenov on an offer made by party insiders is similar
to the accounts of another respondent set, who without being offered anything, saw
themselves  as  the  victims  of  regulatory inspections  coming  from well-connected
party insiders. They are discussed in section 9.3.2 below. 
9.3.2.  Insider’s  Direct  Intervention  against  Outsider  Market
Competitors
The third form of insiders’ drive for better market positioning which explains type 2
parentela dynamics comes from respondents who claim to be victims of their well-
connected  competition  to  oust  them  from  the  market  through  severe  regulatory
inspections. The director of a trade association, Petrov and their co-director (denoted
R2)  deserve  special  attention.  Congruent  with  Donchev,  they  argued  that  all
amendments  in  the  standards  and  licensees  can  be  used  by  party  insiders  as  a
mechanism to beat  the competition.  According to  this  view a party insider  gains
advantage over the competition by using their access to the party and civil service to
influence a change of licenses and standards, so that only the insider group meets the
new standards, hoping the competition that finds it hard to adapt exits the market
(also a position advanced by Donchev).
However, more importantly, in addition to being sectoral representatives, they were
also  owners  of  timber  companies.  They  explained  that  with  the  change  of
government, unusual regulatory activity began in their sector around 2005 until the
point their firms were put under continuous and stringent tax inspections. Very much
like Rumenov, Petrov and his  colleague noted  that  despite  their  best  attempts  to
cooperate with the regulator, the latter remained adamant and determined to precede
with litigation. However, eight years prior to the interview, the court cases are still
ongoing with no verdict and with crucial documentation on the case, the respondents
argue, deliberately hidden from them. At the time of interview, they were looking
into suing the Bulgarian state in Strasbourg. They argued that the absence of firm
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evidence of wrongdoing against them indicated that the inspections were ill-intended
to oust them from the timber market.
Mihailov also argued that his only competitor, oligarch Q, was behind some of the
regulatory  investigations  against  his  business.  Unfortunately,  that  particular
respondent was adamant that recording be stopped, save for eight minutes. From the
little he shared the mechanism used in Q's attempts to beat him was to use his access
to the regulatory agencies in order to rescind Mihailov’s license of operation. (On
that note, Kirilov also commented that this is one tool from the instrumentation on
how  to  eliminate  undesirable  business  actors.)  However,  after  the  change  of
government, Q in turn became the subject of regulatory pressure, with arrests and
police raids, as a result of a personal quarrel with the new government (Mihailov).
Independently from Mihailov and each other, Kirilov and Kuzmanov shared the view
that said police activity related to Q was devoid of any legal wrongdoing of his, but
was  politically  motivated  as  a  form of  personal  retribution.  Note  that  Rumenov
argued that police raids and arrests are the first line of pressure against a business
that has lost favour with the ruling party. The accounts of Mihailov demonstrate two
points raised earlier. First, that the civil service could be used to take a hit at one’s
market competition. And second, that the civil service is also used to deal with policy
and political opponents. (And possibly a third point, namely, that insider access is
fluid and that a party change can make one insider into an outsider)
Respondent Hadzhiev, too, argued that the use of regulatory agencies against certain
businesses were in  fact  a  sign of  conflict  between the party insider  and outsider
businesses. He argued instead that not police raids but that the main weapon is tax
investigations.  Along the  same lines,  respondent  Stoyanov argued that  the  undue
regulatory investigations did not necessarily originate from the party. He disbelieved
his own importance stressing his very strong suspicion that his competitors use their
access to the regulatory agencies provided by a faction within the ruling party to
instigate tax investigations against them.. In conclusion, possibly Nikolov provided
the best summary of the type 2 parentela dynamics and the variety of mechanisms
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used  to  pressure  outsiders,  akin  to  racketeering  (timestamps  are  provided  to
accentuate on the four second silence of the respondent at 5703):
5651 R /repeats to himself/ “Otherwise how could they destroy
you?” They don't give you any tenders, they close your markets,
they send you control organs (regulatory agencies, sic) –
5703 /Respondent becomes silent/
5707 R You stop him from everywhere.
5714 S How can they take your markets away from you?
5717 R […] when they send a Financial Revision team to you
and, say, when they claim that you owe them 10 million Euros
or  Leva,  whatever  it  is.  This  kills.  This  is  deadly. [Because,
g]ood luck trying to prove in court in the next four years that
you  actually  do  not  owe  that  money,  and  you  will  prove  it
indeed but you would be done for. In practice you lose your
market  share  because  you  cannot  sell,  as  [during  litigation
period] your bank accounts would be frozen, [and] there would
be a thorough description of your storages, machines and so on,
and this is how you go bankrupt.
5752 S Is it possible to survive in the market without having to
cooperate with the parties.
5803 R Possibly  there  are  many  people  who  win  their  bread
honestly  and  succeed  to  support  small  and  middle  size
enterprises. […] but in principle, they are so few that in a city
like [the one we are currently in] these are no more than 20-30
firms.
5827 S Some  of  the  previous  respondents  used  the  term
“racket” on part of the state. I do not understand this. What
would they have in mind with “racket on part of the state”, and
that is why I asked that (previous) question.
5844 R /repeats,  annoyed?/  “racket  on  part  of  the  state”
/unintelligible/ Someone comes in here and registers that – say
they came from the fire brigade – and they tell you: “The fuel
tank is improperly fitted, your liquid gas tank is too close to the
road,  etc.”  But  the  fact  that  they  had  earlier  given  you  the
license  and permission  to  sell  fuel  is  of  no  relevance  at  all,
because in the end they order you to stop all sales. You then are
forced to relocate down the road but the costs to do that would
be  prohibitive.   If  you  try  to  figure  out  the  weak  spot  of  a
business in this way, you will always find something.
Nikolov clearly demonstrated hesitation whether and how far to disclose, evident at
the 5703 timestamp. Nevertheless, he took a decision to share some information,
even though he couched it in as neutral phraseology as possible, expressed in terms
of a model and dynamics. The statement of Nikolov describes the type 2 parentela
dynamics in its totality and is what is taken here to represent the core dynamic of
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type 2. It is the deliberate use of inspections from the regulatory agencies to either
drive a business competitor out from the market or pressure them into party political
submission using prejudiced regulatory inspections. The statement also combines the
rest  of  the  elements  of  the  parentela  that  have  been  implicit  in  the  reviewed
respondents’ statements so far. These are namely political appointments and close
party-group cooperation.
9.3.3.  Internal Party Dissent
Another explanation for the type 2 and its conflictual party-group relationship is its
use as an instrument for retribution against party dissenters or intra-party opposition.
Respondent Golemanov spoke from personal experience. He intimated he sought to
speak their mind on numerous occasions in front of the local city council meetings,
however, outside the party hard line dictated by the party headquarters. While also
having a business and a few years spent in intra-party friction the respondent was
subjected to ruthless tax investigations. Speaking in agreement on the use of the state
administration as a tool of repression against internal party dissent, Kirilov gave an
example a more recent example with a different political party:
R It is like the seduced and the abandoned and those abandoned
from  [party  S]  are  doing  tricks  one  against  the  other. That  is,  until
yesterday you had been in the group of the anointed ones [of those who]
had been crushing businesses, and taking it away from others, and that
you had intimidated their children is of no concern to you because you
are on the side of the victor! And you do not notice this, you only smile.
But  in  one  moment,  however,  they  make  the  lists  [of  parliamentary
candidates]  and you are kicked out. And then you say, “OK fine,  but
what we had been doing to the others until yesterday will be done unto
me tomorrow, because I am no longer close to the premier. I have now
become equal to the rest. I am no longer part of the strong, of the good
and righteous”
In  other  words, crushing businesses,  or  purposefully  pressuring  business  with
investigation, can be used against dissenting party members. It should be noted that
the statement sounds exaggerated somewhat with the claim that business is “taken it
away  from  others”.  Nevertheless,  the  statement  bears  the  mark  of  intra-party
repercussions under the guise of regulatory inspections geared towards eliminating
businesses out of the market.
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9.3.4.  External Group Dissent
Another form of using type 2 dynamics as a result of the need to punish relates to
those outsider businesses that are members of business-representative interest groups
who oppose the policy of the party in power. Respondent Hristov hinted that not
always do professional representative bodies voice the grievances of their members
at  the  civil  service  forums.  They rather  begrudgingly admitted  that  some groups
refrain from voicing their problems for fear of repercussions. Respondent Donchev
was adamant stating the same argument. According to him, there is a reverse pressure
from the ruling party back on interest groups:
S In the context of the state administration and interest groups,
does  the  state  administration  provide  a  more  effective  access  to  the
policy-making process than the direct contacts with the ruling party?
R[...]  the representation  of  business  in  its  standard forms is  to  some
degree well structured,  [yet]  it  is empty from any contents.  That is,  a
huge part of the business organizations are also captured and they are
not independent in what they say [...] because they are connected to the
ruling parties in one way or another and with ruling politicians, or even
if they are not directly connected they are highly considerate [of ruling
party’s position]. In the moment in which they are considerate not with
the interests  of  their  members but  with what  the Power (government)
wants, they are not authentic representatives of business' interests. [As a
result], to a great extent the classical tripartite dialogue suffers because
business managed to create /self-interrupting/ I mean I am personally
dealing  with this  project  7-8  years,  there was  a lot  of  authentic  and
strong representation [but] later after a line of a series of attacks that
business organization was practically diffused and broken.
S What were the attacks?
RAll sorts, against the director, attacks on the members /Media attacks?
--S/  Media,  tax investigations,  the whole arsenal.  From the means of
pressure /pause, self-interruption/[from] the beginning of Transition [the
intention]  was  exactly  that,  to  have  fake  participants  from  the  civil
society,  fake  NGOs,  fake  representatives  of  Labour,  syndicates,  fake
business  representatives,  fake  media.  Everyone  who  took  part  in  the
debate had to seem independent, but in fact they had be controlled from
one and the same centre.
According to Donchev in other words, interest groups have two options: to brace for
a  parentela  type  2  conflict  or  appease  the  government  on  legislation  that  they
disagree on. At the same time, the emphasised thread in the quotation above indicates
that  another  strategy of  the  ruling  party  is  to  reciprocally  appease  the  dissident
interest  group’s  leadership  by  offering  them privileged  deals.  This  is  not  stated
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directly but  it  is  a  probable  implication  given the  practice  of  making offers  one
cannot refuse. 
As if to deliberately support the position of Donchev, Rumenov stated at the start of
his  interview that  he  deliberately refused  membership  in  the  Gas  and Petroleum
Association because he felt it did not protect his interests, but those of the colluded
interest groups and party leaderships. Rumenov was particularly disgruntled:
R My business, this is the gas and petroleum association, these
are selected /self-interrupting/ not all of us are members in these things,
traders and players in this business. Well, there, the party in power and
the legislative structures select who to be a member in this interest group
(responded used the term interest groups, sic). Discussing the legislative
changes with the group and other normative and sub-normative (primary
and secondary legislation, sic) a hidden interest is pursued of a lobbying
group. Everything in Bulgaria is subjugated to that. […] So, in the trade
associations, only those directors are elected who are convenient to the
respective parties in power. And from there on, they play together. No-
one explained, for instance, where businesses would find money for the
increase of the minimum salary [...]
The position of Rumenov also reveals the two options interest groups’ leadership
face  when  dealing  with  the  party  in  power.  First,  either  collude  with  the  party
leadership and allow to be seduced (as per Kirilov), or, second, try to oppose the
policies you disagree to and be put under tremendous amount of pressure public and
private,  as  per  Donchev.  Respondent  Nikolov,  too,  advanced  the  same
discontentment from the work of Trade Associations, arguing that they collided with
political parties into a “select society”. Also, the role of such groups was to facilitate
the party to stay in power. Of course, the present study is only able to register these
relationships  as  opposed  to  assess  their  scope.  However,  what  transpires  is  that
party’s ability to appoint in the civil service is to use it as a tool of repression against
groups, both inside and outside party structures. Moreover, this is true for all political
parties. No respondent made an explicit identification nor claim that this peculiar use
of regulatory inspections belonged to a specific political party.
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9.3.5.  Type 2 Parentela Dynamics Causal Summary
In conclusion,  let  us review figure 5 (p.  264) below, which summarises the
causal relationships above in visual form, similar to the approach in Chapter 8.
In figure 5, the elements pertinent to type 1 parentela, outlined in Chapter 8 are
in gray, while the elements relevant to type 2 are in blue. Elements (1), (3 and
4) are shaded in blue and gray to signify that they are relevant for both causal
models. Note that campaign funds (3) are part of the logic of conversion (4)
because it is hard to discern the two.
Type  2  is  used  as  a  policy  tool  of  retribution  against  any outsider  interest
groups that disagree with ruling party’s policies (9.3.4) or internal dissenters
(9.3.3)  and  a  mechanism  used  by  party  insider  groups  to  limit  market
competition, either by absorption through the  offer (9.3.1) or by its forceful
disruption through inspections (9.3.2.). Particularly on the  offer, if that act is
done solely by the party in power, it acts as a mechanism to generate additional
funds for party needs (9.3.1). Each of these scenarios is summarised in figure 5
(p. 248).
Ruling  political  parties  alone  can  enter  a  conflictual  relationship  (10b)  with  an
outsider group for four reasons: to generate party funds in general or for political
campaigns, but following the logic of conversion, nonetheless (4, 3), and to suppress
external or internal policy dissent (11, 12, respectively). Motivated by the need to
increase party funds (IV, 4 and 3), a political party could target an outsider group and
make a forceful offer (5a, DV). The outsider is offered to be granted a public tender
against giving some of the budget dedicated to its completion back to the ruling party
(5a). If the group agrees (IntV, 6a) it becomes an insider (IntV, 6a) and a type 1
parentela dynamic is engaged (DV, 9a). Similar to the process outlined in Chapter 8,
the  party  intervenes  in  the  civil  service  (IV,  7a)  and  facilitated  by  political
appointments (IntV, 8a), secures a favourable outcome of the public tender to the
insider group (DV, 9a). If the offer is declined (IntV, 6b), then, a type 2 relationship
dynamic ensues.  The outsider  status  is  confirmed (IntV, 6b)  and the ruling party
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resorts to an administrative intervention (IV, 7b) facilitated by political appointments
(IntV, 8b).  The  end  result  is  inspections  of  the  regulatory  agencies  against  the
outsider until their business incapacitation (DV, 10b).
At the same time, type 2 has a policy-implication as well.  It  is an instrument of
coercion of dissenters inside (IV, 12) or outside the party (IV, 11). In both cases the
chain is  the  same.  The party intervenes  (IV, 7b)  in  the bureaucratic  via  political
appointments  (IntV, 8b)  and  uses  the  regulatory  agencies  to  scrutinise  the  firms
associated with the dissenting interest group or party functionaries, to the point of
their market incapacitation (10b).
Type 2 dynamics could be seen from the perspective of the party insider group, as
well. Identical to type 1, motivated by the need for a better market standing (IV, 1), a
group could seek to negotiate access to the ruling party in power (DV, 5). If that
group meets the requirements for insiderness (IntV, 6), it can request its desire for
market advantage manifests in requesting privileges at public tenders (DV, 9), i.e.
type  1  parentela  as  per  Chapter  8.  This  is  the  mildest  form  of  gaining  market
advantage. The second and more aggressive form of market advantage is making an
offer, as the party could do (above). In this case, it is the insider group who makes
the offer to the unsuspecting outsider (IntV, 5a): to transfer ownership of the firm to
the  insider,  or  something  else  that  limits  outsider’s market  competition  abilities,
against some form of compensation, which in most responses has been, privileged
access to public tenders (Intv, 5a). Acceptance of the terms leads to a type 1 parentela
relations (6a, 7a, 8a, 9a). Refusal to those terms leads (IntV, 6b) to the third and most
aggressive form of gaining market advantage: deliberate regulatory inspections, or
type  2  relations  dynamics.  In  this  case,  the  insider  group  uses  its  access  to  the
regulatory agencies, via party’s approval (DV, 7b) and political appointments (IntV,
8b), to instigate inspections against the outsider to the point of latter’s market exit
(DV, 10b). 
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Figure 5 Causal Chain for Type 2 Parentela
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The present section discussed the evidence towards the causes of type 2 parentela
dynamics. The next section will briefly discuss the validity of the claims above.
9.4.  Type 2 Parentela Dynamic Validity and Novelty
While there is no direct documentary evidence that shows purposefulness of said
regulatory investigations, the statements in this study are overwhelming that there are
occasions where clearly the inspections are deliberate with the prejudice to establish
malpractice. Zlatarov noted that there is nothing inherently illegal in the longevity or
intensity of regulatory inspections, but confirmed that they indeed can be based on
ill-intent. Those can be short, prolonged, frequent or rare, but all of them ultimately
legal, although one could tell when they are the target. Respondent Stoyanov made a
distinction between regular and prejudiced inspections:
R Unfortunately  I  would say yes,  [but]  I  could prove that  with
great difficulty, because you cannot prove it. Rather, the feeling is in the
way things are handled,  in general,  because our firm has never been
connected to any one political party. We are very particular on this – to
be disjointed from any party and to do our job as we should and pay our
taxes  and everything  would  be  OK.  [...]  But  what  we have  as  a  gut
feeling in some moments is – how to put it – more pressure than it is
normal, regarding inspections on the firm. This imminently creates the
feeling that you are not desired in a given situation. Simply, you are not
desired, which cannot be proven but it is. For example, a tax inspection
lasting 8 months is simply too much! This is unusually much!
True, the respondent speaks of feelings, but what they and others mean to say is that
at  some point  there  is  heightened regulatory activity  which  is  different  from the
routine one. Respondent Rumenov noted that while usually the teams of inspectors
are of 3 and give an announcement prior to the inspections, they are now more, more
thorough and prolific in the offenses – founded or not – that they register. 
In any case, a list of indicators of type 2 could be devised, based on the more often
cited  forms  of  pressure  by  all  respondents  (Golemanov,  Kirilov,  Rumenov,
Dobromirov,  Stoyanov,  Hadzhiev,  Kuzmanov,  Nikolov,  Donchev,  Varbanov,
Konstantinov, Mihailov, Petrov, Cenov):
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● unusual  frequency  and  persistence  of  the  regulatory  investigations
(inspections)
● inspectors appear to be determined to find an offense
● court charges appear based on vague, insufficient evidence
● simultaneous  inspections  from  regulatory  agencies  with  numerous  minor
offenses
● sudden inspections
● the  inspection  immediately  leads  to  a  situation  of  danger  from  license
rescission or court charges
● active resistance of regulatory agency to help resolve matters
Nearly all of the respondents reported tax investigations and police raids in particular
as the first wave of inspections. Overall, this study accepts the validity of the finding
because the respondents shared the same indicators of undue regulatory pressure and
their views sufficiently well converged around the four causes for type 2 dynamics
(above). Moreover, validity is added by the clear distinction between type 1 and 2
dynamics  offered  by  respondents  Golemanov  and  Kuzmanov  in  section  9.2.
Following  the  discussion  on  type  2  and  its  origins,  the  following  section  9.5
discusses the implication of both network types on Bulgarian democracy.
In any case, the novelty associated with type 2 is in expanding of our understanding
of the dynamics that the initial parentela could engage in. It does not claim that the
novelty lies in the finding a  new policy network, that is discrete from the so far
known types. The  novelty is in discovering another dynamic, part of La Palombara's
parentela framework, which also involves a new type of actor: private firms. Sections
9 to 9.3 reviewed the details of the new dynamics. However, the sections did not
emphasise  on  the  fact  that  the  group  actors  are  not  necessarily  formal  trade
associations,  but  firms.  The  other  novelty  is  that  the  parentela,  along  with  its
additional  dynamic  is  also  applicable  to  private  actors  (firms)  who  seek  direct
engagement with the ruling party. 
That  is  to  say,  the  term  group is  more  inclusive  than  initially  conceived  by La
Palombara. This conceptual stretching is necessary in order to reflect the observation
that individual businessmen, firms or oligarchs seeking policy-making participation
engage with political parties outside formalised channels of consultations. Yet, this
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inclusion does not contradict the logic of dynamics of the original parentela. The
study shows that the parentela dynamics is also observable with actors who are not
formal interest groups, but behave as such.  
Chapter  8  demonstrated  that  type  1  parentela  dynamics  are  at  play  at  public
procurement contracts, where both the party and its insider group stand to gain from
monopolising  and  skewing  the  awards  of  public  tenders.  Likewise,  chapter  9
demonstrated that parentela dynamics could be used by the insider group as an extra-
market mean to beat its competition. The party, on the other hand, can use its access
to regulatory agencies to coerce individual firms into cooperation, again in the form
of shaping public procurement outcomes (the offer you cannot refuse).  
Furthermore, the inclusion of such informal actors, also situates the parentela in a
range of dynamics that lie between policy-making and what an external observer
might define as corruption. The research reveals that the same parentela set-up of
relationships between, the party, its insider group and the bureaucracy has dual use
ranging  from  strict  policy-making  to  less  ethical  (yet  within  the  law)  forms  of
machinations, which nevertheless are part of political life. 
Therefore,  a  question emerges as to the extent  to  which types  1 and 2 parentela
dynamics described here are in fact description of corruption. In essence the present
study extends the boundaries of the concept by elucidating on parentela dynamics in
the periphery of policy-making. The parentela dynamics described here should not be
taken to negate that the expanded parentela model is removed from policy-making. A
number of respondents in chapter 9 discussed prejudiced inspections as an instrument
available to the ruling party to suppress internal and external policy-making dissent.
In  this  context,  it  should  also  be  noted  that  chapter  4  revealed  that  a  similar
instrument  is  party’s  ability  to  amend  or  introduce  laws  that  shape  policy-
consultations hosted by the civil service. In this way, the party is able to filter in and
out favoured and not-so-favoured groups and also suppress dissent. Both of these
observations add support to the argument that even the more aggressive parentela
dynamics revealed in this study can bear policy-making relevance. Therefore, a more
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general contribution of the present research is that it reveals a less naiive picture of
text-book policy-making. 
In the same context of legality and ethics, political appointments are a key feature
that,  too,  can  be  seen  in  both  policy-making  and  corruptive  light.  Such  views,
however, are valid only in cases where appointee nominations are selected in the
absence  of  a  discussion  with  (sectoral)  interest  groups  or  the  public.  Political
appointments themselves are democratically founded when nominations are subject
to public discussion.
Therefore, we can look at the initial parentela dynamics, revealed by La Palombara
(1964)  or  type  1  in  combination  of  the  type  2 dynamics  (revealed  above)  as  an
extended parentela policy network model. And this extended parentela (types 1 and 2
together) is what parties make of it. It is a neutral model and whether it is seen in
policy-making or corruptive light, depends on political parties. It is within the hands
of  political  parties  who  have  the  power  to  make  political  appointments  (and
legislatively control access to executive consultations) whether to exploit  that for
narrow party (or personal) needs. Political parties are in the position to decide what
to do with the powers vested in them. They may still make political appointments
following public consultations, or silently slip the right man in the right place. They
may use their  control  over the bureaucracy for a faster policy implementation or
consultations  as  opposed  to  targeting  specific  groups  or  companies  through
inspections. However, regardless whichever path they take, such behaviour still falls
within the framework of the parentela both the original dynamics and its added type
2 dynamics. However, let us review the above concerns on the relationship between
the extended parentela and corruption as well as the more general implications of this
amended network model in section 9.5 below.
9.5.  Perspectives on the Extended Parentela
The extended model begs the question of how are we to understand it and what are
its implications  of its existence for policy-making? The answer to these questions
relies on the level of analysis we will employ. As the introductory chapter explained,
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policy networks analysis operates on the meso level and its purpose is to generate
enough data so that we can generalise on the macro political level. Rresults so far
suggest  that  the  extended  parentela  could  be  used  for  both  policy-making  and
activities which could be best  described only as realist  power-politics  on a meso
level. In the present section, we will, therefore, look at the extended parentela from a
micro and macro perspectives. The reason for that is these, hopefully, will allow us to
better understand the concept by looking at it from different angles. 
Seen  from a  micro  level,  the  extended  parentela  appears  to  reflect  dynamics  of
corruption (9.5.1). This is not necessarily straightforward because it largely depends
how corruption is defined. Yet, this does not mean that La Palombara's parentela, for
instance, is evidence of corruption or about corruption. As it will be reinforced, the
parentela  and extended parentela  can  be  used  for  both policy-making and realist
power  politics  on  a  meso  level.  In  any case,  Offe's  corruption  definition  below
appears  to  directly  match  the  corruptive  dynamics  between  bureaucrats  and
individual businesses who seek to expand their market shares by hitting, so to speak,
their competition with prejudiced inspections.
Looking at the extended parentela from a macro level, in turn, reveals dynamic that
approximates oligarchy and oligarchic policy-making (9.5.2). Both type 1 and type 2
parentela  dynamics  could be see as processes  of  resource accumulation and elite
formation,  with  the  potential  of  solidification  into  an  oligarchic  community.
However, a closer look suggests that thanks to routine elections which have produced
(as of 2013-2015) effective party changes, the elites that tend to form around each
political party have been in a perpetual conflict. Thus, based again on the same type
1 and 2 dynamics, each elite has the opportunity to retaliate at its competitors, once
their  party  comes  to  power.  Still,  it  is  not  quite  clear  whether  informal  groups
manage to always switch to winning parties or are locked in a relationship with one,
but either way, parliamentary elections provide the opportunity for such adjustment
and  it  well  may  be  that  some  groups  do  not  have  the  capacity  to  switch  their
cooperation to the next, winning political party. The bottom line is that the extended
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parentela contains dynamics that help elites to both agglomerate and be crushed later
by their opponents.
It is in this context of oligarchic dynamics that emerges the question of state capture
(9.5.3).  Seen from a macro perspective one may observe a preeminence of a single
company, oligarch or a group of such. There may be news reports of close contacts
between  the  ruling  parties  and  some  disclosed  (say,  thanks  to  investigative
journalism) big business owners. Such business actors may subsequently be observed
to have a boost in their profits and market shares, etc, and as a result of all this, many
observers would be tempted to say that this is a case of  state capture. This notion,
explored below (9.5.3), implies that somehow the ruling party has been overpowered
and those informal groups dominate it. In turn, the present study critiques this notion,
arguing that as ruling political parties have direct control over the state regulatory
and security agencies of the state, via direct appointments, it is not possible for any
single or group of private actors to coerce (overpower) a ruling party. 
Overall, looking at the extended parentela, as implemented in the Bulgarian polity, it
reveals  various  levels  and  scope  of  social,  political  and  economic  injustice  or
corruption. However, as we go higher the levels of analysis, even if we begin from
corruption, the fact that it is imbued in the political system both on meso and macro
level,  suggest  that  the  extended  parentela  is  a  phenomenon  of  much  larger
proportions. We no longer speak of certain business owners bribing the local fire-
department  to  do an  extra  inspection  on his  competitors.  The extended parentela
model depicts  a democratically unjust political system which generates oligarchic
dynamics.  Let  us  delve  in  the  details  of  this  picture  by  looking  at  corruption
immediately below (9.5.1).  
9.5.1.  Corruption
Let us first consider the extended parentela as an example of corruption.  Clearly,
rigging public tenders and exploiting regulatory agencies as a weapon against select
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businesses is most disagreeable. But is this corruption? An answer to this question
may be hard to provide depending on the definition of corruption one employs. If the
term is limited to forms of malpractice legally defined in the law, then the above
practices are not evidence of corruption, simply because they are within the law. If
the definition of corruption, however, is more general and steps outside the legally
defined  forms  of  malpractice  and  misuse,  then  it  may  cover  practices  as  those
summarised  in  the  extended  parentela  but  at  the  same  time  it  runs  the  risk  of
stretching  too  far,  including  thereby  socially  and  the  politically  unjust  yet  legal
practices.  cover  practices  from a  social  and  political.  Pluralist  democracies  may
inevitably appear as unjust simply because the policy process and simply politics
generate solutions that never satisfy all interested actors fully. That is why a very
clear and specific definition of corruption is of paramount importance because not all
of them capture the extended parentela. 
This  inquiry,  however,  begs  one  clarification.  The  parentela  or  the  extended
parentela, if one adds type 2, is an abstract map or model of relations between a set
of actors who have access to policy making. The concept itself was not originally
developed with corruption in mind. However, in light of the evidence presented so
far, the same set of relations could be used for activities that are morally and socially
unacceptable. Therefore, it has to be reminded (again) that the extended parentela is a
set  of  relations  that  could  be  employed  in  policy-making  and  outside  of  it.  The
question,  then is  to  what extend the extended parentela dynamics outside policy-
making are evidence of corruption?
Certainly, even a  cursory look in the corruption literature would provide us with
definitions which may cover the extended parentela dynamics, particularly exhibited
in  chapters  8  and  9  (as  opposed  to  in  La  Palombara's  work  (1964)).  The  only
complaint, however, one could have is that some of the well-established definitions
rest  on the  notions  of  social  and political  injustice,  which  inflate  the  concept  of
corruption too much into activities and policy conditions,  which are in  line with
democratic pluralism but can wrongly be branded as corrupt. Let us demonstrate this
thinking with a few definitions.
272
On the subject of corruption in Eastern Europe, Kostadinova has made one of the
most  in-depth  quantitative  studies  in  the  field  (2014)  and  is  certainly  worthy  of
special attention. At the start of her monograph she reviews some of the definitions
which have achieved literature-wide validity. One definition she provides is that of
Warren (in Kostadinova 2012: 6), namely, that corruption is "the inappropriate use of
common power and authority for purposes of individual or group gain at common
expense".  The  definition  suggests  that  corruption  is  when  political  power  and
authority, vested in active policy-makers is misused so that certain goods are taken
away from the majority and transferred to a select minority, be that an individual or a
group (however defined).
In  short,  the  emphasis  is  on the  inappropriate use  of  power  and the  subsequent
socially unjust  and potentially illegal  transfer  of  resources  from the  many to  the
select  few. This  can  be  seen  in  the  dynamics  in  Chapter  8.  In  fact,  that  chapter
implicitly argues that public tenders in Bulgaria for the most part subjected to the
illegal  act  defined  juridically  as  public  form of  public  tender  manipulation  (see
chapter  8).  Essentially,  opportunities  for  economic  development  of  the  state  are
stolen away and resources unduly concentrated in a small  number of firms when
public tender committees are politically controlled to ensure that the winning tender
proposal is made by the party insider. Likewise, the far more pronounced abuse of
public power in the interest of a third actor (party insider) is evident in chapter 9 with
the prejudiced regulatory inspections. As respondents reported regulatory inspections
aimed at driving a firm out of business are primarily an act of extortion by legal
means.
In  fact,  Kostadinova  summarizes  that  the  common  denominator  among  most
corruption definitions is the notion of some form of misuse of the authority provided
by a public policy-making post-holder (2012: 7). Thus, she adopts the minimalistic
definition of corruptions as the "misuse of public office for private gain" (2012: 7).
This  formulation  would  not  necessarily  change  the  rendition  on  the  extended
parentela dynamics. The difference between the two definitions is simply that the
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latter is a succinct re-statement of the former, e.g. instead of /inappropriate use/, we
have the explicit misuse.
Stated in  those general  terms the definitions  on corruption demonstrate  a  certain
vulnerability  when  one  attempts  to  put  boundaries  on  the  scope  of  practices
classifiable as corrupt. In trying to determine the scope of the definitions reveals that
they  encompass  either  too  few or  too  many  practices.  Essentially,  the  one  who
determines what is inappropriate or misuse of power, also determines the scope of
corruption.  Therefore,  the  scope  of  practices  constituting  corruption  would  be
narrower, if left to the strict legal formalism of courts, than if approached, socially,
i.e.  by  political  observers  or  researchers.  That  is  why,  it  is  debatable  whether
seemingly political and policy-making injustice or disadvantage is form of corruption
or not. For example, it  is debatable whether the evidence provided in the present
study enough to demonstrate that said dynamics are form of corruption, perpetrated
by public  officials  under  the  diktat  of  the  ruling  party?  Likewise,  it  is  doubtful
whether the evidence in chapter 9 on the misuse of regulatory agencies would suffice
in court  to qualify as a case of corruption.  It  is  true that in particular the public
tenders  overlap  with  the  dynamics  of  wrongdoing  in  legal  texts  (KZK decision,
chapter 8), but those still require the rendering of a legal authority to formalise them
as corruption. If the definitions of corruption, therefore rest on legal authorities for
their validity, then, it appears that this would include much less social dynamics as
corrupt.
At the other extreme, if corruption is left to policy-making observers and researchers,
then we run the risk of allowing too many political practices to be defined as corrupt.
The corruption definitions above reflect the popular and naive idea that, if left on
autopilot, or somehow, on their own, pluralist democracies will produce socially and
politically just policy decisions, that equally satisfy all groups and actors with vested
interest in them. Such a formulation may cause an undue expansion of the concept of
corruption because what is seen as socially unfair is left to external observers, if
those are tasked to determine what is an unfair redistribution of wealth, and whether
the gains of some interest groups make in the course of the policy-making process
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are  a  case  of  corruption?  Again,  the  second  important  part  of  the  definition  of
corruption above was that the policy-decisions unfairly redistribute resources from
the majority to the minority. While this is true and with that the extended parentela is
clearly a  case of  corruption,  it  is  also true  that  there  is  private  gain  at  common
expense in contemporary pluralist democracies, as well. The concern, in other words
is, that if the corruption definition is stated by a policy observer in terms of social
and political injustice, then not only the extended parentela practices are also a case
of  corruption,  but  so are  other  practices  and policies  that  are  the  product  of  the
democratic process as it is today.
Western pluralist thought of early and mid 20th century made a series of observations
centering on the fact that given the unequal distribution of resources among groups,
at least some of the time, there are small number of (interest) groups which dominate
a certain policy (or legislative) field at the expense of others (Jordan 1990). This is
point  is  further  reinforced  in  the  study  of  Gilens  and  Page  (2014,  below)  who
confirmed  that  access  to  US  policy-making  process  is  very  difficult  given  the
dominance  of  insider  interest  groups.  In  what  appears  to  be  the  endspiel  of  the
pluralism-corporatism debate, in a literature review Jordan argues that corporatism
was constructed on the misunderstanding of pluralism, namely, that the latter is a
state-group model of power-balance among groups and the state. In fact, pluralism is
a realist viewpoint that acknowledges that well-within democratic dynamics some
groups dominate  over  others  in  the  same policy field,  at  least  some of  the  time
(Jordan1 1990). Essentially, some groups succeed in positioning themselves better
than others thanks to better  organizational resources or clientelistic relations with
policy-makers (Jordan 1990). This means that most of the policy output of interest of
said dominant groups will directly benefit them at the expense of others.
That  is  to  say, policy-outcomes in  pluralist  polities  do not  necessarily benefit  all
sectors equally and these skewed policy-outcomes are part of the democratic policy-
making.  Transplanting  policy-making  in  societies  hitherto  unacquainted  with
democracy and interest group participation, therefore, are startled by this feature and
domestic observers too readily attribute corruption to any policy outcomes that they
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personally feel on the losing side and where the same observers can identify other
groups as the policy winners. This is clearly evident in the text-book criticism against
perception-based corruption indicators, namely, that those are not reliable as what is
perceived as corruption by questionnaire respondents is very broad, and may simply
reflect  their  emotional  response  that  goes  along  with  their  disagreement  with
domestic politics, on which they might be on the losing side and also which may not
necessarily be informed from immediate observation of corruption. Therefore, this
study argues that such perceivably unjust dynamics of wealth concentration by the
few at  the  expense  of  the  many are  part  of  the  democratic  structure  at  present.
However, it becomes harder to distinguish them from corruption, as soon as those
defining the term corruption attempt to include the perceivably and arguably unjust
aspects of pluralist political systems.
A similar point is advanced by Sajo, who argues that any corruption inquiry in the
region  of  Eastern  Europe  has  to  distinguish  clientelistic  policy-making  –  an
unhealthy, but not necessarily undemocratic practice either and criminality (2002: 2-
3). In his view policy-making using political protection mechanics (clientelism) does
not automatically qualify it as criminal or corrupt (2002: 3). Evidently, his thinking
too is informed by the idea that democratic systems may still harbour unfair or unjust
dynamics  that  do not  immediately qualify as corrupt.  He is  vague as to  whether
Eastern European democratic polities are legitimate,  as a result of the mixture of
corruption,  clientelism  and  democracy,  but  he  advances  the  term  clientelist
corruption as the label of the structure of Eastern European polities: 
[clientelist corruption is] a form of structural corruption, which should be
distinguished from discrete individual acts of corruption. […] In Eastern
Europe,  clientelism –  in  interaction  with  various  forms  and  levels  of
corruption – is becoming a stable form of social organization (Sajo 2002:
3). 
While  certainly  his  interesting  line  of  thinking  requires  an  elaboration,  more
importantly for the purpose of the present discussion, the quotation above reflects the
difficulty in drawing a line between corrupt conduct and political  injustice in the
democratic policy-making process.
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We, therefore are  in need of a  more precise definition of corruption.  In order to
achieve  that  it  is  necessary to  delineate  the  legally  criminal  dimension  from the
socially unjust one. Sajo clearly makes the call for specification of the breaking of
what rules constitutes corruption (2002: 26). On that note, Gambetta (2002) responds
by specifying various categories of corruption. Holmes on the other hand offers a
rather specific definition, which seems to answer the call for higher terminological
precision, particularly on the need to distinguish the illegal from the socially unjust
(point 4 below):
1.  [corruption]  is  carried out by an individual  or group of individuals
occupying  a  public  office;  2.  the  public  office  must  be  one  of
responsibility and authority; 3. the official must commit the act at least in
part because of personal interest' 4. the official must be aware that their
actions  or  non-actions  either  are  or  might  be  considered  illegal  or
improper.
Yet, even in this case, policy-making practices that are the result of pluralist (see
Jordan above) dynamics are likely to be rendered, due to the improper actions of
public office holders, i.e. through lobbying. The notion of improper actions is also a
matter of interpretation, particularly if it is a sensitive, disgruntled public who has
that authority to determine whether what is improper.
A far  better  definition  of  corruption.  However,  instead  of  muddying  the  waters
further, the present study will turn to any definitions that seem to match the above
requirements.  In his discussion of a number of corruption types, as well as their
effects on social trust and democracy (2004: 77-100),  he defines political corruption
as  the  “exchange of  official  decisions  for  some payment”,  or  a  bribe  for  policy
decisions (Offe 2004: 78). He defines bribe, as a payment or promise of payment in
cash or in kind (Offe 2004: 78). Corruption is political if one of the interacting sides
is either an elected official or civil servant (Offe 2004: 78). He classifies political
corruption in four categories (Offe 2004: 81-83). In the first type, corruption is a
bribe in exchange for civil servants' permission for the continued sale of illicit goods
(e.g.  of  arms,  alcohol).  The  second  corruption  type  is  receiving  favourable
administrative decisions,  and privileged provision of otherwise free state services
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(e.g.  driver's  license  issuance)  in  exchange  for  a  bribe.  The  third  one,  seems  to
overlap with the previous two. It is a bribe in exchange for regulatory leniency or
provision  of  services,  not  normally unavailable  to  any actor,  such  as  favourable
policy  decisions  or  policy  non-decisions.  The  last  corruption  type  is  political
extortion – when those civil service structures with the powers to impose sanctions
proactively solicit a bribe in exchange for not sanctioning a given business in the
absence of any obvious offenses.
Corruption type 2 in particular is relevant to both parentela types. This is the case of
bribing officials in exchange for specific favours. As such, Offe exemplifies with
public tenders – which relates to type 1 parentela (chapter 8). However, he continues
that this corruption type 2 also includes that favours “can also involve the purchasing
of  relative  advantage,  such as  bribing  an  official  into  harassing  one's  competitor
through inspections” (Offe 2004: 82, original emphasis). In other words, to add to
Offe's examples, a form of corruption is also when bribing officials with a view of
gaining market advantage by instigating regulatory inspections. This is a surprising
match to type 2 dynamics, which revealed that party insiders (or the party alone) can
instigate deliberate inspections against outsider businesses. The emphasis, however,
is on private actors establishing direct contacts with civil servants, outside the party
in power. In our case, in contrast, this appears to be negotiated at a higher, party,
level. We will return to the level of analysis later.
His corruption type 4, where civil servants (including their elected superiors) extort
businesses to own advantage (or – as it is in our case – in the advantage of the party
insider,  which  does  not  change  matters  much)  is  a  close  match  to  type  2.  The
description respondents give to “the offer” is inescapably close to that of extortion.
Respondents Kuzmanov, Varbanov, Rumenov, and Dobromirov revealed a practice of
“visitations” from party officials who solicit funds. It was later revealed that such
refusals  were  usually  followed  by  some  form  of  regulatory  retribution  through
increased inspections. It is precisely those forms of retributions that closely overlap
to Offe's corruption type 4.
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However, while his conception of corruption overlaps with the extended parentela
dynamics,  his  level  of  analysis  makes  his  rendition  of  corruption  slightly
incompatible  with the description of the parentela.  The parentela  is  a  meso-level
concept,  while  his  corruption  analysis  is  on  a  micro  level:  that  of  street-level
bureaucrats.  Offe’s  focus  is  on  the  interpersonal  level  between  a  firm  (a
businessman)  and  single  bureaucrats  working  in  an  agency,  while  the  parentela
networks is about interaction between a policy-making actor (a group) interacting
with parties, agencies and institutions of government, which is on a meso level. We
are, therefore, in the position to implement Sajo's approach of looking at the system –
the  blend  between  democratic  and  not-so-democratic  practices  as  a  whole,  on  a
macro level. Bringing all known circles or possible parentela relationships to-date
(Kotaratsite,  Admiral,  Olimp,  etc),  taking  into  account  the  regular  political
appointments  and  civil  service  sweeps,  the  regular  emergence  of  some  form of
circles or individual players who seek parties' attention suggest that at a macro level,
these  iterations  are  the  informal  system  of  government  which  approximates  an
oligarchy. At the macro level, the political system demonstrates oligarchic dynamics,
although  the  oligarchy  itself  has  not  settled  yet.  Let  us  elaborate  the  macro
perspective on the extended parentela in the following section, 9.5.2.
9.5.2.  Oligarchy and Oligarchic Dynamics
In the previous section 9.5.1, we interpreted the extended parentela from the micro
level  of  analysis.  Looking  at  the  parentela  from  the  meso  level,  however,  is
unnecessary as that has served as the basis of analysis throughout the study. We can
only briefly state at this stage, that looking at the extended parentela from the meso
level  of  analysis,  the  network  facilitates  both  policy-making  and  power-political
dynamics. That network could be used as a mean to procure policies but also as mean
to fight off market or policy dissenters (9.2). 
In this  section,  however, we are now looking at  the extended parentela  from the
highest, macro level of analysis. This section argues that seen from that level, the
extended  parentela  approximates  an  oligarchic  dynamics,  as  opposed  to  a  full
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oligarchic rule or community. In other words, while there is  no  actual oligarchy at
present, the extended parentela reveals  oligarchic dynamics.  They both help create
and destroy prospective oligarchic elites.
The  question  then  is,  what  is  meant  by  an  oligarchy  and  how does  it  relate  to
parentela dynamic types 1 and 2? First of all, there does not appear to be a consistent
use of the term in the literature on oligarchy, nor does the notion of oligarchy lends
itself easily to a strict definition (Leach 2005: 315-316; Winters and Page 2009: 732).
A  number  authors  on  Russian  and  US  oligarchy,  however,  share  the  common
denominator  that  an  oligarchy  is  the  policy-making  arrangement,  where  policy-
making discretion is disproportionately vested in a limited number of extremely rich
individuals (and/or their  representatives),  who are  not  representative of the wider
democratic  polity  (Barker  2013:  559-561;  Winters  and  Page  2009;  Zudin  2000;
Shlapentokh 2004; Fishkin and Forbath 2014; Shinar 2015; Jacobs 2010; Barguinsky
2009; Nonini 2005). An additional feature of oligarchy that transpires from the use of
the term by the same authors is that it correlates with both  economic and political
inequality (particularly  in  Winters  and  Page  2009  and  the  authors  writing  on
oligarchy in Russia). Second, an interesting and important clarification is provided
by Leach (2005) who insists  that  an oligarchic  rule  is  characterised by  informal
exertion of non-public,  i.e.  illegitimate power (manipulation and coercion) (2005:
322-324,  329).  In  her  words  oligarchy is  a  ‘particular  distribution of  illegitimate
power that has become entrenched over time’ (Leach 2005: 316).
Finally, the literature on oligarchy implies a sense of oligarchic community, which is
more easily discernible in the Russian strand of the debate, because the main actors
(oligarchs) are clearly identifiable (see above). This is also implied in Gilens and
Page’s hypotheses-testing based on the US policy-network literature branch with the
categories  of  biased pluralism  and  majoritarian pluralism  (2014:  7-8).  Given the
similarity between iron triangles (US) and policy communities (UK) policy network
types (chapter 2), these authors convey the sense of a community. Being explicit with
their  focus  on  oligarchic  elite  in  the  States,  Page  and  Winters  (2009)  imply  the
existence of an oligarchic community by suggesting that most affluent 10% of the
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population, or the elite, are also the most powerful. Evidence of that are not only the
power indices which Page and Winters (2009: 735, 736) develop but the foreign and
fiscal  policies  which  in  turn  are  dominated  by  elites  who  benefit  from  an
interventionist and inegalitarian policies, respectively (2009: 738-740).
A cursory look at previous chapters allows for the proposition that both parentela
dynamic types are a manifestation of oligarchy. First, in terms of affluent actors who
dominate policy-making process, this was discussed in chapters 6, 7 and 8. Chapter 6
argued  that  the  core  prerequisite  for  access  to  Bulgarian  political  parties  are
campaign contributions, which implied that only affluent private actors could provide
them. Chapter 7 was more specific as it focused on the Multigrup Corporation of the
1990s and  rings and circles  as examples of affluent actors with dominant policy-
making positioning,  who are  not  representative  of  a  specific  economic  sector  or
social stratum. Chapter 8 in turn could be seen as a more recent case of oligarchic
control  over  the  distribution  of  construction  tenders,  leading  to  the  undue
concentration of resources to a limited number of firms – insiders to the ruling party.
Most crucially, however, both parentela dynamics (chapters 8 and 9) demonstrate
how a dominant  oligarchic elite  exercises  illegitimate  power  (as  per  Leach 2005
above) in two ways: to unjustly accumulate resources (chapter 8) and to coerce into
submission any outsiders (either unsuspecting market competitors or, as chapter 9
implies, immediate rivals). As chapter 8 demonstrated, such concentration of public
tenders has the effect of exacerbating a declining market, and by implication, income
inequalities already present in the construction market, which spur and motivate the
parentela dynamics.
Finally, a primordial oligarchic identity is evident in the retributive behaviour of the
party  in  power  and/or  insiders  when  their  offer  of  cooperation  is  rejected.  As
Stoyanov interpreted their “message”, their modus operandi is “You are either with
us or against us”. This mentality of “us” (insiders, oligarchy) vs “them” (outsiders,
rivals), coupled with the cooperation between the party and insider groups may be
indicative of something of a community. Moreover, the need for self-preservation by
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means  of  administrative  retribution  also  speaks  for  some  form  of  shared  self-
awareness.
In fact, the circles, extremely affluent individuals (oligarchs), individual companies,
politicians  and appointed  civil  servants  (chapters  6  to  9)  appear  to  be  the  exact
collective image claimed by some of La Palombara's respondents as an oligarchy that
he confronted in his study (1964: 314).  While he is  dismissive that the parentela
could relate to the notion of oligarchy, this study finds it impossible to ignore it as the
contours  of  the  extended parentela  and oligarchy roughly overlap.  Ironically, the
surprising re-emergence of the oligarchy debate in the two remote cases of Bulgaria
2014 and Italy 1964 adds some credence to the oligarchic argument in both of them.
There is other, more concrete evidence for the existence of an oligarchy, found in the
answers  of  a  number  of  respondents.  Respondents  Nikolov, Donchev, Rumenov,
Kirilov, Golemanov, and Petkov argued openly for  the  presence  of  an integrated
economic, political and administrative elite that ruled over time. Nikolov explained
there  are  a  number  of  families  in  Bulgaria  (at  first  10  but  then  said  100)  that
effectively  participate  in  policy-making  through  all  political  parties.  The  same
respondent also expressed the view of a select community, which envelopes both
policy-makers,  but  more  importantly  the  leaders  of  the  trade  associations,  trade
unions or basically the interest groups that make up the civil society. He, Donchev,
Dobromirov and Stoyanov also made the observation that group representation is on
many  cases  fictitious,  because  the  leadership  abandons  group's  rank  and  file  in
exchange of membership in that select community, i.e. it colludes with the regulator.
Stoyanov was adamant that there is collusion between sectoral group representative
leadership and political parties. That is the reason why he refused to participate in the
Gas and Petrol Trade Association. Dobromirov spoke of the handful of privileged
firms in the construction sector that concentrated majority of construction tenders.
According to Kirilov party functionaries, e.g. politicians assuming posts of deputy
ministers and above, are also part of that community of the privileged. He explained
that a number of leaked wire-tapped recordings of the meeting of Bulgaria's head
prosecutor Kokinov, the Agriculture Minister Miroslav Naydenov at the residence of
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Premier Boyko Borisov were evidence that those who are no longer in that privileged
community are ready to defend themselves if repression, implying type 2 relations,
would be focused on them. Furthermore, respondent Golemanov referred to political
parties and their connections to big business and the intelligence community as a
more or less coherent entity, namely,  mafia. Other respondents also conveyed the
image of community with their use of the term mafia when describing the party-
insider group relations (Dimitrov, Georgiev, Mihailov, and Petrov). Finally, as with
the policy community network, the fact that  trust  is the key ingredient in the circle
formation, as per Zlatarov, is another indicator that it is possible to suggest that there
is, albeit vague, a sense of community in the party-group cooperation.
The above responses seem compelling as they are consistent in their emphasis of
collusion between sectoral group leadership and policy-makers. However, there is the
question whether the argued collusion is the product of misperception on necessary
compromises sectoral group leadership might have had to make in  order to push
forward legislation. Then again, we must not forget that dissident groups are in a
disadvantage, given the prospect of type 2 relations. That in turn could act as a stick
to collude. In any case, there is another question that could discourage us from the
purely stagnat view of the extended parentela as a case of oligarchy. A closer look
reveals a much more compatitive and aggressive dynamic among elites, than the term
suggest.
In other words, how much of the above really fits the term oligarchy? The similarities
between both parentela dynamics on the one hand and the oligarchic features on the
other, however, cannot be stretched so far as to say that there is a complete overlap
between the two. A fundamental assumption behind the notion of oligarchy is the
presence of a  single community of very limited participants with internal cohesion
(cooperation)  that  presides  over  all  political  matters,  as  opposed  to  ad  hoc
arrangement, set up on select matters only. Looking closely into the two parentela
dynamics, they do not sufficiently well resemble an oligarchy.
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If we take type 1 party-group cooperative arrangements as the nucleus of oligarchy,
then they do not fit the requirement of stability and longevity implied in the standard
understanding of oligarchy above. Due to elections, access is always temporary and
usually until the end of present party's tenure. The party change causes shocks in the
parentela relations and introduces systematic instability in what at first sight looks
like an oligarchy. As a result, insiders may fail to renegotiate access and risk being
targeted as outsiders in a type 2 dynamics, when not associated with a political party.
The high turnover of circles co-varying with the change of governments indicates
that new elites are constantly generated and that they are in fierce competition among
themselves, which is contrary to the idea of an oligarchy, where single coherent elite
dominates policy-making long term. This was also exemplified in part by Multigrup
in chapter  7,  where the corporation had to  continuously renegotiate  access  to  all
relevant political parties until its demise when ODS took power in 1997, denied it
any policy-making access and put it under the pressure of regulatory inspections.
Moreover,  most  of  the  major  (publicly known)  oligarchs  from the  early days  of
Bulgaria’s initial capital accumulation have been assassinated, e.g. Kyulev, Mollov,
Iliya  Pavlov and their  representative organization G13 disbanded.  Major political
parties, too, if we take them as partaking in the oligarchic parentela, such as SDS and
NDSV, have collapsed very quickly soon after  the end of  their  tenure,  or  are  in
decline, such as GERB who was forced to make a large coalition with three other
partners (ABV, RB, NFSB) in 2014. At present, there is absence of a single major
political  party  or  identifiable  group  of  the  scales  of  UFU,  Catholic  Action  or
Multigrup  that  clearly  is  a  long-term  oligarchic  partner  to  all  political  parties.
Obviously oligarchs Q and O have survived, with Q in particular with numerous
court  cases.  The  wider  majority,  evidenced  by  the  effervescent  circles  and  the
inability to identify a large company of the scales of Multigrup as a stable partner to
a  number  of  governments  indicates  the  long  term  unstable  existence  of  private
groups (firms, companies) that could partner political parties. In other words, there is
no  evidence  of  a  select  community  of  politicians,  bureaucrats  and  groups  that
conforms to the oligarchic ideal of an informal, durable and internally stable clique
that  rules  long term,  as  Nikolov mentioned “families”.  They may well  be  single
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players who have individually survived in the long term, just as there are oligarchs
who have survived the early days of capital accumulation, e.g. O and Q. But these
overall  are  not  actors  engaged  in  long  term cooperation  among  themselves  and
political parties. Instead, they are engaged in a perpetual confrontation with all and
any parties and oligarchs in a free-for-all setting. Therefore, the longevity of a single
oligarchic  actor  is  not  necessarily  indicative  of  a  presence  of  a  corresponding
community. 
The argument here is that there is only oligarchic dynamics, and not a fully-fledged
oligarchic community. Despite the primordial identity or self-awareness of “us”, the
evidence  so  far  does  not  confirm  the  presence  of  stable  or  (c)overt  oligarchic
structures, as oligarchy definition above implies. The conflict and instability brought
by type  2  parentela  dynamics  and  parliamentary elections  means  no  such stable
community can exist. Elections give an opportunity for new groups to assume insider
status, while type 2 dynamics provide the same the chance to hit at their competitors
(i.e. former insider groups).
To the extent an oligarchy exists, it is in the informally institutionalised practice of
type 1 and type 2 dynamics. The dynamics of the extended parentela have oligarchic-
like  features  but  do  not  constitute  an  oligarchy. True,  type  1  could  facilitate  the
emergence of an elite clique that dominates, say, public tenders, but the pressure
brought by parliamentary elections and the prospect of becoming a victim of type 2
pressure  have  the  potential  to  eliminate  that  elite  in  the  long  term.  The  closest
Bulgarian  policy-making  is  to  an  oligarchy  are  the  type  1  dynamics,  but  not
anywhere close to an actual oligarchic entity whose elite members think and act as
one, for there is none. Instead, there is a free-for-all competition among elites that are
recurringly disbanded and brought into living.
The  proposition  that  the  dynamics  of  the  Bulgarian  polity  have  oligarchic
characteristics,  short  of  complete  oligarchy is  also  shared  by others,  particularly
Barnes in his analysis on Bulgaria’s transition to capitalist democracy (2007). Barnes'
thesis is that Bulgaria is a case of Equilibrium of Competitive Capture (ECC). This is
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a  concept  that  seeks  to  rectify  PRE  or  Partial-Reform  Equilibrium.  PRE  is  a
proposition  that  instead  of  quickly  introducing  a  fully  functioning  competitive
market economy, those elites who introduce and stand to gain most from the free-
market reforms (or first-round winners) find it  more profitable to stall  them in a
middle  state  of  incomplete  market  liberalisation  (Barnes  2007:  72).  PRE  theory
hypothesises  two  main  outcomes  of  marketization  efforts:  full  marketization  or
capture by “first round-winners”.
Barnes argues that PRE made two incorrect assumptions (2007: 72). First, that there
are only two outcomes of the liberalisation process (above). Second, that there are
only two relevant actor types: first time winners and the public. He, respectively,
argues that a third outcome is what he called Equilibrium of Competitive Capture"
(ECC) and that a third actor type could be other prospective captors, other than "first
winners". With regards to his ECC theory, he argues that it then represents a state of
perpetual  indetermination  where  there  is  a  competition  among  a  number  of
prospective captors who change with new elections. In this sense, the state is neither
fully  captured,  nor  ever  immune  to  it.  In  order  to  exemplify  his  thesis,  Barnes
reviews the relationships of all major Bulgarian governments with what here was
explained to be  circles,  such as Olimp, Orion and Multigrup, among others (2007:
73-93).
The  argument  that  type  1  and  2  characterise  oligarchic-like  dynamics  greatly
overlaps with Barnes’ ECC model above. Similar to the analysis in section 9.5.2 he
argues  that  “first-time  winners”  are  not  a  monolithic  entity  but  a  collection  of
competing  elites  and  that  the  Bulgarian  case  demonstrates  how  the  state  is
sequentially captured by them. Similar to section 9.2 and 9.5.2, he also argues that
elections are the mechanism that puts a stress on hitherto captors and their links to
political power and they are a vehicle for a change of captors (Barnes 2007: 73). In
remarkable similarity to section 7.3, he too argues that the best strategy of the circles
or  captors  in  his  parlance  is  to  establish  simultaneous  contacts  with  all  political
parties (Barnes 2007: 74). Ultimately, 'Instead of an end to capture, therefore, the
more likely medium-term result is generalised corruption without a dominant group'
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(Barnes  2007:  73).  This  is  again  an  overlap  with  the  discussion  so  far  on  the
relationship  between  oligarchy,  corruption  and  the  parentela.  The  oligarchic
community image of both parentela dynamics rests precisely on that new elections
give chance of new or former outsider groups to become insiders. What he sees as
elites overlaps with the use of that concept here, in terms of ruling political parties
and insider businesses.  Essentially, his  unit  of analysis  is  identical  to that  in this
study:  ruling  political  parties  and  businesses  (groups)  with  party  insider  status.
Despite these similarities, however, this studies would disagree with Barnes on one
major point: state capture.
9.5.3.  State Capture
While the overlap of the results from both studies adds to the validity of the image
advanced here, namely, that the parentela dynamics of both types are demonstrative
of oligarchic dynamics, both studies disagree on the idea of state capture. Essentially,
Barnes (2007) and Ganev (2001) earlier imply that this party dynamic is the result of
private groups overpowering and somewhat incorporating political parties. We would
oppose this view, arguing that the oligarchic dynamics Barnes' and the present study
speak  of  are  the  product  of  the  cooperation between  ruling  parties  and  affluent
groups (rich individuals, corporations, etc). 
Barnes’ insistence on capture is overstated because it wrongly assumes that private
actors are in the position to overpower political parties (2007). Not only is the term
capture  not formally defined in his study, and that of Ganev (2001) whose line of
research he continues, but the reader is led to believe that those who conduct such
capture somehow assume a position of diktat vis-à-vis political parties. If that were
the case, then, Barnes’ cases lack any explanation of how private groups have come
to overpower the ruling party. 
Chapter 7 demonstrated that the Multigrup Corporation gained access as a result of
close  cooperation  with  Mr  Lukanov’s  faction  and  even  through  bribery
(Aleksandrov)  but  ultimately  on  the  grounds  of  the  exchange  of  resources  for
favourable  appointments.  So  far  as  power  is  concerned,  chapters  5  on  political
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appointments and 9 on type 2 clearly indicate that coercion is in the hands of political
parties,  because political  appointments  in  the  regulatory agencies  enable  them to
exert  selective  repression  against  parente's  rivals through  regulatory  inspections.
Neither Barnes (2007) nor Ganev (2001),  who exclusively focused on Multigrup,
demonstrate the process through which Multigrup  overpowered,  or rather, coerced
any political parties. Instead, the observation that Multigrup benefited in some way
from its insider status is taken as an indicator that the corporation is also somehow
more  powerful  than  the  respective  political  parties  but  that  was  an  underlying
assumption.  In  his  detailed  research  that  adds  clarity  to  what  normally  are  very
nebulous chain of events, Ganev lists a number of cases where Multigrup has taken
advantage of state assets in what often are less than legal means (2001). Yet, as with
Barnes (2007), his analysis is nowhere concerned with the process of how Multigrup
arrived at  the position to exploit  state assets, with political  parties acting as their
gatekeepers. We do not see the interaction between Multi and political parties that
ultimately enabled the former to exploit said resources. That this was the result of
overpowering, takeover or usurpation of some form is taken for granted.
The present parentela study instead shows that this can only be with the cooperation
and  permission  of  the  ruling  party.  Ganev's  (2001)  and  Barnes'  (2007)  idea  of
oligarchy  based  on  state  capture  can  only  happen  with  party's  permission  and
abetment. This study reveals that private actors cannot exert the coercion which the
term capture  implies.  Chapter 7 clearly shows that whatever access Multigrup had
was on the basis of patient cooperation and exchange of party-relevant resources, as
opposed to coercion, which point (in principle) was demonstrated again in chapters
6,  8  and  9.  Again,  prejudiced  inspections  are  the  power  instrument  for  coercion
available to political parties and to which no defense or reciprocal response has been
devised by outsider groups. A number of respondents, such as the active minister at
the time Petkov, and the active agency director Nikolov argued that no private actor,
including  oligarchs  or  corporations  like  Multigrup  could  overpower  the  state,
precisely  because  of  the  state  regulatory  agencies.  Therefore,  the  dominance,
perceivably, of any single actor or a circle can only occur with party’s knowledge and
permission, if not outright cooperation.
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The  argument  here  is  that  the  state  capture  literature  is  only partially  correct  in
positing that some elites take over the state apparatus.  It seems both Ganev (2001)
and Barnes (2007) miss  the importance of political parties as a single, independent
policy-making actor, along interest groups and civil servants. The present research
demonstrates that political parties are independent actors in their own right. They are
an actor with own interests and depending on the country, with unique properties vis-
a-vis civil servants and groups, such as legitimate access to executive and legislative
power. The (near) absence of ideological concerns by political parties, as reported by
respondents,  means  that  they  are  independent  organizational,  policy-making
organisms whose main concern is long-term survival.
By incorporating the party in the analysis the study develops a more nuanced and
accurate picture of state-group dynamics. We can observe that the party acts as a
gatekeeper  to  legitimate  legislative  and  executive  power  and  it  is  only  through
interaction  with  that  actor  that  an  interest  group  (formal  or  not)  can  protect  its
interests. This, however, holds more value when the ruling party is able to interfere in
the  workings  of  the  civil  service.  All  three  studies  confirming  the  parentela  in
Northern Ireland, Italy and Bulgaria demonstrate that the preeminence of a single
(formal or informal) interest group is the result of its productive cooperation with the
ruling party. And this is the controversial point, because the state capture view would
have us believe that a group’s preeminence is the product of that group’s coercion of
the ruling party. Yet, that is not the case. We have yet to observe an interest group
being in the position to force its demands on the ruling party, or in the parlance of
this  study, a situation where there is conflict between a core insider and a ruling
party.
This research shows that Multi’s positioning within the policy-making process is the
result of  cooperation  with certain party factions, more or less following a path of
least  resistance.  This  has  to  be  highlighted  and  contrasted  against  the  notion
promoted  by  Barnes  and  Ganev  that  private  interests,  or  informal  groups  with
immediate market benefits in mind, are in the position to forcefully push their way
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among  policy-makers.  The  present  research  contradicts  this  view. It  showed that
Multi sought the cooperation of factions within BSP, DPS, SDS (or UDF) and sought
to  establish  other  parties.  Its  success  was  variable.  With  BSP, cooperation  was
secured with the leading party faction, on the other hand, there was full cooperation
between Pavlov and the DPS leadership. Finally, no progress was made in the project
of  a  new  political  party  and  SDS.  In  short,  Multi  sought  to  establish  positive,
cooperative relationships wherever they could, and then convert its access to market
benefits only as a result of a bargain as an insider group vis-a-vis the ruling party
(faction).
The present section discussed the extended parentela, as seen from the micro and
macro levels of analysis. In a sense, this section traced the element of injustice  part
of the extended parentela on three different levels. While on a micro level we can
perceive the extended parentela as form of corruption, that view gradually blurs into
meso and macro forms of social injustice. As we already saw in sections 9.2, and
chapter 8, it is quite difficult to argue that there is corruption, primarily because the
practices outlined therein are within the law. Thus, as we go higher in the analytical
levels, the extend parentela assumes the shapes of (grave) social injustice, in the form
of  resource  (public  tenders)  and  power  (party  appointments)  accumulation.
Ultimately,  we  can  perceive  of  the  extended  parentela  as  of  set  of  oligarchic
dynamics which both give birth and suppress oligarchic elites. It is on this note and
in this context discussed briefly in section 9.5.3 that aspiring elites can assume such
privileged status only with ruling party's informal endorsement. The claims of state
capture in the context of elite or oligarchic formation are exaggerated, as parties have
direct control over regulatory agencies and the security apparatus. Therefore, so far
as elites and oligarchic community formation is concerned, entry to those can only be
granted by the ruling party so far as it enters mutually beneficial cooperation with the
private entity.  
However,  let  us  now  turn  to  the  following  section  which  discusses  another
prospective external variable that might have an effect on the parentela formation:
the EU.
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9.6.  The EU as an External Variable to the Parentela
Chapters 7 and 9 argued that elections act as independent variables that cause shocks
on the parentela relations. However, the study also sought to find evidence in support
of  the  hypothesis  that  Bulgaria  joining  EU  has  had  an  effect  on  the  parentela
arrangement types.  The pursuit  of this angle was both necessary and interesting.
However, given the Bulgarian policy-making focus in the respondent selection, many
of the interviewees lacked the knowledge to engage with the topic of the EU on a
technical level. In light of the public tenders as a case of type 1 parentela dynamics
(chapter  8),  therefore,  it  was  not  possible  to  engage,  for  example,  with  EU’s
influence  on them,  save for  a  few respondents.  At  the  same time,  the wealth  of
relevant EU legislation that regulates the process of carrying public tenders with EU
moneys suggested this is a line of research for a future project. For the most part,
respondents felt to prioritise in favour of other issues and look at EU’s potential for
affecting policy-making from a more general perspective.
Respondents were asked to comment on the effects on Bulgarian policy-making had
as  a  result  of  joining  EU  (Kuzmanov,  Nikolov,  Kirilov,  Hadzhiev,  Rumenov,
Stoyanov, Dobromirov, Zlatarov, and Petrov). Overall the responses were positive.
Interviewees saw Bulgaria's EU membership as having some ameliorating effects on
the type 1 relationship as long as EU institutions were aware. They noted Bulgarian
politicians are afraid of EU's opinion on their mandate. Naming and shaming works,
although only to a degree. Probably most notable response came from Donchev who
argued EU institutions at present lack mechanisms of coercion. He argued that EU
institutions must have a mechanism of intervention in order for the conflictual party-
group  relationship  (type  2  dynamics),  for  example,  to  be  contained.  A pair  of
respondents,  however,  were  conflicted.  While  they generally  agreed that  EU has
some suppressing effect on any political misconduct (Stoyanov and Kirilov), Kirilov
also added that structural funds and any other EU-related funding, also acted as a
catalyst to any political misconduct. 
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Public  tenders,  partly  funded  by  the  EU,  in  other  words,  were  seen  by  some
respondents (Kirilov and Donchev) as an opportunity that motivates political parties
to  engage  in  type  1  dynamics.  Dobromirov  elaborated  that  the  cost  of  road
construction in Bulgaria, which is partly funded by the EU is also prone to the same
type of offer described by Rumenov earlier (9.3.1). The former respondent stressed in
most cases the main contractor is not the firm doing the actual work: those would be
the sub-contractors, who would be paid by the main contractor. Following the logic
of the  offer  and cooperation described by Rumenov (9.3.1), Dobromirov explained
first that in the context of road construction the insider too has to repay back the
ruling  party  for  being  positioned  as  such.  However,  because  they  still  have  to
maintain their profits, the higher party’s demand for a repayment, the larger the sum
the insider will retain from sub-contractors’ profits. In this chain reaction, the sub-
contractors in turn find themselves forced to decrease their costs, which usually leads
to paying the workforce less and using cheapest possible materials.  Kirilov (and less
directly Donchev, Varbanov) in particular stressed that it is due to this chain reaction
that the overall infrastructural (road) quality in Bulgaria is poor. 
It is at this point where future research is necessary to determine the effectiveness of
EU  institutions  affecting  such  dynamics  and  at  what  point  of  the  parentela
relationship.  It  has  to  answer  the  question  whether  the  EU  institutions  could
intervene  at  the  party-group  relationship  building  or  at  the  stage  of  tender’s
construction  process  and  how.  Most  respondents  were  not  able  to  tackle  those
technical  questions,  save  for  arguably  Donchev, Dobromirov  and  Kirilov  above,
whose responses indicated that more EU intervention is both welcome and necessary.
The rest  of them speaking on the subject, discussed EU’s influence on Bulgarian
politics in more different, yet, interesting light.
Overall,  respondents  saw the  Bulgarian/EU relations  from the  perspective  of  the
Cold War divide, they couched those in terms of Bulgaria – the civilizational laggard,
trying to  catch-up with the morally superior  West  (Dimitrov, Georgiev, Mihailov,
Kirilov, Dobromirov, Rumenov and intermediary). Respondents had the general self-
perception of a second class, Eastern European citizen. This, however, was a result
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both of assuming either real or imagined share of the responsibility for the current
state of political, economic and social crisis in the state, and trying to keep a realistic
look on the status quo. This is best displayed in the complex position one respondent
had towards the EU, and who was also disappointed that Western companies refused
to participate in Bulgarian trade associations. He felt as if for foreigners, Bulgarians
were not worthy of such interaction: “They look upon us as aboriginals, and in fact
we  are  aboriginals,  but  that  is  the  point:  [the  West]  to  engage  [with  us]  in  a
civilizational exchange”. Others still welcomed the EU but retained the East/West
bitterness arguing that Bulgaria was seen by the West as someone who refuses to
learn  new  and  better  ways  of  doing  democratic  politics  and  truly  free  market
economy: partly because old habits die hard and partly because the EU lacks the
patience to  teach (Kirilov, Dobromirov).  Bulgaria  was seen by Kuzmanov as the
opposite image of the West: where kleptocratic injustices were the norm. In fact, he
regretted putting the State Owned Enterprise formerly vested in him back on its feet
and  showing  to  his  disbelieving  workers  that  a  normal  life-style  is  possible
(Kuzmanov), i.e. with regular salaries, job security and bright life prospects. In his
words  that  acted  as  a  cruel  joke  on  them once  he  was  deposed  and  they  were
gradually laid off and, as he put it, thrown back into reality. 
In a similar but more extreme form of self-criticism than Mihailov, Kirilov relayed
what he claimed to be the dominant insider policy-making attitude towards the EU.
He argued that the Bulgarian parente sees the EU as a source of income that could be
taken advantage of in the spirit of realpolitik. Therefore, it would be unpatriotic of
any  Bulgarian  whistle-blower,  journalist  or  researcher  to  embarrass  Bulgaria  by
demonstrating any form of misappropriation and misconduct with EU funds found in
Bulgaria.  11 Therefore,  through this  rhetoric,  the  dominant  policy-makers  seek to
11 Such perspective, in turn, raises the question of the role of the present research and whether its
critical stance on some party-group dynamics is an act of embarrassment to the state. Yet, the position
here is that, such catharsis is necessary, because staying quiet would be a silent condoning of the
social and political injustice and undue concentration of financial resources, and worst of all, political
power in the hands of the few who happen to be insiders at the time. (Although early to tell, the
continued political  apathy may lead to  a  situation of  a  single party system in Bulgaria,  with the
gradual dissolution of BSP and Bulgarian Left, leaving GERB as the only relevant player.) 
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suppress anyone to speaks out against misconduct, particularly in the public tenders.
This  is  by  falsely  claiming  that  misappropriation  is  for  the  common  good  of
Bulgaria,  whereas  evidence  is  clear  that  this  is  a  mechanism  of  resource
centralisation in the party insiders and the party (chapter 8, 9; 9.5.2). 
Yet, in complete contrast to Mihailov, there were others who, though still thinking in
terms of East and West, did not see the Occident as necessarily morally elevated.
This was completely understandable for two left-leaning respondents both of whom
accused the West for teaching the earliest Bulgarian capitalist class immediately after
the  regime  change  on  how  to  engage  in  market  speculation  and  generally  to
economic and political misconduct in the new, democratic setting. Both of them saw
the West (the EU) as the political centre that exploited marginalised Bulgaria (that
particular point was also aired by Mihailov). 
However,  speaking  as  a  professional  in  construction,  Rumenov  inadvertently
contradicted Mihailov’s argument that there is a civilizational exchange. Rumenov’s
position was it  was  wrong to assume that  there was anything inherently morally
elevated about the West. Rumenov discussed his time working for German Autobahn
construction  firms  whose  owners  negotiated  their  bidding  strategies  at  German
public tenders at coffee shops. Likewise, Austrian and Greek highway construction
firms exercised what was widely known strategy in the industry to register a firm de
jure without having a physical office (or assets) so that when the firm is purposefully
bankrupted, it would not pay its subcontractors and nothing to taken away from it
(for there are no assets to take). He also shared how Occidental firms demanded a fee
from any sub-contractor candidates in the city’s construction projects.  12 In fact, he
argued that as soon as Western companies became involved in the political-economic
dynamics  in  Bulgaria,  they  very  quickly  learned  all  underhand  market  moves,
peculiar  to  Bulgaria  and practice by Bulgarian firms alike.  Rumenov argued that
people are the same everywhere, and it is the strictness with which punishments are
administered  that  matters.  He  also  gave  example  with  Sunny  Beach  resort  in
Bulgaria,  which is almost entirely dominated by Western tourists. He argued that
12 Deliberately concealed which firms operating on what projects and where.
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their  uncivil  behaviour  there  is  the  result  of  young  Western  people  feeling  no
constraints and restrictions on them, as they normally would do back home. He also
gave an example with himself: he never thought twice before handing out a 20 leva
banknote to the police officer for inner-city speeding, while that could not happen in
Germany  because  for  fear  of  the  authorities  there.  Rules  and  their  strict
implementation is what matters and what makes the difference between Bulgaria and
the West.13 
In  conclusion,  respondents  indicated  that  EU  institutions  had  some  constraining
effect  on  a  party’s behaviour  through “naming and  shaming”.  Some respondents
indicated a demand for more direct form of EU intervention that either wrests control
from  certain  administrative  duties  carried  out  by  the  Bulgarian  civil  service  or
implements  a  more  evident  penalty  system  carried  out  by  EU  institutions.
Nevertheless, a more detailed and reliable answer should come from further research.
Respondents’ technical  competence  did  not  extend  to  EU  public  tenders,  which
became relevant at the latter stages of the research, while the relevant EU legislation
itself fell outside the scope of the present research agenda. 
Instead majority of respondents speaking on this subject felt it were more pressing to
share their personal attitudes towards the EU. Bulgarian policy-makers, speaking as
retired or in the periphery of concurrent policy-making offered a range of views. Still
thinking in terms of the Cold War divide, only a few of them blamed the West for the
present  troubles  in  Bulgaria.  Others  saw the  EU as  source  of  enlightenment  and
possibly  an  entity  that  could  teach  Bulgarian  policy-makers  of  new  and  better
conduct. Others, did not see anything intrinsically good or bad about the EU, because
a just and rich society rests on the fairness of the rules and their application.  
13 The legitimacy of this respondent is that he is a 10+ year experience in the construction business,




The present chapter reveals that there is a new parentela dynamic, which is similar to
that  originally described by La Palombara  in  his  seminal  work (1964).  The new
parentela dynamic is labeled type 2 parentela. It is similar to La Palombara’s original
parentela in that it involves the same actors (the party in power and its insider group),
the  same venues  (party  and  civil  service)  but  it  is  highly  conflictual.  The  main
difference lays in type 2 is a mechanism of coercion used by the party in power
and/or party insider group. The position here, therefore, is that it is an add-on to La
Palombara’s  initial  parentela  concept.  While  La  Palombara’s  type  1  parentela
dynamics focuses describes the relations between the party and the group it favours,
type 2 parentela relations focus on the parente and outsiders. La Palombara’s type 1
dynamic  describes  the  cooperative  relationship  between  the  party and its  insider
group(s), which results in party’s intervention in the civil service for mutual gain.
Type  2  dynamic  describes  the  conflictual  relationship  between  the  party  and  an
outsider groups, which results in party’s intervention in the civil service to eliminate
them as political and/or market opponents (if done on behalf of the party insider).
Intervention in both cases is facilitated by party political appointments, which allow
the appointors to dominate any policies of interest or agencies of the civil service.
There are a number of reasons for that conflictual behaviour. First, it follows from an
insider’s drive to improve their  market standing and is manifested in three ways.
First, insiders beat the competition by dominating a fund-distributive policy-sector,
such as the construction tenders discussed in chapter 8. However, second, the present
chapter demonstrates that insiders could neutralise their competition through making
a one-sided offer of cooperation towards outsider groups, which largely eliminates
them as market competition. This offer is usually coupled with the third mechanism
to gain market advantage, the threat of regulatory inspections as a legal mean to fully
disable any business activity. Options two and three are the new elements, part of
type  2  but  related  to  type  1  because  they  are  an  extension  of  the  party-insider
cooperation and former’s ability to make political appointments in the civil service. 
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As far  as  political  parties  are  concerned,  they engage  in  type  2  dynamics  for  a
number of reasons. First, as mentioned already, they are motivated by the need for
campaign funds (logic of conversion). As a result, and similar to their insiders, they
too make the same types of offer to select outsiders, also coupling that with the threat
of prejudiced regulatory inspections, unless the group concedes to participate in the
kind of cooperation described in chapter 8.  However, the greatest  departure from
type  1  is  that  parties  also  resort  to  targeted  regulatory  inspections  as  a  policy-
implementation mechanism: to suppress internal party dissent and outside interest
group  opposition.  The  inspections  themselves  are  characterised  by  unusual
determination of  the officers  to establish malpractice at  all  costs.  This is  usually
manifested  with  sudden,  determined  and  large-scale  regulatory  inspections,
compared to what a business owner would perceive as a normal, regular practice.
They feature but are not limited to police raids and prolonged tax investigations.
Ultimately, the tell-tale element of a prejudiced inspection is regulator’s insistence on
litigation against the select firm (outsider) or on the revocation of its licenses on the
grounds  of  insufficient  and  unfounded  evidence.  The  objective  is  to  paralyse
outsider’s  business  activities  through  long  term  litigation  or  rescission  of  their
licenses  for  operation.  The  point  is  not  so  much  to  reach  a  verdict  against  the
outsider, but to stall their business activities enough so that they lose their customers
and market share, in favour of the party insider groups.
The  existence  of  both  parentela  dynamics  in  turn  raises  the  question  of  the
implications  for  democracy in  Bulgaria.  This  chapter  argues  that  types  1  and  2
combined demonstrate  oligarchic-like  dynamics.  If  oligarchy is  seen  as  a  single,
monolithic community (or elites, for lack of a better term) of limited members who
collectively dominate all policy-making in a state, then no such evidence exists. To
the  contrary,  there  is  competition  among  elites  who  are  only  able  to  partially
dominate policy-making, in most cases until next elections.
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CHAPTER 10:  Validity  and  Variation  in  the
Parentela Policy Network
The present study shows the continued relevance and importance of the parentela
policy-network, which was originally developed by Joseph La Palombara, who in
1960s modeled the relations between the Italian Christian Democratic party (DC) and
its  party  insider  group,  Catholic  Action.  At  the  core  of  this  party-insider  group
cooperation is the exchange of electoral and ideological support offered by the group,
against  privileged  access  to  the  policy-making  process,  via  civil  service
appointments,  offered  by the  party.  Unlike  other  similar  relationship  formats,  or
policy-networks (Anglo-Saxon branch, as per Borzel 1998), in this policy network
type,  the  party  and  its  insider,  or  parente, subordinate  the  bureaucracy  to  their
interests. A pivotal feature of the parentela, therefore, is the ability of the party to
control the civil  service using party political  appointments.  That is  to  say, where
domestic legislation allows it, the parentela primarily rests on the ability of the ruling
political party to appoint civil servants in the executive administration (Ministries,
regulatory agencies, etc). The direct appointment or utilization of existing appointees
ensures that the parente has full control over policy-drafting and consultations hosted
by the civil service. 
The only other researcher who has observed the parentela is Greer (1994), in his
study on the relations between the Unionist Party of Northern Ireland (the Stormont
government)  and the Ulster  Farmers'  Union (UFU) for  the period from 1920s to
1970s.  In  the  same  fashion  as  Catholic  Action,  and  also  facilitated  by  shared
ideology,  UFU  negotiated  insider  access  to  the  Unionist  party  by  primarily
advertising  the  electoral  support  that  it  could  exert  in  favour  of  the  Stormont
government. Thus, a number of agricultural ministers originated from the ranks and
file of the UFU.
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These  distant  studies  on  the  parentela  prompted  two  research  questions,  which
motivated the study: First, implicitly, does the parentela still exist? Essentially, is it
still a viable concept and can we observe similar relationships today and if so, what –
if anything – has changed? It is, in fact, staggering to see that so little research has
been done on such an interesting a concept.
Secondly, a more explicitly discussed question in the literature is:  what causes the
parentela?  From the  limited  research  there  is,  two camps  appear.  La  Palombara
(1964) and Greer (1994) argue that hegemonic parties cause the parentela network.
Yishai (1992) on the other hand contradicted such a causal link in her case on 1980s
Israel, where the existence of hegemonic political parties did not correspond with a
parentela. While some of the controversy also rests on clarifying what  hegemonic
party  actually is, Yishai's case does cast doubt on hegemonic parties as the single
cause for the parentela. Given her study, it also appears that the presence of political
appointments is somehow related to parentela's formation, as it co-varies with the
cases where the parentela is present.
In order to answer these implicit and explicit questions, the present study focused on
Bulgaria  as  a  possible  case  of  the  parentela.  Preexisting  news  and  investigative
journalist  reports  indicated  not  only  close  party-group  cooperation,  but  such
parentela  elements  as  political  appointees  nominated  by  insider  groups.  One
particularly telling sign of the parentela was the recurring reports on the Bulgarian
circles: informal groupings of a handful of firms, companies and/or oligarchs who
act in concert to defend some collective interests. These circles are a metaphor used
by critical Bulgarian media and public used to refer to any such suspicious party-
group interactions. Whenever a party is suspected to have close informal relations
with  a  given  business  or  group  of  businesses,  then  that  is  called  a  circle.  To
distinguish among different circles, however, the almost ritualistic practice dictates
that  each  circle  be  given  a  name which  usually  is  the  venue  where  said  party-
business meetings take place, e.g. the hotel-restaurants Olimp, Admiral or Monterrey,
hence respectively, the  circles Olimp, Admiral and Monterrey. At the start  of the
study and to-date, Bulgarian media is replete with references to the circles, where the
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dawn  of  each  one  corresponds  with  a  party  change.  This  regularity  at  the  time
suggested a systemic phenomenon, which given the reports of political appointees
nominated by said circles indicated that parentela-like dynamics were taking place.
The present study on the parentela in Bulgaria made a series of discoveries in trying
to answer those questions. First of all, La Palombara's parentela relations still exist
and what is new here, they can occupy non-policy-making space, between formal
policy-making and political malpractice. Chapters 4 to 6 inclusive demonstrated the
presence  of  each of  the parentela  elements.  Chapter  4  in  particular  showed that,
potentially, a party's control over the civil service and bureaucratic intervention in the
interest of its own insider group need not be locked to mere political appointments. It
could be done through administrative reforms. As chapter 4 showed, the legislative
re-definition of the eligibility criteria for access to civil service policy consultations
enables  the ruling party to  filter  in  and out  (un-)desired groups.  Though a small
addition  to  the  original  parentela  dynamics,  this  finding  shows  that  party's
intervention  (and  bureaucratic  control)  can  be  executed  through  administrative
reforms  in  parallel  to  political  appointments.  We now see  that  party's  arsenal  of
control is wider.
Chapter 8, then, presented the parentela in a clearly non-policy-making light, with
the case study on the legally permissible subversion of public tender (procurement
contracts) procedure in the interest of own party insider groups (firms). That case
revealed how by exploiting political appointees, the party can steer the decisions of
Public Tender Committees to select the “right” procurement contestant, i.e. the party
insider group. The applicability to non-policy-making contexts was further observed
in chapter 9 with the prejudiced regulatory inspections. Again, (outsider) opponents
to the party and/or its insider are dealt with under the guise of regular inspections by
the regulatory agencies. The targeted firm is simply subjected to excessively time-
consuming  (for  the  targeted  business)  inspection,  court  proceedings  and  license
rescission with the sole ulterior purpose of disable their market participation. This is
a new context of the parentela. This shows that the parentela relations have dual-use:
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for actual policy-making and realist  power politics among political  and economic
actors.
Type 1 and type 2 parentela dynamics combined, i.e. the extended parentela, allow us
to look at  that network from a micro and particularly macro perspective. From a
micro perspective, the extended parentela does contain corruptive practices. These,
however, when zoomed out analytically to a macro perspective take the shape of
oligarchic dynamics. As chapter 7 demonstrates, groups seek continuously to assume
insider  status  within  any  (potentially)  ruling  political  practice,  but  due  to
parliamentary elections, such insider status is never permanent and always at risk.
Therefore, an oligarchy does not exist as of yet, but only oligarchic dynamics. And
an important detail of this big picture is the fact that groups (say, oligarchs, affluent
corporations, etc.) can only assume prominence economically and politically thanks
to party's benevolence. As chapter 9 discussed, the politicization of the civil service
through political appointments means that the regulatory and security agencies are
under party's control, which together act as an instrument of coercion. Therefore, it is
only  with  the  cooperation  with  the  ruling  party  that,  say,  a  prospective  market
oligarch can assume such status. This data now allows us to see the parentela nested
in micro, meso and most importantly, macro relations. The furthest analytical level
allows us to generalise on the character of an entire polity (which was the intention
behind the macro debate on pluralism and corporatism that necessitated a meso level
of analysis), namely, that Bulgaria harbours oligarchic dynamics and that it is not an
oligarchic polity so far as parliamentary elections provide a clear party change. We
can now observe  the  relationship  between the concept,  oligarchy and hegemonic
parties, for if a hegemonic party emerges and persists in the presence of parentela
dynamics,  then  (hypothetically)  a  clear  oligarchic  community  (in  addition  to
dynamics)  will  emerge.  Finally,  on  that  same  note  of  oligarchy,  the  parentela
dynamics  demonstrate  that  the  notion  of  state  capture  wrongly  ignores  political
parties, who should be seen as independent actors in possession of certain resources
(political access, legislative and agenda control) which they are ready to trade. As
chapters 7 and 9 indicate, given party's ability to mobilise the security and regulatory
agencies, private actors are incapable to overpower a ruling party but only negotiate
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with her. And it is the fruits of such  successful negotiations that the insider status of
such a group could be wrongly perceived as the result of some ability to overpower,
that is, coerce the ruling party. Political parties show propensity to intimidate sectoral
interest groups and collude with individual large business actors, and facilitated by
the parentela dynamics engage in oligarchic dynamics. On the note of actors, the data
here is clear that parentela relations need not be locked to formally associated private
actors as in  a  trade associations.  Instead,  a  parentela  relationship is  also open to
firms, oligarchs, corporations, etc, who can come together and defend their interests
in negotiations with the ruling party as a single unit. All of this is a new and enriched
perspective on the parentela, which more or less continues the oligarchy-parentela
debate which La Palombara initiated and culled immediately (1964: 314-315).
In  addition  to  all  of  the  above,  the  study  also  made  some  considerable
methodological advances particularly in the ability to procure and conduct interviews
with elite respondents, overcoming, thereby their reluctance and resistance (Petkov
and  Kaoullas  2016).  Moreover,  it  operationalised  the  parentela  and  other  policy
networks  in  a  classificatory  system  aimed  at  improving  comparison  and  aiding
causality. On that note, the study also moves further the literature on policy-networks
and the parentela,  also because  it  discussed the  possible  causes  for  the  extended
parentela. In this instance of the (extended) parentela, we can say that hegemonic
parties had no effect in  its  formation,  rather party's  insatiable  need for campaign
funds, a market participant's need for better market standing and (related to that) is
the overall decline of an economic sector (which forces market participants to seek
political protection and assistance). Again, the study uncovered more dynamics that
are  endogenous  (type  2  dynamics)  and  exogenous  (economic  decline,  campaign
funds).
Finally, let us now review the above findings: section 10.1 will review the case on La
Palombara's parentela in Bulgaria, 10.2 will discuss type 2 parentela dynamics, 10.3.
restates the causes for the parentela, while 10.4 will look at the extended parentela
from a macro perspective, before concluding with section 10.5 on the limitations and
new directions for research. 
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10.1.  La Palombara's Parentela Confirmed
The findings here not only confirm the existence of La Palombara's parentela, but
they  also  reveal  a  new, add-on  parentela  dynamic  in  a  political  context,  which
occupies the conceptual space between policy-making and political malpractice. Let
us  first  review the  evidence  concerning  the  parentela.  Back  in  chapter  2  policy
networks were operationalised in terms of  five categories (descriptors) as seen from
the perspective of the interest group: degree of access, type of interaction, power
ratio, starting or primary venue and venue scope. The parentela, therefore, is a policy
network which  is  formed around the  ruling  party (primary venue:  party).  It  is  a
relationship  model,  where  the  ruling  party  cooperates  (type  of  interaction:
cooperation)  with  a  privileged  or  insider  interest  group  (degree  of  access:  core
insider).  In its  original form, neither the party nor the insider seeks or is  able to
overpower the other (power ratio: parity). Finally, in La Palombara's parentela, the
party insider extends its access and influence into the civil service by nominating
new or utilising existing party political appointments (venue scope: party and civil
service).  Finally,  the  demonstration  of  the  existence  of  all  of  said  descriptors,
therefore, marks, or rather indirectly detects, the existence of the parentela.
The 26 elite interviews were unequivocal that La Palombara's parentela exists in the
Bulgarian political context. Chapters 4,5 and 6, looked for the 5 descriptors in the
present-day (as  of  2013-2015).  The  results  discussed  therein  clearly indicate  the
existence of La Palombara's parentela. Bulgarian political parties have a considerable
influence over the civil service, which attracts groups as the most influential policy-
making venue, although the access threshold is considerable. Respondents conceded
that  while  engaging  with  the  ruling  party  was  the  most  effective  policy-venue,
gaining access is considerably difficult as it is group's ability to provide effective
campaign support  (funds)  that  determines  whether  it  will  have an opportunity to
engage  with  the  ruling  party.  This  is  nothing  new  compared  previous  parentela
studies, where UFU and Catholic Action owed their insider status largely to their
ability to assist their party partner with electoral support (voters and campaign funds
(chapter  6)).  Similar  to  the  original  parentela,  chapter  5  demonstrated  that  party
political  appointments  are  a  regular  practice,  which  continues  to  be  the  main
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instrument for civil service control and subsequent interference into. The data is clear
that a ruling party change is accompanied by a near-ritualistic sweep of the cadres
appointed earlier by the electoral party loser, substituted later by those of the new
incumbent. Ultimately, this indicated that these two venues are connected, as per the
parentela model.
Chapter six discussed the rest of the parentela elements which exist in the Bulgarian
party-group  relationship:  core  insider  status,  power  parity  and  cooperation.
Respondents  unanimously  argued  for  Bulgarian  political  parties'  dependence  on
campaign funds was provided by nebulous actors. It is not clear whether the resort to
extra-funding is due to exorbitant costs, which the public is unprepared to accept
with the legislation regulating state subsidies for political parties, i.e. by increasing
such subsidies. Or alternatively, it might be that the reliance on an insider's campaign
contribution is the result of the thinking that party competition might be doing it
anyways, so why abstain? Either way, respondents painted a primarily cooperative
and power-balanced picture when it came to party-insider group interaction, which is
based on the mutual  exchange of resources.  Against  the access  to  policy-making
through the civil service, which the party offers, it receives campaign funds. 
All in all, the elite respondent interviews revealed all of the parentela features. As
with La Palombara's study, a comparable respondent pool of elite respondents was
enough to discover his parentela dynamics in the Bulgarian policy-making context.
However, it did so by isolating each of the descriptors on their own. Chapters 4 to 6
inclusive  essentially  were  sort  of  a  detection  of  the  parentela  as  opposed  to
immediate observation. Through the elite interviews the separate existence of each of
parentela's  descriptors  was  affirmed,  without  however  observing  that  network  in
action.  The  rest  of  the  chapters  therefore  attempted  to  provide  a  more  direct
observation of that network as a whole, active system. In doing so, the study made
the  discovery  of  new  parentela  actors  and  dynamics,  which  cast  the  question,
whether and to what extent the parentela as a whole is a policy-making network or a
set of actors and relations more pertinent to political malpractice, such as corruption
or oligarchic policy-making.
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First of all, one new dynamic, which clearly conforms to the parentela, is the use of
“administrative reforms” as a mechanism to filter  in and out (un-)desired interest
groups from consultations hosted by the civil service. Administrative reforms as a
pre-text  for mass  appointments  was in  fact  mentioned by one of  La Palombara's
respondents  (1964:  328-329).  The  case  study  in  Chapter  4,  however,  shows
administrative  reforms  in  a  new  light.  They  enable  the  party  to  rearrange
bureaucratic consultations in a way that determines the insider group that the civil
service will consult. Insufficient data prevents us from determining whether chapter 4
is  indeed a  case  of  the  ruling  party instilling  a  sectoral  group as  a  civil  service
insider, following civil service reforms. Yet it is certainly indicative that it has such
capabilities. The case rather demonstrates an episode where the ruling party flexes its
muscles to intimidate thereby any policy dissenting groups. The case reveals how
legislating  deliberately exclusive eligibility criteria  rendered a  number of (peak)
sectoral groups ineligible to take part in civil service consultations.  
Another discovery concerned the nature of the insider partner to the ruling party.
Elaborated in chapter 7, the Bulgarian data suggests that the parentela need not be a
relationship  between  the  party  and  a  single,  monolithic  and  formally  associated
group.  Instead,  the  parentela  observed  in  this  study  brought  together  firms,
companies or oligarchs who acted together as a single unit in the defense of what
they saw as their collective interests among them. This is at odds somewhat with
existing policy-making literature,  which has  only discussed the relations  between
policy-makers and formal interest groups in a strictly policy-making setting.
This point brings us to the third and final novelty in the observed parentela dynamic
in  the  Bulgarian  case  compared  to  its  Italian  counterpart.  The  Bulgarian  case
demonstrates the original parentela in a different in a different, non-policy-making
context.  As  Chapter  8  revealed,  the  parentela  can  manifest  itself  when the  party
interferes  in  the process  of  auctioning public  procurement  contract.  These results
suggest therefore that the parentela as a model is applicable to non-policy-making
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settings. That is, the same relationship format could be used for non-policy-making
ends, in parallel to policy-making ones.
10.2.  Type 2 Parentela: A New Parentela Dynamic
An important example of the parentela in non-policy-making is the new dynamic,
which  the  present  study discovered  and  tentatively  labeled  type  2  parentela.  As
chapter 9 revealed, and also facilitated by bureaucratic political appointments, the
misuse of regulatory agencies demonstrates that a party insider and the ruling party,
or  the parente  in La Palombara's parlance,  can aggressively suppress the business
operations of outsider or intra-party policy dissenters or outsider market competitors
(of  the  party insider).  This  is  essentially the core  of  this  new, aggressive type  2
parentela  dynamic: the use of  prejudiced regulatory inspections,  where under the
guise  of  a  regular  inspection,  the  ulterior  objective  is  to  disable  the  business
operations  of  the  targeted  firm  by  registering  offenses,  lodging  court  cases  or
rescinding licenses.
Chapter 9 was dedicated to a number of individuals who came out and argued that
the state regulatory agencies can be used by the party in power to pressure, what was
implied, unsuspecting businesses through prejudiced inspections. This means that by
making the right political appointments the party can control the work of those state
agencies that ensure businesses have all the necessary licenses to operate and that the
latter  do not  break any laws in  doing so.  Ultimately, respondents  argued, certain
businesses are deliberately targeted for inspection with the intention to find evidence
of malpractice which would stall or discontinue their operation. 
The party instigates prejudiced inspections for two reasons: to extort outsider firms
for campaign funds and to intimidate policy dissenters. Both of these rationales are
evident in earlier chapters. For example, going back to chapter 4, it demonstrated
how administrative reforms that imposed unattainable criteria or disagreeable rules
for consultative eligibility were party's way of expulsing dissenting groups from the
policy-making. Prejudiced inspections, then, is the second such instrument. In that
case the party targets those firms that are part of the formal association, which stands
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in the way of ruling party's (i.e. government's) intended policies. That is why, it is in
this sense that type 2 parentela has policy-making relevance. Its dynamics could be
used by the ruling party to eliminate any intra- or extra-party opposition to its own
policies. 
Furthermore, respondents also gave voice to what they dubbed the offer you cannot
refuse. This was their way of saying that type 2 parentela dynamic could be used for
extortion. There were a number of personal accounts where the respondents were
visited by party envoys with an offer: to take part in a pre-determined public tender
or be subjected to prejudiced inspections. Chapter 8 suggested that forcing the Public
Tender  Committees  to  select  the  tender  bid  by  the  party  insider  is  her  way  of
reciprocating for the campaign funds provided earlier by that group. Respondents in
chapter 9, however, went further and accused ruling political parties of proactively
looking for firms with whom to engage in the subversion of procurement procedures.
Accordingly,  the  party  would  put  pressure  on  the  Public  Tender  Committee  to
artificially inflate the projected costs for project's completion. Then, the difference
between the delivered moneys  for  the project's  completion and the actual  cost  is
syphoned  back  to  the  party  headquarters.  Speaking  as  immediate  victims  and
observers, respondents argued that one cannot refuse this offer, for if they do, their
business will be subjected to prejudiced inspection to the point of bankruptcy, i.e.
type 2 parentela.
Furthermore, prejudiced inspections are a convenient way for the party insider to
deal with its market competition. Another prominent view among respondents was
that deliberate inspections were made in order to disable select business which acted
as direct competitors to the party insider's. It is not through loyal competition that
certain actors assume larger market share, but by literally eliminating them, through
legal and continuous inspection dragging them thereby in endless court battles. These
in essence, are the contexts of application of this new parentela dynamic, labeled
tentatively type 2 parentela.
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10.3.  The Extended Parentela and Causality
With the discovery of type 2 parentela dynamics we have extended the model to
include  another  dynamic,  one  that  fills  up  the  conceptual  space  between  policy-
making  and  political  malpractice.  If  type  1  parentela  is  a  relationship  arm  that
connects  the  ruling  party with  an insider  group into  a  parente,  then  type  2 is  a
relationship arm that extends from the parente to engage outsiders. The next question
that we need to deal with therefore is what causes the extended parentela (both types
1 and 2 combined together)?
The study identifies the interplay of a number of variables that explain the extended
parentela (i.e. meaning both parentela types 1 and 2 as part of a single framework) as
a whole. These are: sectoral economic decline (IV1) and political parties' incessant
need for campaign funds (IV2). Both, however, are facilitated by parties' ability to
control  the  civil  service  (Intervening  Variable).  Sectoral  decline  can  spur  type  1
parentela relations. As chapter 8 demonstrated, firms from the declining construction
sector in Bulgaria increasingly sought closer relations with the ruling party either on
a local or central level. In doing so they attempt to secure procurement contracts for
themselves by engaging cooperatively with the ruling party. The cooperation is in the
form of exchange, where against electoral support that the firm (or firms) provide,
the party will exploit its nominees in the procurement nominees to skew the public
tender specifications so as to fit the profile of the party insider firm.
However, sectoral decline, can also be seen as causing the type 2 extended dynamics.
As  respondents  argued,  firms  who  want  to  improve  their  market  standing  –  not
excluding declining sector – may attempt to neutralise their competition forcefully.
This means that instead of procurement contracts, a party insider may request a party
bureaucratic  intervention  that  was  labeled  earlier  as  prejudiced  regulatory
inspections. By this we mean the (otherwise legal) inspections by the state regulatory
authority  (agency)  which  has  the  ulterior  objective  to  incapacitate  the  targeted
business. Again, it is not possible to tell with precision whether a sectoral decline
will lead to type 1 or 2 dynamics, but that certainly acts as an external stimulus to the
overall parentela activation.
308
However,  we  should  not  lose  sight  of  the  crucial  question  of  where  hegemonic
parties are in all of this? The answer is  nowhere. None of the described dynamics
related to the Bulgarian case of the parentela is at all connected to any hegemonic
political parties. Historically, there have been none, as of 2013-2015. It is safe to say,
therefore, that hegemonic parties in this case have had no effect on the parentela
formation,  because  the  latter  is  observed  in  operation  in  the  absence  of  any
hegemonic political parties. 
In this causal relationship, what transpires as a very important element, however, are
political appointments acting as an intervening variable. Neither type 1 nor type 2
parentela dynamics can function properly without political appointments. The study
argues that political appointments  enable the parentela, but the combined forces of
campaign funds deficiency (logic of conversion) and economic sectoral decline (or
the  more general,  need for  market  advantage)  cause  the  parentela.  Of course,  as
Greer's case demonstrates, the parentela can still function without immediate political
appointments,  i.e.  by  nominating  ministers  and  other  top-ranking  government
executives from the party insider, but the breadth of the parentela in that case is much
more  contained (1994).  Nowhere does  he discuss  a  wide-spread appointments  of
UFU  nominees  in  the  Northern  Irish  civil  service  of  the  scale  described  by La
Palombara  (1964)  (Greer  1994).  In  the  Israeli  case,  the  absence  of  political
appointments  (due  to  Law  restrictions)  corresponded  with  the  absence  of  the
parentela  (Yishai  1992).  That  is  to  say, party political  appointments  facilitate  the
parentela formation and the inability to perform them, greatly stalls its development
and reach across the executive branch. It remains to be tested in the future, therefore,
whether in other appointments-rich polities one could observe the parentela.
10.4.  New Perspectives on the (Extended) Parentela
The collected data so far allows us to say more on the  extended parentela (types 1
and 2 combined).  It  assumes different shapes when seen from different levels  of
analysis. From a micro level, as chapter 9 demonstrated, type 2 very closely overlaps
with Offe's definition of corruption. Looking at the parentela on a meso-level one
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could see that it  is a set of relations that are hard to determine whether they fall
within corruption, policy-making or political injustice.  
However,  the  emphasis  in  chapter  9  was  on  the  macro  level  of  analysis  on  the
extended parentela. As mentioned in the introduction, the study on policy networks is
the  consequence  of  the  earlier  failed  attempt  to  analyse  the  state-civil  society
relationships directly from a macro-level. The results of the present study, however,
allow us to “climb” bottom-up analytically and engage on a macro level of analysis
with the extended parentela. Accordingly, the Bulgarian polity, albeit a democracy,
features  oligarchic  dynamics.  While  there  is  no  single,  coherent  oligarchic
community which presides  over  policy-making,  there certainly are  dynamics  that
both help create and eliminate elites, which to the general political  observer may
appear as an oligarchy. Both type 1 and 2 can be used to establish and maintain a
concert  of public and private  actors (i.e.  civil  servants,  politicians,  interest  group
leadership, single businesses and/or oligarchs) who dominate policy-making, i.e. an
elite.  The dynamics revealed in  chapter  8 can be seen as a process of such elite
formation  and  resource  accumulation.  The  elite  forms  around  some  of  the  party
leadership (factions) and some of the business community. As chapter 7 revealed in
the case of Multigrup, party insiders are not necessarily welcomed by the entire party
rank and file. Nevertheless, a party faction and its favourite group help each other, as
was the case in public tenders their pre-determination. 
An incumbent elite can then solidify and expand its power (i.e. market shares, loyal
appointees in the executive, favourable legislation)  not only monopolising public
tenders but by also “attacking” the elites that had formed during the tenure of the
previously incumbent party, through type 2 dynamics. If we look at type 1, we can
see that it, too, can produce negative effects for the rivals of the incumbent parente.
By gradually monopolising the most lucrative public tenders, an incumbent elite in
fact  prevents  resources  flowing  into  its  rivals  (former  incumbents).  However,  a
parente  can resort  to type 2 as another instrument  against  rival  elites.  Instead of
silently  dominating  the  outcomes  of  public  tenders,  party  (faction)  insiders  can
request that the businesses of their market competitors be subjected to prejudiced
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regulatory  inspections  with  a  view  of  incapacitating  them.  That  is  why,  taken
together  both  parentela  types,  formally  established  in  this  study,  create  only  an
oligarchic dynamics, as opposed to oligarchic community. Any new elite that forms
around  the  cooperation  with  the  parente,  and  in  doing  so  by  developing  some
primordial sense of collective identity, ultimately has very little time to mature as an
oligarchy because parliamentary elections introduce a party change and with that a
change within the relations of said elites.
An important factor that affects extended parentela, therefore, are the parliamentary
elections which produce governments of different political parties. What dethrones
an incumbent elite, then, are the democratic parliamentary elections which have the
realistic  chance  of  producing  government  of  different  political  parties.  In  the
presence of an extended parentela,  a party system which is free from hegemonic
political parties prevents the formation of an oligarchy. Elections have the potential
to change ruling political parties and with that sever access to the civil service of
their adjacent insider groups. This means there is not enough time for an elite to
mature into an oligarchy. The fear of the party losing next elections forces groups to
maintain good relations with all parties with potential to be in power (ideally, see
chapter 7 on Multigrup). However, as resources to do so may not be enough, party
insiders  of  today  may  find  themselves  outsiders  tomorrow.  At  the  same  time,
remaining in cooperation with one party might make others see that group as a rival
as well, thus long-term cooperation with one party may preclude its access to others. 
Essentially  parliamentary  elections  maintain  the  competition  among  elites.  These
complex and highly volatile extended parentela dynamics are reset every time an
effective party change takes place. With a party change come new elites or old ones
are returned and so begins another round of conflict against other rival elites (old and
new)  following  the  logic  of  the  extended  parentela.  That  is  why,  Bulgaria  is  a
democracy which harbors oligarchic dynamics as opposed to community.
However, all of this depends on the assumption that the party system is capable of
producing genuinely different governments. It can only be hypothesised at this stage
311
that  extended  parentela  dynamics,  coupled  with  elections  that  produce  all-party
coalitions or hegemonic political parties in power, will produce a stable and coherent
oligarchic community. The inability to substitute the incumbent political party due to
lack of alternatives (hegemonic) or due to consociational policy style means, that
each  of  the  party  insiders  would  also  have  to  seek  compromises  with  their
counterparts.  Ultimately, this  will  have  the  effect  of  dampening  competition  and
solidify a common identity, or sense of community entitled to rule. 
And it is these controversial links of parentela's relationship with oligarchy that beg
the question whether it is for ethical reasons that La Palombara had censored himself
from pursuing when he completely dismissed  the  idea  that  there  might  be  some
connection  between  his  parentela  and  oligarchy  (1964:  314-315).  This  is  quite
understandable, given the danger of readers confusing the parentela for a synonym of
oligarchy (or corruption). Given the close overlap between the observations in this
and La Palombara's studies, it is surprising that respondents on the Italian parentela
were silent on the behaviour of politically controlled state regulatory and inspection
organs. It is this silence that makes La Palombara's narrative suspicious of possibly
withholding data. If not, then it would mean that the parentela relationships have
evolved in  time,  incorporating  thereby new dynamics,  which  in  the  end make it
unethical to close our eyes for the possible relationship between this network type
and oligarchy. 
10.5.  Conclusion: Limitations and Future Research
The Bulgarian study on the parentela is subject to a number of limitations due to the
difficulty  in  navigating  the  Bulgarian  political  landscape,  brought  about  by  the
rampant social and political distrust and suspicion. The study rests on the accounts of
26 elite interviews. Despite the fact that it selected a diverse pool of individuals who
had  formed  their  views  at  different  times  and  policy-making  positions,  a  larger
respondent pool would surely have solidified study's validity. Another limitation of
the study was the failed Freedom of Information Request on the rate and scale of
civil service appointments in election years. That has deprived us from up-to-date
information on the scale of political appointments across time. Another limitation
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was the difficulty in receiving access. While the respondent pool is overall reliable
and valid, the distrust towards the researcher considerably disabled access raw data
from respondents.
One item in particular, however, proved hard to address effectively: to give specific
examples of a private, formally organized actor who cooperates with the ruling party.
Instead, their presence, in an informal form at that, is stated indirectly – based on the
accounts of the losing businesses (chapter 8). Yet, on the other hand, specifying exact
firms and individuals as the private partners in a parentela, might also be interpreted
as a formal accusation of illegal practices, particularly when one views the parentela
as evidence of corruption. That would be unacceptable, as the present study aims to
cause as little effect on the observed actors and their relationships as possible. 
In any case, future research projects on the parentela have to do better in gaining
access in obtaining interviews, and more importantly, documentary evidence, which
appears to be scant in light of previous parentela studies. Neither Greer (1994), nor
La Palombara (1964) rest their cases on abundant documentary evidence, which is
largely because this relationship leaves very little of that. It is hard to imagine why a
party would keep a documentary track of the otherwise informal bargaining on the
nomination made by its insider group or firm. 
It is also interesting to see whether there are parentela relations in Western polities
with high levels of political appointments. Kopecki and Spirova (chapter 5) revealed
high levels of political appointments in Germany, for example. In fact, Bulgaria was
a mid-ranking state on political appointments. The question is whether other states
with high degree of political appointments host parentela relations and if so, is that a
combination of causes, such as the need for campaign funds and declining economic
sector that are responsible. This, in other words, would corroborate the findings in
the present research. 
Chapter 4 revealed that certain administrative reforms can potentially be used in the
interest of party insiders, but more generally, showed that administrative reforms are
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another  mechanism  of  party's  control  over  the  bureaucracy  (in  parallel  to
appointments). The significance of this finding is that in theory, the parentela can
exist  without any party political  appointments.  Instead,  the  advantage  of  a  party
insider would be served by re-defining the eligibility criteria for civil service policy
consultations  in  a  way that  would  give  that  group  an  insider  status  in  the  civil
service, in parallel to that in the ruling party. The question is, can we observe any
such dynamics more closely either in Bulgaria or elsewhere? And more generally,
can we observe cases of a party's control over a bureaucracy without party political
appointments,  i.e.  by  more  indirect  means?  How  else  can  a  party  control  the
bureaucracy  in  own  interest,  or  that  of  its  insider  group,  without  political
appointments and administrative reforms? Addressing these questions in the future
would hopefully help us better understand the role and utility of political parties in
future democratic development.
On that note and section 9.5.3 where it argues that private state capture can only
occur with a party's facilitation and cooperation there comes the research or policy
question  of  the  benefit  of  political  parties.  Following  section  it  appears  political
parties  are  an  unnecessary  intermediary  elite  that  colludes  with  or  coerces  the
business one, which it is supposed to regulate. Therefore, the question is whether
democratic polities can do without political parties and elections rest on candidates
nominated  by  the  myriads  interest  groups?  Would  candidates  whose  origin  of
nomination is publicly evident make resulting policies more transparent? Would that
provide the much needed direct popular participation in policy-making?
Chapter  2  on  the  operationalisation  of  the  parentela  developed  a  classificatory
scheme of policy networks. It would be interesting to see whether we can observe
unusual descriptor combinations in polities which are border-line democracies. For
example, the prisoner insider appears as an impossible combination of a group with
insider  access,  yet,  which  is  highly  suppressed  by  policy-makers.  Maybe  such
descriptor combinations exist in nascent or near-democratic polities. Another highly
important methodological avenue for further research is whether we can quantify the
Anglo-Saxon  branch  of  policy  networks,  following  Dowding's  original  idea,  yet
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mindful  against  the  blind  transposition  of  quantitative  indicators  used  for  other
models  in  other  disciplines.  Finally  and  more  generally,  it  is  interesting  to  see
whether the parentela harbours other, new dynamics and how the model relates to
oligarchy.  
In  any  case,  the  present  study  not  only  confirms  the  continued  validity  of  the
parentela model, but it discovered variations of the same, i.e. type 2. It remains to be
seen whether any of these relationships are also relevant to outside political systems,
particularly EU institutions and states with high level of political appointments. The
study  also  shows  the  parentela  under  different  magnification,  which  reveals  its
borderline  with  concepts  such  as  corruption  and  oligarchy,  which  in  turn  opens
further avenues of research on how it relates to either of them. We should also not
lose sight of the fact that while hegemonic political parties have no effect on the
parentela formation, they relate to the same concept when studying its relationship
with oligarchy. 
A bit more than 50 years after its discovery, La Palombara's parentela still  exists.
Moreover, it  has shown other new dynamics, which have been either deliberately
withheld or never existed in the past. In any case, the model is still relevant and new
aspects of its internal and external dynamics were added. Ultimately, the study has
shown that the parentela has been under-researched and it deserves more credit than
its silent omission from the academic debate.
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